Affidavit of Mr Taylor
16Mr Taylor is employed by Xstrata Coal NSW Pty Ltd ("XCN") in the position of Maintenance Manager of Liddell Coal Operations Pty Ltd ("LCO"). He commenced working for XCN on or about November 2007 as Maintenance Manager for Glendell Mine. In September 2009 he was appointed to his current position as Maintenance Manager of LCO. Annexed to his affidavit was a copy of his position description which listed his responsibilities including accountabilities for sustainable development within the maintenance department, cost performance, and fleet performance for LCO.
17Mr Taylor commenced working in the mining industry in 1986 as a graduate mechanical engineer and has worked in the industry since that time. He listed his qualifications and various roles during his career in his affidavit.
18Mr Taylor described the site where the incident took place. The Plant is a facility located 20 minutes northwest of Singleton, New South Wales. The Plant processes coal received from the adjoining open cut operation, Liddell Open Cut Mine, for transportation to market. At the time of the incident, the Plant produced semi-soft coking coal and thermal product coal. Mr Taylor described the plant associated with the Plant at the time of the incident. This included a Unit Train Loader ("UTL") Reyrolle 11 kilovolt Open Circuit Board Plant switch room (located underneath the motor room).
19The switch room contained various electrical cabinets, including the UTL 3.3/3 cabinet involved in the incident. These cabinets housed and secured the operating and earthing switches and allowed switching to occur. The switch room was secured by a locked door that could only be opened with a special abloy key. This key was only issued to appointed electricians who were employees, not contractors. Annexed to the affidavit was a photograph of an electrical abloy key. A register of key type, including abloy keys, was kept and maintained by the Commercial Manager. In addition, the cabinets located within the switch room were secured by a "deformed" tool, which was also only kept by appointed electricians. A photograph of a "deformed" tool was annexed to the affidavit.
20The switch room had several warning signs located on its front door. A photograph of the signs on the door at the time of the incident was annexed to the affidavit.
21An organisational chart showing the hierarchy of management positions within the Plant at the time of the incident was annexed to the affidavit.
22Mr Taylor stated that at the time of the incident, the Plant was managed by LCO on behalf of the incorporated Liddell Joint Venture. At the time of the incident, the nominated operator for the Plant was, and continues to be, the defendant. The defendant is owned by Liddell Joint Venture. A copy of the ownership structure was annexed to the affidavit. The ownership structure presently remains the same.
23Mr Taylor stated that from early 2008, Liddell Joint Venture has spent approximately $120 M in replacing and improving the Plant and other infrastructure with the latest technology.
24At the time of the incident, the defendant employed the majority of the workforce, including Mr Deakin. A copy of Mr Deakin's personnel file was attached to the affidavit. Mr Taylor outlined Mr Deakin's employment history with the defendant.
25Mr Deakin commenced work at the Plant in or around September 1979. A copy of Mr Deakin's Application for Employment was attached to the affidavit. Mr Deakin worked with Upper Hunter County Council for 10 years prior to commencing at the Plant. Mr Taylor outlined Mr Deakin's relevant work experience at Upper Hunter County Council.
26Mr Taylor listed the relevant training courses that Mr Deakin undertook after he commenced work at the Plant. These included "Advanced Certificate in Applied Industrial Electronics" in December 1992; "Take 5 Risk Assessment, Energy Isolation Awareness and Liddell LCPP Emergency Response Standard" on 16 March 2006; "LCPP Isolation Tag and Permit Procedures" on 10 December 1999; "Hazard Awareness" in March 1999; "Isolation Refresher" on 6 June 2006 and 9 August 2006, and "AS3000 Wiring Rules" on 31 October 2006.
27Before being allowed to perform certain functions, employees at the time of the incident, were required to gain an appointment (certificate) at the Plant which was issued by the Coal Handling Preparation Plant Manager. An individual was required to demonstrate a high level of skill, training and experience. At the time of the incident, Mr Deakin held the following relevant appointments: Supervising Electrician; Switch Gear Operator, and electrical appointment for the UTL.
