Grounds of appeal
25 Our rejection of the appellants' applications to amend their grounds of appeal leaves for consideration the grounds of appeal originally stated in the notices of appeal filed in December 2004. The grounds are that the Federal Magistrate erred in failing to find that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in affirming the delegate's decision to cancel the visas without:
(a) having made the decision that there was non-compliance with ss 101 and 103 of the Act as required by s 109(1)(a); and
(b) taking into account the prescribed circumstances as required by s 109(1)(c).
26 Essentially, the appellants contend that the Federal Magistrate failed to address the substance of the appellants' submissions. Accordingly, the appellants repeated those submissions in this Court with little reference to the conclusions of the Federal Magistrate. This approach does not assist an appeal court and has been criticised by previous Full Courts as, for instance, in Sathiyanathan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 210 where the Court commented at [10]:
'We would add that much of the appellant's submissions were directed to the proposition that the Tribunal had made errors in the way it had considered the evidence and issues before it. Although this occurred under the rubric of a consideration of the primary judge's reasons it was of little assistance in understanding why it was said that the primary judge fell into error. The Court wishes to emphasise that an appeal to the Full Court in a refugee matter should not be taken as an occasion to re-consider the Tribunal's reasons as distinct from considering the primary judge's reasons.'
27 In this case, as in Sathiyanathan, the appellants have given us little assistance in identifying errors that are said to have been made by the Federal Magistrate.
28 In relation to the first ground of appeal the appellants submit that the Minister only has discretion to cancel a visa after doing those things required under ss 109(1)(a)-(c). The first of those things is to decide 'whether there was non-compliance by the holder of [the] visa' as described in the notice given under s 107. In making this decision, the appellant submits, the Tribunal did not apply the high standard of satisfaction that the section requires and that the Tribunal correctly identified as being required.
29 In assessing the truth of the appellants' claims, the Tribunal was not able to refer to any positive material contradicting the appellants claims and appeared to proceed on the basis that it needed to be 'satisfied' that the appellants' claims were true. According to the appellants this was manifest in the Tribunal's statement that the Tribunal was 'not satisfied' that NBDY's explanation of her journey was accurate. Further, in assessing the genuineness of the appellants' documents, the Tribunal failed to consider properly other documents that were put forward by the appellants in support of the impugned documents' authenticity. The Tribunal preferred to rely (in the appellants' submission, entirely) on information provided by the Croatian authorities. Second, the appellants submitted that the Federal Magistrate did not address the substance of these submissions and that his Honour considered only whether the Tribunal turned its mind to the correct issues rather than the correct standard of proof.
30 There can be no doubt that the Federal Magistrate was alive to these submissions; they are carefully summarised at [32]-[35] of his reasons. They were, however, not accepted. At [40]-[41] his Honour also summarised the respondent's submissions in reply which were repeated before us. In holding that the Tribunal had discharged its duty to review the delegate's decision 'according to the merits of the case', his Honour clearly, and in our view correctly, accepted the respondent's submissions.
31 The Tribunal correctly directed itself as to the level of proof required in finding that the appellants had made false statements and the fact that the onus of discharging this burden lay on the Minister. In doing so it appropriately cited Jasbeer Singh v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1011 and Tarasovski v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 45 FCR 570. There is nothing in the Tribunal's reasons to suggest that it did not apply the test it identified. The Tribunal carefully analysed the appellants' claims and explained why it did not find the appellants to be credible witnesses and why it concluded that the documents provided were bogus documents. In reaching its conclusion the Tribunal, as it was entitled to do, preferred the information it received from Croatia to the evidence of the appellants. The evidence from the Croatian authorities is capable of providing the high degree of satisfaction required by the provision and there is no jurisdictional error in preferring it to the appellant's evidence.
32 In relation to the second ground of appeal, the appellants submitted that while the Tribunal referred to the prescribed circumstances, and made some observations about them, it did not 'take into account' the circumstances in the relevant sense. In particular, the appellants claimed that the Tribunal failed:
· to exercise independent judgment in respect of each of the prescribed circumstances;
· to reach conclusions of fact as to which were the relevant circumstances; and
· to determine what weight should be attributed to each of the relevant circumstances and to how those circumstances were relevant to the ultimate decision.
33 These submissions were put to the Federal Magistrate who summarised them at [36]-[39] of his judgment. Again, the appellants submitted that his Honour failed to address the substance of these submissions.
34 The prescribed circumstances that the Tribunal was required to consider are set out in [11] above. The Tribunal considered each of these circumstances and, impliedly, the significance of each for the decision under review. The Tribunal then stated that it found the reasons for cancelling the visas outweighed the reasons for not cancelling them and briefly explained in each case why it came to that conclusion. In relation to the daughter, NBDY, the Tribunal took into account her relative youth and immaturity at the time the alleged incidents took place and the fact that she may have been influenced by her father when making the visa application. The Tribunal also took into account the fact that the visa applications were made eight years after the alleged incidents and that at that time NBDY knowingly submitted the claims and bogus documents.
35 In relation to the father, NBDZ, the Tribunal noted that he had applied for Australia's protection on the basis that he was a refugee and referred to the limited ability for Australia to respond to the enormous demand for such places. The Tribunal said that the falsification of a claim of persecution in order to obtain such protection 'brings into question the integrity of the program' and 'undermines Australia's ability to respond fairly and adequately to the demand'.
36 We are satisfied that in both cases, the Tribunal took into account the prescribed circumstances. Ultimately, the weight to be attached to each circumstance must be decided in the context of the circumstances as a whole. This is a matter for the Tribunal as a finder of fact and it is not for the Federal Magistrates Court or this Court to interfere with the Tribunal's conclusions where the finding can reasonably be regarded as open to it. The appellants' submissions would involve scrutiny of the Tribunal's reason at a level inconsistent with the admonitions of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259.
37 For the reasons given above we have concluded that both appeals must be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-seven (37) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Branson and Stone.