Michael Hill Jeweller (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gispac Pty Ltd - [2024] NSWCA 211 - NSWCA 2024 case summary — Zoe

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Michael Hill Jeweller (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gispac Pty Ltd

[2024] NSWCA 211

Court of Appeal (NSW)|2024-06-20|Before: Bell CJ, Payne JA

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Court of Appeal (NSW)

Decision date

2024-06-20

Before

Bell CJ, Payne JA

Catchwords

[2008] HCA 57 Ange v First East Auction Holdings Pty Ltd (ACN 083 112 505) [2011] VSCA 335
(2011) 284 ALR 638 Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 99
[1973] HCA 36 Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 153
[2001] NSWCA 61 Carnival Plc v Karpik (Ruby Princess) (2022) 294 FCR 524

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

[2008] HCA 57 Ange v First East Auction Holdings Pty Ltd (ACN 083 112 505) [2011] VSCA 335(2011) 284 ALR 638 Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 99[1973] HCA 36 Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 153[2001] NSWCA 61 Carnival Plc v Karpik (Ruby Princess) (2022) 294 FCR 524[2022] FCAFC 149 Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337 Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1[1986] HCA 33 Current Images Pty Ltd v Dupack Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 99 Electricity Generation Corp v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640[2015] HCA 37 O'Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310[1982] HCA 24 Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Company Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197[1988] HCA 32 Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 218 CLR 451[2004] HCA 35 Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989[2004] HCA 52 Toyota Finance Australia Limited v Gardiner [2016] NSWCA 162 Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd v Peters (1960) 102 CLR 537

Judgment (35 paragraphs)

[1]

[4]

HEADNOTE [This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment] In September 2003 Michael Hill Jeweller (Australia) Pty Ltd (the appellant) and Gispac Pty Ltd (the respondent) entered into an arrangement for Gispac to provide packaging (small and large bags) to Michael Hill, a retailer of jewellery and accessories. The parties entered into sales agreements for specified quantities of bags for Michael Hill's 167 stores in Australia and New Zealand. In about 2012, Gispac offered a new ordering and delivery facility, known as ePlus, which allowed individual stores to send orders electronically to Gispac for bags to be delivered direct to the stores. In 2017, a disagreement arose as to the terms of the sales agreements which adopted the ePlus system. In 2017 a dispute arose as to whether three sales agreements, two signed on 5 May 2014 and a third on 8 May 2015 incorporated Gispac's standard Terms and Conditions of Trading (the 2012 Terms). The agreements contained a box which Michael Hill was required to tick to confirm that it "agreed to agree" to the 2012 Terms, said to be available at a specified link. Gispac commenced proceedings in the Equity Division alleging that by agreeing to the 2012 Terms Michael Hill had committed to purchasing a minimum number of bags annually and was required to purchase exclusively from Gispac. Gispac claimed payment of invoices issued to Michael Hill for a shortfall in orders and damages for breach of the exclusivity provision. On 31 January 2024, the primary judge upheld Gispac's claims and awarded an amount of $2,259,971.40 plus interest from the date of the invoices. On 22 March 2024, Michael Hill filed a notice of appeal. The issues for determination on appeal were whether: (i) the 2012 Terms were incorporated into the sales agreements; (ii) the annual quantity in cl 18 of the 2012 Terms was the number identified as "QTY" in the sales schedule to the sales agreements; and (iii) the judge erred in his construction and quantification of the exclusivity clause. The Court (Bell CJ and Payne JA, Basten AJA agreeing in part) allowing the appeal in part, held: As to (i) (the incorporation of the 2012 Terms) by Bell CJ: 1 The ticking of the box and execution of the sales agreements bound Michael Hill to Gispac's 2012 Terms, whether the URL link was operable at the time of execution or not: [6], [14]. Lief Investments Pty Ltd v Conagra International Fertiliser [1998] NSWCA 284 considered. by Payne JA: 2 The primary judge, addressing the real issues litigated in the trial, found that a set of terms identical in all respects to the 2012 Terms existed at the relevant time. That finding was not challenged by Michael Hill. Whilst the reasoning of Basten AJA is otherwise persuasive, this ground should be dismissed: [22]-[24]. by Basten AJA (in dissent): 3 The primary judge correctly accepted that by signing each of the sales agreements and ticking the T&C box, the appellant was bound by the terms and conditions so identified: [165]. However, there was an evidential void as to the content of the document referred to in the T&C box: [169], [173]. 4 Where the parties have a long-term relationship, the incorporation of specific terms depends in part on the contextual background: [139]. As at May 2014, the commercial basis on which the parties operated was inconsistent with the application of cll 18 and 21 of the 2012 Terms: [176]. Although Michael Hill's practice of ticking the box changed, that could be accounted for by a change of personnel at Gispac and did not demonstrate an intention to vary the terms on which the parties were operating: [177]-[178]. There was no intention to conduct a contractual relationship based on cll 18 and 21 of the 2012 Terms: [179]. Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; [2004] HCA 52 distinguished; Smith v South Wales Switchgear Co Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 165 applied. As to issue (ii) (annual minimum quantities) by Basten AJA (Bell CJ and Payne JA agreeing): 5 On the basis that the standard terms were incorporated into the agreements, it was necessary to determine whether the reference in the sales schedule to "QTY" meant "Annual Quantity" for the purposes of cll 1 and 18 of the 2012 Terms: [180]. The implication that there was a fixed term contractual obligation for Michael Hill to purchase minimum quantities of bags was not supported by the evidence of commercial practice between the parties: [186]. 6 Each sales agreement should be construed as commencing on the date of execution, which did not reflect the operation of cl 21.1 of the 2012 Terms: [191]-[194]. The history of the sales agreements was inconsistent with the terms of cl 21 that they ran for two years and were automatically renewable: [195]. They did not specify a minimum annual quantity, nor obligation to order a minimum quantity on a quarterly basis, as provided by cl 18: [196]-[200]. As to issue (iii) (breach of exclusivity provision) by Payne JA (Bell CJ agreeing): 7 Assuming that ground 1 was dismissed, and ground 2 upheld, the appellant did not submit that cl 17, dealing with exclusivity, was not incorporated into the three sales agreements: [26]. It was common ground that the quantum of any damages related to breach of the exclusivity provision should exclude the "late 2018 invoices"; the adjustment was agreed: [27]. 8 Ground 4 sought to challenge a common position at trial as to the basis of calculation of loss. Where no evidence was presented or submissions made to the primary judge as to the factual premise upon which the ground was based, Gispac lost an opportunity to lead evidence, and the case not tested at trial. Leave to rely on ground 4 should be refused should not be allowed: [28]. by Basten AJA (in dissent) 9 The ePlus terms, cll 17-21, operated as a package. There was no submission that some would operate if others would not. The exclusivity provided in cl 17 applied to "the Products", defined to mean the "products specified on the front page of a Sales Agreement". Further, exclusivity made practical sense only in circumstances where there was a fixed term contract, as provided under cl 21: [203]-[204].

[6]

In each of the three Sales Agreements, Mr Chris Colville of Michael Hill Jeweller (Australia) Pty Ltd (Michael Hill) ticked the box and executed the Sales Agreements. He gave evidence, which was accepted, that he did not seek to open or engage the link provided.
There can be no doubt that, by the combined acts of ticking the box and executing the Sales Agreements, the parties agreed to be bound by Gispac's terms and conditions of trading that it was said could be found at the identified URL link. That link indicated that the terms and conditions took the form of a PDF document identified with the description "gispac_terms_and_conditions_jan2012.pdf".
The reason for the preliminary or threshold dispute as to whether terms and conditions additional to those set out in the Sales Agreement (which were expressed in short form) were incorporated arose from the fact that the primary judge was not persuaded that the evidence before him established that the URL hyperlink to the 2012 Terms was operable in May 2014 and 2015 (when the Sales Agreements were respectively executed) in the sense that a person clicking on the link in the Sales Agreements or typing in the URL shown on the Sales Agreement into a web browser, would be directed to the 2012 Terms. There was an "absence of direct evidence supporting the proposition": PJ [44].
Evidence was, however, led on behalf of Gispac from Mr Edwin Bogatez who had been the Director of Gispac for 22 years and deposed to being the controlling mind of the company and overseeing its day-to-day business operations. He purported to have made his Affidavit on the basis of his personal knowledge and knowledge obtained by him in his capacity as a Director of Gispac through the inspection of Gispac's books and records.
At [26]-[27] of his Affidavit, Mr Bogatez stated that: "[26] Each of the Sales Agreements contained a URL link to Gispac 's standard terms and conditions as they existed at the time those agreements were entered (the Terms). [27] That link was: http://gispac.com/EquoteNew/docs/gispac_terms_and_conditionsjan2012.pdf (the URL Terms Link)"
He then, in [28] of his Affidavit, exhibited a "copy of the Terms". Giving effect to the definition of Terms in [26], this document must be taken to have been "Gispac's standard terms and conditions as they existed at the time those agreements were entered". The primary judge referred to the Terms, as defined in Mr Bogatez' Affidavit as the 2012 Terms.
The primary judge's finding that he was not satisfied that the link was not operable at the time of the execution of the Sales Agreements was not to deny Mr Bogatez' evidence that (a) Gispac had a set of standard terms and conditions that existed at the time the three Sales Agreements in issue were executed, and (b) that the set of standard terms and conditions were constituted by the Terms, as exhibited to his Affidavit.
At PJ [34], the primary judge held: "The evidence of Mr Bogatez in pars [26] to [28] was admitted without objection and he was not directly challenged on this evidence. I reject Michael Hill's submission that in light of the cross-examination of Mr Bogatez his evidence did not establish that a set of terms identical in all respects to the 2012 Terms existed at Gispac's office, as at 5 May 2014 and 8 May 2015. I also reject Michael Hill's submissions that Mr Bogatez was a deeply unsatisfactory witness and in effect, tailored his evidence and answered some questions 'through the lens of Gispac's case'. By reference to my notes made at the time of cross-examination of Mr Bogatez, I accept that he was a reliable witness, who was doing his best to give honest and accurate evidence in respect of events occurring several years earlier."
The primary judge held (at PJ [72]) that: "The Sales Agreements were obviously contractual, as were Gispac's 'terms and conditions' referred to in the box headed 'Terms and Conditions of Trading'. The question of whether by signing and ticking the terms and conditions box in the Sales Agreements Mr Colvile evidenced Michael Hill's contractual intention to be bound by the 2012 Terms, is answered by asking what that conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party to believe: Toll at [40]. Here, Mr Colvile's act of signing and ticking the box referable to Gispac's standard terms and conditions indicated an intention by Michael Hill to be bound by Gispac's terms and conditions regardless of whether they have been read and considered: Oceanic Sun Line v Fay at 228."
The primary judge, in finding that the Terms were incorporated, necessarily construed the incorporation clause as manifesting an intention to incorporate by reference to Gispac's terms and conditions as they existed at the time of the execution of the Sales Agreements such that, whether in fact the URL link was operable at the time, was not to the point. On this footing, that part of the clause which stated that the Terms could be found at the particular URL link was not an essential part of the parties' agreement, objectively ascertained; rather, it was merely pointing out where (or how) Gispac's Terms could be located, if Michael Hill wanted or needed to consult them. That that advice or guidance may not have been accurate did not detract from Michael Hill's agreement, by ticking the box, to Gispac's terms and conditions of trade.
The present is not a case like Lief Investments Pty Ltd v Conagra International Fertiliser Co ([1998] NSWCA 284) (Lief) where the evidence disclosed that, although a short form contract purported to incorporate Sinochem's standard terms of contract, there were in fact multiple (and different) forms of Sinochem's standard terms of contract in existence at the time of contracting such that the purported incorporation of terms was too uncertain to have any effect. What was said in that case by Sheller JA, with whom Mason P and Beazley JA agreed, was that: "Where parties have chosen to incorporate terms, the Court should do its best to identify the terms intended if there is some doubt."
Michael Hill's argument, as I understood it, was that the ticking of the box would only bind it to Gispac's terms and conditions if Gispac could prove that the link was operable in May 2014 and 2015 and exactly what document would be produced by clicking on it. Michael Hill then relied upon Gispac's inability to demonstrate this to the primary judge's satisfaction as fatal to Gispac's attempt to establish the terms of the Sales Agreements upon which it was purporting to sue Michael Hill. This argument involved a subtly different construction to the clause to that favoured by the primary judge and relied upon by Gispac. Michael Hill's construction was tantamount to saying that, by ticking the box, it was bound by whatever was to be physically found by clicking the link as opposed to a construction that, by ticking the box, Michael Hill was bound by Gispac's terms and conditions of trade.
Michael Hill's preferred construction would permit it to take advantage of the serendipitous fact of Gispac's inability at the time of commencement of the proceedings in 2019 to replicate what may or may not have occurred physically in 2014 or 2015 in circumstances where, as Mr Bogatez explained, "[i]n or about 2016, the Terms were updated to a new set of terms, and accordingly the URL Terms Link to the version '23 1 2012_reviewed' was no longer operational from that point onwards": [32] of Bogatez' Affidavit of 17 November 2020.
In circumstances where the parties plainly intended to be bound by additional terms and conditions that did not appear on the face of the Sales Agreements, and manifested that intention by Gispac requesting and Michael Hill ticking the relevant box, the construction adopted by the primary judge is much to be preferred, consistent with what this Court said in Lief, in circumstances where the uncontested and unchallenged evidence was that Gispac had one set of trading terms and conditions that did not relevantly change between 2012 and 2016, and the mind and will of the company identified what those terms were in his evidence.
In relation to grounds 3-5, I agree with Payne JA's reasons, and the orders his Honour proposes.
PAYNE JA: I have had the benefit of reading the judgments of Bell CJ and Basten AJA in draft.
In relation to ground 1, the underlying evidence about the "2012 Terms" incorporated in the relevant contracts relied upon by Gispac has been set out in their judgments. Each of Bell CJ and Basten AJA have dealt with that evidence and come to different conclusions about its breadth and meaning.
I agree with Bell CJ about ground 1, principally because the primary judge, who was in the best position to address the real issues litigated in the trial, made a finding that the evidence established that a set of terms identical in all respects to the 2012 Terms existed at Gispac's office, as at 5 May 2014 and 8 May 2015 (being the two dates on which the Sales Agreements were executed by Michael Hill).
There was no challenge made in a statement under UCPR r 51.36 or in the Amended Notice of Appeal to that finding of fact. I am not persuaded that the finding of fact was limited to Mr Bogatez's state of mind.
Whilst I find the reasoning of Basten AJA about ground 1 otherwise persuasive, I have concluded that ground 1 should be dismissed.
In relation to ground 2, I agree with Basten AJA that the ground must be upheld for the reasons he gives at [180]-[190].
In relation to grounds 3-5, assuming that ground 1 was dismissed, and ground 2 upheld, the appellant did not submit that cl17, dealing with exclusivity, was not incorporated into the three sales agreements executed by the appellant in May 2014 and May 2015.
As to ground 3, the respondent accepted that it should be upheld and accepted that the quantum should exclude the "Late 2018 Invoices" (as sought in ground 3). This would adjust, downwards, the award by $42,727 to the amount referred to at ground 5(b)(ii), leaving a total in dispute of $82,378, which is the subject of ground 4. The remaining sum identified by the primary judge as damages for breach of cl 17 was not in dispute. The appellant submitted that if ground 3 were upheld and ground 4 dismissed, this Court should make an award of $359,858.00 plus interest to the respondent.
Leave to advance ground 4 should be refused. There was a common position at trial that if the product had been ordered during the relevant period but invoiced after, it was caught by the damages claim. This ground seeks to challenge that common position. No submissions were made, and no evidence was led, before the primary judge concerning what was meant by "required at destination". The factual premise upon which the ground is based (namely that the stock was required by a particular time) could have been tested at trial had the issue been raised. I am satisfied that Gispac lost an opportunity to lead evidence on this subject and that, for that reason, the case not tested at trial should not be allowed.
As the appellant is entitled to succeed on ground 3 and not ground 4, which is what I have found, the appropriate award to the respondent is the amount the appellant agreed (on those assumptions) was appropriate, $359,858 plus interest.
Although only filed for more abundant caution, the appellant's motion dated 7 June 2024 seeking leave to file the amended notice of appeal should be allowed, although, as I have said, leave to rely on ground 4 should be refused.

