This was the state of the relevant provisions regulating appeals to the Full Court when s. 21 of the Arbitration Act, 1895 was enacted and if, as is apparent, it wished to give a right of appeal to the Full Court from the opinion of a judge exercising the jurisdiction under that section, the choice open to the legislature was clear. Plainly enough it cannot be thought that it regarded an opinion given upon a question of law raised by way of special case under that section as resulting in an "order" for, if the contrary view had been held, there could not have been thought to be any need for the concluding words of that section. In the circumstances as they existed the courses available to the legislature were obvious; it could either have given an appeal to the Full Court from an advisory opinion which would be outside the purview of 50 Vict. No. 28, or it could, if it so wished, have merely deemed the "opinion" to be an order within the meaning of that enactment, or, it could have gone further and invested the opinion given under the section with the essential characteristics of an order. And, of course, the question whether the present appeal to this Court is competent depends upon whether it can be said that, in substance, the legislature pursued the last-mentioned course. However the choice which it made is, it seems to me, beyond doubt. It gave a right of appeal from the opinion of a judge to the Full Court and did not make any fundamental change in the character of the opinion even where one of the parties had appealed, successfully or otherwise, to the Full Court pursuant to s. 21. This conclusion remains unaffected by the introduction in 1935 of s. 58 of the Supreme Court Act which deals with appeals from orders. Accordingly, in my view, the "declaration" of the Full Court was of precisely the same character and quality as the "order" of the learned judge of first instance although it was inconsistent with and purported to replace the "order" appealed against. But it did not, in the circumstances, achieve a new quality; it was still advisory in character and did not determine the rights of the parties in respect of the question raised. The arbitrator still remained in law the sole judge of both law and fact and it is not to be thought that when s. 21 was enacted, it was the intention of the legislature, in merely providing for an appeal from an advisory opinion, to give either that opinion, or that of the Full Court upon an appeal under that section, a conclusive effect and so make such a fundamental change in the situation of an arbitrator selected by the parties for the resolution of their differences. At all events, if it did so intend, it did not use language appropriate to express such an intention or to effect such a change.