The challenge to the primary judge's findings of fact
31Although Midcoast Water also challenged the primary judge's finding in relation to the 18 May 2010 meeting, what happened at that meeting was relevant only to the extent that it assisted in resolving what had happened at the earlier meeting by reflecting on the credit of the various witnesses or making one version more likely to have occurred than the other.
32The relevant principles as to fact finding on appeals by way of rehearing are not in dispute. This Court must set aside challenged findings of fact which are shown to be wrong. When addressing those challenged findings, the Court must weigh conflicting evidence and draw its own inferences and conclusions from that evidence, giving due regard to the fact that it has not seen nor heard the witnesses. Specifically, if a finding might be affected by the trial judge's impression about the credibility of a witness or witnesses, this Court should respect the advantage of the trial judge in that regard. Usually such a finding should stand unless it is shown that the trial judge "has failed to use or has palpably misused his advantage" or acted on evidence which was "inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly established" or "glaringly improbable": Devries v Australian National Railways Commission [1993] HCA 78; (1993) 177 CLR 472 at 479, 480-481; Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [25]-[27]. Furthermore, as McHugh J observed in Jones v Hyde [1989] HCA 20; (1989) 63 ALJR 349 at 351, when a trial judge resolves a conflict of evidence between witnesses it does not follow that "because the learned judge made no express reference to demeanour and credibility", they played no part in the conclusion. Also to be kept in mind is that caution should be exercised against placing too much reliance on the appearances of witnesses rather than on "contemporary materials, objectively established facts and the apparent logic of events": Fox v Percy at [31].
33In preferring the evidence of Mr Buchanan, the primary judge accepted that Mr Flew did his best to recall the relevant events and that Mr Koller and Mr Morse were generally to be accepted as witnesses of truth. However, he regarded two "concessions" made by Mr Flew and Mr Morse as casting doubt on the reliability of their evidence. He also noted one respect in which Mr Morse's recollection of the events of 4 May 2010 was influenced by his subsequent reading of affidavits of other witnesses of Midcoast Water.
34Midcoast Water contends that the primary judge's treatment of those "concessions" involved error. The matter is dealt with in the reasons as follows -
"[111] The defendant emphasised that it had put forward five witnesses who essentially concurred that Mr Buchanan had only said that he would check and that he had not said that he understood the payment claim had been served. However, this matter is not to be resolved by a mere weighing of the number of witnesses able to support a proposition. That would be a superficial way of treating with the exercise. The court has examined and accepted the evidence given by Mr Buchanan. Additionally, the defendant's witnesses were not fully accepted in this area. As explained above, Mr Flew made a significant concession, that Mr Buchanan had not said that he would get back to Midcoast after enquiring of Mr Wilkinson. A concession by Mr Morse also cast some doubt over his evidence."
35The concessions to which the primary judge is referring are identified in the following earlier passages in his reasons -
"[64] During Mr Flew's cross-examination, the following exchange took place at T122:
Q - Your expectation was that Mr Buchanan or someone from Reed would respond to Midcoast in relation to whether or not the payment claim had been served?
A - Yes.
Q - Mr Buchanan hadn't said that?
A - Mr Buchanan said that he would look into it with Chad.
Q - But he hadn't said he would get back to you?
A - Mr Buchanan said that he would look into that with Chad and get back to us, yes.
Q - Well the words "get back to you" don't appear anywhere in your affidavit, do they?
A - Maybe not, no.
Q - In fact you just made those up in the witness box, didn't you?
A - No.
Q - If they'd said he's going to get back to you, why wouldn't you have put that in your statement?
A - I was probably incorrect. Mr Buchanan said that he would look into it with Chad, words to that effect.
Q - Well which was it, did he say "I'll look into it with Chad" or "I'll look into it with Chad and get back to you"?
A - I will follow that up with Chad, words to that effect.
Q - So he didn't say anything about getting back to you?
A - No, he didn't.
[65] The above obviously represents a significant concession by Mr Flew. His evidence that Mr Buchanan said that he would check with Mr Wilkinson and get back to Midcoast is obviously not accepted. However outside of the above glitch Mr Flew's evidence appeared to me to be his best endeavour to recall the events of the time."
"[99] Under cross-examination, Mr Morse made the following concession (T146.50) :
Q - See, you saw the responsibility of Reed as being to let you know and by letting you know it meant Midcoast?
