Grounds 2 and 3
25 It is convenient to deal with these two grounds together. As I have said, the sentencing judge declined to make a finding of "special circumstances". As to that aspect of the matter, his Honour made the following observations:
So although it is his first custodial sentence, I do not think this is an appropriate case in which to find special circumstances and that is substantially because of the Form 1 matters.
26 Two complaints, albeit that they are related, are made in respect of that conclusion. Each of them, in my view, has merit. First, it is difficult to discern what relevance the Form 1 matters had to the question of whether or not "special circumstances" existed. Furthermore, it is clear that the sentencing judge had already had regard to the Form 1 matters when determining the overall objective gravity of the applicant's conduct. Since the objective gravity of the offence affected both the total sentence and the non-parole period, it appears that there has been an element of "double counting". There were, in my view, a number of reasons which would justify a finding of "special circumstances". Apart from the fact that this was the applicant's first custodial sentence, it was apparent that the applicant would benefit from an extended period of supervision in the community in order to address his long-standing problems arising from substance abuse. It was those problems that apparently gave rise to the present offences. If the applicant is able to overcome those problems then the likelihood is that his offending behaviour can be curtailed.
27 I would uphold Grounds 1 - 3.
28 In the circumstances, I am of the view that the court should intervene and proceed to resentence the applicant. That being so, it is unnecessary to separately deal with Ground 4. I also accept the submission made by counsel who appeared on behalf of the applicant at the hearing of the matter that, given the "singular" nature of the factual background to the offences, that little assistance is to be derived from an analysis of other cases. That task had been undertaken in written submissions which had been prepared on behalf of the applicant by different counsel.
29 There was no real issue taken by the Crown with the submission that the sexual assault offence fell into the lower range of objective gravity for an offence of that kind. Indeed the representative of the Crown, who appeared on sentence, had accepted that the offence fell "within the low range of objective seriousness for s 61I offences". In advancing the submission, counsel highlighted the fact that the degree of penetration was slight, and that the incident was of short duration. I accept that the sexual assault offence fell below the middle of the range and was, in that sense, to be assessed as being in the lower range of objective seriousness. Nevertheless the circumstances of the offence although unusual, were no doubt particularly humiliating for the victim especially given that the incident took place in a public place in full view of other people, including her friends.
30 I accept that the indecent assault although it revealed conduct of a disturbing and invasive kind was also at the low end of the spectrum for that category of offence. However, it is a matter of particular concern that within weeks of that offence, and whilst on bail for it, the applicant saw fit to sexually assault a woman whom he had only met moments before. Notwithstanding the fact that each of the offences when considered in isolation, may have fallen into the lower range of each of those particular offences, when they are seen in the context of an escalation in seriousness of the applicant's conduct, the need to reflect a measure of both general and personal deterrence in the sentence becomes clear. In the circumstances, although I would reduce the non-parole period to give effect to a finding of "special circumstances" I would not disturb the overall sentence.
31 I propose the following orders.