Discussion
19 It is common ground that the only basis upon which the Magistrate could have authorised the procedure was that it involved " the taking of a photograph of a part of the body" which, as is apparent, appears in sub-paragraph (g) of the definition of "non-intimate forensic procedure". This appeal turns upon the question of whether the Magistrate erred in reaching that conclusion.
20 Despite extensive searches, neither counsel was able to locate any authority which might assist in the resolution of the present case. It is common ground however that the procedure which the first defendant proposes to conduct would not have been permitted at common law: see generally The Queen v Ireland (1971-2) 126 CLR 321 at 333-4; R V G [2005] NSWCCA 291. It is also common ground that a legislative intention to abrogate such a fundamental right would need to be "clearly manifested by unmistakable and unambiguous language": see Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 at 437-8; cf R v Janceski (2005) 64 NSWLR 10 per Spigelman CJ at pars 61-9. It was submitted by the plaintiff that no such intention was manifested in the legislation presently under consideration.
21 The purpose of the legislation was described by Simpson J in Orban v Bayliss [2004] NSWSC 428 in the following terms:
The Forensic Procedures Act conferred new and unprecedented powers upon, inter alia, magistrates that would have the result of compelling persons suspected of criminal offences (including those against whom charges have not been laid) to cooperate in the investigation of the crime(s) of which they are suspected, and to provide, from their own bodies, evidence which may be used against them (and which, of course, may also be used to exonerate them). The Parliament was, in my view, seeking to maintain a delicate balance between preserving the traditional rights of citizens and individuals, including those suspected of crime, to decline to participate in investigations or to cooperate with investigating authorities, and the overall interests of the community and of justice in facilitating the investigation of crime, and the administration of justice, in securing the conviction of the guilty and the non-prosecution or acquittal of the not guilty. The Act was a specific response to scientific and technological developments, but in the context of valued traditional civil liberties. (par 30)
22 See also Walker v Budgen (2005) 155 A Crim R 416 at par 17; Maguire v Beaton (2005) 162 A Crim R 22 at par 20.
23 The plaintiff concedes, as Simpson J observed, that the Act conferred "new and unprecedented powers" to compel suspects to co-operate in the investigation of crimes of which they are suspected. It is submitted however that her Honour said nothing which could possibly suggest that the scope of the legislation was of sufficient width to enable the present procedure to be brought within its purview.
24 The language used by the legislature, namely that the NIFP involves "the taking of" a sample from, or in the present case "the taking of a photograph of a part of the body" of a suspect, suggests that the suspect is a mere passive participant in the conducting of the forensic procedure. A literal reading of the legislation provides no support for the proposition that the suspect is required to perform an active role. The legislation does not, for example, require a suspect to provide a sample of his or her voice by speaking. Such a requirement would mean that a suspect would be obliged to take an active role in the process.
25 Some support for the view which I have just expressed can be found in R v Kane (2004) 144 A Crim R 496 in which Sully J, with whom Studdert and Dunford JJ agreed, made the following observations about the scope and operation of the Act:
The long title to the Act explains relevantly that the Act is intended:
"to make provision with respect to the powers to carry out forensic procedures on certain persons ..."
A careful examination of the s 3 definitions earlier herein quoted shows, in my opinion, that what is contemplated by the notion of a forensic procedure, whether intimate or non-intimate, is that it is a procedure actually carried out on the person of some specific individual. (pars 12-13).
26 The remarks made by the Minister for Police in his Second Reading Speech when introducing the legislation are to similar effect. The Minister said:
The bill provides a comprehensive regime regulating the taking and use of forensic material for the purposes of criminal investigation. It involves striking a balance between the need to enable police to effectively investigate crime and the civil liberties of suspects. The bill confirms the Government's commitment to addressing crime and improving the operation of the criminal justice system in New South Wales. It will enable law enforcement agencies to identify or exclude suspects by comparing forensic material taken from them with material found at crime scenes . (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 31 May 2000 at 6293) (emphasis added)
27 It follows from the discussion thus far, that I accept the plaintiff's submission that the vice contained in the Magistrate's order which is challenged, is that it requires the plaintiff to become an active participant in the investigation of the crime. Moreover it obliges the plaintiff to attend at the scene of the crime and participate in the partial recreation of the crime. The only semblance of any connection between that kind of procedure and the legislation is that the procedure itself will be photographed.
28 The difficulty with the proposed procedure is that, as I have said, it will require the suspect to be involved in the investigation of the crime itself. Support for the view that that is contrary to what the legislature intended can be gleaned from s 45 of the Act which is the following terms:
(1) A forensic procedure must not be carried out while the suspect is being questioned. If questioning has not been completed before the forensic procedure is to be carried out, it must be suspended while the forensic procedure is carried out.
(2) In this section, a reference to questioning of a suspect is a reference to questioning the suspect, or carrying out an investigation (in which the suspect participates), to investigate the involvement (if any) of the suspect in any offence (including an offence for which the suspect is not under arrest).
29 That section makes it clear that the carrying out of the forensic procedure is to be kept quite separate from the interrogation process and/or the conduct of the investigation itself.
30 Analysed in this fashion, it becomes clear that what is contemplated goes well beyond the statutory requirement that there be "the taking of a photograph of a part of the body" of a person.
31 There is one further consideration which is of some significance. In the normal course of events, forensic procedures, and for that matter interrogation of suspects, take place at a police station. That is where the necessary resources upon which police rely are maintained. Furthermore, safeguards to protect the integrity of any such procedure and the interrogation process itself can be provided in such an environment. Concerns about issues of privacy can also be addressed at police stations. Indeed s 44 of the Act is designed to afford reasonable privacy for a suspect who is the subject of the forensic procedure.
32 Against that background the conducting of a forensic procedure at the scene of the crime would represent a radical departure from time-honoured practice. There is nothing apparent in the legislation itself which raises the possibility that such procedures could be conducted at the scene of the crime. Of course a suspect may voluntarily engage in such a procedure at the scene of the crime, or otherwise assist police by, for example, participating in a "run-around". However such a scenario is somewhat removed from the present situation in which the suspect is required to participate in the forensic procedure.
33 Section 47 of the Act provides that a person authorised to carry out a forensic procedure on a suspect, or a police officer, may use reasonable force to enable the forensic procedure to be carried out. That may have some practical significance in the present context when it is borne in mind that the order appears to require the plaintiff to move from one position to another at the scene of the crime. The existence of such a power also serves to highlight the need to ensure that the intrusion upon the rights of a citizen which the legislation envisages must only be permitted in circumstances that are clearly authorised by the legislation.
34 For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the Magistrate erred in making the order in question.