SECTION 424A(1)(A)
15 Section 424A(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides as follows:
Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal
(1) Subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must:
(a) give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; …
Compliance with this provision is mandatory: SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24, 215 ALR 162; SZBYR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] HCA 26 at [13], 235 ALR 609 at 614 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ.
16 One difficulty confronting the Appellant is that the second Ground of Appeal does not identify any "information" which falls within the provisions of s 424A(1)(a). The ground only identifies what may properly be characterised as the factual findings made by the Tribunal. The ground, in its entirety, thus provides as follows:
2. The Learned Federal Magistrate was in error in not determining that the Refugee Review Tribunal failed to comply with sec. 424A(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 because of the following finding it made and thereby denying the Applicant with the opportunity to comply with this provision in terms of the decisions that were made in SAAP and SZEEU…
"The Tribunal does not accept the Applicant was again arrested in 1986. The Tribunal notes the Applicant claimed in the hearing that this incident took place in June or July 1986 and he was detained for 2 days. However, in his Statement, the Applicant claimed it was early 1986, February, according to the evidence he provided to the first Tribunal and was detained for 4.5 days. The applicant submits that this was a serious error made by the Tribunal."…
17 The findings as made by the Tribunal and extracted in the second Ground of Appeal are not "information" which could fall within s 424A(1)(a). This Ground of Appeal is more properly characterised as an impermissible challenge to the merits of the decision made by the Tribunal: NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [10] per Gray, Tamberlin and Lander JJ.
18 At best, it is a contention that the Appellant was entitled to be informed of the findings as proposed to be made by the Tribunal and to be afforded a further opportunity to be heard. The Appellant was not entitled to any such further opportunity. Concurrence is expressed with the reliance by the Federal Magistrate upon SZBYR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] HCA 26 at [18], 235 ALR 609 at 616 and his Honour's conclusion that such findings do not fall within s 424A(1)(a). In SZBYR,Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ held:
[18] … if the reason why the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review was the Tribunal's disbelief of the appellants' evidence arising from inconsistencies therein, it is difficult to see how such disbelief could be characterised as constituting "information" within the meaning of para (a) of s 424A(1). Again, if the Tribunal affirmed the decision because even the best view of the appellants' evidence failed to disclose a Convention nexus, it is hard to see how such a failure can constitute "information". Finn and Stone JJ correctly observed in VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [[2004] FCAFC 123, 206 ALR 471 at 477] that the word "information".
does not encompass the tribunal's subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations … nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc.
If the contrary were true, s 424A would in effect oblige the Tribunal to give advance written notice not merely of its reasons but of each step in its prospective reasoning process. However broadly "information" be defined, its meaning in this context is related to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation, not the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence. The appellants were thus correct to concede that the relevant "information" was not to be found in inconsistencies or disbelief, as opposed to the text of the statutory declaration itself.
See also: SZICU v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 1 at [24]-[25], 100 ALD 1 at 6-7 per Tamberlin, Finn and Besanko JJ; SZLBA v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 484 at [23]-[24] per Cowdroy J.
19 The ground is further without merit for the simple reason that such "information" as is to be discerned from the findings relied upon by the Appellant were - in any event - identified in a letter sent to him pursuant to s 424A(1)(a) on 9 October 2006. That letter invited the now Appellant to comment upon a number of matters, including the following:
… In the hearing you claimed that the second time you were arrested was June or July 1986 and you were detained for 2 days. However in your statement, you claimed it was in early 1986 that you were arrested the second time, February according to the evidence you provided to the first Tribunal, and you were detained for 4.5 days.
This information is relevant because the discrepancies in the evidence you provided at various stages of the process as to when you were detained in 1986 and how long you were detained, raises doubts that you were arrested in 1986 at all.
It is also apparent from the reasons of the Tribunal that this issue, as raised in the 9 October 2006 letter, was further pursued with the now Appellant during the course of the hearing before the Tribunal.
20 The second Ground of Appeal therefore is also rejected.