Metal Manufactures Pty Ltd trading as TLE Electrical v WesTrac Pty Ltd

Supreme Court of NSW|2024-02-14|Before: Stevenson J

Solicitors: Kinneally Miley Law (Plaintiff) HWL Ebsworth (Defendant) File Number(s): 2023/87088

JUDGMENT

The questions in this case [1] are: 1. If A sells goods to B subject to a retention of title clause registered as a security interest under the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) (the "PPSA"); then B sells the goods to C; C sells the goods to D; and D pays C for the goods without notice of the prior transactions or the security interest, can A assert its security interest in the goods against D? 2. Alternatively, can A assert a title in the goods against D?

Decision

The answer to the first question is "no".
The answer to the second question does not arise in view of the answer to the first question, but the answer is also "no".
The Summons should be dismissed with costs.

The course of events

Metal Manufactures is the importer and supplier of solar panels.
WesTrac provides equipment for use in the construction, mining and agricultural industries. It leases premises at Tomago.
By contract dated 8 July 2022, Verdia Pty Ltd (now in liquidation) agreed with WesTrac to design, supply and install a "Solar Photovoltaic System" at WesTrac's Tomago premises. Evidently, this system was to be installed on a commercial building on the site. I will call this contract the "Verdia-WesTrac Contract".
In order to carry out those obligations, on 9 August 2022, Verdia entered into a contract with Symmetry Electrical Services Pty Ltd ("SES") to perform part of those works, namely the design, supply and installation of all or part of that Solar Photovoltaic System. I will call this contract the "Verdia-SES Contract".
In turn, albeit a short time earlier, on 20 July 2022, SES entered a contract with Metal Manufactures to supply 3,030 solar panels (the "Panels") for $753,424.65. The Panels were to be a component of the Solar Photovoltaic System. That sale was under an existing credit agreement and was subject to Metal Manufactures' "Standard Terms of Sale". Those terms included a retention of title clause to the effect that title in the Panels did not pass to SES until payment. I will call this the "Metal Manufactures-SES Contract".
Two years earlier, on 16 July 2020, Metal Manufactures registered a "Purchase Money Security Interest" granted to it by SES on the Personal Property Securities Register (the "Register") maintained under the PPSA. Metal Manufactures thereby perfected by registration the security interest over the Panels granted to it by SES under the credit facility.
In its Purchase Order on 20 July 2022, SES instructed Metal Manufactures to deliver the Panels to the Tomago address. Metal Manufactures did so on or around 25 October 2022.
Metal Manufactures then invoiced SES for the Panels. The last of those invoices was due for payment on 16 February 2023. SES has not paid the invoices.
In the meantime, on 11 November 2022, Verdia went into voluntary administration and, on 15 December 2022, into liquidation. Verdia did not make any payment to SES under the Verdia-SES Contract.
By then WesTrac had paid Verdia for the Panels by way of milestone payments under the Verdia-WesTrac Contract. The final milestone payment of $700,202.91 was made on 10 November 2022 in respect of an invoice that was expressed to be for "panels delivered to site".
WesTrac first became aware of Metal Manufactures' role in relation to the supply of the Panels on 11 November 2022, after Verdia went into voluntary administration.

Metal Manufactures' claim

Metal Manufactures seeks: 1. a declaration that such interest as WesTrac has in the Panels is subject to Metal Manufactures' "first ranking security interest"; 2. an order pursuant to s 123 of the PPSA, or otherwise, that WesTrac deliver up the Panels to Metal Manufactures; 3. alternatively, a declaration that WesTrac has "wrongly converted or detained" the Panels; and 4. damages for conversion of the Panels.

The Verdia-WesTrac Contract

The recitals to the Verdia-WesTrac Contract stated that WesTrac intended to "procure the supply and installation of certain equipment" and that Verdia "has agreed to perform the 'Work under the Contract'"; defined to mean all work, services and activities including the "Work Scope". "Work Scope" was defined as the "design, supply and install[ation] [of] a … Solar Photovoltaic ('PV') System".
The Solar Photovoltaic System included, as a component, the Panels.
Under the contract, Verdia warranted to WesTrac that WesTrac would receive "good and clear title" to all "Goods" supplied under the contract, [2] and that "risk and title" in all "Goods", including the Panels, passed to WesTrac upon "Delivery". [3] The term "Delivery" was defined broadly and included, relevantly to the Panels, when they were delivered to WesTrac. [4]
There was no retention of title clause in this contract.
I do not accept the submission made by Mr Mirzai, who appeared for Metal Manufactures, that the correct characterisation of the Verdia-WesTrac Contract was a contract for services. Verdia was certainly contracting to provide some services, but it was also contracted to sell to WesTrac the "Goods", which included the Panels.

