I entirely concur in the judgment read by my learned brother the Chief Justice. The only question in the case which created any difficulty to my mind was whether the projection of the chairs into the shaft at the 1,100 feet level, at the time when the cage was descending to a level below that, was a defect in the condition of the "way," for which the defendants were liable under sec. 3 sub-sec. 1 of the Employers' Liability Act. To that aspect of the case only I shall advert. It appears that the chairs were part of the proper and necessary equipment of the shaft; that no fault was found with their construction, or with the method by which they were projected into the shaft, or drawn back, as occasion required, or with the mode in use for signalling to the driver of the winding engine that the shaft was clear for the descent of the cage to the different levels. In the ordinary working of the mine the chairs were properly projected under the cage while it was being loaded at the 1,100 feet level. When the cage left that level it was the platman's duty to draw back the chairs, and so clear the shaft for the levels below, or, if he did not do that, to signal the driver of the winding engine that the shaft was not clear below that level. Unfortunately, the platman was guilty of a double negligence. He failed to draw back the chairs when the cage went up from the 1,100 feet level, and he informed the engine-driver that the shaft was clear below that level. On this erroneous information, the cage containing the plaintiff and other workmen was sent down, and on its way to a level below the 1,100 feet level, violently struck the projecting chairs, and so caused the plaintiff's injuries. On these facts the plaintiff contends that the projection of the chairs while the cage was thus descending was a defect in the condition of the shaft or "way," for which the defendants were liable under the section I have mentioned. The defendants, on the other hand, maintain that it was the platman's negligence, for which it is admitted they were not legally responsible, that caused the plaintiffs injury, and that the obstruction of the shaft while the cage was descending caused by that negligence was not a defect in the condition of the shaft or "way," for which they could be made liable under the Employers' Liability Act. I am satisfied that the plaintiffs contention cannot be supported. His counsel, Mr. Villeneuve Smith, relied very strongly upon Tate v. Latham & Son[9]. But that case is clearly distinguishable. The defect there complained of was the absence of a guard under a saw bench in which a machine saw was working. The guard had been supplied by the employer, but an employé working at the saw bench had, before the accident, removed the guard, and negligently omitted to replace it. The saw, thus without guard, was the cause of the accident. The Court held that the machinery was defective in having no guard under the saw bench. Mr. Justice Wright, having stated that it was no answer to say the owner had provided a guard if it was not used, said[10]: - "When it was left out of its proper place its absence was as much a defect as if it had never been provided at all," and later on in his judgment, he distinguishes the case from Willets v. Watt & Co.[11] - Where there was no defect in the condition of the way, but a negligent user of it. On the same ground, Tate v. Latham & Son is distinguishable from this case. Here there was no defect in the condition of the way. It was properly equipped in regard to its machinery, appliances, and system of working. The injury was caused by the negligent use of the machinery, appliances, and system of working. The principle of Willetts v. Watt & Co. applies exactly. That principle may be gathered from Lord Justice Fry's statement of the grounds of his decision[12]: - "The way was properly constructed for a two-fold purpose - the well or catchpit might be used when required, or the place might be used for general purposes, including that of a way. It was properly adapted to subserve both these purposes, and the cause of the accident was not deficient construction, but that it was negligently used for one of the purposes without notice to persons who were using it for the other." So here, the shaft may be regarded as the way provided by the employer by which the men went to their working places in the several levels. The way was without defect; it was properly equipped; the cage and other apparatus for carrying the men were properly appointed and furnished with all necessary appliances for carrying the men safely; the system of working the way was not complained of. But the way, the cage, the signals, and other appliances no matter how perfect in themselves, must be worked with reasonable care, otherwise accidents are very likely to happen. Where the injury complained of has been caused to a workman by the negligent working of a "way," cage, signals, or other appliances in themselves without defect, and the negligence was that of a fellow-servant, not within the class of persons for whose negligence the Act has made the employer liable, the plaintiff cannot succeed. Upon the facts in this case, therefore, the plaintiff must fail in his claim under the Employers' Liability Act. His case upon the other causes of action must equally fail; nor do I see any way in which the legal defects of his position in regard to any of his causes of action could be remedied in another trial. The Supreme Court of Western Australia were, therefore, right in directing the verdict to be entered for the defendants. I agree that the appeal must be dismissed.