NAZL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

Procedural history 17 By an application filed 6 January 2004 the applicant sought the issue of constitutional writs in respect of the decision of the Tribunal. The application was supported by an affidavit affirmed by the applicant on 6 January 2004 which included the following: '5. The RRT failed to take in to consideration the merits of the case. 6. The RRT failed to act on proper principles of fairness and natural justice. 7. The RRT did not act in good faith to make this decision. The Grounds of Appeal (a) The decision made by the RRT was an improper exercise of the powers conferred by the Migration Act 1958 and migration regulations 1994 as amended. (b) The decision involved an error of law being an incorrect interpretation of the applicable laws and incorrect application of the law to the facts.' 18 The applicant's application was heard and determined by the primary judge on 28 April 2004. The applicant appeared in person at the hearing before his Honour. The applicant relied upon both his oral submissions at the hearing and also written submissions to the Court. The primary judge ordered that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent's costs. 19 In the reasons for judgment his Honour said: '19. In his written submissions to this Court the applicant concentrated on two matters; the first concerned the authenticity of the police charge sheets and the second related to his alleged involvement with the members of MQM. 20. I shall deal with the second matter first. The submissions concerning the applicant's involvement with MQM do not go beyond inviting the Court to reach a different conclusion on the evidence that was before the Tribunal. It may be that a different Tribunal may have come to a different conclusion in relation to those matters. That is not a question upon which the Court should embark. The only question is whether or not any error in the way the Tribunal dealt with the allegations of involvement with MQM, indicate that there was some jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. I do not consider that the submissions go anywhere near establishing a jurisdictional error in relation to the way in which the Tribunal dealt with the allegations of a fear of persecution arising out of involvement with MQM. 21. That is sufficient to dispose of the application. However, I shall say something briefly about the submissions concerning the police charge sheets. 22. … Those documents were referred to by the applicant at the hearing before the Tribunal on 28 October 2003. The applicant's complaint is that the Tribunal had no regard to the documents in the course of the hearing, saying that on their face there was no guarantee that they were authentic. The applicant apparently said in the course of the hearing that he had a translation of the documents stamped by the High Court in Pakistan saying that they were true translations of genuine charge sheets. … 31. The way in which the Tribunal dealt with the documents causes some disquiet. However, it does appear that notwithstanding that the decision was made without reference to the certified translations, the Tribunal did, after the event, have regard to them and concluded that its first view ought not to be changed. However, as I have already said, while there may be some disquiet arising from the way in which the Tribunal dealt with the documents, the ultimate decision of the Tribunal was not based upon the authenticity or otherwise of the documents. 32. The Tribunal concluded that even if there were charges made, as might be inferred from the police reports, the Tribunal did not consider that it was plausible that such charges against the applicant would still be current if he were to return to Pakistan after an absence of more than 10 years. In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that there was any error on the part of the Tribunal such as would constitute jurisdictional error…It follows in my view that the application should be dismissed.' 20 The grounds in the notice of appeal filed 18 May 2004 which were before the first Full Court were: 'That the learned single bench failed to appreciate the judicial error in the instant case, moreover, the learned single bench also failed to appreciate the documents so placed on the file page 60 of the court book, regarding the fact that the RRT decided the fate of the documents on 06/11/03 whereas the documents were received by them on 03/12/2003 i.e. a legal error on the part of RRT this means that the decision was made prior to receiving the documents. The document were received by them on 18/11/2003 and the decision was made on 06/11/2003.' 21 As has been noted above, the Tribunal received the third round documents two weeks before the Tribunal handed down its decision and had regard to them in the manner indicated above. 22 When the appeal came before the first Full Court on 18 November 2004, the applicant failed to appear. He did, however, fax a medical certificate to the Court indicating that he was not fit for work. 23 The applicant was contacted by a Deputy Registrar of the Court who reported that the applicant 'said he will see how he feels later on today and if necessary speak to the person who helped him with his appeal papers to see if he could attend the court on his behalf.' 24 At the hearing of the appeal on 18 November 2004 Ms Francois, who appeared for the Minister, sought an order under O 52 r 38A of the Federal Court Rules 'that the appeal be dismissed.' 25 The presiding judge responded: 'It should be added that the members of the bench have looked at the judgment appealed from, the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal and the written submissions that were sent to the Court by the appellant. In the opinion of all of us there appears to be no substance in the appeal. Accordingly, the order of the Court is that the appeal be dismissed with costs.' 26 Approximately 20 minutes after the appeal had been dismissed by the first Full Court, a friend of the applicant, Mr Iqbel, arrived. His arrival was drawn to the attention of the Court which elected not to reconvene because the appeal had already been dismissed. Mr Iqbel was asked to inform the applicant of what had transpired. 27 The orders of the first Full Court were entered on 25 November 2004, no action having been taken by the applicant in the meantime. 28 The applicant filed a notice of motion on 2 December 2004 seeking to set aside the orders of the first Full Court. An affidavit in support was also filed on 2 December 2004. The notice of motion and affidavit would appear to have been accompanied by a document in which the applicant said: '… the RRT has gone beyond the jurisdiction which is vested with the RRT. That the applicant has also challenged the validity of the jurisdictional error, the RRT has committed while dealing the above matter. That the applicant has raised lot of legal issues which have been laid down by the applicant in the written submission …' The matter came before Allsop J on 16 March 2005. Doubt having arisen as to the power of a single judge to hear and determine the application his Honour ordered on 3 June 2005 that '[t]he application to set aside the orders made on 18 November 2004 by the Full Court comprised of Wilcox J, Sackville J and Finn J be stood over to a date to be fixed before a Full Court.' 29 The parties agreed that, in the event that the orders made by the first Full Court on 18 November 2004 and entered on 25 November 2004 are set aside, the Court as presently constituted should immediately proceed to hear and determine the appeal. For this reason the Court heard the parties in full both on the application for an order setting aside the orders made by the first Full Court and on the merits of the proposed appeal should those orders be set aside. 30 Dr Griffiths SC who appeared with Mr Bova of counsel for the applicant pro bono, indicated that, if the application to set aside the first Full Court judgment were to succeed, the applicant would seek to file an amended notice of appeal and an amended application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)to take the place of the application filed 6 January 2004 upon which the primary judge reached his decision. 31 Were the applicant to be given a 'second' chance or, arguably, a 'third' chance as proposed, the grounds of alleged jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal upon which the applicant would wish to rely would be as follows: '(a) the decision was affected by apprehended bias with the consequence that there was a breach of procedural fairness; (b) the appellant was denied procedural fairness because there was no probative evidence or other material to support the Tribunal's finding of fact that actions against the appellant's union comrades were dropped after the union was recognised by the court in Pakistan and that any charges against him had long since been abandoned; and (c) the Tribunal failed to give real and genuine consideration to the documentary materials provided to it under cover of a letter dated 18 November 2003.' 32 Dr Griffiths indicated that the applicant's principal argument now was that the Tribunal brought to bear or gave the appearance of bringing to bear a closed mind on the authenticity of the documents produced by the applicant at the Tribunal hearing.

