WAS 'luscious Lips' USED AS A TRADE MARK?
31 On the first and major argument as to breach, Nature's Blend complains that the primary judge gave insufficient attention to the proper meaning of their own mark. Rather, and it is said, erroneously, the primary judge focussed only on the conduct of and usage by Nestlé of the expression 'luscious Lips'. It was argued that because it was the registered mark which must be used without authority if infringement was to be established, the Court must 'look first to the mark as registered and ascertain its meaning'. Only then was the Court able to decide whether Nestlé had used that mark. In particular, the complaint was that the primary judge had failed to identify that the words in the mark were registered in relation to confectionery generally, not just lip shaped confectionery.
32 In that regard, it was contended for Nature's Blend that the evidence pointed away from the expression 'luscious lips' having any meaning in relation to confectionery before the fourth appellant coined the trade mark. No person other than the fourth appellant was identified as having referred to confectionery by use of the words 'luscious lips' or even 'luscious' or 'lips'. Moreover, it was argued that 'luscious lips' had a distinct meaning quite apart from confectionery in that it described the shape and physical appearance of female human lips.
33 There is no requirement that the meaning of the registered mark must first be ascertained. It is to be noted that there was no dispute below that the words used by Nestlé were substantially identical to those used by Nature's Blend. Had there been an issue on this topic, the evaluation of the registered mark would have required close consideration. In order to determine whether there had been substantial identity or deceptive similarity, the mark of Nature's Blend would have required close consideration in order to ascertain its essential features. In doing this, the importance of the differences and similarities of the Nestlé usage would be assessed having regard to the essential features of the registered mark: Shell Company at 414.
34 As to the argument that the primary judge erred by failing to ascribe a meaning to 'LUSCIOUS LIPS' as at 12 March 2007 independently and apart from considering the alleged in infringing conduct, there is no error apparent in this approach. It is the impugned conduct that is the relevant point of the inquiry: see [19(3)] and [19(4)] above. As Gummow J observed in Johnson & Johnson (at 347), after citing Kitto J in Shell Company:
When the issue is one of infringement, a pivotal question is whether the use complained of is use by the alleged infringer as a trade mark. The answer to that question requires an understanding of the "purpose and nature" of the impugned use. (emphasis added)
35 Nature's Blend stresses that prior to the expression 'luscious lips' coming to the fourth appellant's mind as a brand for chocolate, those words had not 'sprung unaided' in anyone's mind to be used in relation to confectionery. Moreover it was not a natural, obvious or inevitable description of confectionery. It was thus inherently distinctive and hence well adapted to be used as a badge of origin for the proprietor of confectionery sold under or by reference to those words. Therefore 'luscious lips', when used in relation to confectionery, could have a variety of connotations for the reasonable consumer. This was a strong indicator that any commercial usage of the words in relation to confectionery by a competitor was trade mark usage.
36 In Lion Nathan (at [43]), the High Court approved the following test for use 'as a trade mark' as formulated by the Full Court of this Court constituted by Black CJ, Sundberg and Finkelstein JJ in Coca Cola (at [19]):
Use "as a trade mark" is use of the mark as a "badge of origin" in the sense that it indicates a connection in the course of trade between goods and the person who applies the mark to the goods … That is the concept embodied in the definition of "trade mark" in s 17 - a sign used to distinguish goods dealt with in the course of trade by a person from goods so dealt with by someone else.
37 The appropriate question is whether the words 'luscious Lips' would have appeared to consumers as possessing the character of a brand: see [19(1)] to [19(3)] above. This was the question correctly identified by the primary judge (at [23]) citing Shell Company per Kitto J at 425 and Johnson & Johnson per Gummow J at 348. As noted by Kitto J in Shell Company (at 422), context is all important.
38 Additionally, Allsop J in Anheuser-Busch (at [184]-[186]) said:
184 The notion of trade mark use is now given content by ss 7 and 17 of the TM Act. See [129] above.
185 The task is to examine the way the words are used in their context, including the totality of the packaging, to assess their nature and purpose in order to see whether they are used to distinguish the goods from goods of others: Shell Co above,at 422-5; Mark Foys Ltd, above at CLR 198-200 IPR 473-5; Johnson & Johnson Aust Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 30 FCR 326, 335, 342-5, 347-9; 101 ALR 700, 717-20,723-5; 21 IPR 1 at 11-12; 19; 24-5; Pepsico Australia, above at 162-3, 167-9 and 178-82; Musidor BV v Tansing (t/as Apple Music House) (1994) 52 FCR 363, 376-7; Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 100 FCR 90 at 100-1; 177 ALR 167 at 175-6; 48 IPR 257, 265-6; and Aldi Stores, above at [22] - [30] and [54] - [58].
