Should summary judgment be given?
29Consideration of whether summary judgment should be given must involve acting in accordance with the principles in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 128 - 129 as the Plaintiff accepts. The Plaintiff submits that those principles mean that even if the Defendants provide evidence which tends to show the existence of a triable issue, it is open to the Plaintiff to show that on the whole of the evidence there is really no substance in the defence sought to be established: Bank Fur Gemeinwirtschaft AG v City of London Garages Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 149; [1971] 1 All ER 541.
30In the first place it is necessary to see what disputed questions of fact remain upon a consideration of the evidence adduced by each side on the Motion because if there is a serious conflict as to any matter of fact summary disposal will be inappropriate: Sidebottom v Cureton (1937) 54 WN (NSW) 88.
31First, although there is evidence from the Plaintiff tending to show that it received the Commonwealth Bank statements from Lauren Thurbon at Money Matters Mortgages Pty Ltd there is evidence from the First Defendant that Money Matters Mortgages Pty Ltd were not acting as his brokers in the matter. Whether they were his brokers is a crucial issue. If they were there cannot be much doubt that the broker supplied incorrect information in the form of the false bank statements.
32This question of fact involves a resolution of the signature on the Acknowledgement. The First Defendant denies it is his signature. There is a reasonable explanation why Mr Dubedat has not examined it.
33Secondly, the First Defendant says that he provided Mr Hutton with correct bank statements at one of the meetings he had with him at the property. If that is correct it may add weight to the Defendants' account of matters and require some response from Mr Hutton about his subsequent receipt of the false statements from Ms Thurbon and why the loan went ahead in those circumstances. I note that there was no evidence from Mr Hutton with no explanation for his absence other than an assertion from the Bar Table that he "had moved on" and is "unavailable to give any evidence". Even if it is not appropriate to draw a Jones v Dunkel inference from Mr Hutton's absence, there is an issue of fact involving credibility to be dealt with in relation to this assertion of the First Defendant.
34Thirdly, there is an issue about whether the Credit Code applies to the loan. Although the Plaintiff puts into evidence a Business Purposes Declaration apparently signed by the First Defendant, the First Defendant denies it is his signature, and the evidence from the handwriting expert is that the First Defendant's signature on that document is not genuine. There is no evidence to the contrary on the Motion. It cannot be said, therefore, that the Credit Code does not apply in respect of the loan. I note in that regard that there does not appear to have been service of a s 80 Notice prior to the commencement of the proceedings. Until it is resolved whether or not the loan contract is subject to the Credit Code the non-service of a s 80 Notice means that it would be inappropriate to make an order for possession or to give judgment against the Defendants.
35Fourthly, the First Defendant invokes the Contracts Review Act 1980 in relation to clauses 14 (e) and (k). The particulars in relation to that pleading, although reading more like a submission than particulars, draw attention to the unfairness of those provisions if "person" can refer to someone who is not in any way an agent of, or connected with, the borrower and, in particular, is in fact an employee of the Plaintiff. The last assertion arises because it is alleged by the Defendants that the wrongful provision of the material was perpetrated by Mr Hutton, an employee of the Plaintiff.
36Nevertheless, consideration must be given to the Contracts Review Act defence when all of the evidence is available to show the source of the incorrect information in the bank statements and how that source is connected, if at all, with the Defendants.
37It may be accepted that the Contracts Review Act benefits only the First Defendant but the principle in Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1 would make it inappropriate to give summary judgment against one of two defendants: Daleport Pty Limited v Bank of Western Australia [2012] NSWCA 402 at [5]; Griffin v Matthews [2012] NSWCA 348 at [21] -[25].
38Despite these issues of fact, the Plaintiff submits that, having regard to ss 56 - 60 Civil Procedure Act 2005 and consistent with General Steel principles, the Court can look to the end result and say that the overwhelming probability is that the Plaintiff will be successful. It is said that the principle in Gemeinwirtschaft supports that approach.
39 Even if that submission is correct as a matter of principle two things point strongly against such a conclusion in the present case. First, there is no evidence from Mr Hutton to answer any of the assertions of the First Defendant that might be thought to involve Mr Hutton. Secondly, the evidence of the First Defendant that some, but not all, signatures on the bank documents are not his is supported by the evidence of the handwriting expert for the documents he has examined. There was no handwriting evidence to the contrary. I note also that the First Defendant's affidavit, where he asserted that certain signatures were not his, was sworn a week before the report of the handwriting expert.