[7]

Orders

For the foregoing reasons I propose the following orders: 1. The appellant's motion dated 7 June 2024 should be allowed. Leave to rely on ground 4 refused. 2. Appeal allowed in part. 3. Set aside the orders of the primary judge made on 31 January 2024 and in lieu thereof order: 1. Judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant in the amount of $359,858. 2. The defendant to pay the plaintiff interest the amount of the judgment referred to par(a) above pursuant to s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) from 19 June 2019 to the date of this judgment. 1. The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal. 2. Within 7 days of the date of delivery of this judgment the appellant file submissions (limited to 3 pages) about the order for costs of the trial which should be made. 3. Within 14 days of the date of delivery of this judgment the respondent file submissions (limited to 3 pages) about the order for costs of the trial which should be made. 4. The Court will deal with the question of costs of the trial on the papers.
BASTEN AJA: The appellant, Michael Hill Jeweller (Australia) Pty Ltd, is a retailer of jewellery and accessories, having in 2015, some 167 retail stores in Australia. From 2014, it also traded under the brand name "Emma & Roe". A related company operated 52 retail stores in New Zealand.
Between September 2003 and May 2018, the appellant purchased small and large paper bags for packaging goods for customers from the respondent, Gispac Pty Ltd. In 2017 a dispute arose as to the terms on which the parties had contracted. Gispac alleged that Michael Hill was committed to purchasing a minimum number of bags annually and was required to purchase exclusively from Gispac. In the event of a shortfall in the number of bags ordered, calculated on a quarterly basis, Gispac claimed it was entitled to invoice Michael Hill for the value of the shortfall. Further, to the extent that Michael Hill had contracted, prior to the termination of its agreements with Gispac, to obtain packaging from a different supplier, Gispac was entitled to damages for breach of an exclusivity provision in the agreements.
The primary judge, Gleeson J, upheld Gispac's claims and awarded judgment in its favour in the amount of $2,259,971.40 together with interest from the date of commencement of the invoices. [1] Subsequently, the primary judge varied the costs order to require that Michael Hill pay Gispac's costs of the proceedings assessed on an indemnity basis on and from 11 July 2020. [2]
By a notice of appeal filed on 22 March 2024, Michael Hill appealed from those orders, contending that it was not liable under the agreements and that the proceedings brought by Gispac should have been dismissed. In the alternative, depending on the scope and operation of the exclusivity clause (assuming it was engaged), judgment should have been limited to an amount falling between $277,000 and $360,000 plus interest.
A further procedural issue arose in relation to aspects of the appellant's submissions in support of grounds 1 and 4. Gispac, in its written submissions filed on 5 June 2024, submitted that the construction of the agreements had not been raised below and could only be relied upon with leave of the Court and leave had not been sought. However, order 1 sought in the notice of appeal had sought leave, to the extent necessary, to argue the points raised by grounds 2 and 3-5. By a notice of motion dated 7 June 2024 and filed on 12 June 2024, leave also was sought, if required, with respect to ground 1. [3]
By consent, the question of leave was stood over for consideration at the hearing of the appeal and was addressed in the course of oral submissions: determination of the issue was reserved and will be addressed below. Although the question of leave does not depend on the merits of the appeal, it cannot usefully be considered without an understanding of the issues and the nature of the submissions, which included claims of prejudice if leave were to be granted. However, it is convenient to record that as to grounds 1 and 2 leave was not required, but that, if it had been, it should be granted.

[9]

Contractual background

The following matters were not in dispute. On 5 September 2003, at the beginning of the commercial relationship between the two companies, Michael Hill provided an "Account Application", [4] and thereafter entered into a number of sales agreements for the supply of packaging products "by way of bulk order". [5] When the "Account Application" was discovered is unclear: according to an email from Mr Bogatez to Tom Lima of Michael Hill, dated 7 July 2017, Gispac did not then have a copy of the original account application. However, an account application dated 5 September 2003 was annexed to Mr Bogatez' first affidavit.
From an unidentified date, not later than early 2012, Gispac offered a new ordering and delivery facility, known as ePlus, which allowed individual stores to send orders electronically to Gispac for packaging to be delivered direct to the stores.
The earliest sales agreement in evidence was dated 26 November 2012 and was for a bulk delivery; otherwise, it was in relevantly identical terms and form to the subsequent sales agreements. Each sales agreement was in the form of a quotation, valid for 7 days, with a space at the end for signature by both parties. It was to be inferred that the quotation constituted an offer, which was accepted by the customer signing and returning the document to the supplier.
In every sales agreement, the first page identified a postal address and delivery address, being Michael Hill at a GPO box in Brisbane. (The same delivery address was identified even for deliveries to be made in New Zealand or Canada.) The second box, which constituted the bulk of the document, identified the item to be supplied, such as "Michael Hill Large Pink Matt Lamination Paper Bag", followed by a quantity, a unit price and a total price. Below that line was a detailed specification of the product to be supplied. The final item was "Split Delivery", with entries such as "Split Shipment x 3", which was understood to refer to Gispac's arrangements with its suppliers. For bulk orders, the item simply recorded "Bulk".
There followed a second heading, "Terms". Three of the common items under that heading were "Payment Terms", "Delivery Charge" and "Lead Time". Where the ePlus facility operated, three further headings were included in the following terms: "Delivery Charge EPLUS: Free In Store - Direct to Stores Delivery Type EPLUS: Delivery Direct To Stores Minimum Invoice Value $400 Minimum Invoice Value". Of the 21 sales agreements in evidence, six were for bulk delivery and did not include these items.
Under the identified terms, there was a statement which read: "*The total price may vary; as per industry standards and subject to production the final quantity may be 10% over or under the actual ordered quantity. This Sales Agreement is valid for a period of 7 days."
At the foot of the first page there was then a "Sub Total", which was the total price identified at the head of the box, followed by an amount of GST and a "Total Amount". There followed a further box and space for signatures:
The second sales agreement in evidence was a quotation dated 11 February 2013 for 100,000 large paper bags, with a total price, including GST, of $50,600. Under the heading "Terms", there was provision for a "Lead Time" of "Approx 12-14 wks due to Chinese New Year". Other agreements had lead times of "Approx 8 - 10 weeks".
The first eight sales agreements in evidence, dated from 26 November 2012 to 12 December 2013, each contained the box headed "Terms and Conditions of Trading" (the T&C box, or incorporating clause) set out above, but in no case was there a tick in the space provided. The first sales agreement in which the T&C box was ticked was dated 15 January 2014. Thereafter, with one exception, in each case, including those for bulk delivery, the box was ticked. The first issue on the appeal was whether the ticked T&C box was effective to incorporate into the terms and conditions applicable to the sales agreement the document which might have been located at the URL provided.

[10]

Incorporation of terms

The issue arose with respect to three sales agreements which were the subject of the proceedings, each of which was signed by Mr Colvile and included a tick in the T&C box. The relevant details of the agreements will be noted below, but the first two agreements in issue were signed on 5 May 2014; the third was signed on 8 May 2015.
There were two factual questions at trial, being (i) whether any document was available at the URL referred to in the T&C boxes in May 2014 and 2015, and (ii) if so, what that document was. Gispac contended that the document was a document headed "Terms and Conditions of Trading", with a subheading "relating to all sale agreements entered into with Gispac Pty Ltd", a copy of which was downloaded with the identifying footer, "Gispac - Terms and Conditions of Trading - 23 1 12_reviewed (2)". That document was referred to in the primary judgement as "the 2012 Terms", a designation continued below.
As to (i), after considering evidence that the document was only available on Gispac's internal server, that the URL link was not underlined as is usual, and that there was no evidence of complaint from customers that they could not access the document, the primary judge concluded: "44 Nevertheless, I am not persuaded that the evidence establishes that a URL hyperlink to the 2012 Terms was operable in May 2014 and 2015 in the sense that a person clicking on the link in the Sales Agreement or typing the URL shown on the Sales Agreement into a web browser would be directed to the 2012 Terms, given the absence of direct evidence supporting that proposition."
As to (ii), Gispac contended that the sales agreements incorporated the 2012 Terms. Gispac contended that that document contained the terms and conditions in force in both May 2014 and May 2015.
On the assumption that the 2012 Terms were effectively incorporated into the sales agreements, a further issue raised by ground 2 of the appeal was the proper construction of the 2012 Terms. The 2012 Terms fell into three categories, namely (i) definitions (cl 1), (ii) general provisions applying to all sales agreements (cll 2-16) and (iii) certain provisions (cll 17-21) appearing under the bolded subheading: "EPlus Facility The following terms and conditions apply to Sales Agreements where Gispac has agreed to make the ePlus service available to a Customer".
Two clauses were of central importance in relation to Gispac's claims to be entitled to payment in the case of a "shortfall". These were cll 18 and 21 which provided as follow: "18 Annual Quantity 18.1 The Customer agrees to purchase from Gispac an amount of each Product that is equal to or exceeds the Annual Quantity specified in the Sales Schedule for each Product. 18.2 If the amount of Product purchased by the Customer during each quarter during the Term is less than 25% of the Annual Quantity (Shortfall), Gispac may do either or both of the following things : (a) invoice the Customer for the Shortfall; and (b) charge the Customer for storage of the Shortfall at the prevailing market rate for storage or the actual cost of storage, commencing on the day immediately following the relevant quarter. … 21 Term 21.1 The Term is 24 months from the date of execution of the Account Application. 21.2 These Terms and Conditions of Trading will automatically renew for a period of 24 months unless the Customer gives Gispac written notice 6 months before the end of the current Tenn that it does not intend to renew the Eplus facility."
Read together, these provisions envisaged a two-year contract which would automatically roll over for a further two-year period (absent termination on six months' notice) pursuant to which the customer would be required to purchase a minimum annual quantity in quarterly amounts constituting 25% of the annual quantity. The first issue, identified by reference to the application of cl 18, was whether that regime was consistent with the terms of each of the sales agreements.
There was a subsidiary question as to the commencement date of the agreements, stated in cl 21.1 to be the date of execution of the Account Application. On Mr Bogatez' evidence, there was one Account Application made by Michael Hill, in 2003, although the terms of the application and the basis on which payment was to be made at that time were not in the material before this Court. The primary judge accepted that each contract commenced to run on the day it was executed by Michael Hill, a finding which is not challenged. However, it will be appropriate to refer shortly to the reasoning by which that conclusion was reached.
Two other clauses were relevant. First, was a general provision relating to termination which provided as follows: "10 Termination 10.1 If the Customer breaches any provision of these Tenns and Conditions of Trading or any Sales Agreement or commits an Insolvency Event, Gispac may, in its absolute discretion, take one or more of the following courses of action: (a) terminate any entitlements under any Account Application, these Terms and Conditions and/or any Sales Agreement by written notice to the Customer; (b) suspend Gispac's performance until the Customer has remedied its breach; and (c) amend the Terms of Payment for future orders. 10.2 Upon termination of these Terms and Conditions of Trading or any Sales Agreement, Gispac can elect to sell, in which case the Customer must purchase from Gispac, all stocks of Product held by Gispac. Immediately upon making such election Gispac may invoice the Customer for the Products and the Customer must pay the invoice upon receipt. Stocks of Product include but are not limited to Products for which Gispac has placed binding orders from its suppliers. Gispac shall not place orders for Products after it has delivered a notice of termination to the Customer. 10.3 The Customer has no entitlement to terminate any Sales Agreement other than in accordance with these Terms and Conditions of Trading."
Further, there was provision for price changes in cl 20 (applicable to ePlus sales agreements): "20 Prices Payable 20.1 The Customer must pay Gispac for the Products that Outlets or Head Office order at the current prices agreed for the Products by Gispac and the Customer. The prices applicable upon commencement of a Sales Agreement are specified in the Sales Schedule. If an order has not been invoiced before a price change in accordance with clause 20.2, the Products that comprise that order will be supplied at the new price for those Products. 20.2 If any Sales Agreement is renewed in accordance with clause 21.2, Gispac may increase the price of the Products by giving written notice to the Customer. Excluding any component of a price increase due to taxation, price increases will not exceed 15% of the Product price as agreed under clause 20.1 during the extended Term. 20.3 Gispac reserves the right, by notice to the Customer at any time before delivery of the Products, to increase the price of the Products to reflect any increase in the cost to Gispac of producing and/or delivering the Products due to any factor beyond Gispac's reasonable control. The Customer shall, by executing the Sales Schedule, accepts and will pay any such price increase as notified to the Customer by Gispac. 20.4 If required by Gispac, the Customer must pay a fee for the use of the Eplus facility service. Such a fee is payable in addition to the price paid for Products under clauses 20.1 and 20.2. If such a fee is applicable to this Sales Agreement it will be set out in the Sales Schedule."
A separate issue arose as to the operation of cl 17 which was in the following terms: "17 Appointment The Customer appoints Gispac for the Term as the exclusive supplier of the Products to Outlets in the Territory."
After giving notice to terminate the agreements, Michael Hill commenced ordering packaging for a number of products, including large and small paper bags, from a third party (Jewel Pak International), the first invoice being dated 23 October 2016.
The application of the exclusivity provision turned upon a number of considerations, including the period for which the relevant agreement operated, the product in question, and the party bound by the terms of the exclusivity provision. These issues were raised by grounds 3-5.

