In our opinion the argument is unsound. The question which the Commissioner has to consider and upon which he must be satisfied, is whether the rights of the employees to receive the benefits, pensions or retiring allowances have been fully secured. It is not whether the stipulated rights have been secured in due legal form, but whether the Commissioner is satisfied that the actual receipt of the individual personal benefits, pensions and retiring allowances from the fund to which an employer has made contributions from his assessable income is fully secured. The Commissioner has a wide discretion: it is part of his function to satisfy himself that employees shall in fact get the benefit of the fund, that they are protected against unreasonable deprivation of benefits from the fund, that the management and investment of the fund are properly safeguarded, and so forth. This leads to a consideration of the reasons assigned by the Commissioner for refusing the deductions claimed. The Court has not to consider whether in its opinion the rights of the employees to receive the benefits, &c., under the trust instrument were not fully secured, but only whether the Commissioner has acted within the limit to which an honest man, competent to the discharge of his office, ought to confine himself. It is the Commissioner that must be satisfied, not this Court; but he must act "according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion ...; according to law, and not humour": he must not act in a vague or fanciful manner, but legally and regularly (Sharp v. Wakefield[1]). The Commissioner based his view upon several clauses in the trust instrument, namely, 29, 30, 37, 38, 44 and 50. Clause 29 provides that upon the dismissal of a contributor he shall forfeit his right to a refund of all contributions made by him to the fund, and shall cease to have any right to participate in any of the benefits sought to be created by the trust instrument. In our opinion, the consideration of such a provision is within the function of the Commissioner. The dismissal is not conditioned upon misconduct, or any other cause, but forfeiture by the employee of his benefits follows simply upon the fact that he has been discharged from employment by the Company. An honest and competent man might consider that such a provision is unreasonable, and so be led to the conclusion that while it exists the rights of the employees are not fully secured. But we do not suggest such a conclusion. The question is one for the Commissioner to consider in all the circumstances of the case. Clause 30 declares that in case a contributor joins or takes part in a strike, he forfeits his right to a refund of his contributions or any participation in the superannuation fund. Strikes in connection with undertakings for the supply of light and water constitute a grave danger to the public (see Employers and Employés Act 1928, sec. 56), and involve serious losses to the undertakers. It is not an unreasonable stipulation that persons taking part in them should forfeit rights in any superannuation fund established by the undertakers. The Commissioner's objections to this clause cannot be supported. Clause 37 contains a power for the directors of the Company, with the approval in writing of the trustees under the instrument, to make and alter rules, including the rules relating to investment, scales of contributions, and the grant of benefits. Some such provision is necessary, but the objection is that the power is given to the Company, and that the trustees of the fund are the chairman and secretary of the Company. The trustees are, of course, in a fiduciary position under the trust instrument, and must exercise their powers honestly and reasonably in the interest of the contributors. Otherwise, we apprehend, they would be controlled by a Court of competent jurisdiction. The Commissioner's objection cannot be supported. Clauses 38 and 44 together provide that the chairman and secretary of the Company shall be trustees of the fund, and that, in the event of a difference of opinion arising as to a question submitted at a meeting of the trustees, the decision of the trustee who is chairman of the Company shall prevail. We can find nothing sinister or unreasonable in this clause. Trustees there must be, and it is difficult to understand why they should not be the chairman and secretary of the Company; or why the chairman's view should not prevail if there be a difference of opinion. The Commissioner's objection to these clauses cannot be supported. Clause 50 provides for the disposal of the fund on winding up. It is a necessary clause, but the Commissioner objects to the provision that any balance remaining after provision so far as possible of the benefits under the trust instrument to the then beneficiaries and payment to existing contributors of the amounts contributed with compound interest, shall be dealt with in accordance with a scheme to be determined by the trustees with the approval of the directors of the Company. The Commissioner has advanced the fanciful idea that the Company under this clause appropriates such balance to its own use. Again the reply must be that the trustees are in a fiduciary position, and in case of complaint would be under the control and direction of a Court of competent jurisdiction.