Moone v Boston Scientific Pty Ltd

Facts

The FASOC was irregular in form because it attached various documents on which Ms Moone relied in the pleading. While irregular, because she is self-represented that would not of itself justify striking out the FASOC. However, appending the documents did make clear that the essential facts were not in dispute. That is important, because the existence of a genuine factual dispute will almost always be dispositive against the making of an order for summary dismissal.
On 30 June 2015, Ms Moone entered into the contract, which included: 7.0 Termination Either party may terminate the employment by the provision of five (5) weeks written notice ("the Notice Period"). In circumstances where you provide written notice in accordance with this clause, Boston Scientific may: (a) require you to work out the Notice Period (in whole or in part) and require you to perform such duties as it deems appropriate; or (b) require you to refrain from providing services to Boston Scientific but require you to remain ready, willing and able to assist Boston Scientific for the duration of the Notice Period or such shorter period deemed appropriate; or (c) not require you to provide services, deem the employment as terminated at a date determined by Boston Scientific within the Notice Period and make a payment to you in lieu of notice. In circumstances where Boston Scientific wishes to terminate the employment under this fixed term contract with notice, it may, at its complete discretion, require you: (a) to work out the Notice Period (in whole or in part); or (b) to refrain from providing services to Boston Scientific but require you but remain [sic] ready, willing and able to assist Boston Scientific for the duration of the Notice Period, or such shorter period as deemed appropriate; or (c) not to work out the Notice Period (in whole or in part) and make a payment in lieu. In each case, any payment in lieu of notice will be calculated on the basis of your base salary plus statutory superannuation only. Commissions and bonuses will only be included in any payment in lieu of notice in circumstances where the commission or bonus would be payable under this contract during the period of notice. Boston Scientific may at any time terminate the employment without notice or pay in lieu for misconduct or neglect of duty. In each case any post employment restrictions will operate in full from your last day of employment. The above termination provisions will have application to your employment irrespective of any subsequent change to your position or role unless otherwise agreed in writing … 11.0 Work Health and Safety 11.1 You must: (a) safely attend to the duties of your position; (b) be familiar with all occupational health and safety laws ("WHS"} and the regulations which are relevant to the duties of Senior Collections Specialist, and also the occupational health and safety policies and procedures of Boston Scientific; (c) comply with the above and all directions from Boston Scientific relating to occupational health and safety; (d) take a proactive interest in eliminating or reducing health and safety risks to you and others in the workplace; and (e) co-operate with Boston Scientific in their efforts to comply with WHS requirements. 11.2 You must not: (a) interfere with or misuse equipment or facilities provided by Boston Scientific for the health, safety and welfare of persons at work; (b) obstruct attempts to give aid to a person who is injured at work or attempts to prevent a risk to the health and safety of a person at work; (c) refuse a reasonable request to assist in giving aid to a person who is injured at work or preventing a risk to health and safety; and (d) disrupt the workplace by creating unwarranted health or safety fears. 11.3 You must notify Boston Scientific as soon as you become aware of any workplace risks or accidents (including breaches of occupational health and safety laws or policies). Further, you must take all steps reasonably necessary to remove or reduce that risk.
The critical events took place during the COVID 19 pandemic.
On 28 October 2021, Ms Moone sent an email to a manager within Boston with the subject line "Clarity required for integration back into the office Without Prejudice", and which said: Based on the Town Hall meeting yesterday BSC Policy is that only double vaccinated employees are allowed to into the Mascot office. Will this change in December? What is the protocol for unvaccinated people like myself? I require some clarity with regards to the hybrid situation. If KPl's have been met and exceeded over the past 12 to 18 months, Is there a possibility that I can apply for 100% remote working?
On 2 November 2021, Ms Moone emailed, among others, the fourth defendant Mr Fastiggi: Thank you Michael for having a 1:1 with me regarding the staggered return to the Mascot office. At this stage I have concerns about taking the vaccination right now. I would like to ask what measures are being created for the staff who have decided at this point in time to delay getting vaccinated? Depending on the measures, is there options available, in this interim period, to work remotely?
