On 26 July 2017 the Court granted an injunction restraining Georgette Hana from dealing with a property of which she is registered proprietor in Strathfield South ("the Strathfield South property"). Yesterday, 4 September 2017, Ms Hana, who now appears without legal representation, applied to vary that injunction, to use her own words, "for the sale to go through". In this judgment the Court declines her application.
Ms Hana's application comes after an 11-day hearing that took place between 15 and 26 May and then on 16 June 2017, after which the Court reserved judgment. The Court heard three probate proceedings together. In the first proceedings, Ms Hana sought probate of a will of the late Nadia Mekhail ("the deceased"). It is alleged the deceased made this will in December 2014, before her death on 2 April 2015. Ms Hana was unrelated by blood to the deceased but presented a case to the Court that the deceased had always treated her as if she were the deceased's daughter. She is identified in the December 2014 will as the deceased's daughter.
In two other separate sets of related probate proceedings, two of the deceased's nephews, Mr Magdy Mekhail and Mr Youssef Mekail contest Nadia Mekhail's testamentary capacity at the time she made the December 2014 will. Mr Magdy Mekhail and Mr Youssef Mekail will be collectively referred to as "the nephews" in these reasons. The nephews point to various circumstances that they contend attach suspicion to the December 2014 will.
If the deceased is found to have lacked testamentary capacity in December 2014, the nephews propound a will that the deceased made in 2001 in which she gave her estate to her husband, Raghib (who ultimately predeceased her), and then to five nephews, who were related by blood to Raghib. Two of these nephews, Mr Magdy Mekhail and Mr Youssef Mekail, live in Australia and have already been identified. But another three who live in Egypt would also benefit under the 2001 will.
The Strathfield South property was the deceased's principal asset. She held it as sole registered proprietor after her husband's death in 2012. But in March 2015, only a few weeks before she died, the deceased transferred the Strathfield South property to Ms Hana for nominal consideration. Ms Hana's case in the principal proceedings was that the deceased expressly desired to make this gift to her in anticipation of the operation of the provisions of the December 2014 will upon the deceased's death. The nephews challenged the gift as improvident and as having been effected by an improper use of the deceased's power of attorney. They claim in the proceedings that the Strathfield South property is now held on constructive trust for the estate and the transfer to Ms Hana should be set aside.
The Court has reserved judgment on these issues. But in the Equity Duty List on 26 July 2017, the nephews re-listed the proceedings and applied for an injunction to restrain Ms Hana from selling the Strathfield South property before the Court delivered judgment. Shortly before 26 July, it had come to the nephews' attention that Ms Hana was attempting to deal with the Strathfield South property and had allegedly gone as far as attempting to exchange contracts for its sale.
During the trial and when the matter came into the Duty List, Ms Hana was represented by Mr D. Allen of counsel. Mr J. Thomson of counsel, who had appeared for Mr Magdy Mekhail at the trial, also represented him in the Duty List application. Mr Youssef Mekail, who is a resident of Melbourne, represented himself at the trial and was not present on that application.
Mr Allen of Counsel consented to a grant of interlocutory relief on behalf of his client on 26 July. The form of the restraining orders concerning the Strathfield South property were, made upon the plaintiff, Magdy Mekhail by his counsel giving the usual undertaking as to damages, and were as follows:
1. Upon the plaintiff, Magdy Mekhail, by his counsel giving to the court the usual undertaking as to damages the defendant is prohibited from selling, encumbering or otherwise dealing with the property identified by folio identifier [not published] commonly referred to as [the Strathfield South property] until further order of the court.
2. Defendant to pay plaintiff's costs of Notice of Motion dated 25 July 2017.
3. Liberty to apply.
4. These orders may be entered forthwith.
Notice of the Court's order was given to the Land and Property Information New South Wales ("LPI NSW"). The nephews took the view that they may not be able to maintain a caveatable interest in the property as their claim was in relation to an interest in an unadministered estate.
In correspondence with my chambers on 24 August 2017, Ms Hana sought to re-list the proceedings, so she could bring her present application. Although the application was not supported by a formal Notice of Motion, the Court permitted her to move orally for relief. As a litigant in person, she seemed unfamiliar with the need to move by written motion and it was important for the matter to be dealt with yesterday, whilst all parties were present so as to avoid any further delay. Mr Thomson appeared again for Mr Magdy Mekhail, and Mr Youssef Mekail was granted leave to appear by telephone from Melbourne, although he was inadvertently absent towards the end of the hearing.
