21 As is often the case, however, finding that the Court has jurisdiction to transfer proceedings to the Family Court is only the beginning of the decision about whether that jurisdiction should be exercised.
22 The liquidator says that the issues which are raised will involve questions of the interpretation of various Family Court orders. He says that there is a question of whether the orders which Rowland J made on July 2003 proceeded on a basis which assumed the validity of the appointment of the liquidator, and whether, if that is so, it is not open to the parties to challenge that assumption which underlays the Court orders. The liquidator submits that even if that submission not be correct, the occasion would then arise for there being a possible application under the Family Court to amend orders it has made either under the slip rule, or under the power of the Court to set-aside compromises, where there has been a material mistake and an order has been entered pursuant to that compromise.
23 One possible candidate for the application of the slip rule is the orders made by the Full Family Court. Those orders set aside the order of Faulks J, but did nothing to set aside the order of Chisholm J of 10 May 2002, pursuant to which the parties were directed to appoint Mr Young as liquidator and the registrar was authorised to execute the documents.
24 It is suggested by the liquidator (by way of acknowledging a point which could possibly be made against him, rather than as a point he positively seeks to make) that it might be submitted that the Full Family Court by mistake failed to also set aside the order which Chisholm J made. I express no view on the likelihood of the Full Family Court having made a slip of that kind, beyond noting that the order which Chisholm J made does not appear to have been appealed against. The other order which it is submitted might be a candidate for the operation of the slip rule is the order of Rowland J of 3 July.
25 It is also submitted that, in deciding what orders would be appropriate, even if the appointment of the liquidator were to be set aside, or held to have been initially invalid, there are matters like procedural aspects of the conduct of the trial, including possibly the circumstances of appointment of the next friend, which might need to be taken into account in deciding the rights of the parties, and crafting any appropriate relief. It is also submitted that, even if the appointment of the liquidator was held to be vitiated, there may then be power to make a winding-up order under section 461 of the Corporations Act on the just and equitable ground and that, for what were essentially family companies like these ones, the evidence which has already been taken into account in the Family Court might be material for that purpose.
26 So far as the application for extension of time to appeal, and (if extension is granted) the appeal against rejection of proof of debt aspect is concerned, the liquidator accepts that there is no special advantage in the Family Court deciding those matters, but says that the issues involved in determination of those matters are not matters which involve any special expertise in corporate law, so there is no strong reason to keep them in this Court. There is, he submits, an advantage in keeping both aspects of the matter together, so if the challenge to the validity of appointment of the liquidator goes to the Family Court, the proof of debt matters should go too.
27 There has been no particular countervailing factor which has been pointed to by Mr Morton in his submissions.
28 In taking into account the interests of justice, under section 1337H (2), the Court can take into account interests of people other than the parties immediately before it. The wife will be affected by whatever the outcome of the current application is, and the Family Court has a wider range of powers than does this Court to take account of the wife's situation.