But, in order that the jurisdiction of a Court which starts with jurisdiction may be ousted, the case must be such that it is necessary to determine a question of federal jurisdiction in order to decide the case. A very similar rule is well settled in the United States with regard to a class of cases in which under the Judiciary Acts of that republic an appeal lies to the Supreme Court from the highest Court of State. The point is not quite the same as that now before us, but it is very analogous. I will refer to one of the later cases in which the rule has been stated. I read from the judgment in Hale v. Akers[4]: - "In Murdock v. City of Memphis520 Wall., 590, 636., this Court announced, as one of the propositions which flowed from the provisions of the second section of the Act of February 5th 1867, 14 Stat., 386," (the Judiciary Act) "embodied in sec. 709 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, and still in force, that even assuming that a federal question was erroneously decided against the plaintiff in error, the Court must further inquire whether there was any other matter or issue adjudged by the State Court, which is sufficiently broad to maintain the judgment of that Court, notwithstanding the error in deciding the issue raised by the federal question; and that, if that is found to be the case, the judgment must be affirmed, without inquiring into the soundness of the decision on such other matter or issue. This principle has since been repeatedly applied. In Jenkins v. Lowenthal1110 U.S., 222., where two defences were made in the State Court, either of which, if sustained, barred the action, and one involved a federal question and the other did not, and the State Court in its decree sustained them both, this Court said that, as the finding by the State Court of the fact which sustained the defence which did not involve a federal question was broad enough to maintain the decree, even though the federal question was wrongly decided, it would affirm the decree, without considering the federal question or expressing any opinion upon it, and that such practice was sustained by the case of Murdock v. City of Memphis220 Wall., 590.." After citing a number of cases in which the principle had been applied, the judgment continues: - "It appears clearly from the opinion of the Supreme Court" (i.e., of the State) "that it was not necessary to the judgment it gave that the words taking the direction of the Arroyo Seco should be construed at all. It is, therefore, of no consequence whether or not that Court was wrong in its conclusions as to the meaning of the Huichica grant." That doctrine is, as I said, not the same as this, but it is very similar.