[11]

Grounds 1 and 2

Ground 1 in the notice of appeal read as follows: [6] "No incorporation into sales agreements of provisions in 'terms and conditions of trading' document. The primary judge erred at [320] (and [145], [154], [172], [268], [292], [299], [314]) in finding that the appellant was liable, in respect of the three Sales Agreements, to pay the Respondent amounts referable to cll 18 and, in the alternative, cl 17, of the document styled 'Terms and Conditions of Trading' (extracted at [21]) by reason that the primary judge: (a) erred at [32] in finding that the question of whether the URL link specified in the Sales Agreement (extracted at [17]) was operable in May 2014 and May 2015 'does not arise' if the mode of incorporation is by reference as terms of a signed contract; (b) erred at [72] and [73] in finding that, objectively, the box which Mr Colvile ticked (as extracted at [17]) was 'referable to Gispac's standard terms and conditions' and that his signing and ticking the box 'indicated an intention by Michael Hill to be bound by Gispac's terms and conditions' or, alternatively, to the extent [72] and [73] reflect findings of Mr Colvile's subjective intention, the primary judge erred in relying on that subjective intention for the purposes of construing the terms of the contract; (c) ought to have found that, as a matter of construction, each Sales Agreement only incorporated 'the terms and conditions that can be found at the following link: http://gispac.com/EquoteNew/docs/gispac_terms_and_conditions_jan2012.pdf, whatever the terms at the link may be and which may or may not have been any 'standard terms' known to the Respondent; (d) having regard to [44] and [50], ought to have found that because the Respondent did not prove that the URL was operable, it failed to prove that any terms were available at the URL and hence ascertainable to the defendant by the means prescribed in the Sales Agreement, and failed to prove that the Sales Agreements incorporated the provisions in the document styled 'Terms and Conditions of Trading'; (e) accordingly, erred at [72]-[73] and [84] in finding that the provisions in the document styled 'Terms and Conditions of Trading' were incorporated by reference into each Sales Agreement, and erred in finding the appellant liable for breach of those terms (as summarised at [320])."
Putting to one side the question of reliance on Mr Colvile's subjective intention in par (b), ground 1 encompassed two propositions which, as the submissions were developed, were put in the alternative, namely: 1. the only terms and conditions incorporated into the sales agreements were those which were to be found at the URL identified in the T&C box; 2. there was no evidence sufficient to establish that the 2012 Terms were the terms which were available in May 2014 and May 2015 at the URL.
As will appear, these arguments were not entirely discrete. In substance, however, the first argument turned on the proposition that if the terms and conditions were not where they were said to be, they were not incorporated. That argument is analogous to saying that where a contract identifies the terms and conditions by reference to an attachment, but there is no attachment, the contents of the attachment do not constitute part of the contract. The second argument, described as the "provenance" of the 2012 Terms, was that, even if one could look elsewhere for the document described by reference to the URL, Gispac had failed to establish that the 2012 Terms were in fact that document.
Ground 2 was in the following terms: "Whether 'QTY' in the Sales Schedule to the Sales Agreement means 'Annual Quantity' within cl 1 and 18 of the 'Terms and Conditions of Trading' 2 In the alternative to ground 1 above, if each Sales Agreement incorporated the provisions in the document styled 'Terms and Conditions of Trading': (a) the primary judge erred at [115], [117] and [235] in concluding that the reference to 'QTY' in the Sales Schedule to each Sales Agreement was within the meaning of 'Annual Quantity' in cll 1 and 18 of the Terms and Conditions of Trading (extracted at [21]) and thus gave rise to a contractual commitment by the Appellant to purchase from the Respondent 'an amount of each Product that is equal to or exceeds the Annual Quantity specified in the Sales Schedule for each Product' (cl 18.1) and, if the amount of Product purchased by the Appellant 'during each quarter during the Term is less than 25% of the Annual Quantity' (Shortfall), the Respondent was entitled by cl 18.2 to invoice the Appellant for the Shortfall and/or charge the Appellant for storage commencing the day immediately following the relevant quarter; (b) ought to have found that properly construed, the Sales Agreement, read with the provisions of the Terms and Conditions of Trading, constituted a promise by the Appellant to purchase, during the Term of the Sales Agreement - including as extended pursuant to cl 21.2 - the quantity ('QTY') of Product specified in the Sales Schedule for the total price specified in that Schedule, subject to permissible price variation in accordance with cl 20; (c) ought to have found that the construction advanced in (b) above was not 'unlikely' or 'not a sensible business-like construction' (cf [115]) having regard to: (i) the Respondent's unilateral power to amend the Term of the Sales Agreement pursuant to cl 15.1(c), including so as to vary the length of the Term and the operation of cl 21; (ii) the rights and obligations of the parties pursuant to cll 10.2 in the event of termination; and (iii) cl 17 appointing the Respondent 'for the Term as the exclusive supplier of the Products to Outlets in the Territory'. (d) accordingly, the primary judge erred at [145], [286] and [320] in concluding that the Appellant was liable to the Respondent for any shortfall under cl 18.2 of the Sales Agreements ([145]), that the Respondent had established its shortfall claim under cl 18.2 of the Sales Agreements ([268]), and that the Respondent was entitled to judgment for breach of cl 18.2 and in the alternative cl 18.1 of the Sales Agreements (at [320])."
The assumption underlying the separate formulation in ground 2 was that the 2012 Terms might have been incorporated by reference, and yet not all were engaged. On their face, the elements of ground 2 required a consideration of the text, structure and purpose of the sales agreements, by reference to the provisions of the 2012 Terms. The appellant's submissions, however, put those arguments in a broader context, which included the previous dealings between the parties, so far as these were recorded in the evidence, and as represented in part by a chronology of the 21 sales agreements dating from November 2012.
There may be an issue as to the proper manner of addressing the matters raised in ground 2, although the choice may not affect the outcome, as opposed to the structure of the discussion. For example, in Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd v Peters, [7] the High Court considered an option agreement given by a landowner to its lessees permitting the lessees to purchase the land and stating: "Such sale shall be on and subject to such of the usual terms and conditions of sale of the Real Estate Institute of New South Wales as shall be applicable to sales of land of like tenure under like circumstances." [8]
The first question was whether the relevant terms and conditions were to be found in a document approved by the Institute in 1920 and applicable at the time the option was given, or a later version issued in 1953 and applicable when the option was exercised in 1956. Kitto J held that the intention of the parties was to use the version in force at the time the option was granted, but with questions of applicability determined at the time the option was exercised: at 548. Kitto J then stated: "Accordingly I am of opinion that the proper course is to turn to the Institute's form of 1920, delete any of its provisions which are inapplicable to a sale for cash of an estate in fee simple in land under the provisions of the Real Property Act, and treat the rest as the terms and conditions of the sale."
There are, in practical terms, two ways of addressing the problem of inapplicable or inconsistent terms. The one adopted in Peters is to read the incorporating provision as subject to an implied exclusion of terms which are not engaged or are inconsistent with other aspects of the contractual relationship. The alternative approach is to incorporate all the terms of the document referred to and seek to read any inconsistent terms of the resulting contract harmoniously, [9] or subject to a primacy principle, arguably giving effect to the agreed terms over the incorporated terms. [10]
The former approach is not only consistent with Peters, and that adopted by the House of Lords in Thomas (TW) & Co Ltd v Portsea Steamship Co Ltd, [11] but conforms to the modern approach to the construction of contractual provisions which requires that they be read in context and with an eye to their purpose.
This approach has the particular merit in the present case where the three sales agreements (in May 2014 and May 2015) followed an extended commercial relationship involving the two parties and a series of like sales agreements. Although the outcome may not differ from the alternative approach, it will be adopted below. The result is that, in considering ground 1, it will be appropriate to have regard to the matters raised under ground 2. However, ground 2 will also be addressed below in accordance with its assumption.

[12]

Structure of primary judgment

In order to understand the nature of the challenges set out in grounds 1 and 2, it is necessary to outline the structure of the primary judgment.
After providing a brief background and overview of the issues, the judge dealt with evidential matters under the heading "The material facts": at [10]-[46]. In the course of that analysis, there was a subheading "Michael Hill's ticking of the terms and conditions box referring to the 2012 Terms": at [28]-[32]. There are two aspects of this passage which may be noted.
First, the judge dealt with the evidence of Mr Colvile, who had signed the sales agreements in May 2014 and May 2015. The judge accepted Mr Colvile's evidence and made the following finding: "30 I find that in ticking the terms and conditions box located immediately above the signature clause which he signed, Mr Colvile, on behalf of Michael Hill, knew that he was signing and ticking referable to Gispac's terms and conditions. The evidence of Mr Bogatez establishes that these terms were the 2012 Terms: see [33]-[34] below."
Relevant to the present issue, the judge continued: "31 Notwithstanding that each of the Sales Agreements is a signed contract, Michael Hill put in issue whether the 2012 Terms were available for inspection on the website maintained by Gispac at the URL address stated in the Sales Agreements set out at [17] above. The defence of Michael Hill contended that at all times on and after 5 May 2014, the link to the Gispac website that appears on page two of the Sales Agreements was defective or did not exist (par [14(c)]). Michael Hill did not attempt to prove this assertion by way of evidence. Mr Colvile's evidence was that he did not go to Gispac's website looking for any terms (affidavit, par [36]), and he agreed in cross-examination that he 'chose not to read them' (T69.46). 32 As explained under Issue 1 below, the question of whether the URL link to the 2012 Terms in the Sales Agreements was operable in May 2014 and May 2015 does not arise if, as Gispac contended, the mode of incorporation of the 2012 Terms is by reference as terms of a signed contract. The question only arises if, as Michael Hill contended, the 2012 Terms were incorporated by notice as terms of an unsigned contract. This is the context in which I now turn to the dispute as to whether the link to the 2012 Terms was operable in May 2014 and May 2015."
The findings as to the subjective beliefs and intentions of Mr Colvile were not relevant to the proper construction of the sales agreements (although they would have been to certain of the defences). Further, although the appellant took exception to the conclusion stated at [32], it is clear that it was not intended as a reasoned conclusion, but merely as an introduction to the succeeding discussion as to whether the URL link was operable at the relevant time. The conclusion as to that issue at [44] has been noted above.
At [47] the primary judge identified as issue 1(a), the question: "Were Gispac's 2012 Terms incorporated into each of the sales agreements?" The consideration of that question commenced at [49]; the final conclusion was stated at [84].
The judge accepted that Gispac had "the onus of proving that the 2012 terms were incorporated as terms of the sales agreements": at [50]. He then set out the applicable legal principles: at [54]-[71]. (It will be convenient to deal with the cases relied on by the primary judge in considering the submissions of the appellant.) In his conclusions (identified later), the judge accepted, at least implicitly, the submissions of Gispac, which were stated in the following passage: "51 By reference to Toll [12] …, Gispac submitted that the mode of incorporation of the 2012 Terms into the Sales Agreements was the act of Michael Hill's representative signing the Sales Agreements and ticking the box under the heading 'Terms and Conditions of Trading'. Alternatively, it is said that such terms were incorporated by reference."
The submissions of Michael Hill, set out in the following passages, were rejected: "52 Although Michael Hill accepted in closing submissions that this case is a signed document case in that the Sales Agreements had been signed on behalf of Michael Hill and are therefore within the principle in Toll (T120.35-37), Michael Hill says that this case should be treated as an unsigned document case. It is said that the contract is a 'hybrid' comprising the signed Sales Agreement and the unsigned 2012 Terms referred to in that signed document and therefore the principles in the 'ticket cases', not Toll, apply to the incorporation of terms into Sales Agreements. 53 Relying upon the principles in the ticket cases …, it is said that: • terms appearing in the unsigned document are incorporated in the (written) contract only if reasonable notice has been given of them: Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Company Inc v Fay; [13] • the inclusion of unusual or onerous terms in an unsigned document may require its proponent to draw those terms to the attention of the other party, and an express acceptance of an offer that incorporates other terms does not necessarily connote acceptance of all those other terms; if the person has not read the terms, their consent may be taken as being consent to the terms that are appropriate to a contract of the type in question; and • the Sales Agreement 'did not, in that form, take the Michael Hill representative to a copy of the Gispac Terms'; cll 17, 18 19 and 21 of the 2012 Terms were unusual, or not the kind of terms a purchaser might expect in this type of contract in 'standard' terms attaching to the supply of wholesale packaging in Australia, and therefore, Michael Hill is not bound by those terms."
In identifying the applicable legal principles, the judge referred, correctly, and uncontroversially, to the approach to be adopted in construing the contract: "55 In Oceanic Sun Line v Fay, Brennan J distinguished the two types of cases - signed contracts and unsigned documents, such as a "ticket case" - stating at 228-229: 'If a passenger signs and thereby binds himself to the terms of a contract of carriage containing a clause exempting the carrier from liability for loss arising out of the carriage, it is immaterial that the passenger did not trouble to discover the contents of the contract. But where an exemption clause is contained in a ticket or other document intended by the carrier to contain the terms of carriage, yet the other party is not in fact aware when the contract is made that an exemption clause is intended to be a term of the contract, the carrier cannot rely on that clause unless, at the time of the contract, the carrier had done all that was reasonably necessary to bring the exemption clause to the passenger's notice.' (Citations omitted; emphasis added). 56 In Carnival Plc v Karpik (Ruby Princess) [14] …, Derrington J (Allsop CJ agreeing) said of the ticket cases at [166]: 'The ticket cases are concerned with contractual formation and the scope of the terms to which the parties have agreed where an agreement has arisen orally or by conduct, and in the course of which one party seeks to introduce written terms contained on or referred to in a document passing between them.' 57 That is, the ticket cases "form a particular category of cases concerned with the objective assessment of the circumstances in which parties have entered into a contractual relationship in the absence of a signed agreement": Carnival Plc v Karpik (Ruby Princess) at [206(a)]. That is not the present case.

[13]

Written contracts 58 Mainteck Services Pty Ltd v Stein Heurtey SA (2014) 89 NSWLR 633; [2014] NSWCA 184 at [114] (Leeming JA, Ward and Emmett JJA agreeing) is authority for the proposition that, given the general rule in Toll, the 'ticket cases' have no application to the circumstance where a party executes a written contract, even if it chooses to do so without reading documents to which it refers. Leeming JA said at [114]: 'The law here is very clear. A unanimous High Court in Toll … confirmed that: "[57] … The general rule, which applies in the present case, is that where there is no suggested vitiating element, and no claim for equitable or statutory relief, a person who signs a document which is known by that person to contain contractual terms, and to affect legal relations, is bound by those terms, and it is immaterial that the person has not read the document." 59 Incorporation of a set of terms by reference to those terms in a written contract is commonplace. J W Carter, Contract Law in Australia (J W Carter Publishing, 8th ed, 2023) at [10-19], gives several examples of incorporation in a written contract, including: • the standard terms of the business of one of the parties: Smith v South Wales Switchgear Co Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 165, a case involving a written contract: …; and • a standard form document approved by a body such as a law society or a real estate institute: for example, Gilberto v Kenny (1983) 57 ALJR 283 at 284F."

