consideration
21 The approach adopted by the Federal Magistrate to the evidence and other material before him is illustrative of the extent to which the literal meaning of the word 'refugee' has been obscured by the attention given to the Refugees Convention in recent years. The literal meaning of 'refugee' is simply a person taking shelter from pursuit, danger or trouble - especially in a foreign country (see The Macquarie Dictionary, 3rd ed, 1998). Many individuals who fit within the ordinary meaning of the term 'refugee' will fall outside the protection provided by the Refugees Convention. The Refugees Convention, which restricts the protection obligations of signatory states to persons who satisfy the criterion, amongst others, that they have a well‑founded fear of persecution on one or more of the bases identified in Article 1A of the Refugees Convention, reflects the outcome of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries which met in Geneva in July 1951. This Conference was convened to amend and finalise the Convention draft. The outcome of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries has been criticised as having a 'Eurocentric' geographic and chronological focus (Germov & Motta, Refugee Law in Australia at p 15). It is now widely accepted that there are categories of refugees within the literal meaning of that term that do not fall within Article 1A of the Refugees Convention.
22 As the above discussion reveals, it does not logically follow from the fact that the respondent once held a Class 200 visa that he is a person to whom Australia owes, or once owed, protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. The criteria specified in respect of Class 200 visas, read together with the provisions of Part 2 Division 1AA of the Act as in force in the period following 30 June 1992, make it clear that applicants for Class 200 visas were not assessed against the definition contained in Article 1A of the Refugees Convention. Additionally, as is mentioned above, certain dependent members of the family unit of a person entitled to a Class 200 visa, whether or not they themselves were subject to any persecution, could receive Class 200 visas. The inference that the respondent became entitled to a Class 200 visa as a dependent member of Ms Huynh's family unit is, on the material that was before the Federal Magistrate, strong.
23 For the above reasons, the assumption made by the Federal Magistrate and upon which he based his decision, namely that the respondent had been found to be a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention, is not supported by the evidence and other material that was before his Honour.
24 Was the Minister in making a decision under s 501(2) of the Act nonetheless required to take into account the fact that the respondent might be a person who could establish that Australia owes him protection obligations under the Refugees Convention? Alternatively, did the respondent have a legitimate expectation that the Minister would take into account that he might be a person to who Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention?
25 As is mentioned above, there seems to be no reason to conclude that the respondent has even been found to be a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. The Issues Document reveals that the Minister proceeded on the basis that, if the respondent's visa were cancelled, he would be relocated to Vietnam, a country to which he had voluntarily travelled in 1997 to visit his parents and siblings. The respondent was given an opportunity to comment on topics touching on the Minister's decision under s 501(2) which he felt were relevant to his circumstances. The questionnaire which was provided to him to assist him in formulating his comments drew his attention to the topic of possible difficulties should he return to his country of origin, that is Vietnam. He made no comment on that topic although he made quite extensive comments on other topics. The respondent, by being asked about possible difficulties should he return to his country of origin, was given an opportunity to express any fear that he might have of persecution in Vietnam. He expressed no such fear.
26 In the circumstances referred to above, the Minister was not, in our view, required to give consideration to the possibility that the respondent might have a well‑founded fear of persecution in Vietnam for a Convention reason. That possibility was not positively raised by any material shown to have been before the Minister and was inconsistent with the material placed before the Minister by the respondent.
27 The above conclusion is sufficient to dispose of the present appeal. We note, however, that the legislative context in which s 501 of the Act is found also suggests a negative answer to the questions set out in [24] above. Section 501E(1) of the Act prevents a person whose visa has been cancelled under s 501 from applying for another visa whilst in Australia. However, s 501E(2) expressly provides that s 501E(1) does not prevent an application for a protection visa. Section 501F of the Act provides, in effect, that a decision made under s 501 to cancel a particular visa held by a person is deemed to be a decision to cancel any other visa held by that person other than, relevantly, a protection visa. The section also has the effect that a decision made under s 501 to cancel a visa held by a person is deemed to be a decision to refuse any outstanding application that the person may have for another visa other than a protection visa.
28 The above provisions seem to demonstrate a clear legislative intention, where the visa the cancellation of which is under consideration is not a protection visa, to divorce issues relating to protection from the factors required to be considered for the purpose of making a decision under s 501. We are not presently concerned with a decision made under s 501 to cancel or refuse to grant a protection visa. We say nothing touching on that topic. However, where the Minister's decision under s 501 is not a decision to cancel or refuse to grant a protection visa, the better view seems to be that the Minister is not obliged to give consideration to the possibility that the visa holder might be a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations or to notify the visa holder that that topic will not be considered. As we did not hear full argument on this issue, and as the appeal may be disposed of on the ground identified in [26], it is unnecessary for us to express a concluded view on this issue. We note, however, that the Minister acknowledges that there is no impediment in the way of the respondent applying for a protection visa should he consider that he satisfies the prescribed criteria.