Parties
1 The first plaintiff, Mr Nash, was, at all material times, a solicitor holding a practising certificate. He was admitted to practice in 1975.
2 Mr Nash knew and had had a professional association over the years with Mr Stewart and Mr Lord. Mr Stewart was involved in the debt collection and mercantile agency business. Mr Nash had acted as his solicitor or the solicitor for his businesses on many previous occasions. Mr Lord was an insolvency practitioner practising in partnership with others in the firm PKF. Mr Stewart and Mr Lord are the first and second defendants.
3 There are three other parties. They are superannuation funds associated with Mr Nash, Mr Stewart and Mr Lord. The superannuation fund trustees are the second plaintiff and the fifth and sixth defendants respectively (there are no longer third and fourth defendants).
The pleaded case
4 It is important to pay attention at the outset to Mr Nash's pleaded case (advanced also by his superannuation fund). It is articulated in the second amended statement of claim filed on 9 September 2009.
5 Mr Nash pleads in paragraph 9 an agreement made in or about December 2002 or January 2003 by himself, Mr Stewart and Mr Lord "to act jointly for the purpose of conducting a debt recovery business to be conducted by them under a name or style of 'Premium Collections'". The second amended statement of claim then says in paragraph 10:
"It was an expressed term of the agreement referred to in paragraph 9 above that:
(a) A corporation would be established or acquired.
(b) That the corporation would be named "Premium Collections Pty Limited".
(c) There would be two classes of shares, namely, ordinary shares and A-Class shares.
(d) The A-Class shares in the corporation would be non-voting, non-participating in a winding up of the corporation but would otherwise rank equally for dividend with the ordinary shares issued in the company.
(e) The Plaintiff would be allotted ten percent of the ordinary shares of Premium Collections Pty Limited.
(f) J & L Marine Pty Limited in its said trustee capacity would allotted [sic] ten percent of the ordinary shares of Premium Collections Pty Limited representative of the interest of the Second Defendant.
(g) The First Defendant would be allotted Sixty percent of the ordinary shares of Premium Collections Pty Limited at the expiration of any restraint period in relation to his former employment with The Collection House Limited.
(h) 20,000 A-Class shares would be issued to members of the staff employed by the corporation to be established.
(i) The initial directors of the corporation to be established would be the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant.
(j) Upon the expiration of any restraint of trade period relating to the conduct of activities by the First Defendant in favour of The Collection House Limited, the First Defendant would be appointed a director and managing director of the corporation to be established on a salary package of $250,000.00 per annum.
(k) The corporation to be established would carry on business as a mercantile agent and debt recovery agent for creditor companies and in particular for the New South Wales Nominal Insurer and/or insurance companies acting as agents for that body.
(l) The First Plaintiff would be retained as the sole and exclusive solicitor for the corporation to be established to represent the interests of that entity and its clients in connection with the debt recovery business conducted by the corporation to be established and in so doing The First Plaintiff would devise and implement systems to and would undertake the necessary work on behalf of the corporation to be established and its clients for reward and be entitled to earn remuneration and profits in his own right by reason of such work.
(m) The Second Defendant would undertake all insolvency referrals, subject to there being no conflict of interest or otherwise being precluded from doing so, arising from the business activities of the corporation to be established and would be entitled to earn profits from that work in his own right.
(n) The First Defendant would be entitled to income by way of salary and other rewards from the corporation to be established including sixty percent of any dividend issued Premium Collections Pty Limited.
(o) The initial capital of the corporation to be established would be provided by way of loans from the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant in the amount of $60,000.00 repayable on a date 12 months following upon the date of the making of the loan which would be in about February 2004."