A - Yeah.
Q - And therefore you have assumed that that's what would have been said?
A - Yes."
36Mr Flew said he could not recall the precise words used by Mr Buchanan on 4 May 2010. In his affidavit he did not suggest that Mr Buchanan had said that he would "get back to us". However, he did give evidence to that effect in cross-examination. When pressed, he conceded that those words were not said. Midcoast Water argued that Mr Flew's concession did no more than correct a statement made to the cross-examiner which conveyed the witness' impression as to what Mr Buchanan meant as opposed to what Mr Buchanan said. That submission does not accurately reflect Mr Flew's oral evidence. As the extract above shows, Mr Flew did correct his earlier oral evidence as to what Mr Buchanan had said. Nevertheless, he maintained that nothing had been said about the payment claim having been received. I consider that, the concession, although of marginal significance to an assessment of the reliability of Mr Flew's evidence, was something which the primary judge was entitled to take into account for that purpose.
37In his affidavit Mr Morse gave evidence that Mr Buchanan had said he would follow the payment claim up "and let you know". However, in cross-examination, Mr Morse accepted that he had assumed without necessarily recalling that Mr Buchanan had used those words. Midcoast Water submitted that this aspect of his evidence was not relevant to an assessment of the reliability of his account of the relevant discussions, or alternatively could only be of marginal relevance, especially when considered with the other evidence as to what happened at the meeting. Mr Morse also denied that Mr Buchanan had made any reference to the payment claim having been lodged. Mr Morse's concession that he did not recall Mr Buchanan using some of the words which he had attributed to him in the critical conversation was also a matter which the primary judge was entitled to take into account when assessing the reliability of his evidence.
38Ultimately, the primary judge had to resolve the conflict in the evidence of the various witnesses without the benefit of any non-contentious facts or documents which were more consistent with one version rather than the other.
39Midcoast Water submitted that this Court, when weighing that conflicting evidence and drawing its own conclusions, was free to substitute its own findings unconstrained by any need to respect the advantage of the primary judge because his findings did not depend on the demeanour of the witnesses "at least not to a substantial degree". I do not accept that this submission is correct. The primary judge observed that he had "examined and accepted the evidence" given by Mr Buchanan and that "having heard the evidence" of Mr Buchanan, he did not accept the "significant attack" on him. This is not a case in which it can be concluded that the primary judge's decision was not or could not have been affected by his impression of the credibility of the witnesses: Fox v Percy at [26]. Accordingly, it remains necessary to consider whether the primary judge's conclusion was improbable or contrary to compelling inferences or to incontrovertible facts or that the primary judge otherwise misused his advantage.
40Midcoast Water relied on four matters as providing a basis for concluding that the primary judge erred. The first was that Mr Buchanan had failed to correct what was recorded in the minutes of the meeting of 4 May 2010. It was said that his failure to correct them was consistent with them being an accurate and complete record of what was said. The second, which relates to the first, was that in cross-examination on those minutes Mr Buchanan gave evidence of a new conversation with Mr Wilkinson in order to explain away the fact that he had not made any correction. The third matter relied on was that Mr Buchanan had discussed his evidence with Mr Wilkinson in July or August 2010 and before he swore his affidavit. This, it was said, cast doubt on the veracity of his evidence. Finally, it was submitted as more likely that if Mr Buchanan had said he understood that the payment claim had been served, one of the representatives of Midcoast Water would have asked for a copy of it. That did not happen and thus it was unlikely that there had been any reference to the claim by Mr Buchanan.
41As to the first of these matters, the final form of the minutes of the meeting of 4 May 2010 was circulated on 7 May 2010. They recorded "April claim not yet received" but did not identify that matter as one for action by either party. That statement accurately recorded what was asserted to be the position by Midcoast Water as at 4 May 2010. The entry did not purport to record the position after that date and, whilst not a complete or full record of the discussion according to the evidence of Mr Buchanan, was not inconsistent with that evidence.
