Consideration
48 It may be inferred that the Tribunal, standing in the shoes of the Minister, thought fit that the passport be endorsed to specify the particulars, within the meaning of s 9.2 of the Determination.
49 As will have been seen, the Tribunal referred to three matters in its decision that the respondent's passport should contain the endorsement.
50 The first, at [22], was that an endorsement that the respondent had also used the (incorrect) 1966 date of birth would not be inconsistent with the policy or the international obligations the policy reflected. The Tribunal said that the endorsement would be only that the present respondent had used a different date of birth (my emphasis). In my opinion that reason, lack of inconsistency with the policy, cleared away an obstacle and of itself was not the reason for deciding that the present respondent's passport was to include the endorsement. The Tribunal also stated that it could possibly even be said that the endorsement precisely accorded with the information on the present respondent's birth record. I would not regard that observation as an operative part of the Tribunal's reasons. The terms in which it was expressed are too tentative. It follows that I do not need to consider further the terms of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act.
51 The second reason, at [23], was that the public interest in ensuring the integrity of Australian passports as an identity document would not be undermined if the inclusion of an endorsement or observation would result in conflicting dates of birth being shown in a passport. Only one date of birth was shown. The endorsement merely acknowledged that the present respondent had used another date of birth too (my emphasis). This paragraph is difficult to understand in so far as it refers to "conflicting dates of birth" as the balance of the Tribunal's reasoning tends against the conclusion of conflict. Perhaps the word "not" is missing before the word "result". More importantly, in my opinion, this reason cleared away a further obstacle and of itself would not be the reason for deciding that the respondent's passport was to include the endorsement.
52 The third reason, at [24], was that the endorsement would assist the present respondent in explaining the discrepancy between the date of birth on his passport, and that in other documents such as his driver's licence. In my opinion this was the substantial reason for deciding that the respondent's passport should include the endorsement: in context, without that reason the Tribunal would not have so decided. I do not accept the respondent's submission that this was a secondary or subsidiary consideration and not one that necessarily actuated the Tribunal's decision in this case.
53 In my opinion, it is outside the purpose of the Passports Act that a passport be used to contain, even as an endorsement, a date of birth known to be incorrect so that it may be used to explain the existence in another document of an incorrect date of birth. That consideration stands outside the scope of the discretion. It seems to me that endorsing a passport, or making an observation on a passport, to the effect that the holder has used another (incorrect) date of birth or has on his driver's licence another (incorrect) date of birth would be to exercise the discretion for a purpose outside the Passports Act. The relevant purpose or object of the Passports Act is to record the identity of the bearer of the passport, identity being the true facts concerning the passport holder's relevant characteristics, here the date of his birth. The statutory provisions to which I have referred at [5]-[10] above so demonstrate.
54 In light of my findings at [52] above it is unnecessary to consider the expression of the test where an improper purpose, in the sense of a purpose extraneous to the statute, is found amongst a combination of purposes: see Haneef v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1273; (2007) 161 FCR 40 at [287]. However, in my opinion the authorities there referred to, Thompson v Council of the Municipality of Randwick (1950) 81 CLR 87 at 106 (Thompson) and Samrein Pty Ltd v Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board (1982) 41 ALR 467 (Samrein) at 469, albeit resumption cases, are not accurately reflected by saying that the exercise will be invalid only if an improper purpose was the "substantial" or the "true and dominant" purpose of the exercise of the power. In Thompson the High Court spoke of where "such a purpose is a substantial purpose in the sense that no attempt would have been made" to exercise the power if it had not been for the purpose found to be improper (my emphasis). In Samrein, the High Court spoke of whether an unauthorised purpose was a substantial purpose of the acquisition (my emphasis).
55 The only specific discrepancy referred to by the Tribunal at [24] was the respondent's driver's licence.
56 The Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Regulation 2008 (NSW) provided:
10 Form of driver licence (cf cl 22 1999 Reg)
(1) A driver licence must show:
(a) a licence number for the person to whom it is issued, and
(b) the full name of the person, and
(c) a photograph of the person, and
(d) the person's date of birth, and
…
By s 22 of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1998 (NSW) (see now the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 49) a person must not by a false statement or any misrepresentation or other dishonest means, obtain or attempt to obtain a driver licence.
57 In my opinion it is foreign to the purpose or object of the Passports Act that a passport be used to assist the present respondent in explaining a discrepancy between the correct date of birth on his passport and the incorrect date of birth on his driver's licence where, it would appear, consistently with the provisions of the State Act, the incorrect date should not have appeared on the driver's licence.
58 I have not found it necessary to reach a concluded view on question of law 1 or ground 1 in the Minister's notice of appeal concerning the departmental policy.
