The appeal
43At the hearing of the appeal, the sole ground of appeal was the contention that the aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive
44The aggregate sentence necessarily comprehended the sentence indicated for the child abuse material. Given the quite separate and distinct offending comprehended by that charge, the indicated sentence must have been notionally accumulated, to some degree, on the nine break, enter and steal offences the subject of a separate indictment. The focus of the submissions of both counsel was, however, on that part of the aggregate sentence which must be taken to account for the break, enter and steal offences. It appeared to be common ground that, in the application of totality principles, it was that offending which occupied his Honour' primary attention and to which, in a practical sense, the length of the aggregate sentence must be attributed.
45The applicant submitted that on a review of a number of relevantly comparable cases where sentences for multiple break, enter and steal offences were the subject of consideration by this Court, a review amplified by the sentencing statistics compiled by the Judicial Commission, the sentence imposed in this case, is what counsel described as an "outlier", which I take to mean a sentence so far in excess of past sentences as to result in a sentence that is "unreasonable and plainly unjust".
46The applicant's counsel accepted the limitations on the use that can be made of extrinsic material when challenging a sentence as manifestly excessive on appeal (see Hili v R; Jones v R [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 at [54]). He also acknowledged that neither sentencing statistics nor past sentencing decisions fix a range within which sentence might or should fall or that sentences imposed in other cases dictate whether a sentence under challenge is beyond the exercise of a permissible sentencing discretion (see Barbaro v R; Zirilli v R [2014] HCA 2; 305 ALR 323 at [28] and [41]). He maintained the submission however that when the whole of the circumstances that have informed sentences imposed in the past for comparable offending are examined, and where a sentence under challenge is not relevantly distinguishable on its facts and a markedly more severe sentence is imposed, then the past sentences may properly be used as a measure to assist an appellate court to decide whether a sentence said to be manifestly excessive is shown to be "unreasonable or plainly unjust".
47Accepting that to be a principled approach, the question remains whether the applicant has made good his challenge to the aggregate sentence imposed in this case as manifestly excessive. Counsel acknowledged that the question is not whether this Court would have imposed an aggregate sentence of the length of the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge but, rather, whether the aggregate sentence imposed in this case, a sentence which I accept is at the upper limit of a notional range, was so excessive as to amount to error.
48The applicant submitted that despite the sustained and repeated nature of the offending and the sheer quantity and estimated value of the property that was stolen, the degree of notional accumulation between the break, enter and steal offences has exceeded the exercise of a sound sentencing discretion having regard to the applicant's subjective circumstances and, in particular, the fact that he had no prior criminal record which ought to have afforded him some leniency which was not reflected in the aggregate sentence imposed.
49In two of three cases to which particular reference was made (Watts v R [2007] NSWCCA 153 and Lewins v R [2007] NSWCCA 189), sentences were imposed by this Court on re-sentence in accordance with the approach in Pearce v R [1998] HCA 57; 194 CLR 610 with the actual extent of accumulation between the individual sentences revealed in the sentencing order. In the third case (Hernandez v R [2013] NSWCCA 51), sentence was imposed pursuant to s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, coincidentally by the same sentencing judge who imposed the aggregate sentence on this applicant.
50The insertion of s 53A by the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment Act 2010 (NSW) was not intended to alter the application of totality principles. Rather, it is a procedural provision designed to simplify the sentencing process where an offender is to be sentenced for multiple offences and to render the sentencing exercise more transparent by requiring a sentence for each offence to be indicated by the sentencing judge before a single aggregate sentence is pronounced. The same principled approach to questions of accumulation and concurrency in the exercise of the sentencing discretion in fixing an aggregate sentence in conformity with totality principles obtains under s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act as it did under the previous sentencing regime where an effective sentence was the result of the appointment of different commencement dates for individual sentences.
51Although a far larger cohort of cases was extracted in a schedule attached to the submissions of the applicant's counsel, the greater majority of which are not relevantly comparable and only some of which were the subject of elaboration in submissions of both counsel, it is necessary to refer to only three.
52In Watts, the offender pleaded guilty to eleven offences contrary to s 112(1) of the Crimes Act, three offences contrary to s 113(1) and asked for 23 further offences to be taken into account. At first instance, he was sentenced to imprisonment for an effective term of 11 years with a non-parole period of 7 years. On appeal, he was re-sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years with a non-parole period of 3 years. Unlike the applicant, the offender had an uncertain and occasionally violent upbringing, and a psychologist opined that he had depression and anxiety. He had made suicide attempts and was addicted to heroin. The Court allowed the sentence appeal because the value of the goods stolen by the offender (estimated at $83,000) was "modest" by comparison with the value of goods stolen by the offender in Danuca v R [2005] NSWCCA 45 (estimated at $785,000), and because Harrison J (with whom Giles JA and Hidden J agreed) was satisfied that an "extremely unfortunate combination of factors influenced the applicant to commit the offences with which he was charged and to which he pleaded guilty" (at [60]). In addition to Danuca, Harrison J also considered the cases of R v Lay [2006] NSWCCA 45 and R v Johnson [1999] NSWCCA 431, the offenders in both cases being young (20 years old and 22 years old respectively), both were addicted to drugs and had significant criminal histories. In those cases, involving 19 offences with 12 offences taken into account on a Form 1, and 7 offences with 14 offences taken into account on Form 1 respectively, effective sentences of 5 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 3 years and 6 months, and 6 years with a non-parole period of 3 years, were imposed after orders for partial accumulation.
