After referring to the clauses of the Regulation relevant to the case, her Honour added at [15]:
"These provisions are mandatory in their terms and permit of no discretion. The general fall-back position is asserted in cl 91, namely that parties in proceedings for work injury damages are to bear their own costs."
6 It will be noted that by s 346(1) of the WIM Act, these provisions relate to costs in claims for work injury damages, an expression which is defined in s 250 of the Act. In submissions in reply, Mr Murray argued that the plaintiff's claim did not fall within that definition. Relevantly for present purposes, the definition is as follows:
" work injury damages means damages recoverable from a worker's employer in respect of:
(a) an injury to the worker caused by the negligence or other tort of the employer, …"
7 Mr Murray submitted that the plaintiff's claim was for "common law damages at large", unaffected by the limitation on the nature of damages which might be recovered introduced by s 151G of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 as that section was recast in 2001: see my principal judgment at [17]. That may be so, but it does not alter the fact that the claim fell within the definition of work injury damages in s 250 of the WIM Act. In the principal judgment I proceeded on that basis: [8].
8 In the alternative, Mr Murray relied upon cl 93 of the Regulation, providing that the Subdivision does not apply to costs payable in relation to proceedings that are ancillary to proceedings on a claim for work injury damages. The proceedings before me were ancillary, he said, because they were brought merely to determine certain separate questions under UCPR Pt 28 r 2. He argued that, in this respect, they were similar to the proceedings before Malpass AsJ in which the plaintiff obtained leave under the Limitation Act to pursue his claim.
9 The ambit of the word "ancillary" in cl 93 is unclear, and Mr Murray referred me to no authority bearing upon it. However, whatever its ambit might be, the proceedings I heard were anything but ancillary. They led to a finding that the plaintiff's claim faced an insuperable procedural barrier, such that it had to be dismissed. Whether or not a motion under Pt 28 r 2 might generally be classified as ancillary, the effect of the motion before me was the final disposition of the proceedings.
10 Accordingly, I am satisfied that costs in the matter are governed by s 346 of the WIM Act and the relevant clauses of the Regulation. Mr Campbell referred to cl 90(2), providing that a claimant is to pay an insurer's costs if he or she "does not obtain an order or judgment on a claim (that is, if the Court finds the insurer has no liability for the claim) …" He submitted, however, that this case does not attract that subclause because there had been no finding on the question of liability at all. Rather, the proceedings had been dismissed because the plaintiff was unable to comply with a mandatory procedural provision. In his submissions in reply, Mr Murray put no argument to the contrary.
11 That being so, the only relevant provision is that upon which Mr Campbell relied, cl 91. By that clause, there being no other relevant provision in the Subdivision, the parties to the proceedings are to bear their own costs.
12 Accordingly, in the present proceedings the plaintiff and the SRA are to pay their own costs.