Consideration
34Section 52(1) of the PT Act gives this tribunal jurisdiction to review the RMS cancellation decision. Under s 63 of the ADT Act the tribunal is to decide what is the correct and preferable decision having regard to the material then before it and the applicable law. In so doing it may exercise all of the functions conferred or imposed by any relevant enactment. It is not restricted to considering the material that was before the respondent, but may have regard to any relevant material before it at the time of the review: Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA 179; (1979) 46 FLR 409.
35Under s 11 of the PT Act, the purpose of an authority is to "attest" that the person meets the requirements of the Act. The term "attest" is stronger than the concept of being satisfied of something, and envisions the decision- maker assuring the public that the authority holder is of good repute and meets the other criteria in s 11(2). As the requirements are cumulative, the inability to attest to any one of them is fatal to an entitlement to a driver authority. Thus, even if the person is of good repute, he or she must in all other respects be a "fit and proper person to be the driver of a public passenger vehicle" and must also have the requisite responsibility and aptitude.
36Questions of possible hardship to the applicant, or in this case to his family in Bangladesh, cannot be taken into account in determining whether RMS has made the correct and preferable decision: Lal v Director-General, Department of Transport [2001] NSWADT 74, [47].
37In this context a person's reputation is to be sought in the estimate of his moral character entertained by some specific group of people, such as neighbours or work colleagues. "Evidence of conviction for a criminal offence is, however, admissible as evidence, indeed most cogent evidence, of bad reputation": Re T Anderson inand the Director-General of Youth and Community Services [1980] 1 NSWLR 392 at 393.
38The evidence adduced by the applicant tends to show that he enjoys a favourable reputation in the community. While I accept that evidence, it is also to be borne in mind that "The question whether a person is fit and proper is one of value judgment. In that process the seriousness or otherwise of particular conduct is a matter for evaluation by the decision maker. So too is the weight if any, to be given to matters favouring the person whose fitness and propriety are under consideration": Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at [63]. That is reflected in the first of the five Saadieh considerations, the nature, seriousness and frequency of any criminal offences for which the applicant has been arrested or convicted.
39This is apparently the first case under the PT Act in which a cancellation decision has relied on the making of false statutory declarations.
40In this case the applicant made two false declarations, but as they were both sworn on the same day, one can perhaps treat them as being part of a single transaction. On the other hand, they could not be characterized as an act of impulsive wrongdoing. Arranging for a friend's wife to accept responsibility for serious traffic breaches must have required at least some degree of planning and organization.
41In this State, making a false declaration for a material benefit is a serious offence. Under s 25A of the Oaths Act 1900, conviction on indictment can lead to imprisonment for up to seven years.
42As Mr Wozniak pointed out, a former Federal Court judge was recently sentenced to three years' imprisonment for offences arising out of an attempt to avoid traffic points following a speeding charge. He was also disbarred, lost his Queen's Counsel commission, his Order of Australia and his National Trust listing as a "Living National Treasure" (R v Einfeld [2009] NSWSC 119).
43Similarly, in England a former Blair government Minister was sentenced in 2011 to eight months' imprisonment for transferring some traffic points to his then wife in 2003. His (by then ex-) wife Vicky Pryce incurred a similar sentence for her part in the conspiracy and was stripped by the Queen of her honour as Companion of the Order of the Bath.
44This kind of offence is thus viewed very seriously, and not only in New South Wales. Further, in this case the offence related directly to driving and the applicant's driving record. As Huntsman JM noted in Ghachame v Roads and Maritime Services [2013] NSWADT 144, [54], a person's fitness is to be gauged in the light of the nature and purpose of the activities that the person will undertake (at [54]). It is also relevant to note that, having been committed 10 months ago, the offences are relatively recent.
45In relation to the second Saadieh factor, the nature, seriousness and frequency of any complaints made against the applicant, the evidence shows that the applicant has been the subject of a number of complaints, but only two of them were found to have been substantiated. They were not major matters and involved no sexual misconduct, cheating, intoxication, violence or threatening language.
46The third Saadieh factor is the applicant's driving record. His driving history is not unblemished. The respondent said, and the applicant did not dispute, that to date he has received three demerit warning letters. The red light and "No stopping" violations in 2012 were serious and the former especially was potentially very dangerous.
47As regards the fourth factor, the applicant's reputation in the community, I have indicated above that I accept the evidence proffered on his behalf.
48Finally, the tribunal must consider the likelihood that the applicant will reoffend, be the subject of further complaints or commit further traffic offences. As was noted above, the false declaration offences are relatively recent and involved an element of deliberate planning, as well as informal survey research and consultation among other drivers. His remorse and contrition seem genuine, however. But although he has admitted the offences, he said more than once in his oral evidence that in the circumstances he had no choice, no other option but to make the false declarations. He did have the option, though, of accepting the points and a three-month suspension and conscientiously driving more carefully in the future. His less than reassuring propensity to rationalize his wrongdoing leaves a residual concern that if placed in a difficult situation in the future he might again give way to temptation.
49It can hardly be disputed that honesty must be central to any consideration of whether someone is a fit and proper person with the responsibility and aptitude to drive a public passenger service vehicle in accordance with the statutory conditions, the law and custom. An analogy can be drawn with Sara v Director-General, Department of Transport [2003] NSWADT 157, where a taxi driver had been knowingly involved in a Cabcharge fraud perpetrated by one of his regular passengers. Despite his 39-year driving record with no complaints against him, the cancellation of his licence was affirmed.
50After weighing the relevant considerations, and in light of all the evidence, I am unable to conclude that the applicant has shown that the tribunal may attest to his suitability and fitness to hold a taxi driver's authority at the present time. In particular, he has committed serious offences and it is too soon to say with confidence that if he were to find himself under pressure in the future he would not reoffend in some significant way.
51On behalf of the applicant Mr Jones submitted that an appropriate course of action would be to adjourn these proceedings for three months to enable Mr Miah to show that he meets the statutory criteria. In the interim he would enrol in a Traffic Offenders' Program. But that program relates to driving, not the falsification of documents. It would provide insufficient grounds for attesting that the applicant meets the fitness and suitability standards laid down in s 11. After careful/ consideration I conclude that it is not an appropriate option. It may be that if the applicant reapplies in the future he may be able to prove that RMS would be justified in making the necessary attestation, but at present he does not meet the statutory standards.
52The decision under review is affirmed.