On 8 November 2021, Mr Fastiggi replied to Ms Moone: Thanks for your email and time to talk last week. As discussed, our current Sydney office plan is in line with the NSW Government roadmap. At this stage only fully vaccinated employees are able to attend the office and unvaccinated employees may continue to work at home if practical. From 1 December 2021 (this date may change depending on government advice) we anticipate we will be encouraging employees to return to the office more regularly, although there may be some further restrictions to ensure employee health and safety. We will advise all employees when this is confirmed. Regarding your request for 100% remote work, your role has been assessed as hybrid as you are required to be in the office to interact with the team etc. We do not anticipate this will change. You have advised that you are delaying having a COVID-19 vaccination. We appreciate you being open with us about your situation and the decision to be vaccinated is a personal decision. However, it would help us to understand if you intend to have the vaccination and if so do you have a timeline in mind? We can then consider the situation and what interim adjustments you may be requesting if there is a future requirement to be vaccinated to attend BSC premises. The situation is constantly evolving and we will continue to monitor this and communicate any further requirements to the team. Let me know if you want to discuss this further.
On 23 November 2021, Mr Fastiggi followed up with a further email to Ms Moone: Hope all is well I would like to make sure we have answered all your questions. As mentioned below, it would help us to understand if you intend to have the vaccination and if so do you have a timeline in mind?
On 10 February 2022, Mr Fastiggi sent an email to Ms Moone with the subject line "COVID Outbreak Management Plan" which included: As you know we had a plan to return to the office "business as usual" from 1 January 2022 but unfortunately due to the COVID outbreak escalating we have delayed this. Although we don't have a date yet to return to the office and operate in our work modes we anticipate this will happen soon. Boston Scientific has an obligation to ensure the health and safety of people in the workplace. For this reason and in line with the current government guidelines we have determined employees must be vaccinated to attend the office and have contact with Boston Scientific's employees and customers. … As a Senior Collections Specialist your role requires a high level of collaboration. Your role requires interaction and in-person collaboration with the onsite Customer Care team and others in the business. In person interactions and collaboration promote resolution of issues quickly and help to build strong professional relationships with others within the business as well as providing coaching and development opportunities. The hybrid classification of your role also enables access to resources available in the office, including but not limited to the office printers and internet. We understand that while performing your role from home you have required assistance from office based employees in carrying out tasks on your behalf, such as printing statements and access to mail. We have previously requested information from you regarding your vaccination status as part of our return to office arrangements. Our intention is to ensure that all persons who work at Boston Scientific who can be fully vaccinated, are fully vaccinated as part of our obligation to ensure the health and safety of people in the workplace. As outlined above, you are required to attend the office to perform your role. If you are unable to provide confirmation of your vaccination status or your intention to have a vaccination, we will have to consider what alternatives are available as you cannot perform the inherent requirements of your current role. We are not seeking any personal information from you and we recognize the decision to be vaccinated is a personal decision. We are not intending to influence you either way however we would appreciate it if you could provide us with an indication of whether you are vaccinated or intend to be vaccinated and if so, by what date. We appreciate a response to this email by Friday 18 February 2022. We require confirmation from all employees regarding vaccination status as part of our process for ensuring the health and safety of people in the workplace. If you do not provide us with the information requested we can only work on the assumption you are not vaccinated and/or do not intend to be vaccinated. While you have not confirmed your vaccination status, you must not have any face to face physical contact with Boston Scientific employees and must not attend the Boston Scientific premises. I am here to support you and available to discuss this. In addition we take this opportunity to remind you the Employee Assistance Program is available to you if you require additional support. The contact details are: …
On 16 February 2022, Ms Moone sent a document entitled "Notice of Demand" addressed to Boston and the other defendants which, among other things, stated: l have been working safely from my home for the past two years with sound performance reflected in key performance indicator (KPI) results.
The "Notice of Demand" also sought what was described as "further and better particulars" and concluded with: I DEMAND the items listed above be provided within (30) thirty days of this Notice. TAKE NOTICE THAT failure by you to lawfully and/or legally rebut or refute this Notice and provide irrefutable evidence to my Demand and IT SHALL BE TAKEN that you shall accept full personal and financial liability and I shall investigate further legal remedy. Furthermore, TAKE NOTICE THAT if no irrefutable evidence is provided within (30) thirty days, I DEMAND that the requests for evidence of my vaccination status cease and that you hereby agree to my continued working solely from home. Should there be any changes to my work conditions or reduction in my remuneration without my written consent with my signature TAKE NOTICE THAT I shall be entitled to investigate further legal remedy. TAKE NOTICE THAT you have a duty of care obligation at common law. I enjoy my role as a Senior Collections Specialist as I have provided loyal service to Boston Scientific Pty Ltd. I intend to remain with the company until my retirement. I wish to finalise this matter as soon as possible and I hope to hear from you with a positive outcome. If you have any questions regarding this Notice please contact me with written correspondence at my above address.