As the application for an injunction was dealt with by consent on 26 July, it was not necessary for evidence to be presented to the Court about the circumstances of Ms Hana's attempted sale of the Strathfield South property in July 2017. But as the present application was contested, that evidence was fully read on both sides. The present application comprised evidence that supported the nephews' original application for an injunction together with more recent evidence from Ms Hana and Mr Youssef Mekail.
The original application was brought by Magdy Mekhail and was supported by two affidavits of Australy Milo, a solicitor employed by PK Simpson & Co. On the present application, Ms Hana filed and read her affidavit of 1 September 2017 and Mr Youssef Mekail read his affidavit of 1 September 2017. The evidence of 1 September was not made available to the Court until the morning of 4 September and other evidence was tendered on the application. As the Court had another matter listed for final hearing commencing at 10am on 4 September, it was necessary for this material to be considered overnight, so judgment could be delivered this morning. The effect of the evidence on this application may be briefly stated.
[2]
The Strathfield South Property - May, 2015 to September, 2017
In early May 2015 Messrs Simpson Freed Lawyers, on instructions from Mr Magdy Mekhail, caused a caveat to be lodged over the Strathfield South property, claiming an interest in the property; the same interest which Magdy Mekhail later asserted in these proceedings.
By mid-May 2015 Simpson Freed Lawyers had ceased to act for Mr Magdy Mekhail. PK Simpson & Co commenced acting for him.
On 24 July 2017 Australy Milo of PK Simpson & Co became aware that the May 2015 caveat had lapsed after the service of a notice under Real Property Act 1900, s 74J and that attempts were being made to transfer title to the Strathfield South property from Ms Hana to a third party as part of the settlement of a contract for sale.
PK Simpson & Co contacted Mitry Lawyers, who had instructed Mr Allen of counsel on behalf of Ms Hana during the hearing, to ascertain better information about these events. But Mitry Lawyers were then unaware that Ms Hana was selling the Strathfield South property.
PK Simpson & Co found out from LPI NSW that a solicitor, Mr Michael Abboud, had attended the LPI NSW office and sought removal of an existing LPI NSW notation on the property, so as to effect a settlement. It is claimed that Mr Abboud was unaware of the present legal proceedings. The same afternoon Mitry Lawyers confirmed to PK Simpson & Co their instructions, apparently obtained from Mr Bishoy Hana, Ms Georgette Hana's son, that no sale of the Strathfield South property was taking place. Shortly afterwards an officer of the LPI NSW spoke to PK Simpson & Co and reported that Ms Hana and Mr Bishoy Hana had attended at LPI NSW and had asked for any existing LPI NSW notations on the title of the Strathfield South property to be removed, so as allow a sale to be completed.
Mr Magdy Mekhail did not receive any notification of the lapse of his May 2015 caveat. PK Simpson & Co were puzzled as to how it had lapsed without notice to them. So they made contact with the office of the solicitor and conveyancer, Mr Michael Abboud, and warned him that Mr Magdy Mekhail would be seeking orders, as it was put, to "reinstate" the caveat over the Strathfield South property.
Further contact between PK Simpson & Co and the offices of Mr Michael Abboud revealed that a lapsing notice in respect of the caveat had been served at the office of Simpson Freed Lawyers, Caringbah, and not on PK Simpson & Co. Michael Abboud's office indicated that a lapsing notice was served on Simpson Freed Lawyers rather than PK Simpson & Co because that was what was required by LPI NSW as the caveator's address for service had not been altered to the caveator's new solicitors, PK Simpson & Co. Service was accepted by Simpson Freed Lawyers. But the lapsing notice was for some reason not passed on to PK Simpson & Co.
But from the course of these proceedings, it should probably have been evident to anyone in Ms Hana's position that PK Simpson & Co and not Simpson Freed Lawyers had been acting for some two years for Mr Magdy Mekhail. Perhaps it might have been expected that Simpson Freed Lawyers would pass the notice on to their former client. A more obvious course would perhaps have been to additionally serve the lapsing notice on PK Simpson & Co.