The Verdia-SES Contract

The Verdia-SES Contract was, in effect, a subcontract to the Verdia-WesTrac Contract.
The Verdia-SES Contract recited that Verdia had entered into the Verdia-WesTrac Contract and that: "Verdia has decided to engage [SES] under this agreement to perform part of the works under the [Verdia-WesTrac Contract], including the design, supply and install[ation] of solar PV equipment …".
By the operative clause in the contract, [5] SES agreed to "deliver the Works", being the supply and installation and commissioning of the Equipment being, amongst other things, the "Solar PV Equipment", a component of which was the Panels.
There were a number of references in the Verdia-SES Contract to SES "providing" the equipment.
The Verdia-SES Contract also contained an express warranty by SES that the Equipment, including the Panels, would be "free from any encumbrance or defect in title". [6]
The contract also provided, [7] under the heading "Title and risk in Equipment": "(a) [SES] acknowledges and agrees that risk in the Equipment passes to [WesTrac] on the Date of Practical Completion. (b) Title in the Equipment passes to [WesTrac] on Verdia paying in full the invoice or invoices relevant for that Equipment."
This is a peculiar provision. WesTrac was not a party to this contract.
I would read this clause as having the effect that title would pass to Verdia, and through Verdia to WesTrac, on the happening of the events set out in the clause.
In any event, I think it plain that, contrary to Mr Mirzai's submissions, this Contract is not merely a contract for the supply of services but, like the Verdia-WesTrac Contract, should also be seen as a contract for the supply of goods, relevantly the Panels.

WesTrac's s 32 argument

Section 32 of the PPSA provides: "(1) Subject to this Act, if collateral gives rise to proceeds (by being dealt with or otherwise), the security interest: (a) continues in the collateral, unless: (i) the secured party expressly or impliedly authorised a disposal giving rise to the proceeds; …".
The "collateral" here is the Panels.
It is common ground that, for the purposes of s 32(1)(a)(i), Metal Manufactures expressly or impliedly authorised SES to dispose of the Panels.
The question is whether the Panels have "give[n] rise to proceeds". If they have, Metal Manufactures' security interest continues only in relation to those "proceeds"; a matter that Metal Manufactures will need to take up with Verdia's liquidator. Metal Manufactures would in those circumstances no longer have a security interest in the collateral, the Panels.
"Proceeds of collateral" is defined in s 31 of the PPSA to include "identifiable or traceable personal property … that is derived directly or indirectly from a dealing with the collateral (or proceeds of the collateral)".
WesTrac paid Verdia for the Panels. Verdia did not pay SES for the Panels.
It is common ground that had Verdia paid SES for the Panels, that payment would have constituted "proceeds".
The question is whether, absent a payment from Verdia to SES for the Panels, the payment from WesTrac to Verdia itself represents "proceeds" of the Panels such that the exception in s 32 is engaged.
In my opinion, the payment made by WesTrac to Verdia, being the $700,202.91 to which I have referred at [16] above, does represent "identifiable or traceable personal property" that is "derived directly or indirectly" from a dealing with the Panels.
That is because the $700,202.91: 1. is "identifiable" (and indeed "traceable") personal property; and 2. was derived, directly or indirectly, from a dealing with the collateral, the Panels; namely Verdia's purported sale of the Panels pursuant to the Verdia-WesTrac Contract, and the physical delivery of the Panels to WesTrac's Tomago premises by Metal Manufactures pursuant to SES's Purchase Order to which I referred at [13] above.
I do not think it matters whether or not there was, in fact, a "sale" between Verdia and WesTrac.
The result is that Metal Manufactures no longer has a security interest in the Panels.
That conclusion is sufficient to dispose of the proceedings. Nonetheless, in deference to the parties' careful arguments, I will consider the other issues debated.