On 18 February 2022, Ms Moone met with Mr Fastiggi. Ms Moone indicated that the notice referred to in the previous paragraph had been sent and that further discussion should not occur until Mr Fastiggi had received it.
On 23 February 2022, Mr Fastiggi sent this email to Ms Moone: I confirm I have received your letter dated 16 February 2022 by registered post. As advised previously, Boston Scientific has determined employees must be vaccinated to attend the office and have contact with Boston Scientific's employees and customers. Therefore for clarity to remain an employee of Boston Scientific you must be vaccinated. Your letter indicates that you do not intend to be vaccinated. Can you please advise me directly by email whether you intend to be vaccinated by no later than Friday 25 February 2022 by 5pm. Please be advised that being vaccinated for COVID-19 is and remains an inherent requirement of your position with Boston Scientific. If you choose not to be vaccinated or do not advise us of your intention to be vaccinated by Friday 25 February 2022 at 5pm, this will place you in a position where you cannot meet the inherent requirements of the role and Boston Scientific will then regard you as having brought the employment to an end.
On 24 February 2022 Ms Moone sent another document described as a "Notice of Demand" to Boston and the other defendants which included: I refer to my earlier correspondence as a Notice of Demand on 16 February 2022 (refer Attachment A). On 18 February 2022 at 11:30am I met with three leaders from Boston Scientific Pty Ltd including: Kate Harris, the Principal Human Resources Business Partner; Michael Fastiggi, Head of Finance; and Dusi Jehanathan, Accounting and Controls Manager (refer Attachment B). At this time, I informed you that I would like to postpone our discussion until Boston Scientific Pty Ltd had received and read the Notice of Demand. During this short meeting of 18 February 2022 on multiple instances l informed those in attendance that this continuing offence has and continues to cause me significant distress anxiety and harm. l feel that the repeated threats to my ongoing employment are bullying and offensive to my exemplary work ethic. As a Senior Collections Specialist, I have continued every day to provide service to Boston Scientific Pty Ltd and maintained my high performance as a professional working from home as I have done over last two years. TAKE NOTICE THAT l confirm my intention to remain with the company until retirement I acknowledge your response to my Notice via email on 23 February 2022 from Michael Fastiggi, Head of Finance (refer Attachment C). Within this email it was confirmed that Boston Scientific Pty Ltd had received and read the Notice of Demand dated 16 February 2022. Within the first Notice, "TAKE NOTICE THAT in order for me to fully understand my legal obligations in this matter I DEMANDED Further and Better Particulars''. This email has not addressed the seventeen (17) items in the first Notice. I have not yet received the Further and Better Particulars required in order for me to fully understand my legal obligations in this matter. Nor have I been consulted on the proposed changes to my employment conditions for my Workplace Health and Safety in the email 18 February 2022. There has been no effort by Boston Scientific Pty Ltd to meet with me since the first Notice of Demand was received and this is very distressing. TAKE NOTICE THAT I DO NOT CONSENT to the proposed changes to my employment, work conditions or reduction in my remuneration given via email on 23 February 2022 from Michael Fastiggi, Head of Finance. I have not provided my written consent nor my signature. The content of this email places me under duress and may be considered as financial coercion.
On 25 February 2023, Mr Fastiggi sent this termination letter on behalf of Boston to Ms Moone: In my email of 23 February 2022, you were advised of the position of Boston Scientific and provided with an opportunity to change your position regarding vaccination. You attended your team meeting today and made comments that were consistent with your ongoing position that you do not intend to be vaccinated which were unnecessary. This was further confirmed in your communication by email sent on 24 February 2024. You have not advised us to [sic] that you will be vaccinated and accordingly we now regard you as having brought the employment to an end. Your last day of employment with Boston Scientific will be Friday 25 February 2022. Without prejudice to our legal position we will make a payment of 5 weeks in lieu of notice. We will also provide you with a payment for pro rata long service leave. We take this opportunity to remind you of your obligations, including but not limited to confidentiality, as outlined in your employment agreement dated 17 April 2015.