28Mr Taylor stated that only the employees at the Plant who held the appointments listed above were allowed to do high voltage work, including switching. On the day of the incident, Mr Deakin accompanied Mr John Tout (a contractor that the Plant had engaged to repair a conveyor motor) to the switch room to confirm the necessary isolations, which had been done earlier that day. Mr Tout was not appointed to perform high voltage work at the Plant.
29At the time of the incident, Mr Deakin was part of the D crew. The D crew's role was to assist in the production and processing of coal. Mr Deakin was also required to perform electrical or maintenance type work, when required. When performing a production type role, Mr Deakin would report to Coal Handling Preparation Plant supervisors during a day shift, or a team coordinator during a night shift. When performing a maintenance or electrical type role, Mr Deakin would report to Mr Ian O'Brien, a coal handling preparation plant maintenance engineer. At the time of the incident, Mr Deakin was reporting to Mr O'Brien.
30Mr Taylor stated that at the beginning of each shift, Mr Deakin would find out what he was to do and his role. If he was required to do electrical work, Mr O'Brien would, in most cases, give Mr Deakin a work order. On the day of the incident, Mr Deakin was not issued with a work order. Instead, Mr O'Brien asked that Mr Deakin take Mr Tout to the switch room and confirm to Mr Tout that the necessary isolation, which Mr Deakin had done earlier that morning, was in place before Mr Tout commenced his work, as per Mr Tout's Job Safety Analysis.
31Mr Taylor detailed the systems in place at the time of the incident.
32The Plant Health, Safety, Environment and Community ("HSEC") Management System was available in hard copy and was located at the Coal Handling Preparation Plant office. It included a Liddell Coal Preparation Plant HSEC Policy and Management Plan. It also included the Liddell Coal Preparation Plant management plans; standards; policies; plans; systems; procedures; registers, and forms. Mr Taylor described in detail the relevant Policy and Management Plan. At the time of the incident, a copy of the Policy could be found on the Plant intranet. It was also displayed at the front entrance, in the boardroom, and in various offices. The Management Plan was a framework document. It set out the structure of the Plant's HSEC management system.
33At the time of the incident, the Plant required its employees and contractors to complete a permit and have it authorised before performing certain types of work. Examples of the permits relevant to the incident were detailed in the affidavit, including Work Permits and High Voltage Switching Instructions and Permit. A copy of the work permit completed by Mr Tout prior to him commencing work on the day of the incident was annexed to the affidavit.
34In or about late December 2006, the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 2002 and Coal Mine Health and Safety Regulation 2006 came into force. This legislation imposed certain duties on colliery operators to implement specific management plans. Mr Taylor listed the relevant action items that were entered into Xstrasafe, a computer program whereby action items could be tracked. This arose from a meeting of senior staff in about early 2007. In practice, action items were identified; given an appropriate due date; allocated to a person, and details entered into Xstrasafe. Every Monday, at the Plant's weekly meeting, the entire management team would review actions that were due that day, or overdue, and put extra steps in place to ensure that they were closed out in a reasonable amount of time. As a result of the meetings, the High Voltage Management Plan and Electrical Engineering Management Plan ("EEMP") relevant to the incident, were developed.
35Mr Taylor stated that one of the action items that arose out of the 2007 meeting was to consider "the safe operation of high voltage installations throughout their lifecycle". To assist in the development of the High Voltage Management Plan, electrical expertise from PACE Engineers Group were retained to assist. At the time of the incident, the draft plan was approximately 80 per cent complete, but had not been finalised.
36Another action item that arose out of the 2007 meeting was to develop an EEMP. In or around either late 2006 or early 2007, a draft plan was being developed. It was modelled off an EEMP from one of the Plant's sister sites. At the time of the incident, the EEMP had not been completed, however a draft version of the document was available on the intranet and some parts were being put in practice at the Plant.
37Mr Taylor detailed the risk assessments, audits and inspections relevant at the time of the incident.