6 At trial, Mr Nash did not press the words "would devise and implement systems to and" in paragraph 10(l).
7 Paragraph 11 of the second amended statement of claim details things said to have been done pursuant to and in accordance with the agreement. These include formation of a company called "Premium Collections Pty Limited", the constitution of its board of directors, the making of loans to it and the issue of shares by it. Each of the three individuals became a director of Premium Collections (the appointment of Mr Stewart was delayed because of connections he still had with a like business). Mr Stewart's superannuation fund had a majority shareholding, the superannuation funds of Mr Nash and Mr Lord each had smaller shareholdings and each of the individuals or his superannuation fund lent money to Premium Collections. In addition, Premium Collections commenced business as a debt collector and mercantile agent. Its clients consisted mainly of workers compensation insurance companies seeking to recover unpaid premiums. Mr Nash was, he says, "retained by Premium Collections Pty Limited as legal practitioner for its clients in relation to all of its trading activities". Mr Lord accepted liquidator appointments in cases in which Premium Collections, on behalf of its clients, caused companies to go into liquidation.
8 Paragraph 13 of the second amended statement of claim is in these terms:
"In and about the performance and carrying into effect of the terms of the agreement referred to in paragraphs 9 and 10 above each of the Plaintiff, the First Defendant and the Second Defendant were in a relationship of trust and confidence giving rise to respectively in favour of each of them a fiduciary duty owed as between each other as set out following:
(a) Not to depart from the respective arrangements and undertakings on the part of each of them under the terms of the agreement.
(b) Not to unfairly terminate the retainer of the Plaintiff as legal practitioner retained by Premium Collections Pty Limited.
(c) Not to utilise the funds and other assets of Premium Collections Pty Limited otherwise than for the purposes of Premium Collections Pty Limited and for the benefit of its members.
(d) Not to act in their capacity as directors of Premium Collections Pty Limited and in any manner to depart from the terms and conditions of the agreement between them.
(e) Not to redirect or appropriate any profit of or revenue flow or asset of Premium Collections Pty Limited for a purpose other than as agreed between each of them.
(f) Not to use any of the property of Premium Collections Pty Limited for any purposes other than with disclosure and approval of the Plaintiff as a party to the agreement between them and as director of Premium Collections Pty Limited.
(g) To repay to the First Plaintiff and the Second Plaintiff their loans to Premium Collections Pty Limited as a first priority and Parri Passu to each of them.
(h) To pay to the First Plaintiff and the Second Plaintiff their professional fees due but unpaid by Premium Collections Pty Limited or its clients as a first priority and Parri Passu to each of them."
9 Several actions of Mr Stewart and Mr Lord (both directly and through their superannuation funds) are then said to have breached "their respective duties and promises referred to in paragraph 9 and 13 above". The actions in question are described in paragraph 14 and consist of:
(a) causing Premium Collections to lend money to a company called "Premium Advisory Pty Limited";
(b) in or about February 2008, causing or permitting Premium Collections "to retain the services of Premium Advisory Pty Limited as legal practitioner retained for the purposes of carrying out legal services for Premium Collections Pty Limited without the approval or knowledge of" Mr Nash;
(c) in or about January 2008, causing or permitting Premium Collections to terminate the retainer of Mr Nash in relation to the provision of legal services to Premium Collections and its clients;
(d) from about January 2008, causing Premium Collections to engage the legal services of Premium Advisory;
(e) in or about June 2007, causing or permitting a loan to be made by Premium Collections to Premium Advisory without the knowledge, approval or consent of Mr Nash when they knew or ought to have known that the purpose of the loan was to finance the conduct of the legal business of Premium Advisory in competition with Mr Nash in respect of the provision of services to Premium Collections;
(f) causing or permitting loans to be made by Premium Collections to Mr Stewart in the sum of about $600,000.00;
(g) causing or permitting Premium Collections to make loans of about $350,000.00 to Bungarra Tol Pty Ltd;
(h) causing Premium Collections to expend about $100,000.00 in most of the years in which it traded to finance the interest of Mr Stewart in motor racing;
(i) causing or permitting Premium Collections not to pay to Mr Nash moneys due to him in respect of the provision of legal services provided by him to Premium Collections.