After reviewing the cases, the conclusions reached were expressed under the heading "Application of principles to the facts", in the following passage: "72 The Sales Agreements were obviously contractual, as were Gispac's 'terms and conditions' referred to in the box headed 'Terms and Conditions of Trading'. The question of whether by signing and ticking the terms and conditions box in the Sales Agreements Mr Colvile evidenced Michael Hill's contractual intention to be bound by the 2012 Terms, is answered by asking what that conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party to believe: Toll at [40]. Here, Mr Colvile's act of signing and ticking the box referable to Gispac's standard terms and conditions indicated an intention by Michael Hill to be bound by Gispac's terms and conditions regardless of whether they have been read and considered: Oceanic Sun Line v Fay at 228. As said in Carnival Plc v Karpik (Ruby Princess) at [236]: '… the affixing of a signature objectively conveys that the party signing 'either has read and approved the contents of the document or is willing to take the chance of being bound by those contents … whatever they might be': L'Estrange v Graucob; Toll v Alphapharm at [54]-[59]: and no question of the reasonableness of the notice of any onerous or unusual terms arises.'"
A second passage said to involve the application of the stated principles dealt with Mr Colvile's subjective state of mind: at [73]. Its relevance to the conclusion that "the 2012 terms were incorporated as terms of the sales agreements" was by no means clear. The passage may have been misplaced as the last sentence implied that the findings were relevant to equitable and other defences relied upon by Mr Michael Hill, which they clearly were. (There was no challenge on appeal to the judge's rejection of those defences: accordingly, these findings need not be considered further.)
The judge's conclusion was as follows: "84 I find that the three Sales Agreements signed by Mr Colvile on behalf of Michael Hill incorporated the 2012 Terms. Contrary to Michael Hill's submission, this case is not to be treated as an 'unsigned document' case, nor is it necessary for Gispac to establish that reasonable steps were taken to bring the 2012 Terms to the attention of Michael Hill."
Two further observations are in order at this point. First, the discussion of the cases appeared to be primarily directed to the rejection of Michael Hill's submission that this was "an unsigned document case": at [54]. The submission was based upon the proposition that, although Mr Colvile signed the sales agreements, and ticked the relevant box, he did not sign the document containing the 2012 terms and the matter should therefore be treated as a "hybrid" case. The proposition that the signed document cases all involved terms which were either not attached to the signed document or not otherwise provided, was, as the judge noted, inconsistent with a "hybrid" analysis. What may have justified that analysis, but which was not pursued on the appeal, was the combination of two factors, namely, first, that the box to be ticked on the sales agreement was "to confirm that you agree to agree to" certain terms and conditions. Implicit in that language was that a further step would be needed to give effect to the 2012 Terms. The second factor, which gave plausibility to that reading, was that the 2012 Terms (if they were the document referred to in the T&C box) included a space at the end for "Customer signature". However, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to pursue that question on this appeal.
The second observation is that, having stated issue 1(a) as a question whether the 2012 Terms were incorporated into each of the sales agreements, the primary judge answered that question substantially by reference to the fact that the sales agreements were signed, were intended to be contractual and referred to the 2012 Terms. That did not address what the appellant described as an "evidential void" between the language of the T&C box, properly construed, and the 2012 Terms. The primary judge clearly understood the argument that the document referred to in the T&C box had not been demonstrated on the evidence to have been available at the relevant time, but treated that fact as irrelevant, treatment which lay at the heart of the appellant's challenge in ground 1.

[15]

First submission - access to URL

As noted above, Mr Bogatez' evidence was that the 2012 Terms was a document located on Gispac's internal server: it was said to be available to customers, but not to the public at large or to competitors. It was a PDF document, which was intended to be available at a specific URL.
The appellant's first submission was that if the URL link was not shown to be available and operative, no terms were incorporated by reference. That condition was satisfied by the finding at [44] of the primary judgment (set out at [51] above) that Gispac had failed to prove that the URL link was operable at the relevant time. While having the attraction of simplicity, that submission should not be accepted.
Reference to terms at an internet location is analogous to a reference to terms in a document attached to the contract. The essential proposition identified in Toll v Alphapharm and related cases discussed above, is that a signature on a document is sufficient, in the absence of vitiating circumstances, to demonstrate acceptance of incorporated terms, even if the document with the terms is not attached as stated in the signed document. Accordingly, even if the party proffering the contract (Gispac) did not make the terms and conditions available in the manner indicated in the signed agreement, and the party accepting the offer (Michael Hill) has not sought to pursue the omission, the accepting party will be bound by the terms incorporated by reference.
The appellant sought to distinguish Toll v Alphapharm. A relevant contextual circumstance which the reasonable observer would take into account in the present case, it was submitted, was the fact that the relevant terms and conditions were not available to the customer at the identified location. The signature, it was submitted, would not carry the same implicit representation in such a case. For reasons which will be explained below, Toll v Alphapharm was distinguishable on its facts, but for a different purpose. It was not itself an "attached document" case.

[17]

