RPPL's response to objections to access
11The question of access to the Court's files in 315/11 and 316/11 was listed for argument on 18 September 2013. In dealing with each of the Department's reasons for opposing access, as set out in the Crown Solicitor's letter of 13 September, senior counsel for RPPL submitted in response to the numbered paragraphs in the Crown Solicitor's letter:
1. RPPL did not seek access to exhibits made confidential by an order of the Court.
2. RPPL did not seek access to original affidavit evidence that was filed in court that was struck out and not admitted into evidence.
3. (a) Supreme Court Rules Practice Note Gen 2 at point 10 is plainly concerned with applications made for purposes other than exactly the same dispute involving claims of client legal privilege and public interest immunity made by the same party (in this case, the Department) in respect of exactly the same documents in both sets of proceedings.
(b) In any event, Supreme Court Rules Practice Note Gen 2 contemplates that there will be circumstances where leave to access will be granted where such claims are being made in the proceedings in respect of which access to the court file is being sought.
(c) The mere fact that the Glennies Creek/Integra proceedings concern client legal privilege and public interest immunity claims is not a sufficient reason to deny access to the non-confidential parts of the Glennies Creek/Integra court files. In this case neither the purpose of the application for access, nor its effect, is to infringe any client legal privilege or public immunity attaching to documents in the court files.
4. (a) From the judgment in Nash (No 2) it is understood that there is nothing in the Crown Solicitor's 12 July 2013 letter:
restricting its use,
"limiting it to the Glennies Creek proceedings", or
rendering it confidential to the defendants in IRC 315 and 316 of 2011.
(b) There is no principle of law that prevents correspondence between parties to one set of litigation being made available to parties in other litigation.
(c) The 12 July 2013 letter was not sent to Ashurst under compulsion of law, and the contents of the 12 July 2013 letter were not disclosed to Ashurst or its clients under compulsion of law.
(d) It was conceded by the Department on 16 September 2013 that the Sebbens' affidavit is now on the public record.
(e) The fact that the correspondence was admitted into evidence makes the letters (and Mr Sebbens' affidavit) 'normally' accessible by a non-party with leave (cf Supreme Court Rules Practice Note Gen 2, par 7).
(f) There is no claim of and can be no legal professional privilege in correspondence sent by one party to litigation to an opposing party.
(g) There is no claim of public interest immunity in respect of the correspondence.
(h) The utility in RPPL having access to the 10 and 12 July 2013 letters is that in Nash (No 2) the Court found that, in the context of the 10 July letter, by her solicitor's letter dated 12 July 2013 the Prosecutor waived client legal privilege over the communications disclosed in that letter. Those communications are communications sought by RPPL's summons to produce - in respect of which it is envisaged the Department claims client legal privilege. The letter is therefore critical to the resolution of the dispute between RPPL and the Department about production and inspection of documents under RPPL's summons to produce.
5 (a) RPPL's application for access is amended to exclude documents the subject of disputed claims for privilege or immunity.
(b) RPPL has sought an undertaking from the Department that if its objections to production and inspection are adjourned pending the outcome of any stated case or appeal from Nash (No 2) the Department will treat the outcome of any such stated case or appeal as governing the outcome of its objections to production and inspection of the same documents sought by RPPL's summons. The Department has rejected that proposal. If, in respect of its objections to production and inspection which it makes in response to RPPL's summons for production, the Department is not prepared to abide the outcome of the Glennies Creek/Integra decision in respect of the same claims made in respect of the same documents, there is no reason why the Department's motion to set aside RPPL's summons to produce should not proceed to hearing. In that event, there is no reason why RPPL should be shut out of investigating and obtaining evidence for the hearing of that motion to set aside.
6. The fact that the Department may have objections to the use by RPPL of the 12 July 2013 letter by RPPL is no reason for RPPL to be denied access to it (and the whole of Mr Sebbens' affidavit) for the purpose of preparing its case and tendering it.
7. (a) The Prosecutor in the proceedings against Glennies Creek/Integra and the proceedings against RPPL is the same. RPPL is investigating and preparing evidence relating to its contentions that -
the proceedings against it were commenced without proper authority;
prosecution evidence was obtained improperly and/or without lawful authority;
that the Prosecutor has failed to comply with her obligations of disclosure.
(b) RPPL has served a summons to produce on the Department in terms which are practically identical to the first summons from Glennies Creek/Integra served on the Department which was the subject of the Court's judgment in Nash (No 2).
(c) On 16 September 2013, the Department filed a notice of motion for orders, amongst other things, setting aside RPPL's summons. The grounds and reasons given for the orders sought are -
The summons lacks a legitimate forensic purpose;
The summons is a fishing expedition;
The summons seeks the production of documents that are the subject of an unresolved claim of public interest immunity and legal professional privilege in other proceedings;
The documents caught by the summons could be the subject of a claim of public interest immunity and/or client legal privilege pursuant to ss 118, 119, 130 and 131A Evidence Act 1995.
(d) From the decision in Nash (No 2), it appears these grounds and reasons overlap the Department's grounds and reasons in its notice of motion to set aside the first Glennies Creek/Integra summons.
(e)That latter notice of motion was dismissed in Nash (No 2) and orders for production and inspection were made.
(f) In investigating and preparing evidence both for its contentions that the proceedings against it were commenced without proper authority and that the Prosecutor has failed to comply with her obligations of disclosure, RPPL wishes to have access to and, if considered appropriate, to use as evidence relevant material contained in the court file in the proceedings between DTI and Glennies Creek/Integra.
(g) In particular, RPPL wishes to have access to the affidavit of Trent Sebbens, filed for Glennies Creek/Integra, including its annexures and exhibits (if any). From references to the affidavit in the judgment in Nash (No 2), it is understood that it contains material which was, in part, relied upon for the decision in Nash (No 2).
(h) In particular, it is understood that Mr Sebbens' affidavit annexes or exhibits two letters. The first is dated 10 July 2013 and is from Ashurst Australia, the solicitors for Glennies Creek/Integra, to the Prosecutor in those matters. The other is dated 12 July 2013 from the Crown Solicitor's Office, solicitors for the Prosecutor, to Ashurst Australia. The letter of 12 July 2013 is critical to part of the decision made in Nash (No 2). RPPL seeks to use both letters as evidence in its case on the Department's notice of motion to set aside its (RPPL's) summons to produce.