Power Exercised by the First Full Court 33 Although the orders made by the first Full Court do not identify the rule pursuant to which the orders were made, we accept the applicant's submission that the first Full Court proceeded, as counsel for the respondent invited it to do, under O 52 r 38A. That rule relevantly provides: '(1) If a party is absent when an appeal is called on for hearing, the Court may: … (d) proceed with the hearing, either generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the appeal. … (2) If the court proceeds with the hearing under paragraph (1)(d), the Court may (a) set aside or vary any order made after so proceeding; and (b) give directions for the further conduct of the appeal.' 34 We therefore proceed on the basis that this Full Court has power to set aside the orders made by the first Full Court but that this power is to be exercised on the basis that the first Full Court proceeded to hear the applicant's appeal. In this regard we note that the first Full Court referred to the decision of the primary judge, the notice of appeal and the written submissions of the parties (see [24] above).

Explanation for Failure to Appeal 35 The first Full Court noted that the medical certificate provided to the Court by the applicant 'required further elaboration if it was to be accepted as indicating Mr NAZL was not fit to participate and would arrange for someone to participate.' The reasons for judgment of Allsop J drew attention to the fact that '[t]he explanation for the absence of the appellant on 18 November 2004 does not take the matter beyond that recounted by the presiding judge on 18 November 2004.' Nonetheless no material additional to that which was before the first Full Court in explanation for the applicant's failure to appear on 18 December 2004 has been placed before this Full Court.

