Ms Murphy - withdrawal of admissions
3 As many of the remaining objections are common to the two proceedings it is convenient to deal first with Ms Murphy's application to withdraw admissions.
4 The applicable principles may be summarised as follows: - (i) good cause must be shown to withdraw an admission, by way of a "sensible explanation… based on evidence of a solid and substantial character" (Murran Investments Pty Ltd v Aromatic Beauty Products Pty Ltd (2000) 191 ALR 579; [2000] FCA 1732 (Murran Investments) at [45], citing Celestino v Celestino [1990] FCA 449 at 8-9), (ii) good cause may be established if, for example, the admission is contrary to the facts, was made by mistake or was made "without due consideration of material matters" (Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of NSW, Santow J, 16 October 1996) cited in SLE Worldwide Australia Pty Ltd v Wyatt Gallagher Bassett Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 816 at [55]), and (iii) even if good cause is shown, the prejudice to the other party may be such as to warrant the refusal of leave to withdraw an admission (see Murran Investments).
5 Ms Murphy's statement of claim as filed pleaded that: - (i) at a meeting on 19 December 2008, Paul Harvey gave Ms Murphy a deed of release and told her she had to sign it to receive her redundancy entitlements (at [18]), (ii) Ms Murphy signed the deed of release (at [19]), and (iii) when Ms Murphy signed the deed of release Westpac was aware of a series of matters including, for example, that Ms Murphy was not required to sign the deed of release to obtain her redundancy entitlements, which made Westpac's conduct in demanding that she do so unconscionable (at [20]). Relief from the deed of release was sought on various grounds. In its defence, Westpac admitted that Ms Murphy was requested to sign a deed of release but otherwise denied or did not admit the allegations.
6 Ms Murphy's statement of claim as proposed to be amended deletes the paragraphs dealing with and the prayers for relief in respect of the deed of release.
7 The initial motion for amendment in Ms Murphy's case was not supported by any evidence. During the period of the adjournment of the motions, Ms Murphy swore an affidavit of 28 February 2011 in support of the application to withdraw the admissions. At the hearing on 22 March 2011 this affidavit was supplemented by oral evidence, particularly in cross-examination. The effect of Ms Murphy's evidence is as follows: - (i) at the time of the meeting on 19 December 2008, Ms Murphy was under enormous personal stress for a number of reasons (including, but not limited to, her redundancy), (ii) Ms Murphy's state of distress at that time was such that she recalled saying she did not want to read any of the documents except the spreadsheet showing her payouts; she also recalled signing the spreadsheet but did not recall signing anything else or much more about the meeting except for the fact that the meeting was only about 5 minutes long, (iii) because of her distressed state Ms Murphy asked Mr Harvey to keep her copies of the documents relating to her redundancy, (iv) when her statement of claim was being prepared, she asked Mr Harvey to send across to her the documents relating to her redundancy, (v) Mr Harvey emailed the deed of release with a copy of the signed spreadsheet attached to it, (vi) Ms Murphy trusted Mr Harvey and, insofar as she thought about it at all, assumed she must have signed the deed of release at the meeting on 19 December 2008, (vii) Ms Murphy did not appreciate the significance of the deed of release when her statement of claim was being prepared and, at most, the pleading should have asserted that she assumed she had signed the deed of release at the meeting on 19 December 2008 (rather than that she had done so), (viii) subsequently, when considering the entire circumstances of the meeting in a more logical state of mind, Ms Murphy took into consideration the facts that no signed copy of the deed of release could be found, none of her colleagues who had been made redundant at the same time as her had even been asked to sign such a document, and she herself recalled signing the spreadsheet but did not have (and had never had) a positive recollection of signing the deed, and (ix) in consequence, Ms Murphy had come to believe that her statement of claim was in error.
8 Despite this evidence, Westpac submitted that it was inherently extremely improbable that the pleadings would have been framed as they were unless Ms Murphy had recalled signing the deed of release when the statement of claim was being prepared. Westpac suggested that Ms Murphy's recollection had altered after she became aware that no signed copy of the deed of release could be found and that no similar request had been made of her colleagues. Westpac pointed to the lack of any evidence from the solicitor who had taken instructions from Ms Murphy in relation to the statement of claim as supporting this submission. Westpac continued to oppose the grant of leave for the withdrawal of the admissions in the statement of claim in respect of the deed of release on the basis that Ms Murphy's explanation of the circumstances relating to the making of the admissions was unsatisfactory.
9 I am satisfied that Ms Murphy should be granted leave to withdraw the admissions. Contrary to Westpac's submissions, I found Ms Murphy's explanation of the circumstances in which the pleadings were prepared, and those in which they are now sought to be amended, cogent and persuasive. In short, Ms Murphy trusted that Mr Harvey would send her copies of the documents relevant to her redundancy, being the documents which she had signed. He sent her the spreadsheet she had signed, apparently attached to the back of the deed of release. Ms Murphy (and, I infer, on her instructions her solicitors) assumed she had signed the deed. Given the length and detail of her statement of claim, as well as the fact that the events to which the pleading related occurred during a period of enormous personal distress for Ms Murphy, Ms Murphy did not appreciate that the pleading went further than her actual recollection. Considering the matter at a later time and from a more detached perspective, Ms Murphy realised that her assumption that she had signed the deed of release could not be reconciled with the lack of any signed copy or the experience of her colleagues, let alone her lack of recollection of doing so. Ms Murphy's evidence provides good, indeed compelling, cause to permit withdrawal of the admissions. Westpac did not point to any material prejudice it would suffer from the grant of leave. In these circumstances leave should and will be granted for Ms Murphy to withdraw the admissions as proposed.