JS
54 He was aged 14 years and 5 months at the time of the offences. He was the younger brother of MS2 and had the same positive family background. He had not demonstrated any behavioural difficulties until 2003 when he commenced truanting from school.
55 JS admitted that he kicked the victim once in the head as he lay on the ground. JS was unable to explain with any precision in the Juvenile Justice report what his exact motivation for engaging in this violent behaviour was. Alcohol and the use of illicit substances were not a factor underlying the offences.
56 JS had been engaged in fights at school and had a number of suspensions as a result of this. Fights were apparently common at school between groups of different ethnic origin. Some of these fights involved weapons and were often planned to take place outside of school hours. In such fights JS did not contemplate inflicting a lot of damage on others unless he was feeling very angry at which point he would "keep smashing them".
57 JS justified his participation in those fights as a form of self-defence and loyalty towards his peer network. The Juvenile Justice report concluded that JS had difficulty controlling his impulse to respond violently towards others when he perceived that he was being provoked. The report expressed concerns about his beliefs and attitudes towards violence.
58 In the psychologist's report JS said that "he didn't want to actually hit the guy but the boys were talking about it" and he was not going to back down and look like he was a wimp. The psychologist thought that JS was on track for developing a "severe explosive disorder" and would benefit greatly from Anger Management courses.
59 His Honour noted that none of the offenders had any criminal antecedents. He accepted (somewhat surprisingly) that each had pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity and in that regard his Honour said:
"Each is therefore entitled to a discount for the utilitarian value of their pleas of guilty towards the top end of the range of 10% to 25% identified in Thomson (2000) 49 NSWLR 383. Clearly by their pleas of guilty they have saved the community the expense of a trial and in particular have saved the victim Mr Jansz from the trauma and stresses of having to give evidence."
60 His Honour was mindful of the principles relating to the sentencing of children in s6 of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act and also of the obligation to sentence the offenders according to law. In that regard his Honour said (ROS 34):
"In sentencing the offenders I must provide adequate punishment through the recognition of the balancing required on the one hand of the need to protect the community and denounce the offence and on the other hand to promote the rehabilitation of each of the offenders and take into account the relevant subjective circumstances so as to result in a sentence reflecting justice to the community, the victim and each of the offenders."
61 At ROS 35-38 his Honour set out his conclusions and the basis for the sentences ultimately imposed. Since parts of these passages were subjected to criticism in the present applications, it is necessary to set out this part of his Honour's judgment in full.
"Although deterrence, retribution and protection of the community are not to take precedence to the exclusion of rehabilitation, but neither is rehabilitation to take precedence over deterrence, retribution and punishment. All must be balanced in the overall synthesising of the sentence - see R v MA [2004] NSWCCA 92 at [2].
As I have already said the offences for which each of the offenders is to be sentenced today are extremely serious. The offence of aggravated robbery under s96 as I said earlier carries a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment.
Aggravated robbery under s96 involves a number of circumstances of aggravation. In this case those circumstances of aggravation relied upon by the Crown are, that corporal violence was used upon the victim and that there was the malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm. However, the aggravated robbery is aggravated further by the following factors. First, that there was preplanning so as to ensure that the robbery would take place in a dark and isolated place where the victim could more easily be immobilised. Second, the offence was committed in company. Third, there was actual use of a weapon. Fourth, substantial injuries were inflicted on the victim. In particular I refer again to the evidence of Dr Hodgkinson that the victim Mr Jansz has sustained a severe traumatic brain injury likely to result in long-term high-level cognitive impairment. Fifth, the offence is aggravated by the fact that no chance was given to the victim to part with his property without being violently assaulted.
In relation to the offender PM in my view there is a further circumstance of aggravation. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on all the evidence before me that when he struck the victim he did so with an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm upon him. That intention may be readily inferred from first, the nature of the weapon used and second that the victim was struck on the head with that weapon.
