A qualified obligation of confidentiality: the first category of information
30 The mere fact that particular information is of a confidential character does not impose an obligation of absolute confidentiality on every person in possession of it. For example, ordinarily, a director who knows a trade secret of the company would be entitled to discuss that trade secret with appropriate officers of the company. Senior government officers will often be entitled to discuss matters of great secrecy and great national interest with others who are authorised to receive such information. Moreover, circumstances may arise where a person in possession of confidential information is duty bound to disclose it. Each case depends on its own circumstances and in each case there has to be an enquiry into the extent and limits of the obligation of confidentiality that may be imposed on an individual in regard to particular pieces of confidential information in his or her possession.
31 In this case, the applicant contended that the second respondent was obliged not to disclose the first category of information (that relating to the events and discussions concerning Mr Whitlam's occupation of the chair) because, it was argued, such a disclosure would be in breach of her fiduciary duties as a director of the applicant, or, such a disclosure would contravene ss 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act, or the Code of Conduct applicable to the applicant's directors.
32 The basis of the applicant's case against the fourth respondent was not expressly stated but, I think, was assumed by all concerned to be that an injunction would lie against the fourth respondent if it were established that it was a third party assisting a confidant (namely, one or other of the first three respondents) in committing a breach of confidence, that is, by publishing information known to be confidential: Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Limited & Ors [1987] 3 All ER 316 at 327 per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C.
33 It was rightly accepted by Ms McColl that, to establish a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the second respondent, the applicant had to show that the disclosure of the first category of information would be contrary to the best interests of the applicant.
34 Reliance on sub-sections 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act required the applicant to establish that publication of the information in question by the second respondent would be an improper use of her position as director, either to gain an advantage for herself or someone else, or to cause detriment to the applicant.
35 The Code of Conduct upon which the applicant relied did not take the matter significantly further. Clause 13 thereof provided that it would be improper for directors to disclose confidential information received by them in the course of directorial duties unless the disclosure had been duly authorised by the applicant itself. Clause 14 provided that directors must not disclose the content of discussion at board meetings "outside appropriate and responsible circles within the company with a legitimate interest in the subject of the disclosure, unless that disclosure has been authorised by the company…". Clause 15 provided that, subject to prior discussion with the president and notification to the board, "in the exceptional circumstances where it is in the interests of the company as a whole for disclosure of particular discussions [of board meetings] to be made public", a director may publicly disclose the contents of those discussions "if the director honestly and reasonably believes that it is in the best interests of the company as a whole to do so". Clause 16 provided that "where a decision is not unanimous, a dissenting director may disclose the fact that he/she dissented".
36 The argument of the second respondent (as supported by the fourth respondent) in essence was that it was in the interests of the applicant as a whole that she disclose to members the events and discussions relating to Mr Whitlam's occupation of the chair at the board meeting on 17 September 2001. This, it was submitted, answered the applicant's contention that the disclosure would be a breach of fiduciary duty.
37 The second and fourth respondents submitted further that disclosure of the events and discussions relating to Mr Whitlam's occupation of the chair would not be "improper" in any respect and would not be in breach of ss 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act.
38 As regards the Code of Conduct, the second and fourth respondents submitted that a disclosure of events and discussions relating to Mr Whitlam's occupation of the chair largely would be to members who had a legitimate interest in the subject matter (and, hence, within cl 14). Further, they submitted that "exceptional circumstances" existed within the meaning of cl 15 and the discussion that had taken place at the meeting of 17 September 2001 constituted the requisite prior discussion with the president and notification to the board. They submitted that the evidence as a whole revealed that the second respondent "honestly and reasonably believe[d] that it [was] in the best interests of a company as a whole" to disclose the information in question. It was also submitted that, at least to a degree, the disclosure was authorised by cl 16.
39 It is unnecessary and, in my view, undesirable, to canvass in any detail the merits of the arguments so raised by the second and fourth respondents in regard of the first category of information. It is sufficient to point to the following: