(2) Nothing in the succeeding provisions of this Division shall be taken as limiting by implication the generality of subsection (1).
61 In my view all the ingredients for the operation of this provision have been made out in this case. Milford Astor, during the course of a commercial activity, engaged in conduct which was, at best, misleading. MDL, in reliance upon this misleading conduct, entered into a contract to purchase the Bell-Mark printers on conditions which would not have been acceptable to it had it known of the true situation.
62 My finding that Milford Astor was in breach of section 52 of the Trade Practices Act makes it strictly unnecessary to determine whether there was also a breach of an implied condition under s 19 of the Sale of Goods Act. It also makes it unnecessary to determine the effect of the exemption clause which is contained in Milford Astor's normal terms and conditions. According to Mr Riley's evidence, these terms and conditions were sent to MDL both by fax and by ordinary mail. Mr Melville denied ever having seen them. However the objective evidence strongly supports the proposition that they were in fact sent by Milford Astor to MDL on or about 11 November 1999. If I were required to make a finding on this matter, I would therefore conclude that the terms were communicated to MDL, and that they became part of the contract entered into on 4 December 1999.
63 The exemption clause in question was in the following terms:
"8. CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS AND DAMAGE
Save as expressly provided for in the limited warranty in paragraph 8, the Company shall not be liable for any loss or damage or injury, direct or consequential, whether in contract, tort, by statute or otherwise, and whether at law or in equity, and whether caused or arising out of or through the negligence, breach, acts or omissions for the Company, its servants or agents or otherwise and of whatsoever nature and to whomsoever or whatsoever caused arising out of the manufacturing and supply or supply only of any goods to the Customer or out of or through the use of any such goods by the Customer.
64 This clause is in very broad terms. It would almost certainly operate to exclude liability for breach of an implied condition under s 19 of the Sale of Goods Act. But it cannot exclude liability under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act. For there is clear authority that a vendor of goods cannot rely on an exemption clause in answer to a cause of action under s 52, as the conduct in making the representation preceded the contract in which the exemption clause was contained. As Sheppard DJ said in Clark Equipment v Covcat (1987) 367 71 ALJ at 371:
"Parties may agree that statements and representations made antecedently to their entering into a contract are not to form the basis of any remedy in the event of there being a subsequent disagreement. Except in cases of fraud, the common law will give effect to their contract. But the remedy conferred by s 52 of the Trade Practices Act will not be lost, whatever the parties may provide in their agreement. If a vendor of goods has engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct, the law makes him accountable for loss and damage suffered as a result of his unlawful conduct. That conduct will usually have been committed, as in this case, prior to the signing of any contract. If, as a result of the con- duct, a person is induced to enter into a contract and suffers loss, an action to recover it lies. The terms of the contract are irrelevant. As Wilcox J said in Petera Pty Ltd v EAJ Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 375 at 378: "Whatever may be the effect of cl 19 [the exemption clause in that case] in relation to an action brought in contract, in which reliance is placed upon an alleged warranty or condition not included in the contract of sale, that clause should not be allowed to defeat a claim based upon s 52. To permit such a clause to defeat such a claim would be to accept the possibility that a vendor might exacerbate his deception, as by actively misleading a purchaser as to the existence or nature of such an exclusion, and thereby ensure that he would escape liability:"
65 I turn finally to the question of damages. As Mr Burchett conceded, the evidence on this aspect of the matter is less than satisfactory. The evidence indicates that, had the 30 metre cabling been available, the control units would probably have been housed either in a separate room or possibly in the ceiling of the CMG plant. With the shorter length of cabling, alternative means of housing the controllers had to be devised . The solution reached was to place each control unit on the back of the printer it controlled. But there is no evidence as to the projected cost of the original proposal or the actual cost of the substitute measure. Therefore there is no basis upon which damages can be assessed for this part of MDL's claim.
66 There is one portion of the claim, however, which is ascertainable. On 28 February 2000 Mr Matos submitted an invoice to Bagger Company Limited for the work which Automation Systems Limited had carried out in making the Bell-Mark printers properly operational. The amount claimed was NZ$92,862. $7,200 of this was charged for "printer connectors - parts". According to Mr Matos, this related to work carried out in extending the cables which were attached to the printers as delivered. It will be remembered that these cables were only two metres long, which was even less than the cables on the demonstration model. The cables were too short to enable the controllers to be placed on the back of the printers, and a considerable amount of work had to be carried out, according to Mr Matos, to extend the cables so that this connection could be made.
67 In my view this amount is properly included as part of MDL's damages in relation to Milfor Astor's misleading conduct. The evidence indicates that the invoice was paid by MDL, notwithstanding that it was addressed to Bagger Company Limited, a close associate of MDL's.
68 As at February 2000 NZ $7,200 equalled A$9,097. MDL's cross-claim will therefore be allowed in this amount.
69 Milford Astor's original claim was $51,935.20. From this the sum of $2,530 must be deducted (being the commissioning charge), plus the $9,097.20. In the result, Milford Astor will receive a verdict in the amount of $40,308.00.
70 This represents a substantial victory for Milford Astor. However, it is not in my view appropriate that it receive all its costs of the proceedings. I order that MDL pay 50 percent of Milford Astor's costs.
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