The defence
10 The defendants, by their defence:
(a) deny any agreement "to act jointly" as between Mr Nash, Mr Stewart and Mr Lord;
(b) say that, in or about late 2002, it was proposed between Mr Stewart and Mr Lord to form a debt collection business and to establish a company through which the debt collection business would be considered;
(c) say that it was proposed that Mr Nash be retained as the solicitor in connection with the business and that he was so retained;
(d) accept that most of the things Mr Nash describes in his paragraph 11 as having been done were done;
(e) deny the breaches of contract and fiduciary duty alleged by Mr Nash.
11 As to the last-mentioned matter, the defendants admit that Premium Collections lent money to Premium Advisory, that the retainer for Mr Nash to provide legal services was terminated in late 2007 or early 2008, that Premium Advisory was retained by Premium Collections after February 2008 to conduct legal work and that Premium Collections made loans to Mr Stewart and Bungarra Tol Pty Ltd. The defendants deny expenditure by Premium Collections to finance any interest of Mr Stewart in motor racing. They further say that the retainer of Premium Advisory to provide legal services to Premium Collections and its clients did not require Mr Nash's consent; also that moneys due to Mr Nash by Premium Collections were tendered in full by means of six cheques drawn in the period November 2007 to January 2008 for a total of $207,215.24 but that, in March 2008, Mr Nash asked that the cheques be stopped and that a bank cheque be issued in the sum of $189,715.24, which request, as to both its aspects, was met by Premium Collections. The defendants further say that, in the period February to April 2008, Mr Nash did not comply with requests by Premium Collections to hand over files.
12 The position of the defendants, briefly stated, is that:
(a) there was a contract among Mr Nash, Mr Stewart and Mr Lord;
(b) they fully performed the contract;
(c) Mr Nash was retained to provide legal services and the retainer was terminated against the wishes of Mr Nash;
(d) the termination of Mr Nash's retainer was justified by his conduct; and
(e) they owed no fiduciary duties to Mr Nash.
Uncontentious matters
13 The evidence makes it clear that Mr Nash, Mr Stewart and Mr Lord pursued a plan under which each of them would, for his own benefit, bring expertise to a debt collection and debt recovery business. Mr Stewart had expertise in sourcing debt collection work and in client relations. Mr Lord was an experienced liquidator. Mr Nash was an experienced solicitor. With a clientele consisting largely of workers compensation insurers seeking to recover unpaid premiums, the business would need to be able to provide its clients with the services of a solicitor for debt recovery litigation and the services of a liquidator willing to consent to appointment as such in matters in which debt collecting litigation took the form of an application to the court for winding up in insolvency.
14 In 2002, Mr Stewart approached Mr Lord and Mr Nash. He had it in mind to establish a new business. He was himself, at that point, subject to a restraint of trade obligation that precluded his own involvement. It is agreed that Premium Collections was formed on 4 February 2003 and that both Mr Nash and Mr Lord put in loan capital soon afterwards to enable it to start business. Mr Lord was a director at inception and his superannuation fund took up the two issued shares. Mr Nash became a director at a later point (in either 2003 or 2004). In early 2005, when he became free from his contractual restraint, Mr Stewart became the managing director and dominant shareholder of Premium Collections. At that point, each of Mr Nash, Mr Stewart and Mr Lord held shares in Premium Collections through a superannuation fund. Mr Stewart, as I have said, was the majority shareholder.
15 Mr Nash provided legal services from the outset. He was based in Premium Collections' office (although in a segregated part of the premises) and received secretarial and other assistance from Premium Collections' staff. He became solicitor on the record for Premium Collections' clients in proceedings he commenced for those clients after demands by Premium Collections for payment produced no result. Mr Nash was not the solicitor for Premium Collections: the solicitor-client relationship was between him and each particular Premium Collections client.
16 Transition from demands by Premium Collections on behalf of its clients to legal proceedings commenced by Mr Nash as solicitor for those clients occurred as part of a debt collection system offered by Premium Collections to its clients and operated by Premium Collections for those clients. There was no formal commissioning of Mr Nash to act for a particular client in particular proceedings. His involvement was arranged by Premium Collections when a particular debt recovery attempt reached a point where legal proceedings were appropriate. From that point, however, Mr Nash had direct contact with the client, albeit often through Premium Collections' email system and in circumstances where incoming mail passed through the hands of Premium Collections staff and was sometimes dealt with by them if Mr Nash's direct involvement was not necessary.