38The Plant used a combination of formal risk assessments and informal pre-job risk assessments. The Plant Risk Management Standard required Mr Deakin to conduct a risk assessment or job safety analysis prior to completing the type of work he performed on the day of the incident. A risk assessment was not completed, as required.
39At the time of the incident, the Plant's safety management system was monitored through a system of internal and external audits. Any action items arising out of an audit were entered into the Xstrasafe system.
40The Plant also had an inspection system. A copy of a blank monthly inspection form was attached to Mr Taylor's affidavit. This form was used during monthly electrical inspections of various locations, including the switch room.
41Mr Taylor stated that at the time of the incident, the management team including Mr Gibbs, Mr O'Brien, Mr Symes and Ms King, would meet on a weekly basis to review various documents within the Plant's HSEC management system (the Site Standards Review Meeting), in addition to the weekly Monday meetings. The purpose of the Site Standards Review Meeting was to review and improve the Plant HSEC management system documentation.
42At the time of the incident, the Plant communicated with its workforce via toolbox talks; OHS Committee meetings; noticeboards (including information on Safety Alerts); shift handover communications; weekly operations meetings, and reports.
43Employees were scheduled to attend relevant training on an ongoing and refresher basis. Relevantly, Mr Taylor noted that on 31 October 2006, the Plant's electricians, including Mr Deakin, attended a one day course on "AS3000 Wiring Rules" provided by Em Dee Engineering Pty Ltd. A copy of the course topics was attached to the affidavit. Mr Taylor detailed the relevant sections.
44Mr Taylor described the steps taken after the incident. On 1 April 2010, LCO restructured its connection with the Liddell Open Cut Mine from being a contract operator to an owner operator. This prompted a review of the systems and documentation used at both Liddell Open Cut Mine and the Plant. This resulted in a single site Sustainable Development (previously known as HSEC) management system being developed.
45Mr Taylor stated that the electric shock received by Mr Deakin was limited by the operation of the earth leakage protection system tripping as designed, which tripped power off in 107 milliseconds, immediately stopping all incoming power to the UTL 3.3/3 cabinet. Mr Taylor stated that consistent with his training, Mr Deakin notified the team co-ordinator, as per the Plant policy, via the two way radio. The team co-ordinator then assisted Mr Deakin to the first aid room, where ice packs were applied to Mr Deakin's hands, therapy oxygen was given and his condition monitored. In accordance with standard procedure, Mr Deakin was transported to Muswellbrook Hospital for assessment. He was discharged a few hours later and returned to work for his next scheduled shift on 19 November 2007.
46On 6 December 2007, a risk assessment of the use of electricity at the Plant was conducted in response to the incident.
47After the incident, changes were made to the UTL 3.3/3 cabinet. An additional Fortress locking system was fitted to the panel. This system only allows access to de-energised switch gear and terminals. Mr Taylor stated it was fit for purpose and complies with AS3000, AS3007. The isolation systems address MDG40. Toughened glass windows were inserted into the UTL cabinet doors. This allows the electricians to safely view the switch gear so as to verify the isolation and earthing. Additional signage was also installed.
48Mr Taylor stated that in late March 2011, the Plant's switch room, which currently houses the UTL 3.3/3kV cabinet, will be de-commissioned. During the week of 14 March 2011, the Plant commenced commissioning hardware for a new facility, using up to and including 415V. Once commissioning of the new facility is complete, and the switch room de-commissioned, 3.3kV will no longer be used at the Plant.
49Mr Taylor listed the relevant improvements that have been implemented since the incident. These included a review of the EEMP. As a result, the Plant reviewed its isolation procedures and safe work procedures, added photographs to the written descriptions of the steps, and added sign off boxes to its isolation procedures. Since this review, the EEMP has been reviewed on a number of occasions and a copy of the current version was attached to Mr Taylor's affidavit.
50Changes to the High Voltage Work System were also implemented. Since the incident, to conduct high voltage work, employees and contractors need, amongst other requirements, to be authorised to perform the work, and to complete a recognised competency based course in high voltage work.