Cases on incorporated terms

It is then necessary to address the cases in the context relied on by the appellant, starting with the seminal reasoning of the High Court in Toll v Alphapharm. [20] The reasoning commenced by affirming the proposition that rights and liabilities created by a contract are to be assessed objectively: "40 This Court, in Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas …, has recently reaffirmed the principle of objectivity by which the rights and liabilities of the parties to a contract are determined. It is not the subjective beliefs or understandings of the parties about their rights and liabilities that govern their contractual relations. What matters is what each party by words and conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party to believe. References to the common intention of the parties to a contract are to be understood as referring to what a reasonable person would understand by the language in which the parties have expressed their agreement. The meaning of the terms of a contractual document is to be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood them to mean. That, normally, requires consideration not only of the text, but also of the surrounding circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction: Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas."
The second proposition, which said to be consistent with the first, and which is of immediate relevance was "the significance which the law attaches to the signature (or execution) of a contractual document". [21] The principal was stated in the following terms: "44 In Oceanic Sun Line v Fay, Brennan J said: 'If a passenger signs and thereby binds himself to the terms of a contract of carriage containing a clause exempting the carrier from liability for loss arising out of the carriage, it is immaterial that the passenger did not trouble to discover the contents of the contract.' 45 It should not be overlooked that to sign a document known and intended to affect legal relations is an act which itself ordinarily conveys a representation to a reasonable reader of the document. The representation is that the person who signs either has read and approved the contents of the document or is willing to take the chance of being bound by those contents, as Latham CJ put it, whatever they might be. That representation is even stronger where the signature appears below a perfectly legible written request to read the document before signing it."
This position, Toll v Alphapharm continued, was to be contrasted with the ticket cases and others where there was no signed agreement: "55 In L'Estrange v Graucob, Scrutton LJ said that the problem in that case was different from what he described as 'the railway passenger and cloak-room ticket cases, such as Richardson, Spence & Co v Rowntree', where 'there is no signature to the contractual document, the document being simply handed by the one party to the other.' His Lordship said: 'In cases in which the contract is contained in a railway ticket or other unsigned document, it is necessary to prove that an alleged party was aware, or ought to have been aware, of its terms and conditions. These cases have no application when the document has been signed.'" [References omitted.]
The appellant accepted wholeheartedly the propositions in Toll v Alphapharm, but said they did not apply in the present circumstances. In Toll, the operative terms and conditions were on the back of the document which the respondent had signed. This understanding of Toll v Alphapharm is confirmed in the joint reasons at [57]: "The general rule, which applies in the present case, is that where there is no suggested vitiating element, and no claim for equitable or statutory relief, a person who signs a document which is known by that person to contain contractual terms, and to affect legal relations, is bound by those terms, and it is immaterial that the person has not read the document." [Emphasis added.]
Although referring to "the document" in the singular, there is no doubt that the principle applies where the contract is contained within two or more documents. An example may be found in Mainteck Services Pty Ltd v Stein Heurtey SA; [22] as explained by Leeming JA at [114]: "Mainteck executed a formal legal document, the Second Consortial Agreement, which referred repeatedly to the Main Contract, and imposed obligations upon Mainteck by reference ('mutatis mutandis') to that contract."
After reference to Toll at [57], being the passage set out above, Leeming JA further explained: "123 The Main Contract was the premise of the Second Consortial Agreement. It was the reason for the latter agreement, and it specified the obligations of the subcontractor Mainteck to the contractor Stein Heurtey. It is clear that the words in Art II.1 'their respective areas of responsibility being as laid down in technical specification of main Contract' are a reference to a part of the Main Contract, and (for the reasons already given) not to the Bill of Materials. It is evident that the function of those words is to delineate the obligations arising under the Main Contract which each of the parties to the Second Consortial Agreement was promising to perform. The Main Contract describes (albeit at a level of generality) and attaches a contract price to what was described in two schedules, Schedules 1A and 4, as the 'Mainteck Portion'."
Thus, although the agreement was contained in two documents, in circumstances where the second expressly referred back to the first, incorporating obligations under that contract, the contracting parties were bound by those obligations when signing the second agreement. Again, however, this does not engage with the current circumstances where there was no prior contract from which further terms were to be imported. (There had been prior contractual dealings, but they did not engage the Mainteck reasoning, rather the contrary, as explained below.)
This Court again considered incorporation by reference in Warner Bros Feature Productions Pty Ltd v Kennedy Miller Mitchell Films Pty Ltd. [23] A dispute arose between Warner Bros companies producing Mad Max: Fury Road (the Film) with the services of two well-known identities for production and direction. A Letter Agreement in cl 21 referred to the balance of the terms being "WB standard for 'A' list directors and producers". The only relevant term which was said to have been incorporated by that reference was an arbitration clause, and the Chief Justice restricted his findings to that provision. [24] The Court accepted that it was so incorporated. Two circumstances appear to have been critical to that conclusion. The first was an affidavit of the senior vice-president and general counsel of Warner Bros Pictures exhibiting 56 agreements which contained the arbitration clause. The Chief Justice accepted that the clause was "standard" as a term which was habitually proffered. [25] Further, the Chief Justice noted that "there is no reason to assume that those advising [the respondents], who were experienced in the film industry, did not appreciate the meaning of terms which were 'WB standard for "A" list directors and producers'". [26] Thus, while the additional terms were not set out in the Letter Agreement, they were sufficiently described as terms which included an arbitration clause by a description which was understood within the industry.
The significance of the case for present purposes, the appellant submitted, was the need for the Court to be satisfied as to those two considerations, a need which demonstrated that a party relying upon a term incorporated by reference had to establish the existence of such a term as objectively satisfying the language of the incorporation provision. It submitted that the evidence in the present case did not do that.
The primary judge referred to the opinion of the House of Lords in Smith v South Wales Switchgear Co Ltd. [27] Switchgear was carrying out maintenance work on equipment operated by a manufacturing company. Due to the latter's negligence, a Switchgear employee was injured. The contract for maintenance work was expressed to be "subject to our general conditions of contract obtainable on request". There was an original document titled "General conditions of contract 24001" and two later versions with the descriptions "revised January 1969" and "revised March 1970". Switchgear did not request a copy but in July 1970 received a copy of the January 1969 version printed on the back of a purchase order. The conditions contained an indemnity clause requiring the supplier to keep the contractor indemnified against loss or damage. As stated by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton: [28] "The reference in the purchase order clearly show that the respondents intended to include the general conditions in the contract…. It seems to me that the reference to general conditions without any further description must be taken to refer to the edition current at the date of the contract, that is, in the addition revised in March 1970. If the appellants had asked for a copy of the general conditions that is the version which ought to have been sent, and, as the appellants do not suggest that they were in any way misled by the sending of the January 1969 edition in July 1970, I consider that the latest edition is to be taken as having been incorporated in the contract. I shall hereafter refer to the clause, clause 23, in the March 1970 edition, although as I have already mentioned, the argument on construction would be the same whichever edition had been incorporated."
Further, Lord Keith of Kinkel stated: [29] "The purchase order referred to the respondents' 'general conditions of contract 24001 obtainable on request.' It thus clearly indicated the manner in which the terms of these conditions could be ascertained, and that was sufficient in law, unconditional acceptance having followed, for their incorporation into the contract."
Again, the appellant contended that the circumstances of the case are distinguishable from the present case, but it may be noted that Smith had further significance in the reasoning of the primary judge. That arose from the consideration by the judge of the following authority: "63 Ange v First East Auction Holdings Pty Ltd … [2011] VSCA 335; (2011) 284 ALR 638 involved a written consignment agreement for the sale of paintings, which referred to the general conditions, but like McBride such terms were not attached: at [46]. On appeal, Sifris AJA (Neave and Tate JJA agreeing) held that the general conditions formed part of the agreement: at [45]. The dispositive reasons were given by Sifris AJA …: [52] In the present case, the general conditions were not attached to the agreement. However, it is apparent that Bonhams intended that the general conditions apply to the agreement. Further, this is what both parties assented to by signing the agreement specifically acknowledging that the general conditions would apply. … [57] Accordingly, in my opinion, the general conditions in the present case form part of the agreement between Mrs Ange and Bonhams. They were intended to form part of it. They were in the possession of Mrs Ange and were clearly and specifically incorporated by reference. 64 The reference in Ange at [57] to Mrs Ange being in possession of the general terms reflected the particular facts in that case, relevantly, she had previously been provided with the general conditions in connection with an earlier unsigned contract. That fact was unnecessary for the finding of incorporation by reference in a written contract, given his Honour's apparent approval of Smith v South Wales Switchgear, where the written contract the subject of the purchase order referred to 'our general conditions of contract 24001, obtainable on request', the purchaser did not request a copy of the general conditions, and the House of Lords held that it was sufficient that the purchase order indicated the manner in which the general conditions could be ascertained, namely, by request."
With respect, it is by no means clear that the fact that Mrs Ange had a copy of the terms and conditions was unnecessary for the finding of incorporation. It would only have been unnecessary, on the appellant's case, if the general conditions of business were otherwise identified or identifiable. The conditions had not been attached to the consignment agreement which was executed. It is clear from the reasons of Sifris AJA that this was an essential part of his conclusion. Those reasons commenced at [45] with the statement that the general conditions formed part of the agreement. At [46] the judge noted that Mrs Ange had signed a revised agreement although the general conditions were not attached. He continued: "48 The General Conditions may have been irrelevant to the storage agreement recorded in the 24 February 2009 Consignment Agreement, yet they were referred to as being attached and were in fact attached. 49 Although the Agreement differed from the 24 February 2009 Consignment Agreement and had been amended, the General Conditions referred to remained the same. In the transmutation of the 24 February 2009 Consignment Agreement to the Agreement, by use of the very same document, the General Conditions were consistent and more importantly, were attached to the version before adaptation with an express indication that those very same terms would apply. … 51 If, as in many cases, the General Conditions were indeed attached or overleaf and formed part of the document, the fact that Mrs Ange did not read them would not be relevant. 52 In the present case, the General Conditions were not attached to the Agreement. However, it is apparent that Bonhams intended that the General Conditions apply to the Agreement. Further, this is what both parties assented to by signing the Agreement specifically acknowledging that the General Conditions would apply." Reference was then made to Smith, Sifris AJA continuing: "55 The court held that the respondents' general conditions formed part of the contract. It considered that the reference to the general conditions clearly showed that the respondents intended them to be incorporated and the appellants never objected to this. That there were three possible versions of the general conditions did not prevent one version from being incorporated into the contract. It was sufficient that the purchase order clearly indicated the manner in which the general conditions could be ascertained, namely, by request. 56 Similarly, in Walker v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (2006) 233 ALR 687 a third letter of offer did not attach relevant conditions, despite the letter of offer stating that the conditions were attached. The court held that the conditions were incorporated and formed part of the contract as they had previously been provided to the offeree with the other offers. 57 Accordingly, in my opinion, the General Conditions in the present case form part of the Agreement between Mrs Ange and Bonhams. They were intended to form part of it. They were in the possession of Mrs Ange and were clearly and specifically incorporated by reference."
Thus, in each of the three cases, (Ange, Smith and Walker) a document containing the general conditions was identified and in fact supplied, although not attached to the relevant agreement. Whether or not it was necessary that the customer have a copy of the document, it was certainly necessary that the means for obtaining it was "clearly indicated", as in Smith's case, "by request". Then, Sifris AJA continued: "58 A further question arises as to whether Bonhams was required to give notice of the General Conditions to Mrs Ange. Precisely what steps are required (if any) to bring the terms to the notice of a party depends on the circumstances of the case. … 61 In my opinion the evidence in this case establishes that it was more probable than not that Mrs Ange was aware of the General Conditions at the time that she executed the Agreement on 20 March 2009. There are several reasons for such a conclusion. … 68 Mrs Ange was aware of the nature of the term and in the circumstances, there was no obligation on the part of Bonhams to bring either the General Conditions or the particular term to the attention of Mrs Ange in the peculiar circumstances in which the Agreement was executed. The General Conditions formed part of the Agreement."
In Hyder Consulting (Australia) Pty Ltd v Wilh Wilhelmsen Agency Pty Ltd, [30] the relevant question for present purposes was whether an engineer had been employed by an architect, on behalf of a principal, on the basis of "the ACEA Conditions of Engagement". The circumstances were straightforward. On 2 February 1994, the architect had written to the engineer seeking a "fee submission for engineering services": Hyder at [67]. On 8 February 1994, the engineer replied proposing hourly rates and stating: "We propose that our appointment be in accordance with the ACEA Conditions of Engagement."
The architect responded on 11 February confirming the engagement and requesting that a copy of the ACEA Conditions of Engagement be forwarded to the principal. The work went ahead and a pavement was constructed according to a design proposed by the engineer, which was in fact inadequate for its purpose. In substance, the Court held that the engineer's engagement can only have been on the basis of the letter of 11 February 1994, accepting the engineer's offer and seeking that a copy of the ACEA Conditions of Engagement be forwarded to its client. As Giles JA stated: the owner's attempt to avoid the limitation on the engineer's liability contained in the ACEA Conditions of Engagement sought to treat "the letter of 11 February 1994 as making a fee proposal open to be accepted without incorporation of the ACEA Conditions of Engagement". [31] That proposition was rejected as indefensible. There was no doubt as to the identification of the documentary basis upon which the engineer was engaged. The only proposition, which was emphatically rejected by Giles JA, was that the owner "should not be found that it had by its conduct, and without actual notice of the conditions, agreed to be bound by the ACEA Conditions of Engagement".
The primary judge also relied upon a Queensland Court of Appeal decision of McBride v ASK Funding Pty Ltd. [32] The proceedings had commenced in the District Court by way of a claim by the respondent for an amount payable under a loan agreement with Ms McBride. Ms McBride had appeared for herself in the Court of Appeal, having pleaded many grounds of appeal some of which were described by Jackson J as "captious", [33] and supported by a lengthy affidavit of 55 pages with 100 pages of exhibits. The affidavit was described as "in a large part scandalous". [34] So far as the loan agreement was concerned, the offer was made by the appellant on a form provided by the finance company, which the appellant signed. The form provided for a loan to be made on "terms and conditions set out in this contract which includes the attached Standard Terms & Conditions (version 1)". [35] Relevantly for present purposes, Jackson J continued: "50 The appellant complained that the standard terms and conditions were not in fact attached to the loan agreement. Accepting that fact, it does not alter the conclusion that the standard terms and conditions were part of the contractual terms. That is because 'The general rule… is that… a person who signs a document which is known by that person to contain contractual terms, and to affect legal relations, is bound by those terms and it is immaterial that the person has not read the document'. 51 More particularly, the making of an offer on the other party's standard terms and conditions by a person who does not know what the standard terms and conditions are but goes ahead and makes the offer will not usually affect the conclusion that the standard terms and conditions are a contractual document. The failure to attach the standard terms, even where they are described as attached, does not affect that conclusion." [Footnotes omitted.]
The application for leave to appeal was brought from a summary judgment given in favour of the respondent; the application also required an extension of time. The Court was satisfied there was no real prospect of the appellant successfully defending any part of the claim. [36]
Again, this was a case in which there was no doubt as to the nature and content of the document sought to be relied upon as having been incorporated by reference, although it was not in fact attached to the offer.
The parties also referred to the judgment of this Court in Lief Investments Pty Ltd v Conagra International Fertiliser Co. [37] The circumstances were different from the present case in a number of respects. The parties had exchanged facsimile transmissions on 21 February 1997, each setting out the specification and terms and conditions and including "other terms and conditions as per Sinochem's standard contract". However, on 24 February 1997, the parties signed a separate contract stipulating the terms and conditions, but not referring to the terms and conditions of Sinochem's "standard contract". Although the Court held that the standard terms were not incorporated into the final contract, [38] the Court considered whether the reference would have been too uncertain to have resulted in incorporation in any event. Sheller JA observed: [39] "If the evidence was that the terms and conditions of Sinochem's standard contract could be identified, those were the terms and conditions that should be incorporated. But Lief Investments failed to identify such standard terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the trial judge and to my satisfaction."
That conclusion was reached even though (i) Lief Investments had in its possession an unsigned copy of a document and an undated letter from Sinochem attaching a copy of standard terms and conditions and (ii) there was evidence to the following effect: [40] "Also known to all manufacturers and trading companies in the fertiliser industry related with China market. Sinochem standard contract terms and conditions must apply to all fertiliser import contracts to be signed by us for China market. Especially major terms like inspection, arbitration and documents requirement etc have to follow Sinochem standard contract terms and conditions which have been stipulated in compliance with China government regulations. Enclosed please find the Sinochem standard contract terms and conditions for your reference."
However, Lief Investments' general manager, Mr Yu, acknowledged that there were differences between various terms and conditions annexed to various contracts to which Lief Investments was a party, although the arbitration clause (being the clause in issue) was identical. [41]
A final passage in the reasons of Sheller JA dealt with incorporation only by express reference, in the course of which he considered cases involving bills of lading and a requirement that there must be "precise words in the bill of lading alleged to do the incorporating, and also the precise terms of the arbitration clause in the charter party alleged to be incorporated". Not applying that principle to the case before him, Sheller JA accepted that "if the parties had agreed to the incorporation of the terms and conditions of Sinochem's standard contract and these could have been identified with certainty, there was no textual or policy consideration which would prevent the incorporation of the arbitration clause into the contract of sale".
Given the circumstances of Lief Investments, it was unsurprising that the case was relied upon by both parties in this appeal. Ultimately, the question was one to be determined having regard to the nature of the incorporating clause and the document said to constitute the incorporated terms and conditions.
Finally, the appellant relied on the reasoning in Toyota Finance Australia Limited v Gardiner. [42] The proceedings were between a finance company which had entered into hire purchase agreements with respect to six vehicles with Gardiner Petroleum Pty Ltd, which defaulted on the payments due under the contracts, so that the proceedings were brought against a guarantor, Mr Gardiner.
As explained by Payne JA, the contracts were each constituted by a suite of documents described in the following terms: "43 The first relevant document in each suite of documents is described as a 'Term/Hire Purchase Application', on which the respondent was named as the 'Proposed Guarantor'. This form identifies the vehicle to be purchased and the schedule of repayments as between the supplier and the Company. The form was signed by the respondent in his capacity as a director of the Company. 44 The second relevant document is described as an 'Application to Guarantee a Term/Hire Purchase Application'. This form also identifies the vehicle to be purchased and the schedule of repayments as between the supplier and the Company and provides details to the supplier of the proposed guarantor, the respondent. The respondent signed this form, again in his capacity as a director of the Company. 45 The third relevant document is headed 'Term Purchase Schedule and Tax Invoice' ('the Term Purchase Schedule'). This document contains details of the owner of the vehicle, the hirer of the vehicle and the 'guarantor', the respondent. Details of the amount financed and the term purchase repayment amounts are set out. 46 The Term Purchase Schedule contains a printed box headed 'Execution by Guarantor' which is signed by the respondent. 47 Central to determination of this case, the Term Purchase Schedule also contains a printed box in the following terms: RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS: The Supplier and you each acknowledge that you (and each of you if more than one) have received from the Supplier a copy of this Schedule, and a copy of the Booklet 'Terms and Conditions'. The respondent signed underneath this section on behalf of the Company and in his personal capacity as Guarantor."
The terms of the relevant guarantee were contained in cl 14 of a blank pro forma document entitled "Term Purchase Agreement" which Toyota identified as being the "Booklet 'Terms and Conditions'" referred to at [47].
Payne JA found no error on the part of the primary judge in not being satisfied as to the provision of the guarantee and indemnity to the respondent at the time the contracts were entered into. First, he noted that the blank pro forma "Term Purchase Agreement" was dated after the hire purchase contracts were executed. Secondly, the title "Term Purchase Agreement" was not the same as the document referred to at [47] of his reasons, receipt of which was acknowledged, namely the Booklet "Terms and Conditions". Thirdly, evidence from an officer of Toyota, who was not employed by the company at the time the contracts were entered into and who gave no evidence of inquiry as to the company's practice at the relevant time, but merely stated that each of the agreements "incorporated a booklet of 'Terms and Conditions'" a copy of which was attached to his affidavits, should be given no material weight. [43]
In reliance on Lief Investments, the Court was urged to apply the following approach: [44] "In a context where the purchaser had sent one version to the supplier which had raised no question about its terms and a few days afterwards proceeded with the work, the House of Lords [in Switchgear] resolved the doubt by the comparatively simple process of identifying the conditions as those contained in the version most recently revised before the date of the contract… the Court should do its best to identify the terms intended if there is some doubt."
Payne JA rejected that approach on the following basis, which is relied upon by the appellant in the present case, namely: "74 The premise upon which that passage is based is absent in the evidence here. The relevant 'context' is not that the appellant had sent an earlier version of the 'booklet' to the supplier. There is an evidential void about what, if anything, was sent in 2007‑2009 when the Hire Purchase Contracts were executed or in July 2011 when they were varied."

[19]

Direct evidence as to link

First, the appellant contended that no inference could be drawn in the present case because the terms and conditions were identified as those to be found at a particular site on the internet. At its highest, the submission relied upon the fact that the judge was not satisfied that that site had been accessible at the relevant time. It followed, the appellant submitted, that there could be no incorporation of whatever had been on the site at that time, if anything.
At a second level, the appellant accepted that the URL identified a document in the form of a PDF file. Accordingly, it was open to the judge to infer that a document containing "Terms and Conditions" was, or had been at the relevant time, available at the URL. On that view, the evidential void was the link between that document and the document put in evidence by Mr Bogatez.
The material evidence in Mr Bogatez' affidavit of 17 November 2020 was as follows: "Gispac's standard terms and conditions 26 Each of the Sales Agreements contained a URL link to Gispac's standard terms and conditions as they existed at the time those agreements were entered (the Terms)."
Mr Bogatez then gave evidence of the URL link and exhibited a copy of the 2012 Terms to his affidavit. The document was headed "Terms and Conditions of Trading", the contents of which have been discussed above. His evidence continued: "31 The Terms relevant to the Sales Agreements were Gispac's standard terms version '23 1 2012_reviewed'. This version was used in all Gispac's sales agreement between the period 2012 to 2016. 32 In or about 2016, the Terms were updated to a new set of terms, and accordingly the URL Terms Link to the version '23 1 2012_reviewed' was no longer operational from that point onwards. 33 To the best of my knowledge, at the time the Sales Agreements were entered into, the URL Terms Link was effective and operational. I have no reason to believe that the URL Terms Link was not operable at that time."
The primary judge did not accept the statement at par 33 that the URL link was effective and operational, [46] but he did accept that the document available at the link would have been the terms and conditions of trading referred to above. The latter finding was challenged by the appellant.
The appellant noted that the box in the sales agreement identified a document described as "EquoteNew/docs/gispac_terms_and_conditions_jan2012". Accepting that that is a description of a document by its name and electronic location, the next step was to consider the document entitled "Terms and Conditions of Trading" relied upon by the respondent which had an electronic identifier at the bottom of each page which read, "Gispac - Terms and Conditions of Trading - 23 1 12_reviewed (2)". Evidently, that title did not conform to the title of the document identified in the T&C box. Apart from the formal variations, it may be inferred that the document proffered, described as "reviewed (2)", was an amended form of the terms and conditions adopted on 23 January 2012. The inference as to change is strengthened by the name of the URL in the T&C box, commencing "EquoteNew/docs/", which may be contrasted with the reference to "reviewed" in the footer to the document relied on by the respondent. When the review, and by inference amendment, occurred was unknown. Gispac failed to prove it was before May 2014, or that there was no material change.
Mr Bogatez stated in his affidavit (at par 31) that the terms used in "all Gispac's sales agreement [sic] between the period [sic] 2012 to 2016" were "Gispac's standard terms version '23 1 2012_reviewed'". That statement failed to address the discrepancy between it and the description in the URL in the T&C box. The term "standard" adopted by Mr Bogatez was not a descriptor used on the document itself, nor in the URL link.
The primary judge dealt with this issue in three passages. First, after dealing with aspects of Mr Colvile's evidence as to his subjective beliefs, the judge stated: "30 I find that in ticking the terms and conditions box located immediately above the signature clause which he signed, Mr Colvile, on behalf of Michael Hill, knew that he was signing and ticking referable to Gispac's terms and conditions. The evidence of Mr Bogatez establishes that these terms were the 2012 Terms: see [33]-[34] below."
As the appellant accepted, evidence of Mr Colvile's subjective understanding was relevant to a defence of unconscionability: it was not, however, relevant to the proper construction of the contract. Further, the connection with the 2012 Terms depended on evidence of Mr Bogatez, under the heading "Was the link to the 2012 Terms operable in May 2014 and May 2015?" At [33], the judge recorded the evidence given by Mr Bogatez at pars 26-29 of his affidavit, set out above. He noted that the first three paragraphs were admitted without objection but rejected as inadmissible the evidence as to the operation of the URL link at par 29. With respect to the evidence concerning the identity of the terms, the judge stated that the evidence was admitted without objection and continued at [34]: "I reject Michael Hill's submission that in light of the cross-examination of Mr Bogatez his evidence did not establish that a set of terms identical in all respects to the 2012 Terms existed at Gispac's office, as at 5 May 2014 and 8 May 2015."
It is true that Mr Bogatez was not directed to the terms of these paragraphs in the course of his cross-examination, but he was challenged as to his knowledge of the operation of the URL and stated that he was unable to recall if he had clicked on the link in 2014 or 2015. [47] He was therefore not in a position to state that the document available at that location was the document he described in his affidavit as the 2012 Terms. He was asked if any attempt had been made to search for historical archives recording the URL at earlier dates but was not aware of that having happened. [48] The cross-examiner also sought to establish that Gispac did not conduct its business with Michael Hill on the basis of two-year rolling contracts, or on the basis that Michael Hill was required to pay for any shortfall on a quarterly basis. [49] He was cross-examined as to when he became aware of the terms of cl 18 of the Terms and Conditions of Trading.
In the line of questions in relation to the contracts or terms of trade that Gispac had with its own suppliers, Mr Bogatez was questioned about his experience of such terms as cll 17, 18 and 21.2 in those contracts. [50] When specifically asked as to "the very first time" he saw the Gispac Terms, and in particular cl 18, he replied "I can't recall". [51]
The effect of the cross-examination was, first, that Mr Bogatez had no direct knowledge of the terms of the document available at the URL location and, secondly, could not recall when he first became aware of the critical term in the document he had identified as being available at the URL location. However, he accepted that Michael Hill had not been supplied with a copy of the 2012 Terms until June 2017. [52]