After that date, Ms Moone sent several further documents described variously as a "Notice of Demand", "Notice of Remedy", "Notice of Demand and Liability" and "Notice of Breach" to Boston and the other defendants. This culminated in a document entitled "Final Notice" dated 19 May 2022 and which included: TAKE NOTICE THAT my records show that your responses have failed to provide me a full, diligent and properly considered response with direct irrefutable evidence to the items demanded in my previous Notices as is lawfully expected and demanded including but not limited to: 1. Notice of Demand 16 February 2022; and 2. Notice of Demand 24 February 2022; and 3. Notice of Demand 25 February 2022; and 4. Notice of Demand 4 March 2022; and 5. Notice of Remedy 22 March 2022; and 6. Notice of Demand and Liability 22 March 2022; and 7. Notice of Breach 4 May 2022 (Refer Attachment A) TAKE NOTICE THAT the Notice of Breach with the date of service 4 May 2022 were acknowledged as received by each respondent through Australia Post registered post as per the Delivery Confirmation - Advice Receipts (Refer Attachment B). TAKE NOTICE THAT my records show that you have failed to provide any response to the Notice of Breach. TAKE NOTICE THAT you are here now on Final Notice TAKE NOTICE THAT IT IS HERE NOW AGREED UPON BY ALL PARTIES you are in Breach and therefore in a position of Default and dishonour that you are here and now required to provide Remedy for the sum certain amount of $3,665, 420.61. I provide you therewith the opportunity to Remedy your obligations under the previous Notices and extend your response time to close of business in seven (7) days being the 26 May 2022. TAKE NOTICE THAT I DEMAND payment for the full amount of $3,665, 420.61 as per the Invoice attached to this Notice (refer Attachment C) that is here now due as identified by the heading INVOICE be paid within seven (7) days being the 26 May 2022.

Consideration

There was no dispute about the applicable legal principles. In particular, Mr Fernon SC accepted that an order for summary dismissal would only be made if the high bar for such an order set out in General Steel (see [6] above) was met. That is the test which the Court has applied. Ms Moone submitted that the FASOC did disclose a cause of action against the defendants for breach of the contract.
In applying General Steel, I have borne in mind the recent observations (with which I respectfully express my agreement) of Leeming JA (Payne JA agreeing) in HNOE Limited v Angus & Julia Stone Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 271: [119] The passage in Barwick CJ's reasons, sitting in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130; [1964] HCA 69 is familiar but also, with respect, somewhat opaque as to its application in any particular case: in my opinion great care must be exercised to ensure that under the guise of achieving expeditious finality a plaintiff is not improperly deprived of his opportunity for the trial of his case by the appointed tribunal. On the other hand, I do not think that the exercise of the jurisdiction should be reserved for those cases where argument is unnecessary to evoke the futility of the plaintiff's claim. Argument, perhaps even of an extensive kind, may be necessary to demonstrate that the case of the plaintiff is so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed. [120] More recently, the joint judgment in Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41 at [57] observed that "[t]he test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way." The joint judgment in Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256; [2006] HCA 27 at [46] cautioned that the statements in General Steel should not be given "canonical force". In Shaw v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 102 at [32], Barrett JA (with whom Beazley, McColl and Macfarlan JJA and McClellan CJ at CL agreed) enunciated the test thus: The question is ... whether the claims in question are so obviously untenable or groundless that there is "a high degree of certainty" that they will fail if allowed to go to trial; and whether this is one of the "clearest of cases" in which the court may accordingly intervene to prevent the claims being litigated. [121] Ultimately it is a question of judgment, but where as in the present case the viability of a claim for damages for breach of statutory duty was a pure question of law, it was open and appropriate to resolve it in the course of determining the motion to enforce the exclusive jurisdiction clause. Further, because there were no facts and the arguments relatively brief, there was no occasion for a separate question to be ordered before that could occur.
For the reasons which follow, the Court does not accept Ms Moone's submissions. Essentially that is because in this case the Court has reached a high degree of certainty that whether as currently pleaded or otherwise, any claim brought by Ms Moone against any of the defendants for breach of the contract will fail.