WesTrac's s 46 argument

Section 46(1) of the PPSA provides, relevantly: "A buyer … of personal property takes the personal property free of a security interest given by the seller … if the personal property was sold … in the ordinary course of the seller's … business of selling … personal property of that kind."
Section 46(2) contains an exception, not relevant here, in the case of a buyer with "actual knowledge" of certain matters. It is common ground that WesTrac had no such knowledge.
WesTrac contends that the Panels were "sold" by SES to Verdia, that s 46 was thereby engaged and that, accordingly, SES, for that reason alone, [8] took the Panels free of Metal Manufactures' security interest. It followed, it was submitted, that Verdia also took the Panels free of that interest.
It is common ground that SES entered the Verdia-SES Contract "in the ordinary course" of its business.
What divides the parties here is whether the Panels were, for the purposes of s 46 of the PPSA, "sold" by SES to Verdia pursuant to the Verdia-SES Contract.
As I have set out earlier, that contract was, on its face, a contract for the "sale" of the Panels. However, because of the retention of title clause in the Metal Manufactures-SES Contract, and because SES has not paid Metal Manufactures for the Panels, SES did not have title in the Panels to transfer to Verdia. Verdia was for the same reason not able to transfer title to WesTrac. [9]
The question is whether, for the purposes of s 46, the Panels where thereby "sold" by SES to Verdia.
The PPSA does not define "sold", "sale", or "buyer".
In one sense the Panels were "sold": there was an agreement to sell. They were "sold" in that sense.
In another sense they were not: transfer of title was expressed to occur "at a future time" and "subject to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled". These are circumstances that, were the matter to be considered under the SGA or its analogues in other States, would not amount to a "sale of goods" but, rather, merely an "agreement to sell". [10] Thus, in that sense, the Panels were not "sold"; SES merely agreed to sell them.
In the only Australian decision on the point to which my attention has been directed, Warehouse Sales Pty Ltd (in liq) v LG Electronics Pty Ltd, [11] Sifris J, considering a lay-buy "sale", [12] held that when construing the PPSA, it was appropriate to have regard to the Victorian sale of goods legislation: the Goods Act 1958 (Vic). It followed, his Honour held, that the relevant goods had not been "sold" for the purposes of s 46.
Thus, his Honour said: [13] "As referred to earlier, the PPSA is not a code. Accordingly, in my opinion, and for reasons referred to below, there is no reason why sale of goods legislation should not be considered in determining whether a person is a 'buyer' of personal property that has been 'sold' under PPSA s 46. The PPSA discloses no intention to displace the existing law relating to the sale of property (as opposed to the operation of security interests over property). When the PPSA refers to existing concepts such as the sale of property, and those concepts are not necessarily affected by the PPSA's reconfiguration of personal property securities law, there is no reason to suppose that the Parliament intended anything other than a reference to the accepted meaning of familiar concepts. Accordingly, it will be necessary to refer to various applicable sections of the Goods Act 1958 (Vic) ...".
His Honour considered Canadian authority to which I will return but, referring to a work of which Mr Mirzai is one of authors, [14] said: [15] "[The authors] have suggested the most compelling reason why sale of goods legislation should be considered in determining whether a person is a 'buyer' of personal property that has been 'sold' under PPSA s 46: namely, that the PPSA discloses no intention to displace the existing law relating to the sale of property (as opposed to the operation of security interests over property). When the PPSA refers to existing concepts such as the sale of property, and those concepts are not necessarily affected by the PPSA's reconfiguration of personal property securities law, there is no reason to suppose that Parliament intended anything other than a reference to the accepted meaning of familiar concepts. That logic is consistent with orthodox principles of statutory construction. When used in legislation, words that have a well-known legal meaning are presumed to carry that meaning unless a contrary intention clearly appears. 'Sale', 'seller' and 'buyer' have longstanding meanings under the Goods Act and the substantially-uniform cognate legislation throughout Australia. No contrary intention being found in the PPSA, the question of whether a person is a 'buyer' of property that has been 'sold' should be determined by reference to the relevant sale of goods legislation."
As Ms Beechey, who appeared with Ms Lam for WesTrac, pointed out, there is an appellate Canadian authority to the contrary, particularly the decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Calidon Financial Services Inc - Calidon Equipment Leasing v Magnes. [16] In that case the court, considering the Saskatchewan equivalent to s 46, said that the "plain reading" of the section was that "there must be a buyer" and "the goods sold must be goods sold in the ordinary course of the seller's business". [17] The court expressly departed from an earlier decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, Royal Bank v 216200 Alberta Ltd, [18] that Sifris J had found persuasive. [19]
I am thus faced with conflicting authority on the point.
Where trial judges of State Supreme Courts are dealing with national legislation, it is desirable that they construe that national legislation uniformly.
It is also well established that a trial judge should not depart from a construction of such legislation adopted by a trial judge in a sister jurisdiction unless satisfied that it is "plainly wrong". [20]
I am not persuaded that Sifris J was "plainly wrong". Indeed, his Honour's reasoning is careful and persuasive.
It is true, as Ms Beechey emphasised, and as Sifris J observed, [21] that the Victorian Goods Act contains no provision equivalent to s 26(2) of the New South Wales legislation, which states that "nothing in this Act shall effect" the PPSA. [22] However, I do not read that subsection as having the effect that the provisions of the SGA are not available to aid in the construction of the PPSA.
My conclusion is that I should follow Sifris J's decision in Warehouse Sales Pty Ltd (in liq) v LG Electronics Pty Ltd and conclude that "sold" referred to in s 46(1) of the PPSA means "sold" in the sense described in the SGA.
The Panels were not "sold" in that sense. Section 46 is not engaged.