17 The arrangement was one in which Mr Nash incurred professional obligations and duties direct to the plaintiffs he represented but provided his services to them in accordance with a separate contract which, on the case he seeks to make, was a contract with the defendants.
The fiduciary duty claim
18 It is convenient to address at once Mr Nash's allegation that he was owed fiduciary duties by Mr Stewart and Mr Lord.
19 The submissions made on Mr Nash's behalf were replete with references to the three individuals' "joint venture", the concept being that each had something to contribute to the successful pursuit of a venture and that they came together in order that their respective contributions might be pooled for their common advantage. It is from that characterisation - and from the close analogy between "joint venture" and partnership noticed in United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 49; (1985) 157 CLR 1 - that Mr Nash sought to extract the proposition that fiduciary duties were owed to him by Mr Stewart and Mr Lord.
20 Central to this characterisation is the notion that the three individuals were associated together for a common end and that their relationship was based on a mutual confidence that they would engage in the particular activity for the joint advantage only. This is an adaptation of words used by Mason J, Brennan J and Deane J in the United Dominions case (at 12 - 13). But as their Honours observed (at 10), there is a distinction between a joint venture in this sense and "a simple contractual relationship", albeit a distinction that "may on occasion be blurred".
21 Mr Nash pleads a contract in paragraph 9 of the second amended statement of claim. In paragraph 10, he sets out the terms of the contract. He then says in paragraph 13 that "a relationship of trust and confidence" existed between the three individuals "[i]n and about the performance and carrying into effect of the terms of" the pleaded contract, "giving rise to" a "fiduciary duty" the content of which is then pleaded; and in paragraph 14 that certain actions amounted to breach by Mr Stewart and Mr Lord of "their respective duties and promises referred to in paragraph 9 and 13 above". The terms of the alleged contract and the content of the alleged "fiduciary duty" do not coincide, but the actions described in paragraph 14 are said to amount to breaches of both the contract and the fiduciary duty.
22 There thus arises for consideration a question about co-existence of contractual and fiduciary duties or perhaps more accurately about the capacity of a contract to provide the foundation for a fiduciary relationship. In Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41 (at 97), Mason J said
"In these situations it is the contractual foundation which is all important because it is the contract that regulates the basic rights and liabilities of the parties. The fiduciary relationship, if it is to exist at all, must accommodate itself to the terms of the contract so that it is consistent with, and conforms to, them. The fiduciary relationship cannot be superimposed upon the contract in such a way as to alter the operation which the contract was intended to have according to its true construction."
23 Hospital Products was a case in which a limited fiduciary obligation was found to co-exist with contractual obligations. The source of it was the overseas company's having entrusted its Australian distributor with the protection, promotion and custodianship of its product goodwill in Australia. The matter was explained by Mason J in this way (at 101):
"U.S.S.C., by entrusting H.P.I. with a responsibility for protecting and promoting the market for U.S.S.C.'s products in Australia, effectively constituted H.P.I. the custodian of its product goodwill in this country. Its responsibility in procuring orders, making sales and effecting deliveries of U.S.S.C.'s products in Australia armed H.P.I. with a power and discretion to affect U.S.S.C.'s product goodwill. And in exercising this responsibility H.P.I. had a special opportunity of acting to the detriment of U.S.S.C. which was, accordingly, vulnerable to the abuse by H.P.I. of its position."
24 As French CJ, Gummow J, Hayne J, Heydon J and Kiefel J recently pointed out in John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd [2010] HCA 19; (2010) 84 ALJR 446 (at [93]), the finding of fiduciary duty in Hospital Products came from the circumstance that the overseas party was "a remote principal lacking the capacity to observe what was happening half the world away and in a situation where the Australian distributor was the only person in touch with the Australian market and thus positioned so as to enrich itself at the overseas principal's expense". This, their Honours said, created the principal's "vulnerability to the distributor's abuse of its position".
