There is still one matter remaining for consideration. Although the respondents were completely successful in the action, Morris C.J. (apart from two matters of small importance) refused to make an order in their favour for costs. There was no cross-appeal as to this refusal, but, on the hearing of the appeal, the Solicitor-General applied for an order extending the time for appealing. The appellant's notice of appeal was given early in December 1954. It would appear that for a very considerable time reasonable doubts were entertained as to whether it was intended to proceed with the appeal, and it was in these circumstances that the necessity of giving a notice under O. 70, r. 13, was overlooked. It is impossible, in our opinion, to justify the refusal of costs to the successful defendants. The defendants were not merely entitled, but bound, to rely on the statute of 1950, and the fact that they raised by their defence the Statute of Frauds and another "technical" defence, on which they did not rely, or need to rely, is quite insufficient to disentitle them to costs. It was not established that the class to which the plaintiff belonged were very substantially worse off under the Act of 1950 than they would have been if their contentions had succeeded. In some respects they were better off. We should have thought that, if there ever was a case in which plaintiffs should be held to litigate at their own risk as to costs, this is that case. And, in all the circumstances, we do not think that the respondents should be precluded from challenging the order made as to costs. The ground of attack is not merely that a discretion has been wrongly exercised. It is a general rule that a wholly successful defendant should receive his costs unless good reason is shown to the contrary, and no reason to the contrary was shown in this case. The failure to give notice under O. 70, r. 13, is not wholly unexplained. Again, the case is not like Jenkins v. Lanfranchi [1] , where an application for special leave to appeal as to costs was refused. Here the plaintiff has himself brought the whole case before this Court, and it has not been suggested that he has been in any way prejudiced by the failure to give a notice under O. 70, r. 13. We think that a proper course, and the simplest course, is to make an order under O. 64, r. 2, and then to vary the judgment of the Supreme Court by ordering that the plaintiffs pay the defendants' costs of the action. Whether any attempt should be made to enforce the order is a matter which does not concern us. Subject to that variation the appeal should be dismissed with costs.