The New Ground of Appeal 36 As identified above, the case that the applicant wishes to advance if the orders made by the Full Court on 18 November 2004 are set aside is one of apprehended bias on the part of the Tribunal. Although the affidavit in support of the application before the primary judge said 'the RRT failed to act on proper principles of fairness and natural justice' it is conceded on behalf of the applicant that no claim of actual or apprehended bias was made at the hearing before his Honour. The transcript of proceedings before the Tribunal was not placed before the primary Judge or, indeed, before the first Full Court. 37 An allegation of apprehended bias was not raised in the notice of appeal nor in the written submissions to the first Full Court. 38 It is thus apparent that the present application is not intended to place the applicant in the position that he would have been in had he attended the hearing before the first Full Court. It is intended to facilitate his advancing a case that there is no reason to think he would have advanced had he attended that hearing. Arguably he seeks to be placed in a better position than he would have been in had he attended the hearing before the first Full Court.

Apprehended Bias 39 The allegation of apprehended bias is based upon the Tribunal's treatment of the 'three rounds' of documents sent to the Tribunal and the applicant's description of those documents. What the applicant now wishes to do is, in effect, to bring a fresh application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) almost two years out of time (see s 477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)). 40 To enable the proposed new grounds to have any prospects of success it would be necessary for the applicant to secure the admission into evidence on the hearing of the appeal of a transcript of the proceedings before the Tribunal on 28 October 2003. For the purposes of the hearing of the current application to set aside the orders of the first Full Court the transcript of the Tribunal hearing has been admitted into evidence. The passage relied upon to found the allegation of apprehended bias was the Tribunal response to what was said by the applicant at page 17 of the transcript: 'Applicant Yes, this is the fax I receive yesterday. The original is with my brother. Attested by the Sindh High Court. Translated by Sindh High Court. So the FIR record is --- Member No, just a moment, there's no attestation as to the genuiness of this. Applicant This is the one he faxed me before the translation, Member But see, that's fine, you know what. I'll say this. Here you're in trouble and I'll tell you why you're in trouble. Applicant Okay. Member It's fine for a High Court to, it is a fine thing for a Notary Public or a solicitor or a proper person to certify the genuiness of a translation. All that that does is certify the correctness of the job of the translator, it is no guarantee as to the authenticity or authority of the document that was translated. Ok, now if ---' 41 The applicant proceeded to indicate to the Tribunal that '… if you want to check authenticity, you can check either from the Police Station with the reference number or you check from the Sindh High court.' 42 As we read that statement by the applicant, it is open to the interpretation that the applicant was saying that the original of the copy document (a faxed copy) that he gave the Tribunal had been attested. Clearly, if the original had borne an attestation, a copy of it should also have borne a copy of that attestation. Accordingly, the comment to that effect by the Tribunal was understandable. It also explains why the Tribunal, having commented on the absence of the attestation, was suspicious of a subsequent copy of the document which bore the attestation. 43 It may also be noted that none of the documents later produced by the applicant to the Tribunal were 'attested by the Sindh High Court', nor was there any indication that any of the translations were effected by the Sindh High Court. 44 Even if that was not the correct meaning of the applicant's statement to the Tribunal and the applicant meant that there was another original (with the Sindh High Court) to which the attestation of a true copy was attached, it is an interpretation that was available. Great difficulty attends the argument that adoption of it by the Tribunal demonstrates apprehended bias. 45 We are not satisfied that the ground of appeal set out in the proposed amended notice of appeal has a reasonable prospect of success.

CONCLUSION 46 We fully recognise the significance to the applicant of his claim to be entitled to a protection visa. We are also conscious of the many difficulties faced by unrepresented litigants and of the consequent need for courts to avoid unnecessarily strict insistence on compliance by them with rules of practice and procedure. Nonetheless, for the reasons set out above, on 3 November 2005 we concluded that it had not been demonstrated that the interests of justice called for the orders of the first Full Court to be set aside. I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Branson, Bennett and Graham.

Associate: Dated: 24 November 2005 Counsel for the Applicant: J E Griffiths SC and C N Bova

Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

Date of Hearing: 3 November 2005

Date of Judgment: 3 November 2005