WesTrac's s 20 argument

WesTrac came into possession of the Panels on or around 25 October 2022. [23]
Ms Beechey submitted that transfer of possession of the Panels to WesTrac constituted it a "grantor" of the security interest in the Panels and that, as WesTrac did not sign, adopt or accept a security agreement with Metal Manufactures, [24] the security agreement is not enforceable against it by Metal Manufactures.
This appears to be an alarming proposition. If correct, it would mean that the mere fact that an original secured party parted with possession of the goods would, without more, defeat its security interests.
Ms Beechey's argument proceeded as follows.
First, she pointed to s 19(1) which provides: "(1) A security interest is enforceable against a grantor in respect of particular collateral only if the security interest has attached to the collateral."
Section 19(2) sets out the "Attachment rule" and provides: "(2) A security interest attaches to collateral when: (a) the grantor has rights in the collateral, or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to the secured party; and (b) either: (i) value is given for the security interest; or (ii) the grantor does an act by which the security interest arises."
Subsection 19(2)(b) appears to be satisfied here as, assuming that WesTrac did have a security interest, it gave value for it.
The question is whether s 19(2)(a) is engaged, namely whether WesTrac, as the putative "grantor", had "rights in the collateral".
For that purpose, Ms Beechey referred to s 19(5) which provides, relevantly to Ms Beechey's argument: "For the purposes of paragraph (2)(a), a grantor has rights in goods that are … sold to the grantor under a conditional sale agreement (including an agreement to sell subject to retention of title) when the grantor obtains possession of the goods."
"Grantor" is defined in s 10 to mean, relevantly: "(a) a person who has the interest in the personal property to which a security interest is attached …; or … (e) a transferee of … the interest of a person mentioned in [paragraph (a)] …".
Ms Beechey submitted: "It follows that it is sufficient to be a grantor under paragraph (a) of the s 10 definition of grantor if the grantor's 'interest in the personal property' is the interest of a possessor of goods under a conditional sale agreement (including an agreement to sell subject to retention of title). It is that interest that, if transferred, causes the transferee to become a grantor under paragraph (e). In the present case, SES had rights/an interest in the Panels being its possession of the Panels obtained under a conditional sale agreement, being an agreement to sell subject to retention of title. On possession of the goods being transferred to WesTrac, WesTrac became the 'transferee of … the interest of a person mentioned in' paragraph (a), and therefore became a grantor under paragraph (e)."
The difficulty with this argument is that although SES had rights in the collateral, the Panels, when it took possession of them and then transferred possession of the Panels to WesTrac, the rights of SES were not the same as any rights or interests that WesTrac has obtained. The interests of SES in the Panels took the form of a security interest whereby title was retained (in the same way that Metal Manufactures' title was retained under its agreement with SES); whereas the interest on which WesTrac relies in the Panels is merely possessory.
Section 20 sets out the "General rule" as to when a security interest is enforceable against a third party.
Relevantly to Ms Beechey's argument, s 20(1) provides: "(1) A security interest is enforceable against a third party in respect of particular collateral only if: (a) the security interest is attached to the collateral; and (b) one of the following applies: … (iii) a security agreement that provides for the security interest covers the collateral in accordance with subsection (2)."
Section 20(2) provides that, for the purpose of s 20(1)(b)(iii), a security agreement "covers collateral" if, relevantly, it is "signed by the grantor".
Ms Beechey's point was that, as WesTrac had not signed any agreement with Metal Manufactures, Metal Manufactures' security interest was not enforceable against it.
But this assumes the correctness of Ms Beechey's submission that WesTrac has become a "grantor".
Further, as Mr Mirzai submitted, s 34 of the PPSA appears to be inconsistent with Ms Beechey's argument.
Section 34 provides, relevantly: "Transferred collateral - temporary perfection after transfer Security interest is temporarily perfected (1) If collateral is transferred, and at the time of the transfer a secured party held a perfected security interest in the collateral, the security interest is temporarily perfected for the period starting at the time of the transfer and ending at the earliest of the following times: … (c) if another security interest attaches to the collateral at or after the time of the transfer, and the other security interest is perfected: (i) in a case in which the original secured party consented to the transfer - the end of 5 business days after the day of the transfer".
The effect of this section is that Metal Manufactures had five business days after the "transfer" of possession of the collateral, the Panels, to WesTrac to perfect its security interest in the Panels as against WesTrac. It did not do so, although that is of no moment as there is no priority dispute between Metal Manufactures and WesTrac.
What it does show, as Mr Mirzai pointed out, is that the "security agreement remains the agreement between [Metal Manufactures] and SES - all that has changed is that there is a 'new grantor' defined to be the transferee".
Thus, as Mr Mirzai submitted: "In circumstances where the security agreement remains that between the original secured party and the transferor (or original grantor), subsection 20(2) of the PPSA remains satisfied notwithstanding the effect and consequence of section 34 - which, in the present case, the Plaintiff agrees with the Defendant that this provision is of no moment."
Thus, the fact that WesTrac did not adopt or accept a security agreement with Metal Manufactures does not, itself, affect Metal Manufactures' rights.