25 Vulnerability of some kind, coupled with reliance, is thus identified as the source of fiduciary duty. In relation to the particular case before it, the High Court said in John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd (at [83]):
"The only vulnerability of the Club was that which any contracting party has to breach by another. The only reliance was that which any contracting party has on performance by another. If JACS committed any breach of contract, it was quite open about it. If the Club could have established that JACS was in breach of contract, it had an ample array of contractual remedies to protect itself. It chose not to do so. It spoke of the difficulty of a social club giving an undertaking as to damages, and of the inutility of damages to a social club which wishes to continue its past activities in a new guise on the same site. It also said that monetary remedies against impecunious companies like JACS and Poplar were worthless. These factors do not justify converting the contractual relationship between JACS and the Club into a fiduciary relationship."
26 In the present case also the existence of the pleaded contract is not, of itself, sufficient to permit a finding of fiduciary duty. Mr Nash's claims based on breach of fiduciary duty can be sustained only if the facts disclose some vulnerability on his part and related reliance by him warranted by circumstances existing over and above that pleaded contract. He must be seen to be "specially disadvantaged, vulnerable or in need of the protection of equity from the [other party's] misuse of a superior position": Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi [2003] HCA 57; 217 CLR 315 at [112]. He must show himself to be in a position akin to that of a partner whose credit can be pledged by any other partner in the ordinary course of the partnership business and whose relationship with his fellows is based on mutual trust and confidence; or a party to a joint venture in which the participants are committed to pursue the particular activity for their joint advantage only.
27 The case Mr Nash has presented does not establish any such vulnerability on his part. When approached about becoming part of the new venture, he was an experienced solicitor who had been in practice for many years. The idea outlined to him was one that involved each of the three parties bringing his own skills to bear for his own benefit, in a context where all were to become directors and (through related entities) shareholders of a company to be formed. Mr Stewart was to be the major shareholder and the managing director. His position of greater influence and majority financial participation was thus acknowledged from the outset. He was the person who had the relevant business expertise and marketplace knowledge and the debt collection business was in substance his. Mr Lord was to make himself available to accept liquidator appointments as a result of proceedings brought by clients of the company but on the basis of retaining for himself (or, more accurately, no doubt, for his firm) the remuneration he received from such appointments. Mr Nash was to make himself available to accept appointment as the solicitor for clients of the company wishing to bring recovery proceedings in court and likewise was to retain for himself fees charged for the services he provided as solicitor. Clients of the debt collection company were not obliged to use the services of Mr Nash. It was open to them to use any solicitor of their choosing. As a matter of convenience, however, they almost always retained Mr Nash because the system operated by the company made it easy to do so.
28 Neither Mr Lord nor Mr Nash was tied exclusively to Premium Collections in the sense of lacking freedom to act for clients other than that company and its clients. Indeed, Mr Lord and his firm, as a leading insolvency practice, had numerous other clients. And it was open to Mr Nash to take on other work if he chose to do so. There was, in that sense, freedom of action and independence.
29 The fiduciary obligations Mr Nash postulates are obligations of Mr Stewart and Mr Lord owed by them to Mr Nash. But Mr Nash has shown no basis for any expectation that either of them would subordinate his own interests to those of Mr Nash. The arrangement among the three was exclusively contractual in nature, supplemented by sub-relationships existing within and through the company of which the three men were directors and which was owned by their superannuation funds. None of the individuals stood in a relationship of vulnerability and reliance towards either of the others.
30 I therefore approach the case on the footing that any relief to which Mr Nash ultimately shows himself to be entitled will be relief for breach of contract by Mr Stewart or Mr Lord or both of them. In saying that, I note that Premium Collections is not a party to the proceedings and that any allegation there may be that Mr Stewart or Mr Lord breached some obligation owed to that company, whether contractual, tortious, fiduciary or statutory, cannot ground any entitlement to relief on Mr Nash's part and is therefore irrelevant to the case before me. In addition, of course, the positions of Mr Stewart and Mr Lord as directors of Premium Collections did not entail fiduciary duties on their part owed to Mr Nash (either as a co-director or as a shareholder of that company), absent some special knowledge on their part and reliance by Mr Nash on them to use it for his benefit: Brunninghausen v Glavanics [1999] NSWCA 199: (1999) 46 NSWLR 538; Crawley v Short [2009] NSWCA 410; (2009) 262 ALR 654. There is no postulated basis for a finding that Mr Stewart and Mr Lord (or either of them) possessed any such special knowledge warranting reliance by Mr Nash as to its use.