It is convenient to begin with the most obvious point. Mr Fernon SC submitted that the FASOC (in particular paragraphs 43 to 45) pleaded no material facts which could give Ms Moone an action in damages for breach of contract against the second to fourth defendants. The reason is that they are not parties to the contract. The Court finds for that reason that the claim against those defendants is in the language of General Steel "manifestly groundless" or "under no possibility" could Ms Moone have such an action against them, and the proceedings against those defendants should be summarily dismissed.
Summary dismissal is the appropriate remedy because there is no utility in giving Ms Moone an opportunity to replead her claim against those defendants. That is because, as I develop further below, she informed the Court that if she was given an opportunity to replead, she would nevertheless still be relying only on an action for breach of contract and the Court is satisfied that Ms Moone has no such action against the second to fourth defendants.
Turning to Ms Moone's claim against Boston, her written and oral submissions left the Court in no doubt that she genuinely believes that she has suffered a serious wrong at the hands of Boston which sounds in considerable damages for breach of contract. As she explained to me, she had arrived at the figure for the amount of her claim based upon her intention to remain in Boston's employ until her retirement. She confirmed to me that her claim was one solely in contract and she submitted that it was properly pleaded.
For various reasons (being essentially those advanced by Mr Fernon SC), the Court concludes that the FASOC does not disclose a reasonable cause of action against Boston for breach of contract sounding in damages (or, to be more precise, in the alternative sounding in damages greater than her five weeks pay in lieu) and Ms Moone has been unable to demonstrate that an opportunity to replead would produce a different outcome.
Mr Fernon SC submitted that the termination letter was a written notice of termination in accordance with clause 7 of the contract (see [10] above) and that Boston had validly exercised its right under that clause (by its indication that Ms Moone's last day of employment would be the date of the termination letter) that she not work out her five weeks' notice period and, in lieu, be paid her five weeks salary. There was, Mr Fernon SC submitted, plainly no breach of contract by Boston.
I accept Mr Fernon SC's characterisation of the termination letter when read in the context of the events leading up to it (set out in [12] to [23] above) and the terms of clause 7 of the contract. However, in reaching that conclusion I have borne in mind that Ms Moone is a non-lawyer representing herself. Given the drastic nature of summary dismissal, and the references in some of Ms Moone's material to a contention that the contract was not terminated in accordance with its terms, I have also taken into account the consequences for her case of that possibility.
To that end, I accept it could be said that the termination letter does not, in terms, provide five weeks written notice and, therefore, does not give notice of termination in accordance with clause 7. However, on that analysis (which assumes in Ms Moone's favour that the contract could only be terminated in accordance with clause 7), Ms Moone is still left without any cognizable cause of action for breach of contract that will sound in damages greater than the payment which was made to her in lieu. This is because her best case would be on all fours with the conclusion of the majority of the High Court in Sanders v Snell (1999) 196 CLR 392; [1998] HCA 64: [19] The contract of employment was terminated by the Bureau on 19 June 1992. That termination was a breach of the contract, for it brought the contract to an end then and there, without first giving the stipulated notice. This was not a case of an employer giving notice of intention to terminate the contract in two months, paying the employee in advance for those two months and saying to the employee that he or she need not attend work during that time. The payment that was made to the respondent was payment in lieu of notice in the sense of being a payment made after the contract was brought to an end and intended to be set off against, and to extinguish, the damages that ordinarily would be payable for the wrongful termination of the agreement.
I have taken this alternative analysis into account notwithstanding that, in the course of argument, Ms Moone said that she could not point to any express term of the contract which she could say had been breached.
Ms Moone did, however, contend that while not pleaded in the FASOC, if she was to be given an opportunity to replead she would rely on an allegation of breach of an implied term of the contract. That term was identified in this exchange (Tcpt, 15 November 2024, p16 (27-45): PLAINTIFF: It would be a dispute resolution process as per the Civil Dispute Resolutions Act to discuss and resolve whatever issue the employee was experiencing at the time. HIS HONOUR: Sorry, say that again. A dispute resolution process - would you mind saying that again, and I'll just take a note. A dispute resolution process‑‑ PLAINTIFF: Where the parties come together, and the - address the employee's matter. Whatever - whatever the employee has an issue with, that there's a - a - a meeting to have that resolved. HIS HONOUR: All right. And do you say that that's - that there is an implied term - there would be implied some terms into this contract that would constitute a dispute resolution process of that kind? PLAINTIFF: Absolutely, especially in an accounting and controls role, a finance role, within the company. Not just - not just a finance role. It - it needs - it needs to be part of every employment contract. It's - it's‑‑
However, in my respectful opinion, the possibility of asserting an implied term to that effect is not a proper basis to allow Ms Moone an opportunity to replead. That is because the Court accepts Mr Fernon SC's submission that an implied term to that effect would never be implied because it does not satisfy the familiar test for the implication of a term to give business efficacy in the advice of the majority of the Privy Council in BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266 at 282 - 283.
