The country information cited by the Tribunal
8 Again, for reasons which will appear, it will be necessary to refer to this part of the Tribunal's reasoning in some detail.
9 Citing several sources, the Tribunal said:
'There is no question that Falungong promotes salvationist and apocalyptic teachings in addition to its qigong elements. Despite its own protestations to the contrary, it also has a well-organized and technologically sophisticated following and has deliberately chosen a policy of confrontation with authorities. ...
Falun Gong first came to the attention of PRC authorities after demonstrations by Falun Gong adherents in April 1999 in Tianjin and later that month outside the Zhongnanhai in Beijing. The initial government crackdown against Falun Gong began in late July 1999, when a number of government departments implemented restrictive [measures] against the movement, banning Falun Gong and issuing an arrest order for Li Hongzhi. The movement was declared an "evil cult" and outlawed in October 1999.
Founded in 1992, Falun Gong first came to prominence in April 1999 after several thousand Falun Gong adherents staged a sit-in in Tianjin, outside the publishers of the Tianjin University journal that had published an article criticizing the movement. Official attention was heightened when more than 10,000 adherents of Falun Gong coordinated a peaceful demonstration outside Beijing's leadership compound, the Zhongnanhai, on 25 April 1999. The demonstration was the first major public manifestation of Falun Gong's popularity in China, and is reported to have caught the PRC authorities unawares. The incident is widely considered to have been the trigger for the initial crackdown against Falun Gong commencing in July 1999. The authorities are reported to have been mainly concerned by the capacity of the group to mobilize large numbers of followers, unnoticed, for a public demonstration. Subsequently, after some conflicting signals, they branded the Falun Gong a "threat to social and political stability". The government banned Falun Gong on 22 July 1999 and launched a massive propaganda campaign to denounce its practice and the motivation of its leaders, in particular Li Hongzhi. Since then, the government's accusations against the group have been repeatedly publicized by the state media and government officials.'
10 Without citing any specific source, the Tribunal went on to say:
'The crackdown against Falun Gong commenced in July 1999. From that time on, Falun Gong protests were countered by police roundups in which thousands of practitioners were detained in police lockups and makeshift facilities for short-term 'reeducation'. The crackdown was accompanied by a coordinated media campaign by China's public institutions, highlighting the alleged dangers of Falun Gong and attempting to justify the crackdown. From July 1999 until the end of 1999, a "legal infrastructure" to counter Falun Gong was erected: the banning of CCP members, civil servants and members of the military taking part in Falun Gong activities; the introduction of restrictions on legal officers representing Falun Gong practitioners and a circular calling for confiscation and destruction of all publications related to Falun Gong. Falun Gong internet sites also came under attack.
By October 2000, a year after the "evil cult" regulations went into effect, the government was demonstrating less and less tolerance for rank-and-file practitioners who continued to defy the government by participating in protest rallies. Instead of sending them back to their hometowns for "transformation," they were immediately detained.'
11 The Tribunal noted reports suggesting -
'... that a series of increasingly more restrictive measures were implemented during 2001. Such measures included the utilisation of more severe sentences, allegedly incorporating the use of psychiatric institutions to detain and "re-educate" Falun Gong practitioners; an increase in systematic and state sanctioned violence against Falun Gong practitioners; an escalated propaganda campaign against Falun Gong, repeatedly reinforcing the government's message that the group was an "evil cult" which posed a threat to Chinese society; and the utilization of state institutions such as the police and universities to combat Falun Gong.'
12 The Tribunal further noted the following:
'The measures employed by PRC authorities during 2001 were met with some degree of success: by late 2001 many reports were suggesting that Falun Gong had been effectively suppressed as an active and visible organisation within China. The success of these measures also necessitated a change in the conduct of the Falun Gong organisation in China itself. While there has been a dramatic abatement in the visibility of Falun Gong activities within China, there have increasingly been reports highlighting demonstrations in China by foreign followers of Falun Gong. These demonstrations have been met with strong resistance from PRC authorities, with the arrest, temporary detention and expulsion of foreign Falun Gong adherents commonly reported.'
13 The Tribunal went on to refer to reports that PRC authorities are less interested in individual members practising alone than those actively propagating Falun Gong as a 'core' member.
14 The Tribunal next cited a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ('DFAT') indication in November 1999 that -
'... the Chinese government's campaign against Falun Gong had targeted the leaders and organisers of the organisation, and those with some degree of influence or recognition, noting:
The main criterion for selecting individuals for prosecution while releasing others appears to be the degree to which an individual has played a leadership or organisational role in Falungong. [T]his is especially the case for those suspected of organising demonstrations and other perceived acts of defiance after the banning of Falungong on 22 July [1999]. Detainees who express contrition for their actions, renounce their beliefs and publicly denounce Falungong teachings are likely to be released quickly after questioning. Others have been released with a warning . ...
Those deemed to have played a leadership role faced possible charges of "incitement to subversion". ... PRC authorities have questioned large numbers of Falungong practitioners in their efforts to identify leaders and organisers. In many cases, such questioning has involved periods of detention. Early release is offered for those who co-operate, including by identifying those who had "led them astray".'
15 The Tribunal concluded its analysis of country information as follows:
'A Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board research response in January 2000 highlighted information indicating that Falun Dafa practitioners may face criminal as opposed to administrative punishment if they are alleged to have occupied a leadership role, publicized Falun Dafa through the Internet or print publications, "leaked state secrets" about the campaign against Falun Dafa or were high ranking officials. (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2000. CHN33627.E., 21 January - REFINFO)
Official reports continue to distinguish between a small minority of "core members" or "diehards" who play leading roles or actively participate in illegal Falungong-related activities, and the majority of ordinary practitioners "infatuated" or led astray by Falungong. (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 2001, China Falun Gong Update, 10 September - CISNET China CX57264; DFAT 2002, CIR No. 136/02 Falun Gong practitioners, 20 May - CISNET China CX64757)
The US Department of State's International Religious Freedom Report 2002, however, suggests that the targets for such repression were widened from those groups discussed above. The report stated:
After the January 2001 self-immolations of five individuals claiming to be Falun Gong practitioners in Tiananmen Square, the Government initiated a comprehensive effort to round up practitioners not already in custody, and sanctioned the use of high pressure indoctrination tactics against such individuals in an effort to force them to renounce Falun Gong. Neighborhood committees, state institutions (including universities), and companies reportedly were ordered to send all known Falun Gong practitioners to intensive anti-Falun Gong study sessions. Even practitioners who had not protested or made other public demonstrations of belief were forced to attend such classes. Those who refused to recant their beliefs after weeks of intensive anti-Falun Gong instruction reportedly were sent to reeductaion-through-labor-camps, where, in some case, beatings and torture were used to force them to recant their beliefs. These tactics reportedly resulted in large numbers of practitioners pledging to renounce the movement. (US Department of State 2002, International Religious Freedom Report 2002: China, October, section II)'