[20]

Context - the on-going business relationship

Where the parties to a particular agreement or agreements have a long-term relationship, the question whether specific terms are incorporated in a particular set of contracts may depend in part on the contextual background. The terms in question (cll 17-21 of the 2012 Terms) related to those agreements which adopted an ePlus service delivery component, allowing individual stores to place orders directly with Gispac.
It was common ground that Michael Hill had obtained packaging material from Gispac from approximately 2003. (The Account Application which commenced the commercial relationship was dated 5 September 2003.) [53] Mr Colvile gave evidence that the company was placing orders through Gispac's ePlus service when he commenced dealing with Gispac in October 2012. [54]
Prior to the first two agreements relied upon by Gispac, there were in evidence 12 sales agreements dating from 26 November 2012 up to 30 April 2014. Each contained, for each product, a schedule with two parts headed "Specification" and "Terms". Two had no sub-heading "Delivery Type" under Terms; the other 10 had a sub-heading "Delivery Type" and provided for "EPLUS: Delivery Direct To Stores". Every sales agreement contained the T&C box, but in the first eight (including six providing for ePlus delivery) the box was not ticked. Three were then ticked, being sales agreements dated 15 and 22 January 2014 and 3 March 2014. The twelfth, dated 30 April 2014 for Emma & Roe products and providing for ePlus delivery, was not ticked.
On the case presented by Gispac, its Terms and Conditions of Trading were only incorporated into the sales agreements when the T&C box was ticked. Accordingly, cll 17-21 were not incorporated into those sales agreements where the box was not ticked. There was, however, no evidence to support a conclusion that the contractual arrangements upon which the parties operated up until 5 May 2014 changed on that date, or changed with the first ticked T&C box, four months earlier on 15 January 2014.
In fact, the history of the sales agreements was inconsistent with the proposition that the companies were operating on the basis of a two-year rolling agreement. For example, on 11 February 2013, the senior account manager at Gispac, Neil Duff wrote to Mr Colvile stating: "We no longer have any Large Michael Hill Paper Bags left to produce in production, and will need to get a new Agreement signed. If you could please confirm, and I can process a new quote for the Large Paper Bags."
Gispac then produced a quotation for 100,000 bags at a total price of $50,600 including GST. On 19 February 2013, Mr Colvile signed the new sales agreement.
Seven months later, on 6 September 2013, Mr Duff again emailed Mr Colvile in relation to large paper bags in similar terms: "We no longer have any of the Michael Hill Large paper bags to put into production, and will need to get a new agreement signed. Could you please advise a quantity? As im not sure when you will be implementing your new design at this stage. The current stock on hand and in production is set to last around 3-4 months according to our Forecast&Usage Report (attached)."
Mr Colvile replied: "Yes, we will need to manufacture more; another 3 - 4 months' worth. It looks like we won't be placing orders for the new packaging until Oct/Nov, so we'll need enough to see us into March/April."
A further agreement was signed on 11 September 2013 for 150,000 large paper bags. Self-evidently, the agreements were entered into in anticipation of supplies running out, with no intention that the quantities indicated were minimum annual quantities, or that there was a rolling over of the agreement after two years. Indeed, the contracts did not last for a single year, let alone two years. The next agreement dealing with large paper bags was dated 22 January 2014.
As noted above, the first sales agreement in evidence where the T&C box was ticked was dated 15 January 2014 and involved an order for 50,000 small paper bags. However, the requirement to tick the T&C box appears to have operated generally, and not merely in relation to ePlus deliveries, as claimed by Gispac. Between 6 May 2014 and 7 May 2015, four of the five sales agreements involved bulk delivery, and only one ePlus delivery: all T&C boxes were ticked. Those sales agreements which did not involve ePlus delivery, even if the T&C box was ticked, did not attract the operation of cll 17-21 of the 2012 Terms. That was not inconsistent with Gispac's case in relation to the three contracts sued upon, but it cast real doubt on the existence of a routine practice to invoke those terms.
Significantly, if the ticked box were intended to create an annual rolling contract, it should not have been necessary, without some acknowledgement of that fact, to place an order for small bags on 15 January 2014, followed by another order for the same product four months later. Similarly, the order for large bags placed on 22 January 2014 was repeated (for a larger quantity) six weeks later on 3 March 2014, and again (for an even larger quantity) two months later on 5 May 2014. In each case the T&C box was ticked.
As will be noted shortly, there were changes made by Michael Hill in 2014 in two respects. First, the design of the bags was changed to include a feature known as "Spot UV". Secondly, a new brand known as Emma & Roe was launched, with separate packaging orders. However, before that took place, Mr Duff (Gispac) sent Mr Colvile (Michael Hill) a document on 1 April 2014 which appears to have been consistent with past practices, titled "Michael Hill Forecast & Usage Report". These reports provided usage figures for the last twelve months together with forecast usage based on the last year. The document was attached to an email which, after referring to the attachment continued: "These reports indicate the current status of all your packaging. I suggest that you analyse the attached carefully, as these reports will assist us in maintaining your stock levels and any feedback that you can provide will be greatly appreciated. It is important to notify us of future sale periods, new stores opening, or any other reasons which might cause increased levels of stock usage over a period of time. This information is highly valuable for us to manage your stock levels effectively. Please note that the 'quantity and production' is included in the month's usage figures and the 'quantity pending production' has yet to be released into production. The quantity pending will be released into production as stock levels are consumed. Once there is nothing left pending production on your Sales Agreement, your sales representative will send you another Sales Agreement to sign so that more of your stock can be produced." Blue 205
On 2 April 2014, Mr Colvile responded to Mr Duff: "As we have again run out of bags in NZ and AU; we require sufficient stock to last until at least the end of the financial year. I would suggest adding 20% on you [sic] forecast figures for both markets".
On 3 April 2014, Mr Duff responded: "We do have quite a significant quantity in production and in stock at the moment, around 4-6 months worth of cover. But we will be monitoring the usage and will hopefully be able to catch any spikes that may throw out figures for upcoming months. We will be putting more into production in the next 2 weeks also, so we should see cover for around 6-7 months."
With respect to the new brand, Emma & Roe, sales agreements were signed on 30 April 2014 (5,000 small bags and 5,000 large), 26 August 2014 (same quantities), 8 December 2014 (10,000 of each), 4 March 2015 (30,000 small and 40,000 large) and 8 May 2015 (100,000 small and 100,000 large). The last contract was that upon which proceedings were brought and was referred to as the "Third Sales Agreement".
Although the Emma & Roe sales agreement of 30 April 2014 provided for ePlus delivery direct to stores, it is by no means clear that that was in place at that time. On 9 July 2014, Gispac was seeking details in order to set up the systems at their end. [55] On 21 August 2014, Ms Andronas (Gispac) sent an email to Mr Colvile stating: "Your EPLUS accounts are active. Quantity is available to order. There is no image at this time, but we will that this sorted out [sic]. Apologies for any inconvenience."
On 26 August 2014, Mr Colvile signed a further sales agreement in similar terms to the 30 April agreement which also said that a "lead time" of "approx. 8-10 weeks from pre-production sample approval" applied. One might infer that the 30 April 2014 agreement had been superseded.
On 8 December 2014, Ms Andronas sent Mr Colvile a new sales agreement for the Emma & Roe paper bags, stating: "Please find attached your Sales Agreement. If you wish to move forward with this I would be grateful if you could sign and return, remembering to tick the terms and conditions box."
The quote was in fact dated 2 December 2014 but was signed by Mr Colvile on the day it was received, 8 December 2014.
On 19 February 2015, Ms Andronas emailed Mr Colvile in relation to Emma & Roe again, noting the stock on hand as being, small - 9,750 and large - 13,250. She continued: "Please note that we do not have anything else pending for Emma & Roe at this time. Based on the growth of the Emma & Roe Brand we suggest another Sales Agreement for a year's worth of stock and we can do releases, as we do for Michel [sic] Hill at this time. To do this I will need an approximate monthly usage? Also, can you please send through an updated listing of Emma & Roe Aus and NZ and I will update our records."
In response, on 28 February 2015, Mr Colvile emailed in the following terms: "Please send the agreement through; please over estimate usage to allow for promotional events - Say and [sic] extra 20,000 large bags".
Ms Andronas responded in similar terms to her previous email attaching a sales agreement in the standard form of a quotation dated 3 March 2015 with a revised quantity of 30,000 small paper bags and 40,000 large paper bags. (There may have been some further communication because the number of large bags increased from 10,000 to 40,000 and the number of small bags from 10,000 to 30,000.) Mr Colvile signed the agreement, having ticked the box, on 4 March 2015.
On 21 April 2015, Mr Colvile emailed Ms Andronas with respect to Emma & Roe bags stating: "I understand that we are out of stock of both Emma & Roe bags in NZ and out of stock of small bags in AU. Could you advise when these will be back in stock please Also, can you make sure that you maintain a stock in NZ I would much rather over stock than under stock. Transactionally, Emma & Roe are much higher than MH stores, typically 3 times, therefore requiring 3 times the packaging. Can you please supply another sale agreement based on this".
There was a further email on 23 April 2015 from Ms Andronas noting the total yearly usage for both brands in NZ as, small - 120,000 and large - 110,000, and asking whether separate sales agreements were required for Australia and New Zealand. She concluded: "Please note that the Emma & Roe has been completed and we can expect to have these available 2nd week of May."
Mr Colvile replied on 24 April 2015 saying: "Please complete as separate. Thanks - let's do the annual usage, as we have events planned requiring additional bags Let's say 10,000 large and 20,000 small for NZ".
On 8 May 2015, Ms Andronas responded with her standard form of request to sign and return. The Emma & Roe agreement for New Zealand provided for 10,000 large bags and 20,000 small bags, in accordance with Mr Colvile's instructions. He signed the agreement on 8 May 2015. A second agreement for Emma & Roe (AU) provided for 100,000 small and 100,000 large bags, an agreement which Mr Colvile also signed on 8 May 2015. This was the third agreement relied upon in the proceedings.

[22]

Direct evidence of linkage

It may be inferred from the footer on the 2012 Terms document annexed to Mr Bogatez' affidavit that the document was obtained from an electronic source, and was capable of constituting the document found at the URL identified in the box. Nevertheless, the evidence connecting it with the URL is not persuasive. First, the name of the document is not the same as the description provided in the URL. Secondly, the footer to the document permits an inference that the document was not simply that prepared in January 2012, as the URL indicated, but one which had been reviewed.
That inference gives rise to two levels of uncertainty in circumstances where the respondent bore the onus of proof. The first is whether the relevant terms and conditions were those found in an unamended document prepared in 2012, or whether they were the terms and conditions in force at the date the sales agreements were signed. If they were the original terms and conditions, there is no good reason to conclude that the document provided by Mr Bogatez was in the original form prepared in January 2012.
In accordance with the reasoning in Switchgear, it is arguable that the parties intended that terms and conditions in force at the date of signing a particular sales agreement were the terms and conditions to apply in relation to that sales agreement. According to Mr Bogatez, [56] it was indeed the terms and conditions "as they existed at the time those agreements were entered" which were the applicable terms and conditions. Given there was no change in the description as "EquoteNew" in the URL, it is not likely that there had by 2015 been a significant change. Further, had there been a change, it is probable that the Gispac would have advised the appellant. The problem for Gispac remained, namely the absence of documentary evidence as to the form in which the terms and conditions of trading existed in May 2014 or May 2015.
Mr Bogatez' evidence did not fill the evidential gap. Mr Bogatez did not say in his affidavit how or when he obtained a copy of the 2012 Terms, nor, if as appears it was downloaded, from what source it was downloaded. In his oral evidence he was unable to recall when he first saw the particular terms in issue.
In Switchgear, the choice was between three sets of terms and conditions each of which was identified as operating at a particular date. In circumstances where Gispac bore the onus of establishing the terms and conditions in operation at the two relevant dates, the approach adopted in Switchgear does not assist. In my view, the correct inference is that the terms and conditions were not "standard" in the sense that they were the same terms at all times; rather, they probably predated the introduction of ePlus delivery in about 2012. Further, it is more likely than not that the terms which were formulated in January 2012 had been reviewed and changed by 2021.
Two internal factors support the inference. First, cl 15 of the 2012 Terms permitted Gispac to make amendments "to these terms and conditions of trading or any sale agreement from time to time" in certain conditions, including where the customer agrees to the amendments or the amendments will benefit, or will not permanently and adversely affect the customer: cl 15.1(a) and (b). Clause 15 may not have been in this form in the original document, but its presence in the 2012 Terms supports the inference that amendments may have been made from time to time before 2021.
Secondly, the period of an agreement identified in cl 21, was referred to in the definition of "Term" in cl 1, as the period set out "in any Sales Agreement under an ePlus facility or otherwise in accordance with cl 23 of these Terms and Conditions of Trading". Although it is possible that the reference to "clause 23" was a typographical error, it is at least equally likely that there was at some stage a cl 23, but the terms were amended after the definition was included, without the effect of the amendment being carried through to the definition. If that is the correct explanation, it is an amendment which would have been made after the introduction of the ePlus facility.
For these reasons, the primary judge should have declined to find that the 2012 Terms obtained by Mr Bogatez in 2021 were the terms and conditions of trading which operated in May 2014 and in May 2015.
This conclusion is strengthened when regard is had to the context in which the sales agreements were executed. The practices of the parties prior to May 2014 (and, with respect to Emma & Roe, before May 2015) described above were not consistent with the operation of the sales agreements described by Mr Bogatez.
Secondly, the 2012 Terms did not conform to the terms of the sales agreements. This may be illustrated by the analysis of the terms on which the appellant relied as ground 2.