53In Lewins, the offender pleaded guilty to four offences contrary to s 112(1) of the Crimes Act and sentenced, at first instance, to imprisonment for an effective term of 10 years with a non-parole period of 7 years. On appeal, the offender was re-sentenced to imprisonment for an effective term of 8 years with a non-parole period of 5 years and 6 months. The offender was a professional thief and had a criminal record for offences of dishonesty dating from when he was aged 11. He had served a period of imprisonment for armed robbery. He had used drugs from an early age and was addicted to amphetamines for three years in his late teens. He was also addicted to gambling. The appeal was allowed on parity grounds. The co-offender, sentenced for the same offences in addition to 68 matters taken into account on a Form 1, was sentenced to an effective term of 3 years with a non-parole period of 12 months.
54In Hernandez, the offender pleaded guilty to seven offences contrary to s 112(1) of the Crimes Act, one offence contrary to s 113(1) and one offence contrary to s 308E(1), and asked for ten further offences to be taken into account on a Form 1. Property valued at a total of $136,351 was stolen. The offender cut cables to disarm alarms and CCTV cameras in commercial premises before drilling or cutting into safes to access cash. He had prior convictions in the USA, including three offences of break, enter and steal and one of possessing burglary tools. The offender was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 13 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 9 years. The offender gave evidence at the sentence proceedings that he committed the offences because he had accrued gambling debts and threats had been made to his wife. The sentence appeal was dismissed, there being no error in the process of accumulation that must have been undertaken by the sentencing judge by which the aggregate sentence was arrived at. Significantly for the present purposes, the Court said:
"[43] This Court has observed on a number of occasions (R v MMK [2006] NSWCCA 272; (2006) 164 A Crim R 481 at 486; Murray v R [2013] NSWCCA 12) that questions of accumulation and totality are matters primarily within the discretion of the sentencing judge and this Court will be reluctant to intervene. Intervention can occur only on one of the well known bases for interference with a discretionary exercise: House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505.
[44] None of the offences for which the applicant was sentenced contain overlapping factual elements. That comment does not refer to the theoretical elements but to the factual circumstances of the commission of each offence.
[45] In other words, each offence was separate and no part of one offence overlapped with the other, except in relation to the offence of impairing electronic communications, which is ordinarily an aspect of the commission of certain types of break, enter and steal. All of the offences of break and enter (either with intent to steal or to steal) were committed on separate occasions and involved separate victims.
...
[49] Moreover, for a total of seven sentences of break, enter and steal, one sentence of break, enter with intent to steal and one sentence for impair electronic communications, which have maximum sentences of 14 years, 10 years and 10 years respectively, a total sentence in aggregate of 13 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 9 years has been imposed. I reiterate that there were 10 further offences taken into account on a Form 1, which, in the sentences to which they were relevant, emphasise the need for deterrence.
[50] I accept that none of the offences are in the worst category. The applicant is not a person who has no criminal history and, as a consequence of that, he is not entitled to the leniency afforded a first offender. Nor is the applicant a person who has not before spent time in a penal institution.
[51] Notwithstanding the finding by the sentencing judge, with which I do not cavil, that the applicant has reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, the history of the applicant and the circumstances of the offending show that specific and general deterrence are significant factors. Yet, the sentencing judge imposed a sentence on the applicant for nine offences, taking account of a further 10 on a Form 1, which is less than the maximum sentence for one break, enter and steal.
[52] In terms of totality of the sentence imposed, the extent of the accumulation and concurrency were not outside of the range available to his Honour in the exercise of the sentencing judge's discretion. For this reason this ground of appeal also fails."
55The Crown submitted that despite the applicant's favourable subjective circumstances, the sentencing judge was entitled to regard the objective gravity of the totality of the offending as overwhelming the leniency that might otherwise have been afforded the applicant in the appointment of an aggregate sentence. She further submitted that the sentence ultimately imposed, including the fact that a finding of special circumstances resulted in a significant variation to the statutory ratio under s 44 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, has not been shown to have exceeded his Honour's legitimate sentencing discretion or that the authorities referred to compel that conclusion.
56Although no complaint is made about the individual sentences (as indicated), the Crown submitted the fact that they so readily withstood scrutiny provides strong support for rejecting the challenge to the aggregate sentence as "unreasonable" and "plainly unjust".
57I am not persuaded that the applicant has made good his challenge to the aggregate sentence as an "outlier" or that the notional accumulation inherent in the appointment of the aggregate sentence, although a severe sentence, has breached totality principles.
58The order I propose is as follows:
(1)Leave to appeal granted.
(2)Appeal dismissed.