NOTICE OF APPEAL
9 On 13 November 2006 the appellant filed a notice of appeal. It is to be treated, in the circumstances as a draft notice of appeal. The first respondent was content for the Court to follow this course. The notice of appeal raises the following grounds which are, in effect, a repetition of the grounds before the Federal Magistrate.
1. The Tribunal did not comply with s424A & s441A of the Migration Act 1958.
2. The Tribunal breached the rules of natural justice in connection with the making of the decision. The respondents denied the applicant natural justice by not considering the context in which the applicant will face persecution and serious harm for being a Falun Gong practitioner in China.
3. The making of the decision was an improper exercise of power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be made.
4. The respondents have no considered the amount of evidences which are in favour of the applicant. The respondents regards all the evidences as produced for the sole purpose of strengthening the applicant's refugee claim. They have only considered the evidence which is not in favour of the applicant.
(Transcribed from the original without alteration)
10 I have considered the reasons of both the Tribunal and the Federal Magistrate. None of these grounds, in my opinion, discloses any jurisdictional error on the part of the learned Federal Magistrate. It was well open to his Honour to exercise his discretion pursuant to r 44.12(1)(a) and to dismiss the application without it going to a final hearing. My reasons, which follow, essentially reflect the submissions put by the first respondent.
11 The test for whether leave to appeal is granted or refused is well established: Décor Corp v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 3 FCR 397 at [9].
12 The applicant's grounds contained in his notice of appeal do not identify any error in the Federal Magistrate's decision. Rather, the grounds are directed to the decision of the Tribunal.
13 The applicant alleges that the Tribunal failed to comply with sections 424A and 441A of the Act. This ground is unparticularised. The Tribunal as first constituted wrote to the applicant inviting his comment on two occasions. The Tribunal was not required to write to the applicant, as reconstituted, in respect of any information upon which it relied as its findings relied on the applicant's evidence given to the Tribunal, both as originally constituted and as reconstituted and the documents provided by the applicant to the Tribunal. Accordingly, there is no merit to this ground.
14 At the hearing before me the applicant emphasised that he had not had a fair hearing before the Tribunal because he was denied the opportunity of putting on important additional evidence.
15 When I asked him about the orders which the Federal Magistrate had made on 12 September 2006 for the filing by 17 October 2006 of additional material including further affidavit evidence including a transcript of the Tribunal hearing he said that he knew that he had to provide further evidence by 17 October but thought that the pro bono legal adviser would attend to this.
16 The applicant was present before the Federal Magistrate, assisted, he told me, by an interpreter. No such explanation was given to the Federal Magistrate. His Honour did state however that the applicant did not act on the opportunities provided by the orders of 12 September 2006.
17 The applicant's second ground relates to a purported breach of the rules of natural justice by the Tribunal in not considering the context in which the applicant would have faced persecution and serious harm by reason of being a Falun Gong practitioner in China. Section 422B of the Act excludes the common law rules of natural justice. Insofar as the applicant alleges that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant's refugee claims, it is clear that this is not the case. The Tribunal considered and rejected the applicant's claims that he feared persecution in China by reason of his practice of Falun Gong.
18 The third ground alleges that the "making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be made". This is a generic, unparticularised ground. It is without substance.
19 The fourth ground alleges that the Tribunal failed to consider evidence in favour of the applicant and that it only considered evidence which was not in favour of the applicant. To the extent that this is an allegation of bias the applicant has not met the requirement that such an allegation be firmly and distinctly made and clearly proved: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia Le Geng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [530].
20 To the extent that the Tribunal, upon considering the evidence as a whole (which it expressly stated it had done) gave no weight to evidence on its face favourable to the applicant it did so because it found the applicant not to be a credible witness. No error and in particular no jurisdictional error arises by reason of that approach which was clearly open to it.
21 Accordingly I am of the opinion that the Federal Magistrate's decision is not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the Federal Court. Whilst the applicant disagrees with the decision below he has been unable to point to any relevant error. It is evident that no substantial injustice would result from my refusal of leave.
22 Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal ought be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding twenty-two (22) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gilmour.