[23]

Conclusions from practice

The conclusion to be drawn from the objective circumstances revealed in the evidence outlined above is that prior to May 2014 and May 2015 respectively, the parties operated on a commercial basis which was inconsistent with the application of at least cll 18 and 21 of the 2012 Terms. The evidence contained 12 sales agreements entered into prior to 5 May 2014, over a period of 17 months. Throughout that period the delivery service adopted was ePlus. The only variation in the nature of the sales agreements was that the T&C box was routinely not ticked between 26 November 2012 and 14 January 2014. Why the box was ticked on 15 January 2014 was not the subject of evidence, but appears to have been a step taken by Mr Dennis, for Michael Hill, in the absence of Mr Colvile. The first request to tick the box was found in an email of 23 January 2014 from Simon Cook of Gispac, apparently in the absence of the usual Gispac officer, Mr Duff. When Mr Duff returned on 3 March 2014, his email requesting execution did not refer to ticking the box, although a further request the following day for a different product stated: "If you could please sign, tick the T&C's and return to me, we can proceed with production asap." Mr Colvile complied with the requests.
A further reference to signing and returning the attached agreement, "remembering to tick the terms and conditions" appeared in an email from Mr Cook of Gispac dated 28 April 2014. A request from Mr Duff on 30 April 2014 did not contain that instruction; an email from Ms Andronas of 26 August 2014 asked Mr Colvile to "please tick and sign sales agreement at your earliest convenience". Subsequent requests from Ms Andronas contained a similar reminder to tick the T&C box.
It is apparent that a practice of ticking the T&C box developed between January 2014 and May 2014. The only basis for the change in practice which can be inferred from the evidence was a change in personnel at Gispac. There is no basis for inferring any intention on either side to vary the terms and conditions on which the parties were operating. The objective circumstances contradicted such an inference.
For these additional reasons, the proper conclusion is that, as at May 2014 when the first two agreements sued upon were executed, there was no intention to conduct a contractual relationship based on cll 18 and 21 of the 2012 Terms. The same reasoning applies with respect to the third agreement entered into with respect to Emma & Roe packaging in May 2015. The appropriate conclusion is, therefore, that neither of those clauses was engaged.

[24]

Ground 2

Ground 2 accepted that the 2012 Terms had been incorporated into the sales contract but contended that the reference in the Sales Schedule to "QTY" did not mean "Annual Quantity" for the purposes of cll 1 and 18 of the 2012 Terms. [57] It followed that there was no annual quantity and no quantity, 25% of which would constitute a guaranteed quarterly order. Rather, the agreement included a promise by the appellant to purchase the quantity of products specified under the heading "QTY" in the schedule for the total price specified.
Of the three passages in the judgment with which ground 2 took issue, it is convenient to start with the second, which read as follows: "117 Contrary to Michael Hill's submission, there is no inconsistency between the Sales Schedule (ie the front page of each of the Sales Agreements) and the 2012 Terms. As Gispac correctly submitted, the two documents work harmoniously together. The Sales Schedule says nothing about timing or minimum amounts; such matters are addressed in the 2012 Terms. Reading the two documents together, cl 18.1 directs attention to the Annual Quantity 'specified in the Sales Schedule for each Product'. I find that the 'QTY' referred to on the front page of the Sales Schedule of the Sales Agreements is the minimum amount of product to be purchased over a period of 12 calendar months."
It is true that the schedules to the sales agreements said nothing about "minimum amounts"; nor did cl 18. Clause 18.1 set out an agreement whereby the customer would purchase an amount that is equal to or exceeds "the Annual Quantity specified in the Sales Schedule". The term "Annual Quantity" is the defined term and introduces the concept of "the minimum amount" to be purchased by the customer over a period of 12 calendar months. The reasoning at [117] appears to assume that, once it is accepted that the 2012 Terms are incorporated, whatever quantity of a product may be found in a Sales Schedule must be construed as the "Annual Quantity" to be purchased within a twelve-month period.
Although the legal analysis speaks of a contract constituted by the Sales Agreement, into which certain terms and conditions are incorporated, a more practical approach would be to treat the 2012 Terms as the primary contractual document, into which the details to be found in the Sales Schedule are incorporated. Nevertheless, however one approaches the interrelationship of the two documents, it is necessary in order to uphold Gispac's approach to find an annual quantity "specified" in the Sales Schedule: it is not enough to find that the Sales Schedule refers to a quantity.
That which is "specified" must be identified expressly. No "Annual Quantity" is identified expressly in the Sales Schedules of any sales agreement before this Court. Clause 18 did not state that the "quantity" of a product identified in a Sales Schedule is to be taken as an "Annual Quantity". It is possible that evidence of a commercial practice existing at the time the 2012 Terms were first incorporated into the sales agreement might establish the necessary connection. However, practice before and after the first incorporation of the 2012 Terms was inconsistent with that implication. It was also inconsistent with the implication of a two-year contract period, creating a fixed term agreement for annual supplies during that period. As noted above, the commercial practice revealed a series of contracts for specified amounts, each being replaced by a new contract when supplies ran short.
The appellant submitted that the reasons for the finding, stated in conclusory terms in the last sentence of [117], were to be found in [115], in which the primary judge wrote: "115 Michael Hill says that cl 18 is not engaged because the Sales Agreements do not disclose any 'annual' commitment, rather the Sales Agreements provide for a one-off quantity or 'QTY'. According to the submission, the parties' obligations under the Sales Agreements came to an end once Michael Hill had ordered, and paid for, the 'QTY' stated on the front page of the Sales Agreements, which 'could happen in one month, or it could happen in one year, or even longer'. I reject this proposed construction. In the context of Gispac agreeing to provide the benefits of the ePlus facility to Michael Hill, this is not a sensible business-like construction. It involves the most unlikely view that Gispac would be committed to supply bags at a fixed price up to the QTY for so long as Michael Hill determined, subject to Gispac's limited right under cl 20.3 to increase the price in the specified circumstances."
There were three problems with this reasoning. First, "the benefits of the ePlus facility" did not coincide with the incorporation of the 2012 Terms. The implication that the consideration for the benefit was a fixed term contractual obligation to purchase minimum quantities on a quarterly and annual basis was not supported by the evidence of commercial practice between the parties.
Secondly, the inference that Gispac was committed to supply bags at a fixed price up to the contractual quantity "for as long as Michael Hill determined" carried little weight, legally or factually. Legally, as the primary judge recognised, under cl 20.3 Gispac could increase the price in specified circumstances. [58] However, although the power to increase prices was identified by reference to "specified circumstances", the right is not aptly described as "limited". Rather, Gispac was entitled to increase prices "to reflect any increase in the cost to Gispac of producing and/or delivering the Products due to any factor beyond Gispac's reasonable control". The right was not exercisable only after a specified period had elapsed; it could be exercised on a single occasion or from time to time.
Thirdly, the provision of cl 20.3 in relation only to ePlus contracts implied that the rolling two-year contractual period carried with it a risk for Gispac that costs might increase over that period, whereas with other contractual arrangements Gispac took the risk of increased cost in fixing its price. Significantly for present purposes, cl 20.3 did not demonstrate Gispac's concern that its customer might drag out the period over which the bags were being supplied. Gispac was protected against that eventuality by the shortfall entitlement under cl 18, which applied in the same circumstances as cl 20, namely use of the ePlus facility.
It follows that inferences derived from the supposed uncommerciality of Michael Hill's construction of the sales agreement with the 2012 Terms lacked substance. Such weight as might be given to that reasoning does not allow the rewriting of the Sales Schedule as specifying an Annual Amount when, in its terms, it did not purport to do so.
On this basis, ground 2 should be upheld. However, there are other difficulties in applying Gispac's 2012 Terms to the contractual agreements entered into with the appellant. These support the conclusion as to the non-engagement of cl 18.

[25]

Commencement of agreement

As noted above, "Term" was defined in cl 1 to mean "the period set out in any sales agreement under an ePlus facility or otherwise in accordance with clause 23 of these terms and conditions of trading". Accepting that the reference to cl 23 was intended to be to cl 21, the term identified in subcl 21.1 was "24 months from the date of execution of the Account Application". The "Account Application" was defined in cl 1 to mean "an application made by the customer requesting Gispac not to require immediate payment upon order or delivery of goods or the provision of services by Gispac". That language made sense in relation to an agreement entered into for an initial period of two years with an automatic renewal for a further period of two years, in accordance with cl 21.2. However, it made no sense in the context of numerous separate sales agreements entered into from time to time as the need for further packaging arose.
The primary judge found that each of the three sales agreements in issue "commenced on the respective dates that the agreements were executed by Mr Colvile": at [103]. That finding was not challenged and made commercial sense. However, in order to derive that conclusion from the operation of the 2012 Terms, it was necessary to find that each sales agreement which provided for payment within 30 days of invoicing constituted an "Account Application". The judge rejected the appellant's submission that the term "Account Application" referred to a separate document from the sales agreement itself. The reasoning also ignored Mr Bogatez' evidence as to "the Account Application" made by Michael Hill - in 2003.
This reasoning strained the ordinary meaning of the defined term and its application to the facts. Each sales agreement was constituted by a "quotation", which was accepted by Mr Colvile signing on behalf of Michael Hill, the offeree. The quotations included the payment term, "30 Days from invoice date". The quotation itself cannot reasonably be understood as an application by the appellant; nor can its acceptance by the appellant, which, as the judge found, was the date the agreement commenced. The application cannot have been processed. The quotation described "this sales agreement" as being "valid for a period of 7 days". Mr Colvile in fact signed each quotation/sales agreement within 7 days of receipt.
The conclusion that each agreement commenced on the date of execution by Mr Colvile was entirely reasonable; as an objective understanding of the intention of the parties. It did not, however, reflect the terms, or the intended operation of cl 21.1.

[28]

Obligation to order a minimum quantity on a quarterly basis

Clause 18.2 assumed the existence of an annual quantity and permitted Gispac to identify a shortfall if "during each quarter during the term" the customer purchased "less than 25% of the Annual Quantity". The term "Annual Quantity" was defined to mean "the minimum amount of Product to be purchased by the Customer over a period of 12 calendar months commencing on the date of commencement of the term".
There was no rational basis upon which the sales agreements could be construed, otherwise than by reference to the 2012 Terms, as involving any such obligation. Indeed, such an obligation was inconsistent with the practices of the parties, for the reasons already stated. In addition, the sales agreements themselves anticipated a "lead time" of 8-10 weeks "from pre-production sample approval" which, even if there had already been approval, rendered impractical the "purchase" of such amounts during the first quarter. Indeed, Mr Bogatez volunteered a longer lead time in the course of cross-examination: [59] "Q. So, you say, though, that, this is right, isn't it, from the date Gispac placed its order with its own supplier it took about three months from that time to deliver the bags to Michael Hill? A. Correct. Three to six months, actually. Q. Where does the six months come in? Because, I've not seen that in your affidavits. A. Well, it's just, it's just a, it's a date that's a broad range, because when you're dealing with overseas manufacturers it's just timeframes are, sometimes you can get product in three months, sometimes it takes a lot longer."
Although the sales agreements generally described the Lead Time as "approx 8-10 weeks", later in a year, the period was expanded to "approx 12-14 weeks due to Chinese New Year". [60] Yet, according to Mr Bogatez, these periods were regularly exceeded, making a regular quarterly accounting from the date of commencement of the agreements impractical. There was no evidence that any such exercise until June 2017, three and two years respectively after the agreements the subject of the proceedings.
Furthermore, the "product usage and forecast" reports prepared by Gispac demonstrated large fluctuations from month-to-month: they were provided as a basis for calculating the amounts required under further sales agreements. Two points are significant: first, no such report in evidence identified quarterly figures; secondly, none suggested that the level of fluctuating demand was inconsistent with the contractual arrangements.

[30]

Leave to rely upon new submissions

In written submissions, filed on 5 June 2024, Gispac questioned the entitlement of the appellant to make submissions in support of ground 1, on the basis that the point had not been raised before the primary judge. Gispac noted that ground 1, "raises a construction question as to whether the words in the box 'you … agree to the terms and conditions that can be found at the following link' means [sic] that only terms that were available at the link could be incorporated. So, according to Michael Hill, if there were no terms available at the link (because it had not been established the link was operable) then there were no terms and conditions incorporated into the sales agreements".
Gispac also submitted that the case proceeded on the basis that there was a "hybrid" signed and unsigned document case and that the "ticket cases" principles applied. The appellant's response to these submissions was to seek leave to rely upon its written submissions, to the extent that they departed from the case ran at trial. Nevertheless, the appellant denied that leave was required.
The immediate answer to Gispac's first complaint is that, for the reasons noted above, the submission in those terms (the appellant's first alternative) cannot succeed. It will be necessary to say more shortly about the so-called "hybrid" case submission.
Further, Gispac submitted at par 7: "Michael Hill also raised at trial (belatedly) a factual provenance issue as to whether it had been established on the evidence that the 2012 Terms were the actual terms that existed at the time that the Sales Agreements were signed…. That question was answered in favour of Gispac …. His Honour found that the terms referred to in the box were the 2012 Terms …. Again, there is no challenge on appeal to the factual finding as to the provenance of the 2012 Terms."
This point was not that the "provenance" argument had not been raised at trial, but that there was no challenge to the finding that the terms identified by Mr Bogatez were the terms which were intended to be engaged by the ticking of the T&C box.

