Mineralogy's proposed amendments to its Reply
22 Following consideration of amendments over the weekend, Mineralogy sent proposed amendments to the CITIC parties on Saturday and applied this morning to amend its Reply in the terms sent. In broad terms, Mineralogy proposed to delete entirely its pleading in para 15 and to replace that with a pleading of paragraphs as follows:
15A. By email dated 15 March 2010, Mr Lam on behalf of CPMM communicated to Mineralogy that Mineralogy would be required to expand on the role of Terminal Operator for the respondents' consideration.
15B. By letter dated 17 March 2010 Mineralogy informed CPMM that an Operations Level Agreement between Mineralogy and CPMM defining the role of Terminal Operator was yet to be negotiated.
15C. The letter of 23 March 2010 was expressed by Mr Robinson to be his understanding of how issues had been resolved.
15D. In the premises, Mineralogy and CPMM did not intend to form a concluded agreement that CPMM would be Terminal Operator until such time as the role of Terminal Operator was defined by further agreement.
15E. Further, the absence of intention to form a concluded agreement is to be inferred from the sending by Mineralogy of the letter dated 5 August 2010 and the written acceptance of its terms by Sino/Korean, and the sending by Mineralogy of letters dated 10 December 2010 and 9 March 2011.
15F. Alternatively, no agreement was formed on 23 March 2010 as to the respective roles of Mineralogy and CPMM, because the meaning of the term Terminal Operator was uncertain.
15G. Alternatively, the alleged agreement was terminated by agreement or mutually abandoned by the sending and acceptance of the terms of the letter dated 5 August 2010.
15H. Further and alternatively, if there was an agreement, which is denied:
(a) It was not an agreement to which Sino Iron and Korean Steel were parties;
(b) It did not vary the Facilities Deeds;
(c) It did not permit CPMM to subcontract the role of terminal operator to any
other party;
(d) It was not performed by CPMM.
23 The proposed amendments can be divided into seven categories:
(1) Paragraphs 15A to 15E which senior counsel said were pleadings to clarify Mineralogy's existing Reply pleading and plead a Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353, category 3 case.
(2) Paragraph 15F which pleaded that no agreement was formed because the 23 March 2010 letter was too uncertain.
(3) Paragraph 15G which pleaded that any agreement was abandoned.
(4) Paragraph 15H, the first matter, which pleaded that this was not an agreement to which Sino Iron and Korean Steel were parties.
(5) Paragraph 15H, the second matter, that the Port Terminal Operation Agreement did not vary the Facilities Deeds.
(6) Paragraph 15H, the third matter, that the Port Terminal Operation Agreement did not permit CPMM to subcontract the role of terminal operator to any other party was also raised by Mineralogy in its opening written submissions and responded to by the CITIC parties.
(7) Paragraph 15H, the fourth matter, which raises an allegation of lack of performance.
24 During oral submissions this morning, senior counsel for Mineralogy accepted that the matters raised in points (6) and (7) did not relate to any identified legal issue between the parties. He abandoned reliance on those matters. He also said that point (5) had already been pleaded elsewhere; this was accepted by senior counsel for the CITIC parties and no real argument was directed to point (5).
25 The focus of the argument was on points (2), (3) and (4) which senior counsel for Mineralogy accepted to be wholly new points. As I explain below, the CITIC parties filed affidavit evidence which pointed inevitably to an adjournment of the trial if any of these amendments were allowed. At least in relation to points (2) and (3), not only do I accept this evidence but I consider that evidence to this effect was wholly predictable. An inference could probably have been drawn to this effect even without the evidence.
26 As to (2), the obvious difficulties causing delay in the trial would include the need to explore whether there was a meaning of "Terminal Operator" known to both parties or whether there was an industry meaning of the term. This may require expert evidence.
27 As to (3), and the proposed abandonment plea, the difficulties include the need for the CITIC parties to explore what is meant in the 5 August 2010 letter about "discussions today": who were the parties to those discussions? Were they continuing? If they were continuing then what had previously been discussed? Are those persons still employed by the CITIC parties? The difficulties also include the need to determine what occurred between the time of the 23 March 2010 letter and the alleged abandonment on 5 August 2010? Why does the 5 August 2010 letter which is said to abandon any agreement on 23 March 2010 fail to refer to the 23 March 2010 letter? Was the 5 August 2010 alleged agreement conditional? If so, were the conditions satisfied? Could any estoppel by convention of the nature already pleaded arise to prevent the Facilities Deeds, if varied by the 23 March 2010 letter, from having the variation removed when the 5 August 2010 alleged agreement took effect?
28 As to (1), there was dispute about whether this was a new point or whether it was a point which clarified the existing pleading. It is clear that it is expressed differently from the existing pleading. To the extent that it clarified the existing pleading it was not opposed by the CITIC parties but their senior counsel explained that the language of 15A to 15E had moved from the previous focus on a "contingency".
29 In oral submissions, senior counsel for Mineralogy submitted that the plea that Mineralogy and CPMM intended to reach an agreement but not a concluded agreement was intended to be a reference to the third category in Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353. In that case, the High Court explained three possible legal characterisations of an agreement expressed to be "subject to contract". One category was that the parties intended to be bound immediately and the restatement in a later contract was a mere formality. The second category is a circumstance in which the parties intend to be immediately bound but performance is suspended until they execute a formal contract. The third category is a circumstance in which the parties do not intend to be bound until a formal agreement is executed. In Masters v Cameron the High Court said (at 361):
Cases of the third class are fundamentally different. They are cases in which the terms of agreement are not intended to have, and therefore do not have, any binding effect of their own … The parties may have so provided either because they have dealt only with major matters and contemplate that others will or may be regulated by provisions to be introduced into the formal document … or simply because they wish to reserve to themselves a right to withdraw at any time until the formal document is signed.
30 These are questions to be determined objectively in light of "the subject matter of the agreement, the status of the parties to it, their relationship to one another, and other surrounding circumstances": Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc [2002] HCA 8; (2002) 209 CLR 95, 105-106 [25] (Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne & Callinan JJ).
31 This proposed pleading of paras 15A to 15E was not altogether too different from the pleading it sought to replace and which alleges that the 23 March 2010 letter was "contingent". This is also consistent with the reiteration in para 15E of the previously pleaded, but subsequent, correspondence as somehow reinforcing the "contingent" nature of the 23 March 2010 letter. Nevertheless, there are some potentially material differences. The most significant of these, to which senior counsel for the CITIC parties referred, is the reference to the "contingency" being the role of "Terminal Operator" rather than "the parties agreeing a set of port operating protocols". As I have explained in relation to the proposed pleading at para 15F, this is a potentially substantial difference.
32 Many of these submissions by senior counsel for the CITIC parties were entirely predictable. As I had explained to senior counsel for Mineralogy last Friday, questions of abandonment often involve very fact-intensive enquiries. It was inevitable on any objective assessment of the application that if it had succeeded then the trial would have been adjourned, potentially for a long time. Given the seriousness of this litigation, its potential effect on the CITIC parties, and the multi-billion dollar nature of the project, such delay and accompanying uncertainty would be a matter of considerable prejudice to the CITIC parties.