CONSIDERATION
62 The Court generally looks favourably upon negotiated settlements: Trade Practices Commission v TNT Australia Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR 41-375.
63 It is in the public interest for the Court to make orders in litigation concerning the EPBC Act on the terms that have been agreed between parties so as to encourage parties to assist the applicant in investigations and achieve negotiated settlements. The Court has recognised that, in addition to savings in time and costs, there is a public benefit in imposing agreed pecuniary penalties where appropriate as parties would not be disposed to reach such agreements where there are unpredictable risks involved.
64 The Court's role, as the parties accepted, is not simply to accept and adopt the position agreed between the parties. In NW Frozen Foods (1996) 71 FCR 285, concerning the imposition of a civil penalty under the TP Act, a single judge declined to give effect to the civil penalty proposed in the minute of consent orders and the joint submissions of the parties, and imposed a more severe penalty. On appeal, Burchett and Kiefel JJ observed at 290-1:
Since the decision in Trade Practices Commission v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd, it has been accepted that both the facts, and also views about their effect, may be presented to the Court in agreed statements, together with joint submissions by both the Commission and a respondent as to the appropriate level of penalty. Because the fixing of the quantum of a penalty cannot be an exact science, the Court, in such a case, does not ask whether it would without the aid of the parties have arrived at the precise figure they have proposed, but rather whether their proposal can be accepted as fixing an appropriate amount.
There is an important public policy involved. When corporations acknowledge contraventions, very lengthy and complex litigation is frequently avoided, freeing the courts to deal with other matters, and investigating officers of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to turn to other areas of the economy that await their attention. At the same time, a negotiated resolution in the instant case may be expected to include measures designed to promote, for the future, vigorous competition in the particular market concerned. These beneficial consequences would be jeopardised if corporations were to conclude that proper settlements were clouded by unpredictable risks. A proper figure is one within the permissible range in all the circumstances. The Court will not depart from an agreed figure merely because it might otherwise have been disposed to select some other figure, or except in a clear case.
These observations are capable of applying to the making of orders reflecting negotiated outcomes in respect of civil penalty provisions of enactments other than the TP Act: Warne; Minister for Industry, Tourism & Resources v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 72.
65 The fixing of a quantum of a penalty cannot be an exact science. However, it is necessary to form a view as to whether the proposed penalty is within the permissible range. Commonly, a proposed penalty does readily fit within that range and little more need be said about it.
66 In this instance, the maximum penalty against the first respondent is $5,500,000. A civil penalty in the amount of $110,000, in my view, is not at first impression clearly within the permissible range. It is but 2% of the maximum. Moreover, as I have indicated, in certain respects I do not consider that matters said by the parties to be relevant, and presumably taken into account by them in arriving at their suggested penalty, should be taken into account. Consequently, it is necessary to consider in greater detail than is sometimes the case the permissible range of penalties in this matter. Having reached tentative views to that effect, I invited the parties to make further oral submissions, in addition to the written joint submissions, on such matters.
67 The matters noted above have taken into account the further submissions and the further evidentiary material adduced on behalf of the first respondent.
68 The contravention of s 18(3) of the EPBC Act occurred soon after the first respondent acquired the property. It acquired the property for the purpose of increasing its cropping output and securing a more reliable cropping foundation overall for its business. At the time, although it operated a very substantial business, the first respondent was apparently under significant financial pressure. Those matters provide some explanation for the first respondent's conduct.
69 Nevertheless, it consciously embarked upon the clearing of native vegetation when it knew that it was not entitled to do so. It did not appreciate the particular risk to the Cockatoo when doing so, but I consider that it must have been aware - if it thought about the issue - that a reason for restricting the clearance of native vegetation may have been to protect natural wildlife habitat. I proceed on the basis that it was not aware of the particular provisions of the EPBC Act, or of the penalties prescribed under that Act for conduct in contravention of s 18(3). However, it was aware of the need to obtain approval of the relevant South Australian authority to the clearing of those trees and it chose to proceed despite not having that approval.
70 As I noted above, although the impact of the contravening conduct upon the Cockatoo and its future breeding and its survival is not quantifiable, that conduct is likely to adversely affect habitat which is critical to the survival of the Cockatoo, a proclaimed endangered species.
71 Consequently, the conduct was both deliberately unlawful, although in ignorance of the particular offence under s 18(3) of the EPBC Act and of any particular risk to the Cockatoo, and it was significant. It was also engaged in through its managing director.
