HIS HONOUR: I delivered the principal judgment in these proceedings on 9 March 2015: New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2015] NSWSC 176 (the "principal judgment"). These reasons should be read in conjunction with that judgment. Defined terms in that judgment have the same meaning in these reasons.
In the principal judgment I determined that ANZ was liable to the Corporation on the guarantees as a matter of their proper construction. It followed, by reason of concessions made on behalf of the second to sixth cross-defendants, that those cross-defendants were liable to indemnify ANZ for its liability to the Corporation and for the costs that ANZ had incurred in relation to those guarantees and these proceedings.
Costs are in the discretion of the Court, but starting with the usual position that costs follow the event. In the absence of any other features, costs following the event in this case means that ANZ should pay the Corporation's costs of the proceedings and that the cross‑defendants should pay ANZ's costs of the cross‑summons. The question for determination is whether there are features which would warrant the Court departing from what I have referred to as the usual position.
The first point put as a relevant feature is the Corporation's failure to make an express claim for costs in its summons. ANZ did not put the submission as high as saying that the Corporation's failure to make such a claim meant that it could not now claim its costs. Rather, it was a matter to be taken into account in the exercise of the Court's discretion. It was further submitted that when the failure to claim costs expressly was added to comments made during the course of the hearing which accepted the commercial and legal difficulty of ANZ's position, this suggested that there should be a departure from what should otherwise be the usual result.
I am not satisfied that the failure to claim costs is sufficient either by itself or in combination with any other feature of this case to disqualify the Corporation from the costs order to which it would otherwise be entitled. One obvious answer is that when an offer to compromise the proceedings was made by the Corporation to the other parties contained in an email dated 20 January 2015 (the "Offer"), the Corporation referred to the "significant compromise" it was offering in respect of abandoning what was said to be its entitlement to costs. It would have been obvious to all the parties that the Corporation clearly understood itself to be entitled, if ultimately successful, to a costs order.
A further matter that has been called in aid to depart from the usual position is the failure of the Corporation (until the day before the hearing) to have presented the guarantees in accordance with their terms, thereby crystallising the Corporation's entitlement to payment under those guarantees if, as the Court ultimately found, the Corporation was the beneficiary referred to in those guarantees. I do not accept that as a reason to depart from the usual position for at least two reasons.
First, when the dispute arose the Corporation wrote to ANZ and, in effect, offered to make formal presentation of the guarantees at a time and place suitable to ANZ. What then ensued was correspondence between the Corporation and ANZ in which ANZ disputed the fact that the Corporation was the entity entitled to call upon the guarantees. It would have been obvious to everybody that, at that time, the presentation of the guarantees would have solved nothing, given ANZ's fundamental position that the Corporation was not the entity entitled to call upon the guarantees. In those circumstances to suggest that a failure to have formally presented the guarantees earlier should now disqualify the Corporation from a costs order would be an unjustifiable triumph of form over substance.
Second, I accept the Corporation's submission that presentation of the guarantees was not necessary for the Corporation to succeed in the principal relief which it claimed in the summons. That relief related to the construction of the guarantees. I accept the submission that, having presented the guarantees by arrangement with ANZ on the day before the hearing, the Corporation is now in a position to seek ancillary orders (which were claimed under the usual rubric of "such other order" in the summons) for orders for payment under the guarantees. That is a different matter and does not go to costs.
The next feature to which the parties have made reference is the Offer. In reliance upon the Offer, the Corporation submits that it is entitled to its costs on the indemnity basis from 23 January 2015, being three days after the Offer was made.
The Offer was contained in an email between counsel marked "without prejudice" but not expressly said to be an offer made in accordance with the principles in Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333. The Offer also did not contain a precise period of time within which it was open for acceptance, instead making a request for ANZ's and the other cross‑defendants' counsel to "obtain instructions asap with respect to [the Corporation's] proposal."
The Offer included:
1. The plaintiff is paid the amounts nominated in the two subject bank guarantees (totalling $146,965.06).
2. The payment(s) may come from the defendant or the cross-defendants or any combination of those parties.
3. The payment(s) is made within 28 days of the filing of terms of settlement (and the execution of any deed of release required by the parties).
4. The proceedings (including the cross-claim) are dismissed with no order as to costs in favour of any party.
5. The plaintiff waives any entitlement to interest.
The significant compromise offered by my client is in respect of its entitlement to costs and interest. …
I accept ANZ's submission that, whatever the nature of the Offer, it was not unreasonable for ANZ to have refused it. That is because the cross‑defendants, to whom the Offer was also addressed, refused the Offer. In the principal judgment I referred (at paragraph [36]) to the difficult commercial and legal position in which ANZ found itself. That position required ANZ not only to settle the proceedings with the Corporation but also to have reached an acceptable settlement with the other cross‑defendants. If it did not do so, while ANZ could agree to pay the Corporation under the guarantees, in the absence of a settlement binding all parties ANZ would still have been faced with a dispute between it and the other cross‑defendants as to the latters' liability to indemnify ANZ for what ANZ had paid under the guarantees. That reason is sufficient to satisfy the Court that ANZ's refusal of the Offer was not unreasonable.
It was also advanced on behalf of ANZ that the Offer was not to be understood as a Calderbank offer. It was submitted that therefore the Offer should have no effect upon the exercise of the Court's discretion. I do not propose to express any final conclusion on the question of whether or not the Offer should, on its proper construction, have been understood by the parties as being a Calderbank offer.
It is clearly desirable that letters which pass between parties containing offers even when marked "without prejudice" should, for the avoidance of doubt, go the next step and recite the familiar words making reference to the principles in Calderbank so that the question of the intent of the offer and its later potential use is put beyond doubt. On the other hand, it seems to me there is much to be said for the proposition that as between experienced commercial parties and experienced commercial solicitors and counsel an offer such as the Offer expressed to be without prejudice would be readily understood as being intended to invoke the Calderbank principles. Given what I have said in paragraph [12] above, it is not necessary for me to express a final view on that question or whether, even if not a Calderbank offer, the Court could otherwise take the Offer into account.
It therefore follows that none of the various matters relied upon by the parties as warranting a departure from what I have described as the usual position has succeeded. After hearing submissions as to other outstanding issues, I will order that the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs on the ordinary basis and that the cross‑defendants pay the cross‑claimant's costs on the ordinary basis.
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Decision last updated: 24 March 2015