(ii) wilfully shutting the eyes to the obvious;
(iii) wilfully and recklessly failing to make such enquiries as an honest and reasonable man would make;
(iv) knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable man;
(v) knowledge of circumstances which would put an honest and reasonable man on enquiry.
19 Modern English authority has abandoned these distinctions; however, on my reading of the Australian authorities, the distinctions are still considered valuable. If the 'knowledge' of the propositus falls within categories (i)-(iv) the propositus may be liable under the second limb of Barnes v Addy, but it is otherwise if his or her knowledge comes within category (v).
20 Mr Pembroke put that the applicable law was that laid down by the High Court of Australia in Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373 at 399-400. The basal facts of that case were that Grey was manager of a company, DPC, controlled by Walton, a solicitor, which carried on the business of acquiring dilapidated properties which could be renovated and sold for a profit. Walton employed one Robert Clowes as his clerk. Grey told Clowes about a number of properties which he had recommended for purchase saying that the company had been interested in them, but could not afford them. Clowes' company, Consul Development purchased the properties having reached an agreement with Grey that they would share equally any profits or losses. The solicitor's company claimed that those properties were held on trust for it. At 399 Gibbs J said Clowes was aware that Grey stood in a fiduciary position; he knew that Walton did not have full knowledge of the transactions and had not assented to them. His Honour then continued:
"If it has been proved that Clowes knew, or that an honest and reasonable man with knowledge of the facts known to Clowes would have thought, that Grey was acting in breach of his fiduciary duty in arranging for Consul to buy the properties to share in the profits, enough will have been established (on the assumption made above) to render Consul accountable to DPC."
21 However, his Honour later said that as on the facts which Clowes believed to exist Grey was not acting in breach of fiduciary duty, Clowes did not knowingly participate in Grey's breach "he neither actually knew, nor had reason to believe, that Grey was violating his duty, and in the circumstances an honest and reasonable man would not have thought it necessary to enquire further."
22 Stephen J, with whom Barwick CJ agreed, said at 407-408 that the plaintiff had not only failed to establish actual knowledge against Clowes but the evidence established that Clowes did not wilfully shut his eyes to the truth. He considered that knowledge does not include constructive notice.
23 Accordingly, when the second limb of Barnes v Addy is relied upon the pleading must allege that there is a fiduciary, the fiduciary has breached his or her fiduciary duty and that the defendant has assisted with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the fiduciary.
24 Of course, equity is flexible and does give relief in cases analogous to Barnes v Addy as Lord Selborne's statement is not to be construed as if it was a statute or as exhaustively stating the reach of equity over fraudsters. Thus if a wife makes a profit from a trade in a commodity which she knows her husband has stolen, she will be accountable in equity, see Franklin v Giddens [1978] Qd R 72, 81. However, it is not suggested that the instant case falls into this extended category.
25 Before turning to the pleadings, I should make a few further observations about this second limb of Barnes v Addy.
26 In Robb Evans v European Bank Ltd [2004] NSWCA 82 at [160], Spigelman CJ, with whom Handley and Santow JJA agreed, said:
" … it is an essential aspect of accessorial liability for 'knowing receipt' that the act of transfer of the property … must be in breach of a fiduciary obligation. The claim arises in equity's exclusive jurisdiction …".
27 Whilst those words were spoken in connection with the first limb of Barnes v Addy, and although, generally speaking it is wise to put the two limbs of Barnes v Addy in two separate watertight compartments, it would seem to me that they apply equally to the second.
28 There are many situations where directors will be liable under what is called the second limb of the Barnes v Addy principle for assisting a breach of trust committed by the company. Many of the cases in this area are noted in Ford and Lee on Trusts [22680] at p 96 of Chapter 22 of the booklet issued in December 2000.
29 It is clear when one reads the cases referred to in Ford & Lee that they fall into two categories. Category 1 is where the director owes a fiduciary duty to the company and breaches it and causes the company loss by breach of that fiduciary duty. An example is Young v Murphy (1994) 13 ACSR 722. The other case, which is more common, is where the company owes a fiduciary duty to a third party and the director assists in the company diverting property from the third party to some other purpose. The simplest case is where the company holds money on trust for a third party and the director makes sure that it is used for some other purpose such as paying the company's bills: the Royal Brunei case and Educational Resources Pty Ltd v Poteri (1996) 20 ACSR 628 are examples.
30 However, the cases attach liability in a wider situation; see eg Biala Pty Ltd v Mollina Holdings Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 785, 833 per Ipp J, affirmed by the Western Australian Full Court sub nom Dempster v Mollina Holdings Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 1 and Turner v TR Nominees Pty Ltd (supra). In these cases, the directors of a trustee type of company carried on its activities for their own or the company's best interests and not for the benefit of the beneficiary.
31 It should be noted that there is no case of accessory liability where the directors of a company do something "naughty" in order to further what they perceive to be the benefit of the company at the time they acted. It is trite law that the directors are the mind of the company and their actions in making a corporate decision are seen as the corporation making a decision and not as the directors acting in conspiracy or individually inducing a breach of contract: O'Brien v Dawson (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 295, 308. Such directors may perhaps be attacked for failing to act honestly or some other way but they do not breach any fiduciary duties owed to the company.
32 Finally it must be observed that whilst the second limb of Barnes v Addy is often indexed as "accessory liability", it must be made clear that this in no sense connotes some liability which will only attach if some other person makes default. As Professor Michael Bryan says in his learned article "Cleaning Up After Breaches of Fiduciary Duty" (1995) 7 Bond Law Review 67 at 70:
"A fiduciary does not escape liability simply because the victim of the breach elects to sue a secondary party. The secondary party may seek contribution from the fiduciary, compelling the latter to pay a proper share of the compensation payable upon breach and thereby defeating the victim's election of the defendant."
33 Professor Bryan says this in noting that there is a very strong tendency of families not to sue the principal perpetrator of a breach of fiduciary duty who might be a relation or companies not to sue their directors because other directors have a personal or business reason of their own for not suing them.
34 Ford and Lee point out in [22700], that the accessory is jointly and severally liable with the principal malefactor to pay the amount of equitable compensation required to restore the trust fund; see eg Rolfe v Gregory (1865) 4 De G J & S 576; 46 ER 1042.
35 I now turn to the proposed amended statement of claim.
36 The second defendant makes four principal attacks on the latest version of the pleading.
37 Paragraph 29 of the statement of claim alleges that the directors of NCRA were acting pursuant to a dishonest and fraudulent design to cause NCRA to enter into Leg One and Leg Two. It alleges that the directors were acting pursuant to a dishonest and fraudulent design under which the company facilitated its holding company falsely to claim that its financial state was in a much better situation than was really the case.