Section 28(2) of the SGA

As I have concluded that Metal Manufactures security interest is now confined to the "proceeds" to which the Panels have "give[n] rise to" [25] the question of whether Metal Manufactures or WesTrac has title to the Panels is of no moment.
Nonetheless, Ms Beechey submitted that, to the extent that it was relevant, WesTrac did obtain title to the Panels by reason of its purchase of the Panels from Verdia in good faith and without notice of Metal Manufactures' interest.
Ms Beechey relied on s 28(2) of the SGA, that provides, relevantly: "Where a person having bought or agreed to buy goods obtains with the consent of the seller possession of the goods …, the delivery or transfer by that person ... of the goods … under any sale … thereof to any person receiving the same in good faith and without notice of any … right of the original seller in respect of the goods shall have the same effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer were a mercantile agent intrusted by the owner with the goods or documents of title."
Section 28(2) is be read with s 5(1) of the Factors (Mercantile Agents) Act 1923 (NSW) that provides that a sale, pledge or other disposition of goods in the ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent, or by a mercantile agent entrusted with the possession of goods is, subject to that Act, as valid as if the agent were expressly authorised by the owner to make the sale, pledge or other disposition. [26]
In Gamer's Motor Centre (Newcastle) Pty Ltd v Natwest Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd, [27] Mason CJ stated that "[t]he mischief aimed at [in s 28(2)] is a sale by a buyer in possession of goods or documents of title who is not the owner of them, the object being to protect the sub-buyer who is deceived by the appearance of ownership arising from possession." [28] Thus, the object of s 28(2) is to protect innocent sub-buyers dealing with a "buyer in possession" by giving validity to a delivery which would, but for the absence of title in the person making it, be an effective delivery. [29]
The only candidate to be a "buyer in possession" here is SES. There is no suggestion in the evidence that Verdia was ever in possession of the Panels.
In that regard, Mr Mirzai accepted that SES "took possession" of the Panels "and then transferred possession to WesTrac". [30]
As I have not accepted Mr Mirzai's submission that the SES-Verdia Contract was merely a contract for the supply of services, and have held it was also a contract for the sale of the Panels, [31] it follows that SES was a buyer in possession for the Panels within the meaning of s 28(2) of the SGA for the purposes of its sale of the Panels to Verdia. [32]
As there is no suggestion that Verdia acted otherwise than in good faith and without notice of Metal Manufactures' security interest in the Panels, the sale by SES to Verdia had "the same effect as if [SES] were a mercantile agent intrusted by [Metal Manufactures] with the [Panels]" and thus effective to transfer title to Verdia.
By reason of the Verdia-WesTrac Contract, which I have held was also a contract for the sale of the Panels, and not merely a contract for the supply of services, Verdia was able to transfer title in the Panels to WesTrac. [33]
Although Mr Mirzai did not develop any submissions in support of Metal Manufactures' claim for a declaration that WesTrac has "wrongly converted or detained" the Panels, [34] any such claim for this reason must fail.

