Meyer v Falcone

2 In his application, Mr Meyer sought interlocutory relief in the following terms:

"1. An order for a Stay of Proceedings in the matter No. 144 of 2000 in the Supreme Court of Tasmania, Launceston Registry s.86.

2. An order to Cross-Vest any State matters into the Federal Court in the interests of Natural Justice.

3. An order that A.D. Pearce immediately return with interest all funds sent from NZ to his Trust Account[.]

4. An order that judgement (M41 of 2000) of Underwood. J be reversed on the basis that the Supreme court of Tasmania did not have competent jurisdiction. s.67 TPA.

5. An Injunction s.80(4) restraining the Vendors from continuing & compounding their Misrepresentations by pursuing Breach of Contract in the Tasmanian Supreme court. Their action is an abuse of process."

3 The application for interlocutory relief was supported by an affidavit sworn by Mr Meyer and filed on 23 October 2001. The affidavit is entirely argumentative and consists of a series of conclusions and accusations. It does not state any facts in support of the application for interlocutory relief. 4 Mr Meyer's first claimed interlocutory order, in effect, seeks an anti-suit injunction. To grant relief in the nature of an anti-suit injunction is a serious step and should ordinarily be granted only in cases of clear need. See for example Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Multiplex Constructions [2000] FCA 101, (2000) 95 IR 225. None of the evidence presented in this matter reveals any such clear need. 5 It is inappropriate for this Court to stay proceedings in the Supreme Court of Tasmania where there is no evidence before this Court of any steps taken by Mr Meyer to use mechanisms available in the Supreme Court to stay those proceedings. 6 In respect of the second claimed interlocutory order, it is sufficient to say that this Court has no power to grant relief in the nature of cross-vesting "any State matters into the Federal Court in the interests of Natural Justice". 7 The order sought against an "A.D. Pearce" concerning the return to Mr Meyer of certain funds, is not an order that the Court can make given that "A.D. Pearce" is not a party to the proceeding. "A.D. Pearce & Co" is the third respondent in the proceeding. In any event, the affidavit merely visits the consequences to Mr Meyer of the non-return of the funds rather than whether he has legal right to have such funds returned to him. 8 It would be extraordinary for this Court to consider reversing a judgment of a judge of the Supreme Court at all, let alone in the absence of any information about the proceeding or any relevant appeal in the State jurisdiction. 9 Finally, it is a matter for a State Court to determine whether a matter before it is an abuse of process or not. It is not a matter for this Court. 10 The application for interlocutory relief is dismissed. I certify that the preceding ten (10) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Marshall.

Associate: Dated: 24 October 2001 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Meyer appeared for himself

Solicitor for the 3rd Respondent: Simmons Wolfhagen