Re: ESTATE OF MRS DAWN DAY-MILES
We have been consulted by children of the abovenamed who recently passed away. In order to advise our clients as to any possible entitlement, would you kindly provide us with a copy of the will forwarded by you to the Caro Synagogue.
Yours faithfully,
ROACH & HALLIGAN
21 Watkins Tapsell asked for proof of death. On 1 November 2001, Mr Halligan forwarded copy of the death certificate of the deceased and asked for a copy of the will to be faxed to him. This was sent on 2 November 2001. There was other correspondence between the Public Trustee and Messrs Watkins Tapsell concerning the original will and confirming that it had been sent to the Caro Synagogue on 10 June 1998.
22 Some time in 2002 Richard and Andrew changed solicitors from Mr Halligan to Mr Scully of Macree Scully Solicitors of Bankstown. Mr Scully was known to Andrew. At the time the change took place, Richard and Andrew were both aware that the original will could not be found. They also knew that the will had been made. It seems that Mr Scully was instructed to apply for a grant of letters of administration on the basis the deceased died intestate. Mr Scully knew of the 1997 will. Andrew had gone to the synagogue to ask for it. The affidavit in support of the grant was sworn on 19 December 2002. It disclosed nothing of the 1997 will according to Richard on the basis that the deceased had said that she had destroyed the papers in the glove box. If that were so then the affidavit was quite misleading. It made no mention of the inquiries for a particular will but general information about searches and inquiries for a will at the bank by advertisements in the Law Society Journal and by inquiries of solicitors in the area where the deceased lived. Mr Scully may have made these inquiries. On any basis the affidavit was misleading.
23 Letters of administration were granted on 27 December 2002. The only property of the deceased disclosed was her home at Kianga, estimated to be worth $150,000.
24 By statement of claim in new proceedings 121579 of 2003 (the first revocation proceedings) between Mr David, as plaintiff, as representative for the synagogue and Richard and Andrew as defendants, application was made for revocation of the grant of letters of administration and for a grant of letters of administration with a copy of the 1997 will annexed to be made to Mr David. An amended statement of claim was filed on 19 April 2004 in a more appropriate form for a grant to a syndic. The statement of claim alleged that the will 2 December 1997 remained unrevoked at the death of the deceased, but that the original will could not be found. The Public Trustee had by then renounced probate of that will. The original statement of claim was served on Richard and Andrew. The amended statement of claim was probably not served but nothing really turns on this. There was no appearance. After a number of false starts, and on the basis that the will was last traced to the synagogue but could not be found, I made orders on 10 May 2004 revoking the grant of letters of administration on intestacy and for a grant of letters of administration with a copy of the lost will annexed to be made to Mr David as syndic for the synagogue until the original will was proved. Orders were made for the earlier grant to be deposited in the registry and for accounts to be filed and passed by Richard and Andrew. Those orders were served. The new grant was issued on 10 May 2004.
25 The orders as to deposit of the original grant with the court and for accounts were not obeyed. A notice of motion for punishment for contempt was filed. At that stage Mr Scully appeared, filed in court appearances by Richard and Andrew, and in essence took responsibility and produced accounts showing the Kianga property was sold with net proceeds of sale of $158,414.37 which after deduction of costs was distributed between Richard and Andrew.
Estoppel Defence
26 In response to a defence of estoppel in the present action, being the second revocation proceedings, the plaintiffs here, Andrew and Richard, gave affidavit evidence to the effect that when served with the first revocation statement of claim, they put the matter in the hands of Mr Scully; that they had sent the documents to him; that they had a number of meetings with him at which he made notes of their version of events; that they attended a conference with a barrister but were unhappy with his views and asked Mr Scully to brief a different barrister. They said that Mr Scully arranged for them to attend to see a new barrister on 24 October and asked them to meet him in the coffee shop below the relevant chambers. They said that Mr Scully came to the coffee shop and said "I've got bad news. The synagogue has successfully overturned the letters of administration". They went to see the new barrister who said that as Mr Scully had been to see him for advice for having failed to act they should seek alternative representation. They said that until that day they did not know that the matter had been to court.
27 Mr Scully did not give evidence but this evidence of Andrew and Richard was not really challenged and I accept it. It was clearly relevant to the application to set aside the order made in their absence pursuant to Pt36 r16(2)(b) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 . It is fair to say that it was not really made clear whether the second revocation claim was put on the basis of setting aside an order made in the absence of the defendants in those proceedings or whether the application was made on the basis that a grant in favour of the synagogue was not a grant in solemn form but rather an interlocutory order not available to support a defence of estoppel by judgment. Both were argued and only arose through an amended defence filed at the commencement of the hearing although notified some time before.
28 Some time was spent in argument as to whether the grant of letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed was a grant in common form or in solemn form. While this was interesting I do not think it is necessary to spend time on it. As the grant was limited until the original will be proved it was certainly not a final order in one sense. It might be though that a solemn form grant cannot be made in a case where the original will is not proved: after all the original will might be found later with the word "revoked" written across it. However, this thought is not correct. This is best explained in the second edition of Mortimer on Probate at pages 533 and 593 with the statement of claim precedent 16 on page 1036 being an action in solemn form where the executor propounds a lost will. The real difference between grants in solemn form and grants in common form is that the latter grants are usually applied for ex parte and on summons, no person other than the applicant for a grant being joined as a party; whereas solemn form actions are commenced by statement of claim and interested parties are either joined as defendants and served or are served with citations so as to bind them to the result. Persons properly joined as defendants and necessarily so joined, as were Richard and Andrew in the first revocation proceedings, are as a matter of law bound by the result unless and until the judgment is set aside. Service on them brought about this result and the fact the grant did not include the words "in solemn form" does not change this. But even if it did Richard and Andrew as parties to the first revocation hearing, were bound by the result. They could not, in my view, have argued thereafter that it was an interlocutory order on an issue which they were entitled to have relitigated. The right of any interested person in an estate to require a will proved in common form to be proved in solemn form cannot sensibly extend to parties to common form proceedings on pleadings if such proceedings are possible which I do not consider they are. Thus a defence based on estoppel would succeed unless the claim of the plaintiffs in their reply succeeds namely that the judgment should be set aside as it was obtained in their absence through the fault of their lawyer, not themselves, thus giving the court discretion to set aside the judgment so obtained if satisfied there was some defence on the merits. In probate actions it is the grant pursuant to judgment which must be revoked. That makes it appropriate and desirable to claim this by separate action. In special circumstances even a grant in solemn form made in the absence of a party or persons cited, can be set aside even though a judgment in rem. I consider there are proper grounds to allow the plaintiffs to bring this action: Re Barraclough deceased [1967] P 1 at 11; Re Izett [1982] 2 NZLR 425. I turn to the merits.