The contract claims otherwise than for termination
31 Mr Nash's principal claim is that Premium Collections' termination of his retainer as the solicitor to service its clients was a breach of the contract he had with Mr Stewart and Mr Lord. He makes other claims based on the pleaded contract but I do not consider these to be maintainable. I refer to the breach of contract claims at items (a), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) at paragraph [9] above.
32 The position in relation to those matters is, in my judgment, that the three individuals agreed to co-operate together in relation to a new business conducted through a company (ultimately, Premium Collections) and to adopt certain roles within that company (as directors and shareholders) on the footing that their rights and obligations, after establishment, would be those arising from the new structure and the roles they adopted within it.
33 To the extent that there were to be decisions about Premium Collections' business directions, the investments it undertook and the transactions it engaged in, those decisions were to be made according to the corporate processes and procedures applicable to Premium Collections. Mr Nash's ability (and right) to influence such decisions were those commensurate with his position as one of three directors and a minority shareholder.
34 Mr Nash says that the lending of money by Premium Collections to Premium Advisory, Mr Stewart and Bungarra Tol Pty Ltd contravened the constitution of Premium Collections and involved breach of duties owed by directors of Premium Collections. Let it be assumed, without deciding, that that is so. The consequence is that Premium Collections has an action against the directors who breached their duties or are otherwise implicated in the wrongdoing. It does not follow that Mr Nash personally has any breach of contract claim against either or both of Mr Stewart and Mr Lord.
35 The express contractual terms pleaded by Mr Nash (see paragraph [5] above) do not include any term forbidding the loans that were in due course made by Premium Collections, whether by way of outright prohibition or in the form of a requirement for Mr Nash's prior consent. The express terms required the establishment of the company that in due course became Premium Collections, for the issue of shares on a stated basis, for the provision of the initial capital, for the constitution of the board of directors and for the company to retain Mr Nash and Mr Lord respectively. Mr Nash does not put forward any basis for finding an implied term forbidding the loans in question. This reinforces the conclusion that the matter of loans by Premium Collections and deployment of its funds was left to be dealt with within the confines of the company structure and in accordance with ordinary legal principles of corporate governance unaffected by any contractual overlay in the nature of an umbrella shareholders agreement.
The contract claim for termination - identifying the relevant term
36 The real focus must therefore be upon Mr Nash's claim for damages for breach of contract, as against Mr Stewart and Mr Lord, arising from termination of his retainer as solicitor. The express terms pleaded (see paragraph [5] above) say nothing about the duration of Mr Nash's retainer or the circumstances in which either side might terminate it. Nor is any implied term identified by the pleaded case. There can, however, be no doubt that some term on that subject is to be implied. It simply could not be accepted that there could be no termination as against Mr Nash if, for example, he absented himself permanently or ceased to hold the necessary solicitor's practising certificate and was thereby disabled from performing as required.
37 Since the contract, of its nature, included some implied term regarding termination, the task is to identify that term. Mr Nash contended in submissions that there was an implied term allowing termination against him only if he consented to the termination or Premium Collections was floated on the stock exchange. Mr Stewart and Mr Lord maintain that that there was an implied term allowing termination against Mr Nash if he repeatedly failed to provide legal services with the requisite degree of skill and care - something that Mr Nash tended to accept in closing written submissions, at least to the extent of an acknowledgement that "there were implied terms of the arrangement in respect of which he supplied legal services to the company and especially its and his clients in terms of attention and competence".
38 Reference was made in submissions to the normal conditions for the implication of terms. These are stated in BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266 as follows: