15 There was dispute between the parties as to whether there was a need to show a causal nexus between the disability and the failure to bring the cause of action. Mr Temby argued that if the Applicant's evidence that he knew of no requirement to bring proceedings was accepted, then his disability had no impact on the failure to bring proceedings. Mr Campbell argued that this introduced a dimension with which the Act was not concerned. I agree with Mr Campbell in that if disability is established it is not necessary to then examine the relationship between the disability and the failure to bring proceedings (the disability of children is an obvious example). However in the case of a s 11(3)(b) disability it is a question of fact as to whether the person was substantially impeded in the management of his affairs. 'Substantial' does not mean total impediment nor does it mean 'trivial or minimal' impediment: Kotulski (supra) at 117C per Slattery J and see p 118C. Whilst I accept that there may be difficulties in obtaining a detailed statement from a person in custody and enabling proper instructions to be given there is in this case evidence that by the end of 1991 a detailed statement had already been provided by the Applicant (see Annexure "A"; and see also Annexures "B" and "C" to the Applicant's affidavit of 5 June 2004), and by 1993, I infer, his solicitor, Mr Marx, had access to the police documents and medical records relating to the examination of the Applicant (see Annexures "F" to "T" and see Annexure "E" p 4 of transcript of 4 August 1993 - no copies of Mr Marx's letters referred to in the correspondence from the Ombudsman were produced), all of which was sufficient to mount a successful campaign with the Ombudsman. Although Mr Morris did give evidence of the limitations on phone access and checks on correspondence there is nothing to indicate that the proceedings before the Ombudsman were impeded by reason of his incarceration and no evidence that a step required for commencement of civil proceedings (for example a fresh medical examination) could not be arranged. An examination of the Plaintiff by a medical practitioner was carried out soon after the injuries were reported and a report was prepared. There is evidence (see p 4 of the transcript of 4 August 1993) that a psychiatric report had been subsequently obtained. Thus whilst I would not exclude the possibility of full time custody being a substantial impediment I am not persuaded that in this case it was. It follows therefore that the limitation period expires in October 1994 and the court by virtue of s 60C(2) has no power to extend the limitation period beyond October 1999. That conclusion disposes of the matter but against the possibility I am in error I shall deal with the other issues in the case on the basis that the limitation period was suspended to 22 October 1997 and ended on 22 October 2000.