for an approved security in your portfolio, the market value of that approved security multiplied by its security percentage (expressed as a decimal); and for your mortgaged cash account, the credit balance (if any) of that account."
54 The definition of "Transaction documents" includes not only the loan agreement itself but also the application form and "each other document contemplated by or required in connection with any of the above or the transactions which they contemplate …".
55 The respondents submitted that a margin call did not require any notice or notification to the client. It took place if the event in clause 7.1(a) occurred, that is to say if the formula within the 15% cap were triggered, under any of the circumstances in clause 7.1(b) or indeed any other circumstance that might bring that result about.
56 Interpolating the factual position here, there was, following the earlier events in relation to the BHP shares, in the monthly statements provided by BNP to the client an entry referring to that transaction. Under "code" appears "XXX". Under "description" appears "unlisted XXX" with a stated portfolio market value of $274,365 and a portfolio lending value of $246,928.50 and with a lending ratio of 90% implying that a corresponding percentage of that value was available for loan facility purposes from BNP.
57 By the week starting 6 August 2001, it had been appreciated within BNP that there was an error in the statements for SCC because BNP had still not debited the margin lending account for the cost of purchasing the BHP shares.
58 Accepting that this error should also by then have been appreciated by SCC and the Morgans, it is nonetheless undisputed that they did not have any awareness of what then occurred on 9 August 2001. On that day, Mr White directed Ms Garside "to cause the XXX code in the Morgans' margin lending statements to be reversed", no one telling Morgan that this had been done; see White affidavit at para 21, Blue 6,1580, Black, 184.12-.36 and Black, 164.1-.25. I shall refer to this as "the reversal".
59 It is as, I have said, common ground both that the reversal took place and that at no time in the events leading up to and including 17 August 2001 was SCC or the Morgans made aware of this.
60 It is also common ground that the effect of the reversal was to put the Morgans, and (insofar as one may equate SCC with the Morgans though the former was not an actual party in their own right to the loan agreement), SCC, in a position where, under the formula in cl 7.1(a) the sum of SCC's loan balance and any outstanding settlements exceeded the margin call buffer amount, though only because of that reversal. That excess, as again is common ground, did not cause there to be what clause 7.1(a) deems "a changed circumstance" with its different contractual consequences.
61 Notwithstanding the background knowledge and expertise of Mr Morgan, he, being ignorant of the reversal, could not have been aware that the formula in clause 7.1(a) had been triggered so as to give rise to a margin call or any capacity to make one. On the facts, no explicit margin call was made on 15 August 2001 in terms of clause 7. The respondents, however, simply submit that this is irrelevant as the clause was triggered by the undisclosed reversal of the XXX entry thus giving rise to a margin call without more being required on anyone's part.
62 As Kirby P observed in Hide & Skin Trading Pty Limited v Oceanic Meat Traders Limited (1990) 20 NSWLR 310 at 313-4,
"Whoever may be the parties to the agreement, it is the fundamental rule, that a Court should give the words of a written agreement the natural meaning that they bear. Subject to that rule, in giving meaning to the words of an agreement between commercial parties, Courts will endeavour to avoid a construction which makes commercial nonsense or is shown to be commercially inconvenient. This is because Courts will infer that commercial parties would not themselves normally agree in such a way."
63 When one turns to the natural meaning of the words used, the interpretation pressed by the respondents is not a necessary consequence of the natural meaning of the words used. I am satisfied that the better view is to the contrary of the interpretation pressed by the respondents; a margin call cannot be made sub silentio as it were, in circumstances where the Morgans were ignorant of the happening of the trigger event of cl 7.1(a).
64 Consider clause 7.2, setting out "how you can satisfy a margin call". If the respondents' interpretation were correct it would lead to the consequence that in the absence of any communication at all from Equities, the Morgans (or SCC) would not know what amount was needed to be paid or repaid to satisfy the uncommunicated "call" or what further approved securities needed to be added. It is true that under clause 7.2(a)v there is also a formula. It says that after doing "some or all of these things" (repayment of money owed, depositing further funds or having further approved securities or additional security acceptable to BNP) "the sum of your loan balance any outstanding settlements does not exceed your facility limit". But to comply, one must first know, or at the very least be in a position to know by the exercise of reasonable diligence, that the trigger for the margin call under cl 7.1(a) has occurred. There is no basis for assuming any awareness on the part of the Morgans (or SCC) of that trigger event, as they did not know of the reversal which brought it about.
65 A further problem with that interpretation is that the elements of the formula in cl 7.2(a)v are themselves dependant on further information from BNP. Thus the definition of "facility limit" is dependant on quantification of "the total security value". It is in turn "the sum of the security value of each approved security in your portfolio and the security value of your mortgage cash account". That in turn depends upon the market value of an "approved security" multiplied by its "security percentage". The latter is the discount which BNP would impose. Unless the client knew what that percentage was at the time, the client could not be confident that it had brought itself into compliance with the formula in cl 7.2(a)v. Moreover, even compliance with that formula in cl 7.2(a)v does not mean that the margin call trigger clause (7.1(a)) is no longer operative, though one might imply that it was not.
