18. Consent may be expressed or it may be inferred from conduct. For example, entry onto premises by a person who has clear notice of the fact that egress from the premises, by the person or their property, may be contingent on payment of a fee may lead to an inference that the person has agreed to pay that fee, and that they have consented to the reasonable restraint of their person or property, as the case may be, until the fee is paid. In Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson [1906] HCA 83; (1906) 4 CLR 379, the plaintiff entered onto a private wharf at the entrance to which there was affixed a notice that a fare of one penny must be paid by all persons entering or leaving the wharf, whether they had travelled on the company's boats or not. The plaintiff paid his penny to enter the wharf through a turnstile. Having missed his boat, he attempted to leave the wharf through another turnstile but without paying a further penny. Servants of the appellant company endeavoured to detain him, but he eventually succeeded in forcing his way through a small opening beside the turnstile. He brought an action against the company for assault and false imprisonment. The plaintiff was successful at first instance. On appeal to the High Court, this judgment was overturned on the basis that, in part, it could be inferred from the plaintiff's actions in entering the wharf in the knowledge of the conditions of entry that he consented to being subject to those conditions, which included a right on the part of the company and its servants to detain him until he had complied with those conditions. Similarly, in Arthur v Anker [1996] 2 WLR 602, the Court of Appeal held that a car owner could not maintain an action for tortious interference with his car based upon the owner of a private car park clamping the wheels of his car where the car owner was aware of notices at the entry to the car park that vehicles parked without authority would be clamped and a release fee would be charged. The Court of Appeal held that, by voluntarily accepting the risk that the car might be clamped, the car owner also accepted the risk that it would only be released on payment of the reasonable cost of clamping and removing the clamps and accordingly had, by inference, consented to the otherwise tortious act of clamping the car and its detention until payment. These cases may be contrasted with the decision in Vine v Waltham Forest London Borough Council [2000] 4 All ER 169, where the Court of Appeal held it could not be inferred that the owner of a motor vehicle had consented to having her car clamped, and to having to pay a fee for the removal of the clamps, in circumstances where she did not see the notices warning that any vehicle left unattended would be clamped or towed away, and would only be recoverable on payment of a fine.