72 There are a number of reasons why, nevertheless, the pecuniary penalty should not be in a range towards the maximum prescribed.
73 The first respondent is not a large public corporation with a substantial prescribed capital. It is a private family company. It has not previously contravened the EPBC Act, or like legislation. Those matters point strongly towards a penalty in the lower range.
74 I have considered whether, because of the nature and purpose of the EPBC Act, the fact that conduct contravening s 18(3) has not previously been engaged in might not be so significant as in relation to contravention of some other legislative proscriptions, even though s 481(3)(d) specifies it as a relevant matter. A first contravention of s 18(3) may have quite devastating consequences for an endangered species. I have not taken that step because, in this matter, the applicant did not contend that I should do so, and because the effect upon the Cockatoo of the contravening conduct is not shown to be of that nature. I give the first respondent full credit for the fact that its conduct was its first contravention of the EPBC Act or of similar legislation.
75 The penalties imposed upon the respondents for contravention of the Native Vegetation Act 1991 (SA), and the potential order on the remediation application, are each said to be reasons pointing towards a lower pecuniary penalty. I am prepared to take them into account, on the basis of the joint submissions. I do not think they weigh greatly in the scales towards reducing the pecuniary penalty of the first respondent. It was fined almost 30% of the maximum penalty for its contravention of the Native Vegetation Act 1991 (SA), but the maximum is a very low one relative to that under s 18(3) of the EPBC Act. I have commented at [29] above about the remediation application. I have no information about what orders might be made or at what cost to either of the respondents.
76 I have rejected the implicit suggestion that the pecuniary penalty should be fixed on the assumption that it really is a penalty upon an individual, so that (implicitly at least) the relevant maximum penalty is $550,000.
77 I take into account, in the first respondent's favour, not simply its status but its financial performance over the last several years. That is generally referred to above. It was under some financial pressure at the time of the offence. Indeed, it is not trading profitably at present and its borrowings are high relative to its assets (at least at cost). Nevertheless, whilst it is clearly a family company, it is a significant one with substantial sales each year and a number of staff. Whilst I am not critical of its assets being valued at cost, it is difficult to assess the impact of a significant penalty on it. That is also the case because it is not clear the extent to which the drawings of its shareholders and "associates" are reflected somehow in its accounts, presumably through an associated entity, or the extent to which ultimately they reflect the value of any services provided to the first respondent through the associated entity. On the other hand, the first respondent is clearly not in the lowest tier of potential contravenors of s 18(3) of the EPBC Act, at least from a financial perspective. It is agreed that the jointly proposed penalty of $110,000 would not be unduly oppressive, but it does not follow that a higher penalty would be unduly oppressive to the first respondent, particularly if progressive payment of any penalty were to be ordered (as is the case in respect of the proposed penalty).
78 I have also taken into account, for the reasons I have discussed above, the cooperation of the first respondent both in admitting the offence and in agreeing the facts presented to the Court, as well as the cooperation with the applicant from an early point in the investigation of the offence. But for that cooperation, I would have reached a penalty considerably higher than I have reached.
79 Having regard to the matters raised by the joint submissions, and the matters I have discussed, in my view the penalty proposed by the joint submissions is not within the permissible range. The contravention was not within the least serious category of contraventions. The deliberate nature of the conduct, the indifference to its potential consequences, and its significance in relation to the endangered species, and the need for the Court to fix a penalty which will operate as a deterrent to those who might otherwise be minded to clear native vegetation contrary to s 18(3) of the EPBC Act all point to a penalty significantly greater than that suggested, even taking into account all the matters which weigh in the first respondent's favour to fix a low pecuniary penalty.
80 In my judgment, the appropriate pecuniary penalty is $220,000. That is, having regard to the first respondent's cooperation throughout, the bottom of what I regard to be the permissible range. It is only 4% of the maximum penalty. I order that the first respondent pay to the Commonwealth of Australia a pecuniary penalty of $220,000. As the parties have previously agreed upon a timetable for the payment of the proposed agreed penalty, I will give them the opportunity to reach agreement upon a timetable for the payment of that penalty, and to submit consent minutes on that topic. In the event that there is no agreement, I give liberty to either party to apply for any orders as to the period by which that pecuniary penalty is to be paid or as to the rate at which it is to be paid. As agreed, I order that the first respondent pay to the applicant the costs of the application fixed at $22,500.
I certify that the preceding eighty (80) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Mansfield.