186 The assessment is made from the perspective of what a person looking at the label would see and take from it, as to the purpose and nature of its use: Shell Co, above at 425; Wrigley's (A'sia (sic)) Ltd v Life Savers (A'asia) Ltd (1936) 37 SR (NSW) 9 at 16; Aldi Stores, above at[22] - [24] and [76].
39 In addressing this question, the primary judge correctly noted that the context is all important: see [19(5)] and [19(6)] above. His analysis did involve examining the way in which the words were used in their context including the totality of the packaging in order to assess the purpose and nature of the words from the perspective of a consumer reading the label. In this regard, the primary judge noted the observation of Allsop J in Anheuser-Busch at [191] and the authorities cited by Allsop J, noting that the branding function can be carried out in different places on packaging with different degrees of strength and subtlety and observing that '[O]f course, the existence on a label of a clear dominant 'brand' is of relevance to the assessment of what would be taken to be the effect of the balance of the label'.
40 The primary judge correctly noted that the words 'luscious Lips' are significantly less prominent than the word 'CAPLETS' in Johnson & Johnson and the word 'Kettle' in Pepsico where the impugned wording appeared on the front of each of the packages in each instance. In neither instance was the usage held to be as a trade mark. His Honour correctly observed (at [30]-[32]):
30. In Pepsico Australia Pty Ltd (t/as Frito-Lay Australia) v Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (1996) 135 ALR 192 the Full Court held that the word 'KETTLE' was not used as a trade mark in respect of kettle cooked potato chips. Relevantly, the potato chips packet also prominently displayed the well‑known trade mark 'Thins' and another well-known phrase 'Double Crunch'. Sackville J, with whom Lockhart J agreed, said at 213:
The purpose and effect of the words are to be determined by having regard to the context in which they are used. In this connection, the fact that Frito‑Lay has used the words in conjunction with its own distinctive mark (THINS and, perhaps, DOUBLE CRUNCH) does not prevent the use being for the purpose of distinguishing its chips from those of other traders. However, the use of the distinctive marks on Frito‑Lay's packets has a bearing on whether the words 'Kettle Cooked' have been used to show the commercial origin of the potato chips in the packets, or whether they have some other purpose and effect. It is necessary to consider the words used, as they present themselves to buyers or potential buyers of Frito‑Lay's chips who are to form a view about what they are meant to connote.
31. In Anheuser‑Busch 56 IPR 182 Allsop J held there was trade mark use, and in relation to other marks on the packaging said at [191]:
It is not to the point, with respect, to say that because another part of the label (the white section with "Budejovicky Budvar") is the obvious and important brand, that another part of the label cannot act to distinguish the goods. The "branding function" if that expression is merely used as a synonym for the contents of ss 7 and 17 of the TM Act, can be carried out in different places on packaging, with different degrees of strength and subtlety. Of course, the existence on a label of a clear dominant "brand" is of relevance to the assessment of what would be taken to be the effect of the balance of the label.
32. In Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Limited 30 FCR 326the Full Court held that the word 'CAPLETS' on a paracetamol product called 'TYLENOL' had not been used as a trade mark. At 341 Lockhart J said:
The context in which CAPLETS appears on the TYLENOL packaging and in its advertising demonstrates plainly in my opinion, that the use is essentially descriptive and not a badge of origin in the sense that it indicates a connection in the course of trade between the product TYLENOL and the appellant. A person looking at the packaging would assume that the word CAPLETS describes or indicates the shape of the product contained in it or the dosage form.
41 Nature's Blend contends that the issue of trade mark usage ought to be decided on the basis that the reasonable consumer would consider all of the RETRO PARTY MIX packaging, and would read the back of the packets, as well as the front. The front of the packaging contained little information about the product itself except illustrations, the manufacturer's brand and reference to it being a RETRO PARTY MIX. Nestlé accepted that reasonable consumers would be expected to look at the back of Nestlé's product before purchasing but that is not the same as accepting that all consumers would actually read the blurb.
42 Even if most consumers may look at the back of Nestlé's packet before purchase or even read the blurb, such an inspection would simply reveal that one of the mixed lollies in Nestlé's product is described in a light and amusing context as being 'luscious Lips'. However, by the time the consumer has read the blurb, if indeed the consumer does so, he or she has already seen that it is in an Allen's brand of product with the name of the product variant being RETRO PARTY MIX. If the consumer does go on to read the blurb, the consumer is well aware by that stage that the brand and commercial source is Allen's. Further, on looking at the back of the packet the consumer would also see another very well known trade mark, namely, NESTLÉ. The consumer then is left in no doubt as to the commercial origin of the product by the time he or she has read the relatively long discursive and humorous description referring to one of the lolly varieties as being 'luscious Lips'.