I now turn to the question of the youth of the offenders. In the case of young offenders there is generally greater emphasis given to rehabilitation and less to deterrence than in cases of adult offenders. But that depends in part on the circumstances of the offence. As was said in R v MA (supra) at [28]:
"There comes a point at which the seriousness of the crime committed by a young offender particularly if a crime of violence, is so great that the special attention normally given to rehabilitation in the case of young offenders must give way and greater emphasis given to punishment and deterrence. The relevant principle was summarised in the joint judgment of this Court in R v AEM Senior & Ors [2002] NSWCCA 58 at [97]-[98] as follows:
"It is well accepted that in the case of youth, general deterrence and public denunciation usually play a subordinate role to the need to have regard to individual treatment aimed at rehabilitation … however, important as that principle is, it cannot defeat the primary purpose of punishment nor, in circumstances where young offenders conduct themselves in a way which an adult does, can it stand in the way of the need to protect society.""
In R v Pham & Ly (1991) 55 ACrimR Lee CJ at CL said this at p135:
"It is true that courts must refrain from sending young persons to prison unless that course is necessary. But the gravity of the crime and the fact that it is a crime of violence frequently committed by persons even in their teens must be kept steadfastly in mind otherwise the protective aspect of the criminal courts' function will cease to operate. In short, deterrence and retribution do not cease to be significant merely because persons in their late teens are the persons committing grave crimes, particularly crimes involving physical violence to persons in their own homes."
In R v Hearne [2001] NSWCCA 37 the Court of Criminal Appeal considered an appeal by the appellant against a sentence imposed upon him for stabbing and killing Constable Peter Forsyth in February of 1998. In reducing the sentence imposed upon the appellant the Court found that the act of the appellant in suddenly stabbing Constable Forsyth occurred in circumstances which were unplanned and that the sudden stabbing which was not premeditated resulted primarily from the immaturity of the appellant. The Court further found that his act in stabbing Constable Forsyth was impetuous.
In this case, however, there is clear pre-planning and in no way in my view can these offences be regarded as the product of an immature and impetuous act. As the Court said in R v Hearne at [28]:
"It takes no great maturity to appreciate in the course of planning for example an armed robbery or other instance of violence that such activities infringe the rights of others in a way that no civilised society can tolerate."
I will, as I must, give consideration to the fact that I am sentencing children under the law. But I must also take into account that the offences for which they are to be sentenced are, as I have previously stated, of the highest order of criminality and seriousness. As I have previously said, the protection of the community is paramount in the sentencing exercise.
However, rehabilitation is an important factor in the sentencing exercise which I must not ignore. Children, no matter how appalling their criminal acts may be, are still children and they hopefully have a long life ahead of them. The community will be benefited by the fact that when they are released from custody that there has been some rehabilitation. A crushing sentence of many years will not assist in the rehabilitation of a child.
The sentences that I will impose on the offenders are severe sentences. But I wish to make it perfectly clear and particularly to the victim who has been sitting in court throughout these entire sentencing proceedings that much longer sentences would have been imposed had the offenders been adults. The law does require me to take into account that they are children and that there must be prospects of rehabilitation, unless the offence falls into the most exceptional category that no consideration at all can be given to an offender's youth. In my view, these cases do not fall into that exceptional category."
62 His Honour concluded his remarks by referring to what he regarded as a "very troubling aspect of this case" in that he could not understand the motivation for "how these four children with no prior criminal antecedents came to commit this appalling and unprovoked ferocious attack against Mr Jansz". His Honour speculated as to the possible influence of peer pressure and violence depicted in the media and in video games so as to desensitise young persons to the real ramifications of violence. His Honour concluded:
"In my view the only appropriate sentence with respect to each of the offenders is a custodial sentence. I am also of the view that the culpability of the offender PM is greater than that of the other offenders. He clearly took the leading role as I have earlier indicated. I have found, and it is conceded by his counsel, that he was not under the pressure of his co-offenders. I do accept with respect to the other offenders that there was some degree of peer group pressure in the commission of the offences although that does not excuse the offences."