59 In Gray there were two or possibly three categories explained at 208. The first category was where the existence and content of such a policy was to be regarded as a relevant fact which the Tribunal is bound to consider. Justices French and Drummond said that a serious misconstruction of the policy's terms or misunderstanding of its purposes in the course of decision-making may constitute a failure to take into account a relevant factor and for that reason may result in an improper exercise of the statutory power. The second category was where a decision-maker, not bound to apply a policy, purports to apply it as a proper basis for disposing of the case in hand but misconstrues or misunderstands it so that what is applied is not the policy but something else. Justices French and Drummond said there may then be reviewable error. The third possible category was where "in a limiting case" a policy may be so broadly stated as to cover all considerations properly brought to bear on the exercise of the discretion. In such a case misconstruction of the policy may reduce to misconstruction of the statute or misunderstanding of its purpose.
60 The present case, on the parties' submissions, was within category one. However, it does not appear to me that the majority in Gray intended to depart from what had been said in Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409 (Drake) at 420, another criminal deportation case. There Bowen CJ and Deane J distinguished between a case where the Tribunal may be expressly required to regard itself as bound by the principles formulated by the Minister and the case before that Court which was where it was permissible for the decision-maker to take relevant government policy into account in making his decision but where the Tribunal was not under a statutory duty to regard itself as being bound by that policy. It may be correct to say, as the Minister submitted, that the first two categories referred to in Gray overlap. However, my preferred analysis is that the first category is where the decision-maker is bound to have regard to the existence and content of the policy, because it amounts to a mandatory relevant consideration, while the second category is where the decision-maker is not bound to apply a policy but purports to apply it as a proper basis for disposing of the case in hand. In any event, there was no Ministerial policy in the present case and it may be that, despite the agreement of the parties, the present case is in the second category, being a case where the Tribunal was not bound to have regard to the departmental policy but chose and purported to do so. In such a case, as I understand Gray, the misconstruction or misunderstanding of the policy must be more radical than for the first category. A further complication is that there appears to have been a number of decisions of the Court which seem to elide the use of "relevant" in its ordinary sense of permissible to be taken into account, as in Drake, and "relevant" in its technical sense of a mandatory consideration. These decisions include Nikac v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 65 at 81; BHP Direct Reduced Iron Pty Ltd v Chief Executive Officer, Australian Customs Service (1998) 55 ALD 665 at 682; and Gerah Imports Pty Ltd v Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce (1987) 17 FCR 1 at 15. On that approach, which appears to be that a valid but non-statutory policy is not binding upon a decision-maker but is always a mandatory relevant consideration in the making of a decision, it is not clear what the content is of the second category in Gray. Hneidi v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 20; (2010) 182 FCR 115 at [58] also suggests there may be no relevant distinction for this purpose between a Ministerial policy and a departmental policy.
61 As I have said, it is not necessary in the present case to attempt to resolve these complexities. In my opinion the Tribunal erred in exercising its discretion on the basis that it was a purpose of the Passports Act to assist the present respondent to explain the discrepancy between the correct date of birth on his passport, and the incorrect date of birth in other documents, particularly on his driver's licence.
62 However, I observe that in my opinion to include a reference to an incorrect date of birth as an endorsement would be inconsistent with the policy because an incorrect date of birth is not information which is relevant to the identity of the bearer. Put differently, to state the fact that the respondent had also used an incorrect date of birth is to make a statement about the respondent's practices rather than about his identity. I would not accept the submission on behalf of the respondent that any discrepancy between the date of birth recorded on the respondent's driver's licence and as would be recorded on his passport would need to be explained as a matter going directly to his identity or that the endorsement would operate to record additional information relevant to the respondent's identity.
63 I should mention one other aspect of the hearing of the appeal. Counsel for the respondent sought to tender pages of the departmental policy which were not before the Tribunal. I marked that material MFI 1 and indicated that I would rule on its admissibility in the course of my reasons for judgment. In my opinion that material is not admissible as evidence to support the Tribunal's decision, in particular its construction of the departmental policy. It is difficult to see how the correctness or incorrectness of the Tribunal's construction of that policy could be affected by parts of the policy which the Tribunal did not have before it. In any event, the parts sought to be tendered did not, in my opinion, take the matter any further than the terms of the Passports Act and the Determination. For example, counsel for the respondent sought to emphasise a reference at page 99 of 132 to the place of birth and gender in an Australian travel document being the same as appears on the person's cardinal document (i.e. the person's Australian birth certificate). However, that part of the policy refers to s 7.2 of the Determination, which in turn is a reference to the Minister requesting certain kinds of personal information for the purpose of satisfying himself or herself of the person's identity and the kind of personal information there specified is, relevantly, the person's date of birth as shown in the records held by the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages of the relevant Australian State. In my opinion the date of birth in those records, the cardinal document, is the respondent's correct date of birth and not his incorrect date of birth shown on the Registrar's endorsement. I reject the tender.