42Midcoast Water contended that Mr Buchanan's failure to correct what was recorded in the minutes was more consistent with its version of what took place at the meeting. There are a number of difficulties with this argument. First, Mr Buchanan's evidence was that he did not receive or see the minutes of the meeting of 4 May 2010 until the day of or before the meeting of 18 May 2010. At that time he raised the question with Mr Wilkinson. Secondly, the minutes were not clearly inconsistent with Mr Buchanan's version of events. Thirdly, Mr Buchanan's evidence was that he did not take the view that the minutes were wrong or incomplete and that he did not regard himself as having any "influence" over the minutes. In cross-examination it was apparent that he read the minutes as suggesting that the progress claim had still not been received. This led to his conversation with Mr Wilkinson which is the subject of the second matter raised by Midcoast Water. His evidence in these respects was plausible. None of this provides a basis for doubting Mr Buchanan's version of events.
43As to the second matter, Midcoast Water's submission concerning a "new conversation" not referred to in Mr Buchanan's affidavit, was rejected by the primary judge. In my view this was correct. In his affidavit Mr Buchanan had said that following his discussion with Mr Wilkinson after the 4 May 2010 meeting, his next discussion with him occurred on the morning of 18 May 2010 and before the site meeting. That was consistent with his evidence in cross-examination that the discussion he had with Mr Wilkinson concerning the content of the minutes took place "prior to" the meeting on 18 May 2010.
44As to the third matter concerning the discussion between Mr Buchanan and Mr Wilkinson in about July or August 2010, this evidence was rejected by the primary judge as calling into question the reliability and integrity of Mr Buchanan's evidence. In his answers under cross-examination, Mr Buchanan was forthright and not evasive. At the time of the conversation he was unaware of any defence raised by Midcoast Water to Reed's claim based on the non-payment of the April payment claim. His evidence was that he was asked for his recollection of what happened at the meeting and that he provided this, giving a version consistent with that found by the primary judge. It was not suggested to him that he was prompted in any way in giving that response or that Mr Wilkinson sought to obtain his agreement to a particular version of events. In these circumstances the primary judge is not shown to have erred in concluding that this discussion did not affect the reliability of Mr Buchanan's evidence.
45Finally, as to the sequence of events, the absence of any request for a further copy of any payment claim following the meeting of 4 May 2010 was equally explained by a wrong assumption on the part of Midcoast Water that Mr Buchanan, having checked with Mr Wilkinson, would let them know what the position was. In some respects that position is consistent with the evidence of Mr Flew and Mr Morse although not in circumstances where they conceded that Mr Buchanan had made reference to the sending of the payment claim.
46In my view, the primary judge's conclusion as to what Mr Buchanan said was more consistent with what was likely to have occurred in the circumstances as found and not challenged on appeal. Specifically, Midcoast Water accepted the correctness of the finding that before the meeting on 4 May 2010, Mr Wilkinson and Mr Buchanan discussed the fact that the progress claim for April had been lodged. It is most unlikely, in the absence of sharp practice or conduct verging on incompetence on the part of Mr Buchanan, that at the meeting later on that day he would not have recalled and referred to the fact that Mr Wilkinson had told him that a payment claim had been lodged. Midcoast Water did not suggest sharp practice on the part of Mr Buchanan. Furthermore, the primary judge accepted the evidence of Mr Wilkinson and Mr Buchanan that following the meeting, Mr Buchanan reported that he had told Mr Koller that the payment claim had been sent and said that he would check that again with Mr Wilkinson. The findings in relation to that conversation are not challenged on appeal. That being so, there was only one possibility in relation to that evidence consistent with MidCoast Water's case. That was that Mr Buchanan did not truthfully report to Mr Wilkinson what had occurred. Again, the probabilities are against this position as the only reason why Mr Buchanan might have falsified that part of his report to Mr Wilkinson was to hide his failure to raise it at the meeting. This was never suggested to him to have been the case.
47In the result, the matters raised by Midcoast Water do not provide a basis for concluding that the primary judge misused his advantage or acted on evidence which was inconsistent with established facts or that he made a finding which was glaringly improbable.
48Midcoast Water's challenge to the primary judge's finding as to what Mr Buchanan said at the meeting on 4 May 2010 should be rejected. Once that finding is upheld, the conclusions of the primary judge as to the alleged representations not having been made follow for the reasons given by him. In this respect, as to the second alleged representation, I agree with the primary judge's conclusion that the statement that Mr Buchanan understood that the payment claim had been served, did not convey that Reed was "genuinely uncertain" as to whether or not it had been served at all. Rather, it conveyed Mr Buchanan's understanding of the position in circumstances where he was not the person responsible for preparing and sending the claim and the person who was responsible had told him that it had been served.