[31]

The prejudice to the respondent

Gispac submitted that it would suffer prejudice if the matter were allowed to be pursued. Its written submissions suggested that leave was opposed on the basis that the new contentions were without merit; prejudice was not explored. However, in oral argument the question of prejudice was put in the following terms. The first point relied on was that counsel, "would have got more heavily involved in cross-examining as to how the parties operated through their conduct on rise and fall type issues, web ordering ePlus to make good. Because one can look at post contractual conduct for the purposes of working out contract formation." [61]
It is true that in Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council [62] Heydon JA stated a principle that "post-contractual conduct is admissible on the question of whether a contract was formed", but not admissible on the question of what a contract means. However, Heydon JA further stated: "27 The fourth relevant principle is that the construction of a contract is an objective question for the court, and the subjective beliefs of the parties are generally irrelevant in the absence of any argument that a decree of rectification should be ordered or an estoppel by convention found."
There was no doubt that each of the relevant contracts existed; there was no doubt as to the identity of the parties. [63]
In Medical Device Technologies Pty Ltd v Health Administration Corporation, [64] a case relied upon by Gispac, Payne JA stated: "91 The primary judge correctly found that post contractual conduct was admissible in considering whether the contract had already been formed: Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 at [25]. Ms Hanigan's enquiry quoted at [64] would have been unnecessary had she thought that the Purchase Order Terms and Conditions governed the first Agreement. Of course, Ms Hanigan's subjective state of mind is not relevant to the question of determining the terms of the first Agreement. But the primary judge was correct to conclude that this enquiry, viewed by an objective bystander, supported the conclusion that the parties did not intend the Purchase Order Terms and Conditions to be incorporated into the first Agreement."
There is good reason to maintain a tight rein on the admissibility of post-contractual conduct, even as evidence as to the formation of a contract. In most cases such evidence will constitute a direct challenge to the objective determination of the existence of a contract. Subsequent conduct of a party may indicate that the party does or does not believe there is a contract in place, but that will be an expression of a subjective opinion and, indeed, quite likely an opinion as to a matter of law. [65]
The point of prejudice was further explicated by senior counsel in the following terms: [66] "So we would have, at least, wished to consider at trial, if this point was properly in the ring, (a) whether we cross-examine in a slightly different way (b) whether we introduce new topics through cross-examine or (c) whether we make additional submissions to his Honour about all these points. That's one matter we may have done differently."
In so far as there were further submissions of law which might be put, that course was open on an appeal by way of rehearing. In so far as there was an intention to explore factual issues further in relation to subsequent conduct, there was no sound basis put forward for permitting such a course.
The second element of prejudice was stated, somewhat obliquely, in the following terms: [67] "The other one… is it is true that the question of whether the link was in operation was a fact in issue, but as one knows, facts in issue arise in a particular forensic landscape and if the forensic landscape we were facing was this is a hybrid signed/unsigned case, it's possible to take a view that claim will fail or that argument will fail… … It is possible one takes a forensic view that we're going to prove it's a signed contract and, therefore, the working of the link is not really central. If one had put the incorporation point either in opening or at some point prior to now, that is in the Court of Appeal, one may have addressed the forensic landscape of the importance of the link in a different way and one can't rule that out as being something that we would have done on this side of the bar table. It's all about dealing with the factual issue in the context of what one understands the arguments are going to be."
The suggestion was that an alternative factual case might have been put, thereby attracting the principle identified in Coulton v Holcombe, [68] in the following terms: [69] "In a case where, had the issue been raised in the court below, evidence could have been given which by any possibility could have prevented the point from succeeding, this Court has firmly maintained the principle that the point cannot be taken afterwards …. In O'Brien v Komesaroff, [70] Mason J, in a judgment in which the other members of the Court concurred, said: 'In some cases when a question of law is raised for the first time in an ultimate court of appeal, as for example upon the construction of a document, or upon facts either admitted or proved beyond controversy, it is expedient in the interests of justice that the question should be argued and decided …. The consequence is that the appellants' case fails at the threshold. They cannot argue this point on appeal; it was not pleaded by them nor was it made an issue by the conduct of the parties at the trial.' In our opinion, no distinction is to be drawn in the application of these principles between an intermediate court of appeal and an ultimate court of appeal."
In the present case, Gispac's amended statement of claim expressly pleaded at par 14 that "[e]ach of the Sales Agreements incorporated the Terms and Conditions". (The phrase "Terms and Conditions" was identified by reference to the 2012 Terms.) Michael Hill's denial further stated that Gispac "did not give, or otherwise make available, to it any documents separate from, and in addition to, the sales agreements that contain terms and conditions in relation to the supply of its packaging products" and that upon and after 5 May 2014 "the link to the website … was defective or did not exist".
As Gispac's case, supported in evidence by Mr Bogatez, was that the terms were supplied, or at least available at the URL, and not otherwise, the question of the availability of the terms through that medium was always in issue. If Gispac had a case to bring in response to Michael Hill's defence, the evidence should have been available prior to the opening of the trial on 22 August 2022.
In a written opening dated 11 August 2022, Gispac noted as the first issue, "Were Gispac's 2012 standard terms incorporated into each of the sales contracts?" It stated that its answer was "yes": at par 8. It relied upon the signing of the agreement and the ticking of the box as incorporating the terms governing the supply of paper bags to Michael Hill under each of the sales agreements: pars 16, 24-25. It noted that it did not matter that the document was found on a website: par 26. It then noted the submission that the link was defective or did not exist and responded: "The evidential basis for Michael Hill's positive factual contention is not apparent." It then to sought to place on Michael Hill the burden of establishing the negative.
Michael Hill's opening submissions, dated 18 August 2022, asserted that it was "for Gispac to make out the contract it asserts, and it cannot do so on the available evidence": par 3. It took issue directly with the contention that "the website address in the box was a functioning hyperlink, and that it took a person who clicked on it to an electronic document with its purported standard terms and conditions. It has not proved this fact." Michael Hill noted the contrary assertion by Mr Bogatez but dismissed it as not being evidence demonstrating that the hyperlink was operational at the relevant time: par 10. It repeated what it described as a "fatal problem" in Gispac's case, namely that "it has offered no evidence of any probative value that shows the hyperlinked worked in 2014 and 2015": par 16(a). The allegation was repeated at pars 17 and 18.
In closing submissions dated 24 August 2022, Gispac asserted that the "act of signing the sales agreements and ticking the box is sufficient to incorporate the 2012 standard terms into its contracts": par 17. Assuming that the link did not work, it submitted that "it does not matter": par 26. It repeated its contention (correctly rejected by the primary judge) that "given the contention that the link did not work is a factual assertion propounded by Michael Hill, it bears the evidential onus in establishing the fact": par 33.
The cross-examination of Mr Bogatez and Mr Colvile were completed on the first day, 22 August 2022. On the second day, there was discussion about expert evidence, in the course of which the primary judge outlined a number of the issues which have been addressed above, including the contextual considerations raised by the sales agreements prior to the ones relied upon by Gispac. With respect to the last day of the first tranche of hearings (the second tranche only addressed expert evidence as to quantification of loss) counsel for Michael Hill identified the hyperlink dispute as involving two problems faced by Gispac. [71] The first was the availability of the link and the second was that even if the link were in operation, Gispac had not proved the "provenance of this document": "They have a document which has 2012 written on it. Mr Bogatez says that that was the agreement that applied to other customers. But there's really no chain of evidence that shows when it was produced and who produced it. So you don't actually know what was ever sitting behind this link, if it worked."
The judge expressed doubts about the second issue, but it was not abandoned or withdrawn. In response, senior counsel for Gispac took issue with the second point in the following terms: [72] "The other matter that my learned friend started to try to put in closing was some provenance issue with the 2012 terms. She didn't open on that point. She can't be allowed, in my submission, to run a new case, now, that the 2012 terms that went into evidence without objection somehow are not the 2012 terms referred to by reference to the link. That's a new case put in closing. It would cause me unfairness if she was permitted to advance that case now. And in any event, its not persuasive. And one only needs to look at the footer on the 2012 general terms to see that they reflect the description in the hyperlink."
There was no ruling that it was a new case, presumably because, given the earlier references set out above, it clearly was not. While it is true that it was not addressed in the judgment, except in the conclusory form of rejection by an express finding to the contrary, the issue was open at trial and was entitled to be relied on by the appellant on the appeal.

[32]

The 'hybrid' case

At the trial, and on the appeal, Gispac's position was that there were only two classes of cases involving incorporation of terms and conditions by reference. The first class, of unsigned contracts, was exemplified by the so-called "ticket" cases; the second was that of signed contracts, which included the sales agreements. There was no "hybrid" category. Yet, Gispac submitted, the focus of the trial was upon the existence or otherwise of a "hybrid" category: that was the "forensic context" in which the submissions now sought to be run on appeal should be evaluated. Furthermore, no "hybrid" category was asserted on appeal.
It appears that the term "hybrid" was first used by counsel for Michael Hill in closing oral submissions and picked up by the primary judge as meaning that the case involved "the hybrid electronic and hardcopy nature of the contract". [73]
The judge immediately expressed "difficulty with that submission", noting that the quotation was a PDF file sent by email, printed out by Mr Colvile, "so he actually has a hard piece of paper", which he signs, ticks the box and returns to Gispac. The judge continued: [74] "The fact that the terms exist at Gispac is no different to a case, is it, where someone signs and returns a facsimile by facsimile a quotation [which] incorporates the standard terms and condition[s] of the supplier, which the supplier has sitting in his or her office and hasn't given to the potential customer. But the potential customer takes the chance that those conditions are not going to be disadvantageous. What's the difference? … Instead of sitting in the file drawer at the supplier's office, it sits as a PDF and the witness has come along and says 'Here it is'…. You suggest there's some doubt about the provenance."
Counsel then responded, submitting that the Court should not accept Mr Bogatez: [75] "So the Court would have to have a real doubt about whether he, in fact, knew what the story was with the 2012 terms and whether they were Gispac's terms in 2014. He just didn't have the level of knowledge to assure the Court that anything he said on those topics was reliable."
In short, the response is that the case differs from other signed contract cases in that, contrary to the primary judge's assumption in the passage set out above, it had not been established that "there were standard terms and conditions of the supplier, which the supplier has sitting in his or her office". The term "hybrid" may not have helpfully encapsulated that proposition, but the point raised on appeal was squarely raised at trial and, for the reasons set out above, had merit.

[35]

Endnotes

Gispac Pty Ltd v Michael Hill Jeweller (Australia) Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 18 ("primary judgment").
Gispac Pty Ltd v Michael Hill Jeweller (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 356.
The notice of motion was dated 7 June 2024 and was served on that date.
The document was annexed to the affidavit of Mr Bogatez 17 November 2020, but was not in the material before this Court.
Mr Bogatez' affidavit, 17 November 2020, par 10.
The symbol "J" before paragraphs referred to the primary judgment: the symbol has been omitted.
(1960) 102 CLR 537; [1960] HCA 16 (McTiernan, Kitto and Menzies JJ).
Peters at 542 (Kitto J).
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 99 at 109 (Gibbs J); [1973] HCA 36.
Ford Motor Co of Australia Ltd v Arrowcrest Group Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1156 at [8] (Finkelstein J), applied in Current Images Pty Ltd v Dupack Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 99 at [52] (Bathurst CJ, Macfarlan JA and Sackville AJA agreeing).
[1912] AC 1.
Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; [2004] HCA 52.
(1988) 165 CLR 197 at 227-229; [1988] HCA 32.
(2022) 294 FCR 524; [2022] FCAFC 149 (reversed on other grounds: Karpik v Carnival Plc [2023] HCA 39; (2023) 98 ALJR 45).
Toll v Alphapharm at [40].
(2004) 218 CLR 451; [2004] HCA 35.
(1982) 149 CLR 337.
[1976] 1 WLR 989; [1976] 3 All ER 570.
See also Electricity Generation Corp v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640; [2014] HCA 7 at [35]; Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104; [2015] HCA 37 at [46]-[50] (French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ); [107]-[109] (Kiefel and Keane JJ); [118]-[121] (Bell and Gageler JJ).
See fn 12 above.
Toll v Alphapharm at [42].
(2014) 89 NSWLR 633; [2014] NSWCA 184 (Leeming JA, Ward and Emmett JJA agreeing).
[2018] NSWCA 81; 130 IPR 527 (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P and Emmett AJA agreeing).
Warner Bros [75].
Warner Bros [82]-[84].
Warner Bros [59].
[1978] 1 WLR 165 (Smith).
Smith at 171E-H.
Smith at 177B.
[2001] NSWCA 313.
Hyder at [78].
[2013] QCA 130 (Jackson J, Muir and Gotterson JJA agreeing).
McBride at [7].
McBride at [30].
McBride at [49].
McBride at [59].
[1998] NSWCA 284 (Sheller JA, Mason P, Beazley JA agreeing).
Lief Investments p 10(15), 11(42).
Lief Investments p 12(33).
Lief Investments p 7(48).
Lief Investments p 8(7).
[2016] NSWCA 162 (Payne JA, Leeming JA agreeing; McColl JA also agreeing with further reasons).
Toyota Finance at [55]-[66].
Toyota Finance at [73].
Primary judgment at [30], [33]-[34] - see [74] above and [135] below.
In fact, the judge had rejected Mr Bogatez' evidence to the same effect at par 29: primary judgement, at [33]-[35].
Tcpt, 22/08/22, p 22(25)-(30).
Tcpt, p 25(45)-26(10).
Tcpt, p 26(33)-27(10); p 34(36)-(45); p 37 (invoicing).
Tcpt, p 20(22); p 21(8)-(27).
Tcpt, p 43(33)-(38).
Tcpt, p 25(1)-(9).
Affidavit, Edwin Bogatez, 17 November 2020, par 9.
Affidavit, Christopher John Colvile, 27 July 2022, par 3; primary judgment at [11].
Email, 9 July 2014, Christie Andronas (Gispac) to C Colvile. Blue 230
Affidavit, 17 November 2020, par 26.
See text at [65] above.
Clause 20 is set out at [58] above.
Tcp, p 27(17)-(30).
See, e.g. Sales Agreement, 3 December 2013.
CA Tcpt, 20/06/24, p 43(12).
(2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61.
Cf Sinclair v Balanian [2024] NSWCA 144 at [16] (Leeming JA) referring to Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570; [2008] HCA 57 at [35].
[2024] NSWCA 142 (Payne JA, Stern and Harrison JJA agreeing).
Johnston v Brightstars Holding Company Ltd [2014] NSWCA 150 at [120]-[121] (in my reasons) and [134] (Gleeson JA agreeing).
CA Tcpt, p 43(42).
CA Tcpt, p 43(45).
(1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7-8; [1986] HCA 33.
Coulton at 7 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ).
(1982) 150 CLR 310 at 319; [1982] HCA 33.
Tcpt, 25/08/22, p 136(45)-137(20).
Tcpt, p 146(49)-147(10).
Tcpt, p 138(38).
Tcpt, p 138(46).
Tcpt, p 139(25). DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 27 August 2024

Michael Hill Jeweller (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gispac Pty Ltd

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