In my opinion the interpretation placed by Lord Somervell of Harrow, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in McKenna v. Porter Motors Ltd. [3] upon grounds (h) and (m) contained in sub-s. (1) of s. 24 of the Tenancy Act 1948 N.Z. must be applied to grounds (g) (ii) and (m) contained in sub-s. (5) of s. 62 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1948-1954 N.S.W.. In the course of the judgment his Lordship referred to certain remarks of mine in Burling v. Chas. Steele & Co. Pty. Ltd. [1] made in reference to grounds (g) (ii) and (l) contained in sub-reg. (5) of reg. 58 of the National Security (Landlord and Tenant) Regulations. At the time these remarks were made the National Security (War Service Moratorium) Regulations were in force and it was provided by reg. 30 (2) of those regulations that an application should not be made for an order for the recovery of possession of any premises from a protected person on any ground specified in pars. (f), (k) or (l) of sub-reg. (5) of reg. 58 of the National Security (Landlord and Tenant) Regulations. It was provided by reg. 30 (5) that notwithstanding the provisions of the National Security (Landlord and Tenant) Regulations, an order should not be made for the recovery of possession of any premises from a protected person on the grounds specified in pars. (g) or (i) of sub-reg. (5) of reg. 58 of the National Security (Landlord and Tenant) Regulations unless the court making the order was satisfied - (a) that reasonably suitable alternative accommodation was, or had been since the date upon which notice to quit was given, available for the occupation of the protected person or (b) that the protected person had sub-let the premises in respect of which the order was sought and was permanently residing elsewhere. When, therefore, the lessee was a protected person, it was impossible for a lessor who required the demised premises for reconstruction or demolition to obtain an order for possession but it was possible for him to do so if he required them for occupation by himself &c. Accordingly a lessor who could prove that he reasonably required premises in order to occupy them by himself etc. and as incidental thereto to reconstruct or demolish the existing building, whether it was replaced or not, was in a more favourable position when the lessee was a protected person than a lessor who could not prove that he reasonably required the premises for occupation by himself etc. By a strange inversion, under the Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act N.S.W., a lessor who seeks to recover premises from a lessee who is a protected person in order to reconstruct or demolish the premises is in a more favourable position if he proceeds under ground (m) than if he proceeds under ground (g) (ii) because s. 100 of that Act provides that "except in the case of an order made upon any one or more of the grounds set out in pars. (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (k), (m), (n), (o), (p), (q) or (r) of sub-s. (5) of s. 62 of this Act, an order for the recovery of possession of any prescribed premises shall not be made against a protected person unless the court, in addition to being satisfied upon any other ground upon which the court is required to be satisfied, is further satisfied - (a) that reasonably suitable alternative accommodation is, or has been since the date upon which the notice to quit was given, available for the occupation of the protected person or (b) that the protected person (being the lessee) has sub-let the prescribed premises in respect of which the making of an order is sought and is permanently residing elsewhere". A lessor therefore who seeks to recover possession of premises from a protected person for occupation by himself &c. under ground (g) (ii) is still in the same position as he was under the National Security (War Service Moratorium) Regulations, whereas a lessor who seeks to recover possession of premises from such a person in order to reconstruct or demolish them can now take proceedings to do so and the court can make an order after taking into consideration, in accordance with s. 70 (1) in addition to all other relevant matters, "(a) any hardship which would be caused to the lessee or any other person by the making of the order; (b) any hardship which would be caused to the lessor or any other person by the refusal of the court making the order; and (c) whether reasonably suitable alternative accommodation in lieu of the prescribed premises is, or has been since the date upon which notice to quit was given, available for the occupation of the person occupying the prescribed premises or for the occupation of the lessor or other person by whom the prescribed premises would be occupied if the order were made". As stated in the remarks that appear in [1] , I did not intend to suggest in Burling's Case [2] that the two grounds in question were mutually exclusive but that if the lessor could prove that he reasonably required the premises for occupation by himself &c., although he also intended to reconstruct or demolish them, he could proceed under ground (g) (ii), but that if all that he wished to prove was that he reasonably required them for reconstruction or demolition so as to leave himself free to put the premises to some use other than occupation by himself &c., ground (l) was the appropriate ground. I did not intend to suggest that a landlord who wanted to reconstruct or demolish the premises for occupation by himself &c. could not rely on ground (l) as well as on ground (g) (ii), but that if he relied on ground (l) he might be met by a defence not open to the lessee under ground (g) (ii). Where, therefore, the lessor could prove that he reasonably required the premises for reconstruction or demolition for occupation by himself &c., (g) (ii) was the correct ground. The definition of a protected person in the National Security (War Service Moratorium) Regulations was so wide that a lessor might often have found that ground (l) was not available.