**22 The essence of the appellant's argument is that it is a key tenet of the Guides that they are directed to the assessment of permanent impairments, and a "permanent impairment" is defined as "one that has become static or stabilized during a period of time sufficient to allow optimal tissue repair and one that is unlikely to change in spite of further medical or surgical therapy."[4] The Guides further expressly provides that, before a judgment regarding impairment is made, it must be shown that the problem has been present for a period of time, is stable, and is unlikely to change in future months in spite of treatment.[5] Consequently, according to the appellant, the construction which the judge put on the Section 3.3 Direction is opposed to a key tenets of the Guides and to the fundamental conception of permanent impairment. As counsel for the appellant submitted, it would also appear to be an inherently unlikely way of going about the assessment of an index which, according to the Guides, "is intended ... to represent an informed estimate of the degree to which an individual's capacity to carry out daily activities has been diminished". She posed the question, rhetorically: why should a system of assessment which has as its avowed objective the assessment of an individual's capacity to carry out daily activities be taken to treat a patient who has had his or her capacity restored by surgery as if he or she were still in his or her pre-surgery state of incapacity? And by way of answer, she submitted that the only logical response is to conclude, as Balmford J did in Bayliss v Transport Accident Commission,[6] that the direction in clause 3.3 is "an oversight" which needs to be ignored.