43 Nature's Blend submits that the primary judge erred in appearing to reason that as the mark was descriptive, therefore Nestlé's use of the mark in RETRO PARTY MIX confectionery was not a badge of origin. That was not the approach taken by the primary judge. Many marks may be partly descriptive. But this says nothing about whether or not a sign has been used as a trade mark: see [19(2)] above. In Aldi Stores Ltd (at [60]) Lindgren J said:
Aldi's submission is to the effect that a word which, devoid of context (as typed on an application for registration of a trade mark) may be understood to be "entirely descriptive", can never be used as a trade mark. I do not accept the submission. I will have occasion later to discuss in more detail what his Honour meant when he used the expression "entirely descriptive" (see [167]-[172] below), but it suffices for the present to note that it is well established that words which, devoid of any context or which in one particular context may be understood to be descriptive, may nonetheless be used as a trade mark: JB Stone & Co Ltd v Steelace Manufacturing Co Ltd (1929) 46 RPC 406; Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton Ltd v Nicholson & Sons Ltd (1931) 49 RPC 88 at 109 per Lord Macmillan; Picot Ltd v Goya Ltd [1967] RPC 573 at 578; James Watt Constructions Pty Ltd v Circle-E Pty Ltd [1970] 3 NSWR 481 per Hope J; Kolotex Glo Australia Pty Ltd v Sara Lee Personal Products (Aust) Pty Ltd (t/a Hilton Hosiery) (1993) 26 IPR 1 per Wilcox J.
44 Similarly, Gummow J in Johnson & Johnson said (at 347-348):
Where the trade mark allegedly used by the defendant comprises ordinary English words (such as "Page Three", considered by Slade J in News Group Newspapers Ltd v The Rocket Record Co Ltd [1981] FSR 89 at 102) then, as this decision illustrates, that circumstance may be taken into account by the court in the process of reasoning by which it accepts or rejects a submission that the use in question is not a trade mark use but a description of the goods in question. To say that is not to gainsay the point made by Dixon CJ in Mark Foys Ltd v Davies Coop and Co Ltd (the Tub Happy case) (1956) 95 CLR 190 at 194-195 that language is not always used to convey a single, clear idea; a mark may have a descriptive element but still serve as a badge of trade origin. However, where the issue is one of infringing use by use of a word mark (as in the present case), the fundamental question remains, to paraphrase what was said by Williams J in the same case (supra) (at 205), whether those to whom the user is directed are being invited to purchase the goods (or services) of the defendants which are to be distinguished from the goods of other traders "partly because" (emphasis supplied) they are described by the words in question. (emphasis added).
45 Nature's Blend also relied in its argument on the comparative packaging of Nestlé's CHEWMIX product. It is also a mix of confectionery. This product was sold at the same time and through the same trade channels in which the RETRO PARTY MIX product was sold. The contents of the CHEWMIX product are identified as 'SHERBIES, MILKO CHEWS and REDSKINS …'. Each of these names is a registered trade mark of Nestlé in relation to confectionery. The contents of the CHEWMIX pack are clearly identified by sub‑brand and represented on the rear panel of the packaging. Nature's Blend also points out that SHERBIES can be considered to be somewhat descriptive (orange chews fizzy sherbet centre). Likewise, MILKO CHEWS (chews with milk), and REDSKINS (raspberry flavoured confectionery). Nonetheless, each mark as referred to on the rear of the panel of the Chewmix product was used as a badge of origin.
46 Nature's Blend argues that the primary judge erred by diluting the significance of 'luscious Lips' as it appears on the packaging, by the prominence of the registered ALLEN'S and NESTLÉ marks. Allen's differentiates the products which it sells by sub-brands and the illustration of Allen's products. Some of those sub-brands are registered trade marks, for example, SHERBIES, REDSKINS, MILKO CHEWS and KILLER PYTHONS. Others are not, such as RETRO PARTY MIX.
47 However the presentation of the CHEWMIX product is quite different from the presentation of the RETRO PARTY MIX. In the case of the former, SHERBIES, REDSKINS and MILKO CHEWS are depicted on the front of the CHEWMIX product as distinctively wrapped and individually branded products. There is no corresponding depiction on the RETRO PARTY MIX product. The only reference to the expression 'luscious Lips' at all appears on the back of the packet within the 'blurb'.
48 The primary judge was correct in taking into account the prominence of the registered ALLEN'S and NESTLÉ marks on the packaging in contrast to the location and style of the expression 'luscious Lips'. That approach was entirely in conformity with the authorities on which the primary judge relied.
49 Nestlé's use of 'luscious Lips' did not infringe the trade mark.