Although a chair had been pushed over, a pot plant had been knocked out of its stand, telephone books had dropped on the floor and perhaps a hole had been made in a plasterboard wall during the altercation, these events would not have produced the series of thumps or bangs which brought the altercation to a close. Similarly, if Tracey McNamara had been merely pushed away and fallen onto the carpeted floor, her fall would not have accounted for the series of thumps or bangs. Nor is it likely that the clump of hair which had been pulled from her head by the appellant would have simply come to rest under the head of her inert body. The question is whether evidence of this sequence of events provided a sufficient foundation of fact for a reasonable jury to be satisfied that the act or acts which caused the death of Tracey McNamara was or were done with the intent to cause her really serious injury[3]. That is to say, was that the only rational inference to draw from the proved circumstances[4], considered together with the appellant's assertion that he had merely pushed her away to get to the phone. The carpet on the floor of the room in which the altercation occurred, the sounds that were heard by the neighbours, the temporal correlation of those sounds with the voices of the appellant and the deceased, the injuries sustained by Tracey McNamara and the presence of the clump of hair under her head when she was lying unconscious on the floor were sufficient, in our view, to support an adverse verdict. The jury were entitled to reach the conclusion that the appellant had repeatedly banged the deceased's head against a flat surface - wall, table or floor - with the intent to do her really serious injury and that after she pleaded with him to stop she was lying on the floor, provoking his command to get up. In other words, the jury were entitled on the evidence to discard the hypothesis which the appellant advanced and which otherwise might have precluded the appellant's conviction for murder.