Endnotes

As posed in the submissions of Ms Beechey, for the defendant.
Clause 4.1(a)(vi).
Clause 25(e).
Clause 1.1.
Clause 2.1(a).
Clause 11.1(b)(viii).
In cl 12.1.
That is, leaving aside the effect of s 28(2) of the SGA, as to which see [90] to [100] below.
Again, leaving to one side the effect of s 28(2) of the SGA.
SGA, s 6(1)-(3).
(2014) 291 FLR 407; [2014] VSC 644.
Pursuant to which property in the goods did not pass until payment; a circumstance I find indistinguishable from the circumstance here.
At [47].
J Harris and N Mirzai, The Annotated Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) (2nd ed, Wolters Kluwer CCH, 2014) at [43.5.1]. The corresponding paragraph in the current edition (4th ed) is also [43.5.1].
At [72]-[73].
[2021] SKCA 106; [2021] 11 WWR 507; [2001] 461 DLR (4th) 278.
At [40].
(1986) 51 Sask R 146 (CA); [1987] 1 WWR 545; [1986] 33 DLR (4th) 80.
See [60] in Calidon Financial Services Inc - Calidon Equipment Leasing v Magnes (Ryan-Froslie JA, Caldwell and Barrington-Foote JJA agreeing); see [65] and [72] in Warehouse Sales Pty Ltd (in liq) v LG Electronics Pty Ltd (Sifris J). The passage I have set out at [57] above reflects that approach.
Re Brashs Pty Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 477 at 482 (Hayne J); Re York Street Mezzanine Pty Ltd (in liq) (2007) 162 FCR 358; [2007] FCA 922 at [22] (Finkelstein J); Duckworth v Water Corporation [2012] WASC 30 at [31] (Edelman J).
At [36].
Indeed, there appears to be no such equivalent provision in the sale of goods legislation in any other state or territory.
See [16] above.
For the purposes of s 20(1)(b)(iii) and 20(2) of the PPSA: see [80] to [81] below.
See [33] to [44] above.
Gamer's Motor Centre (Newcastle) Pty Ltd v Natwest Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 236 at 242; [1987] HCA 30 (Mason CJ).
Ibid.
Ibid 249.
Ibid at 248.
Reply submissions at [5].
See [24] to [32] above.
It is unnecessary, in view of Mr Mirzai's concession, to consider whether mere constructive possession by SES would have been sufficient to enliven s 28(2): see McHugh JA in the NSW Court of Appeal in Gamer's Motor Centre (Newcastle) Pty Ltd v Natwest Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 475 at 488 and Simon Brown J in Four Point Garage v Carter [1985] 3 All ER 12 at 15, both suggesting constructive possession is sufficient; but cf Mason CJ and Brennan J in Gamer's Motor Centre (Newcastle) Pty Ltd v Natwest Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd at 248 and 255 respectively.
See [19] to [23] above.
See [18(c)] above. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 23 February 2024

Personal Property and Securities Act 2009(Cth)

J Harris and N Mirzai, The Annotated Personal Property Securities Act 2009(Cth)

ed, Wolters Kluwer CCH, 2014) J Harris and N Mirzai, The Annotated Personal Property Securities Act 2009(Cth)

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