should bail be granted?
14 The jurisdiction of the Court to grant bail pending the determination of an appeal before the Court is not in doubt. The power to grant bail, pending the determination of an appeal, arises from s 59(1)(f) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ("the Federal Court Act") which gives the judges of the Court power to make rules relating to the custody of convicted persons, and under Order 52 rule 35(3) of the Federal Court Rules, the Court or a judge has power to admit an appellant to bail pending an appeal: Clarke v R [2000]FCA 171, per Miles J, with whom Finkelstein and Dowsett JJ agreed.
15 As the Full Court there set out at [3], the nature of the power was described by a Full Court in Chamberlain v The Queen (1983) 69 FLR 445. The principle well recognised at common law was there applied. The principle is that bail will not be granted pending the hearing of an appeal from a conviction and sentence, unless there are exceptional or special circumstances.
16 The Court also has power pursuant to s 29(1)(b) of the Federal Court Act to stay or suspend the operation of an order the subject of an appeal.
17 With those powers and principles in mind, I turn to consider whether there are special or exceptional circumstances in this case.
18 Mr Nathan was sentenced to one month's imprisonment. He has now served more than 18 days of that sentence. No date has yet been set for his appeal. It is apparent that he needs legal assistance and, no doubt, time to prepare his appeal. There is, it seems to me, a real chance that he will have served all or the majority of his sentence prior to the appeal being determined. In that sense, his appeal will be rendered nugatory or substantially so.
19 Those facts are similar to the facts considered by Fullagar J in Re Cooper's Application for Bail [1961] ALR 584. In that case, Fullagar J at 584 said:
In this case I think there are sufficient circumstances which can fairly be regarded as exceptional to induce me to think that I ought to grant bail. The sentence is, perhaps, the main affirmative consideration in my mind. It is a very short sentence, namely, imprisonment for two months, and the applicant has already been in gaol for some months because he did not obtained bail, apparently for technical reasons before the trial, and if he remains in gaol pending the hearing of his application for leave to appeal, and perhaps his appeal, he may well have spent in gaol the full period of his sentence, so that success, on an appeal would not even alleviate his punishment.
20 That decision has been followed on many occasions, including by the Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal in Roddan v R [2002] WASCA 87, a decision of Pidgeon, Wallwork and White JJ. In that decision, White J, with whom the other members of the Court of Criminal Appeal agreed, said:
Exceptional circumstances will be shown if the applicant will have served all or the majority of the custodial portion of his sentence prior to the appeal being determined, Re Cooper's Application for Bail [1961] ALR 584.
21 It seems to me that the shortness of the sentence and the likelihood of any appeal being rendered nugatory or substantially so is a most weighty consideration in this matter. There are, however, other matters that I will address, as did Fullagar J in Re Cooper's Application.
22 The first is the merit of the appeal. I do not propose to canvass in any great detail the prospects of success on the appeal. I do, however, take the view, on the material that I have seen, that there may well be merit to the appeal.
23 In that respect, there are questions raised as to, first, whether Mr Nathan was properly made aware that he was charged with contempt and accorded a proper opportunity to deal with such a charge. Secondly, there are questions raised as to whether what occurred before the learned Federal Magistrate could constitute contempt in the face of the court. In that respect, I note that Mr Nathan was not refusing to give evidence or to abide by any obligations he had under the Bankruptcy Act in the proceeding before the learned Federal Magistrate but, at best, had indicated a refusal to abide by a direction that he give evidence before Registrar Allaway.
24 I am at least satisfied, as was Fullagar J in the matter before him, that the appeal is not frivolous.
25 Furthermore, there is nothing before me to suggest that the appellant is a person of bad character or that he presents as a danger to the community (should he be released) or that there is any real danger of him absconding (should bail be granted).
26 I am prepared to grant bail to Mr Nathan, subject to particular conditions being met and subject to Mr Nathan giving particular undertakings. As to those matters, I will hear further from the parties.
I certify that the preceding twenty-six (26) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Bromberg.