51Since the incident, the Plant has reviewed and updated its high voltage work permit system. This system requires, prior to any high voltage work, that electricians complete a high voltage work permit and have it signed off by an electrical engineer or their nominee. A copy of the High Voltage Work Permit currently in use at the Plant was attached to the affidavit. Since early December 2010, the Plant's High Voltage Work Permit system was replaced by an XCN wide permit system. This also requires that prior to any high voltage work, a high voltage work permit must be completed and signed off.
52Additionally, as a result of the risk assessment, a High Voltage Safety Management Plan was developed to provide an overview of the measures needed to control risks associated with high voltage electrical installations at the Plant. Mr Taylor listed the relevant measures contained in the plan, a copy of which was attached to the affidavit. These included safety rules, operating procedures, safety equipment, systems of work and qualifications and training.
53High Voltage Safety Rules were developed to support the High Voltage Safety Management Plan and provide a guide to electrical personnel. Mr Taylor stated that they have a broad application across all high voltage electrical work, are supported by procedures and are the basis for the assessment of competence.
54Mr Taylor stated that immediately after the incident, access to the UTL 3.3/3 cabinet was restricted to one key, which was held by Mr O'Brien, the Coal Handling Preparation Plant Maintenance Engineer. A short time after this, in order to get access to the UTL 3.3/3 cabinet, suitably appointed electricians were required to set out the steps they were going to take on a high voltage access permit, which had to be checked by Mr O'Brien. In September 2008, Mr Deakin and Mr Symes developed the "UTL 3.3/3 HV Isolation Procedure (Internal)" which provided safe access to 3.3kV high voltage switch equipment in the UTL 3.3/3 panel. A copy of the procedure was attached to the affidavit.
55Mr Taylor stated that as a consequence of the changes to plant, systems and documentation after the incident, the defendant either provided or arranged for relevant training to be conducted. He described some of the training courses in his affidavit. These included a course run by Country Energy in March, July and December 2008 titled "Country Energy High Voltage Safe Work Practice Course for Access Permit Issuers & Recipients". In or about April 2010, Mr Nick Hall, electrical engineer, gave a series of electrical presentations, including a refresher presentation titled "High Voltage" to electricians at the Plant. A copy of the presentation was attached to the affidavit.
56Mr Taylor stated that LCO, on behalf of the entities associated with the Plant, has contributed directly to local initiatives. In 2009, LCO contributed $11,375 towards community events and programs including the Cancer Council, Lifeline Muswellbrook Shop, Singleton Mercy Nursing Home, and the Lake Liddell Trust Area. In 2010, LCO provided a total of $13,273 to support local projects including the Hebden Rural Fire Brigade, Lifeline Muswellbrook, Hebden Wild Dog Association, and the Prostate Cancer Foundation of Australia. Mr Taylor stated that LCO has committed $24,000 towards a Community Support Program for 2011.
57Additionally, Mr Taylor stated that the Plant encourages its employees to partake in initiatives such as Movember (raising funds for Beyond Blue and the Prostate Cancer Foundation of Australia), the Sparke Helmore/NBN Television Triathlon, Quit Smoking, and Relay for Life. The Plant also provides salary sacrifice for charitable donations. The Plant's purchasing standards requires it to use local businesses where possible and hire local personnel when recruiting. The Plant also holds Community Consultation Committee forums twice a year to discuss topics such as environmental performance, complaints, progress over the preceding year, and plans for the forthcoming year.
58Mr Taylor stated that the defendant accepts responsibility for its failures in relation to the incident. He stated that the defendant recognises that it did not meet its obligations under the OHS Act and acknowledged that its failures exposed Mr Deakin to a risk to his health and safety which resulted in an electric shock injury. Mr Taylor stated that on behalf of the defendant, he was authorised to express remorse for these failures. The defendant was particularly regretful of the impact the incident had on Mr Deakin, his family, and his colleagues.