66 All of this strongly indicates that when clause 7.1(c) states that "BNP may notify you of the margin call and of details of the actions which can be taken to satisfy the margin call", "may" in effect means "shall" when it comes to making a margin call in terms of the loan agreement. Otherwise, the client would simply not know what were the actions which should be taken to satisfy the margin call. Nor would the client know, in the absence of knowing a margin call existed, that actions were required to be taken in the first place.
67 That then leads to the proper interpretation of clause 7.1(d) with its concluding sentence, "You must do so [that is satisfy each such margin call] even if BNP does not give you a notice requiring you do so". The words are ambiguous and are capable of meaning, read literally, that no notice of the margin call is required before the obligation to satisfy arises. But the more plausible meaning, and one which avoids a commercially unreasonable result, is that what is excused of BNP is the necessity to give notice that the margin call must be satisfied; it is enough to give notice of the call itself. Here it could not be said that even a person of Mr Morgan's expertise was obliged to act upon a margin call when he was not aware that there had been one, nor of circumstances that would allow him to conclude that the trigger event in cl 7.1(a) had occurred. This was because he was not made aware at the critical time of the reversal.
68 I now turn to the other relevant events as they bear on any margin call.
69 Part of the background information which BNP through its officers brought to the interpretation of the relevant agreements was that there was dissatisfaction both with the July Agreement as being outside the normal and standard arrangement that BNP had with its clients and, with the double pledge agreement. The latter came about because the options clearing house had first rights over the same shares that also provided margin cover to Equities for the share trading. Equities were therefore at risk that it would not have any security when needed; White's evidence at Black, 142.16-.49 and 144.26-146.31. That realisation on BNP's part in the second week of August, led to discussion taking place internally within BNP on 13 August, see Orange, 63-65. There was a desire within BNP to collateralise the relevant loan facility, but without any spelling out of the degree of collateral to be lodged nor how it was to be determined. There was no notification to the client then or subsequently that dual pledging was to be suspended. The client SCC and the Morgans were entitled to assume continuance of that arrangement, as reflected in the July Agreement.
70 On 14 August 2001, Mr Hedley sent an email to Mr Knights concerning SCC saying,
"Further to my discussion yesterday, we need to ensure that the clients Margin Lending facility is operated with sufficient collateral buffer. Can you please ensure that no additional liability is incurred on the account until such time as this occurs. We require the position to be operating under our normal margin lending requirements no later than this Friday, 17 August. I am happy to discuss with Bob [Morgan] if he wants."; Blue 1, 27 and 75.
71 Mr Knights replied to Mr Hedley's email saying "I have spoken to Bob yesterday and I believe this can be sorted out by the client buying stock. The client would prefer to clarify this with you. Grateful if you would ring him …".
72 This provides the background to the critical conversation that occurs at about 9.50am on 15 August 2001 as set out in paras 296-7 in Mr Morgan's affidavit (Blue, 405-408 and Blue, 917).
"296 At around 9.50am on 15 August 2001 Hedley telephone me and we had a conversation to the following effect:
Hedley said:
'The Bank wants the margin on the special $1.1 million facility collateralised.'
I said:
'What do you mean?'
Hedley said:
'The Bank wants you to purchase stock with this special facility as happens in the normal way of a margin lending account. The present management is too difficult. The Bank will not continue to lodge cash at the OCH for the margin cover. The Bank has no ability to control the cash. The Bank can control stock through margin lending.'
I said:
'But what about the agreement Sydney Concrete has with the Bank? That makes no mention of Sydney Concrete putting up stock. It's a cash facility.'
Hedley said:
'I interpret the agreement different from you. The Bank never had in mind for Sydney Concrete's margin at the OCH to be covered without collateral.'
I said:
'I don't see the agreement as that. That's not what's written.'
Hedley said:
'I've gone into bat for you with "Hong Kong". They want to liquidate Sydney Concrete. I've got them to agree not to do this. If you don't agree, the Bank will fight in court and that seems like a waste of time as I thought we would be able to work this out.'
I said:
'What's the Bank going to do about Sydney Concrete's loss? Under the agreement Sydney Concrete has the ability to recoup its loss?'
Hedley said:
'The Bank is giving Sydney Concrete time.'
I said:
'I don't agree with what you are now proposing.'
Hedley said:
'"Hong Kong" want to liquidate Sydney Concrete. I've gone into bat so that this won't happen, but you have got to collateralise with stock.
Sydney Concrete's options position must be collateralised by Friday.'
I said:
'I don't want to buy stock at their current prices.'
Hedley said:
'Well as I have said, if you don't agree the Bank will take you to court.'
Hedley and I then discussed stock. Hedley said:
'The Stock that would be appropriate to collateralise with is Telstra, Westpac, Commonwealth Bank. I think each of these stock will appreciate.'
Hedley then gave his views on each of these stocks and why he thought the [sic] would go up.