Metera v Administrative Appeals Tribunal

FINDINGS 22 In considering whether it is 'in the interests of the administration of justice' to grant an extension of time to file an Application for Judicial Review, the Court is guided by the observations of Stone J in Fisher v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Another (2007) 162 FCR 299. In such decision at [35] her Honour said: The latter requirement [whether an extension of time is in the interests of the administration of justice] would involve consideration not only of the reasons for not meeting the original time limit but also whether the application, were the extension of time to be granted, would have any prospect of success.

23 Although Stone J's observations were made in the context of s 477(2) of the Act, which provides the criteria to be considered by the Federal Magistrates Court in determining whether it should grant an extension of time to file an application, Stone J at [47]-[48] adopted the above considerations in determining whether this Court should grant an extension of time under s 477A(2). The Court also observes that s 477A(2) of the Act is in substantially the same terms as s 477(2). Accordingly, the Court will adopt the above considerations in its determination of whether to grant an extension of time under s 477A(2) of the Act.

Explanation for delay 24 The Court notes the applicant's explanation that he attempted to file an appeal within the prescribed time but utilised the wrong form. The Court records establish that such claim is incorrect. The applicant attempted to file a Notice of Appeal on 12 September 2008, but the document was returned to him by the Court registry with the advice that the time for filing such appeal had expired and that an extension of time was required. It follows that no appeal was sought to be filed within the prescribed time limit. 25 Since the applicant lacks legal representation the Court is prepared to accept that a lack of understanding led to his failure to comply with the time constraints. Accordingly, the Court finds that the issue of delay is satisfactorily explained.

Prospects of success 26 Firstly, the applicant claims that the Tribunal failed to take into account a relevant consideration, namely the recommendations contained in the Ombudsman's report. However, the Tribunal only failed to take into account a relevant consideration if it was bound to take into account such consideration: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Another v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Others (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39 per Mason J. 27 The Court observes that the Ombudsman's report is not a document required to be taken into consideration under Ministerial Direction No. 21, nor under any statutory or other provision. The Court finds that the Tribunal was not required to take the Ombudsman's report into account in making its decision. 28 Secondly, the applicant relies upon the High Court's decision in Teoh in submitting that he held a legitimate expectation that the Minister, having been aware that the applicant had been in Australia for 25 years and had arrived as a child, would take into account the Ombudsman's report. 29 In Teoh the High Court determined that a delegate of the Minister had failed to give consideration to the effect of deportation upon a family, being a matter to be taken into account under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ('the Convention'). The Convention had been ratified by Australia and the Court held that the respondent had a legitimate expectation that such matter would be considered. 30 At 291 Mason CJ and Deane J rejected the submission that a convention ratified by Australia but not incorporated into Australian law could never give rise to a legitimate expectation, stating: … ratification by Australia of an international convention is not to be dismissed as a merely platitudinous or ineffectual act, particularly when the instrument evidences internationally accepted standards to be applied by courts and administrative authorities in dealing with basic human rights affecting the family and children. Rather, ratification of a convention is a positive statement by the executive government of this country to the world and to the Australian people that the executive government and its agencies will act in accordance with the Convention.

31 The Court observes that the recognised sources of legitimate expectations have generally been restricted to material emanating from or adopted by Parliament: see for example Teoh (legitimate expectation arising from the Commonwealth Executive's ratification of an international treaty); Renton v Bradbury & Anor [2001] QSC 167 (legitimate expectation arising from rules or regulations made in the exercise of a statutory power); Century Metals and Mining NL v Yeomans and Another (1989) 40 FCR 564 (legitimate expectation arising from a public promise made by a Minister); Haoucher v Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 169 CLR 648 and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193 per Gummow J (legitimate expectation arising from a policy statement made by a Minister). 32 The Ombudsman's report has no regulatory status, nor is it a document which has been adopted by Parliament. Accordingly it is not a document which has been the subject of any approval by Parliament, unlike the Convention considered in Teoh. Whilst the applicant claims that the Ombudsman's report was tabled in Parliament 'on or around' 9 February 2006 and was 'publicly accepted over two years ago', there is no evidence before the Court that such report was tabled or that, even if such report had been tabled, Parliament has taken any action in regard to it. 33 In light of the above authority the Court finds that the Ombudsman's report could not give rise to a legitimate expectation that the recommendations contained therein would be considered by the Tribunal. 34 The applicant also relies upon the decision of Madgwick J in Hong v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1567 at [20] which states inter alia: Section 499(1) [of the Act] does not empower the giving of directions that would turn a discretion, touching "human fate" (to adopt a phrase used by Toohey J in Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62; (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 407) into no discretion at all. It follows that there must be a genuine weighing of factors tending to opposite conclusions and no artificial limitation of such factors.

35 In answer to such submission, the Court observes that the Tribunal considered all relevant aspects of the applicant's claims, as well as the requirements of Ministerial Direction No. 21. The Court cannot discern any basis for the submission that the Tribunal was constrained so as to fetter its discretion. 36 For these reasons the Court is satisfied that the draft Application for Judicial Review has no prospects of success. The Court observes that the merits of the applicant's application are determinative in the Court's consideration of whether to grant an extension of time: Jeffers v R (1993) 112 ALR 85 at 86.

CONCLUSION 37 The Court is not satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time under s 477A(2) of the Act. Accordingly the Court dismisses the applicant's application with costs. I certify that the preceding thirty-seven (37) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Cowdroy.

Associate: Dated: 4 November 2008 Counsel for the Applicant The Applicant appeared in person.