Applying that test, there are at least three reasons why the Court accepts Mr Fernon SC's submission: 1. The contract is effective without such a term; 2. Such a term contradicts clause 7 of the contract, which provides for termination without cause; and 3. It is not a term which can be clearly expressed (hence I have referred to it as a term "to the effect" of a dispute resolution process) because there is no one way in which dispute resolution clauses are expressed.
Further and alternatively to the conclusion in the preceding paragraph, the Court also accepts Mr Fernon SC's submission that if an implied term to the effect advanced by Ms Moone was part of the contract, then the course of meetings and correspondence between the parties (the critical parts of which I have set out in [12] to [23] above) demonstrate that the parties had engaged in a process which sought to address Ms Moone's concerns. In other words, even if there could be such an implied term in the contract, Boston had demonstrated by reference to those facts that a claim for breach of a term to that effect could not succeed.
Finally, in relation to the lack of utility in giving Ms Moone an opportunity to replead, two further matters must be noted.
First, when I asked Ms Moone what she would do if she was given an opportunity to replead, she affirmed that she would continue to maintain an action for breach of the contract but would reconsider the amount of damages to claim a lower figure. That is not a proper basis to allow Ms Moone to replead, because it demonstrates a fundamental inability to identify what breach of the contract could properly be pleaded that would justify a however much reduced claim for damages.
Second, in her written submissions, Ms Moone identified what she said were seven reasonable causes of action available to her. I will next set out each of these, together with Boston's response which the Court accepts: 1. "Breach of Contract: My employment was terminated without just cause". Such a cause of action must fail because clause 7 of the contract permitted termination without cause. 1. "Failure to Follow Dispute Resolution Process (DRP): The defendant violated the Civil Dispute Resolution Act by not adhering to the required Dispute Resolution Process before termination." The Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) imposes an obligation to take genuine steps to resolve disputes before proceedings are instituted in the Federal Court of Australia and the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2). The legislation is irrelevant both to the interpretation of the contract and the proceedings before this Court. 1. "Unauthorised Request for Private Information: The defendant demanded private information not stipulated and outside the scope of my contract, and my refusal to provide this information does not amount to a breach of my contractual obligations." Any such refusal on the part of Ms Moone was not the basis of an allegation of breach against her and, in any event, the request for private information would not in and of itself be a proper basis for a cause of action in contract against Boston. 1. "Legal violation - Breach of Privacy: The defendant unlawfully requested private and sensitive information, in breach of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) which was not necessary or required by my contract." There is no prohibition under that legislation against making a request for private and sensitive information. 1. "Unjust Termination: My employment was terminated without valid business reasons or my consent, causing significant financial and emotional harm. This wrongful dismissal disregarded procedural fairness and due process". This contention is no more than a restatement of the allegations in the FASOC and, in any event, could not succeed when neither "valid business reasons" nor Ms Moone's consent was required under the contract to bring her employment to an end. 1. "Neglect by Directors: The directors repeatedly ignored my 12 Notices to resolve the matter, demonstrating a clear disregard fair (sic) dealings and for good faith". Only two of the "notices" predate Ms Moone's termination on 25 February 2022. In any event, there was no obligation under the contract for the defendants to respond to the "notices", to the extent they were expressed in terms that were capable of being the subject of a response. 1. "Deprivation of Livelihood: The unjust termination has significantly impacted my ability to earn a living, as it was my primary source of income". Again, this allegation cannot stand in the face of a contract terminable without cause. So far as the reference to "unjust termination" seeks to invoke a statutory concept of "unfair dismissal", that is not a matter within the jurisdiction of this Court.

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

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Source

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Judgment (8 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (4)

Cases Cited (12)