PK Simpson & Co have made clear that when Australy Milo took over the carriage of the file in about July 2016, the need to lodge with LPI NSW a notice of change of address for service pursuant to Real Property Act 1900, s 74N(3) in respect of the Simpson Freed Lawyers' caveat of earlier May 2015 had not been effected and it was not appreciated that it needed to be effected thereafter. But there was no cross-examination on this interlocutory application. The Court does not have to decide the merits of this issue, other than to find that neither Mr Magdy Mekhail nor his solicitors were served with Real Property Act, s 74J notice of the lapsing of the caveat; and, the failure of Ms Hana to give such notice raises a question as to whether Ms Hana may have been satisfied to allow the 24 July sale transaction to proceed without notice to the nephews.
Further communications between PK Simpson & Co and LPI NSW reveal that Mr Bishoy Hana attempted to file a caveat over the Strathfield South property on 24 July 2017 and he then sought to lodge a withdrawal of that caveat on 25 July 2017. The caveat in question claims in Schedule 1 in its particulars of the estate or interest claimed, an "equitable interest". This is claimed to arise by virtue of the following facts: "caveator provided funds for purchase, registered proprietor approves". The document is apparently signed by Ms Hana as the registered proprietor. The text of Bishoy Hana's caveat is some basis to infer a financial connection between Ms Hana and Bishoy Hana on the one hand and the present purchaser of the Strathfield South property on the other. But when the Court directly asked Ms Hana on 4 September whether she knew the purchaser, she indicated that she did not.
Ms Hana's evidence fills in the picture from her side. She gives an account that "the [Strathfield South] property was not in the probate". By this she is apparently inferring that she felt she was free to transfer the property. She says that Mitry Lawyers declined to act for her upon the sale of the property due to what they said was "a conflict of interest", so she was in communication with Ms Yolla Abboud of Abboud & Co Conveyancing. Ms Hana says "I, Georgette Hana, tolled (sic) Yolla Abboud to make a contract of sale and told her about the whole situation about the property". Ms Hana recounts advice she received from Yolla Abboud about the history of the property and that Ms Abboud said to her "you should have lapsed the caveat long time ago". Ms Hana also recounts that Yolla Abboud advised her that "the property is not in the probate and that the caveat should not have been on the title". Ms Hana's affidavit makes clear that with Ms Hana's knowledge, Ms Abboud prepared and filed lapsing notices for the May 2015 caveat over the Strathfield South property. She says she "commenced with the contract of sale to Paul Mitri, Carla Azzo and they paid 10 per cent deposed (sic) of $1,100,000 dollars".
Ms Hana further deposes to the fact that the contract of sale "was settled and signed on the 24 July 2017" and that "the transfer was handed into the LPI NSW on 25 July 2017 to be registered". She says that RM Legal Sydney Pty Ltd, through Mr Raymond Mawad, solicitor, will be acting for her with the conveyance for the property and that any funds she receives as vendor on the purchase will go through a trust account of RM Legal, her solicitors on the conveyance.
Mr Youssef Mekail's evidence indicates that, in his opinion, the Strathfield South property is worth between $1,725,000 and $2,199,000. A comparative market analysis of the property (Exhibit 1), by a real estate agent appraises the property in the range $1,697,000 to $1,905,000. On its face at least this appraisal seems to be based on an extensive range of comparable properties. Other evidence indicates that a real estate agent appears to have been engaged to sell the Strathfield South property. The agent, Luis International, estimated that the sale price of the property is $1,350,000 and that if the property were sold at that price, upon the agreed commission of 1.91 per cent of the sale price that agent would be entitled to a commission of $14,850.
The contract for sale of the Strathfield South property was not available at the hearing. It was sent through afterwards and tendered into evidence. It shows the purchasers as Paul Mitri & Carla Azzi and that the purchasers' solicitor is Abboud & Co. The sale price is $1,100,000, with a deposit of $110,000 and a balance to pay of $990,000.
The contract specifies a date for completion 28 days after the date of the contract, which is dated 24 July 2017. The form of the contract which has been provided to the Court (Exhibit 2) has a number of features worthy of comment. It contains a warranty by the purchaser that the purchaser was not introduced to the property by any agent. Also, no page of the contract is signed apart from the first page; so it is difficult to know with certainty what pages were annexed to the contract at the time that it was exchanged.
Finally, Abboud & Co, the solicitors for the purchaser have now served a notice to complete dated 29 August 2017 upon the vendor Ms Hana, appointing 3pm on 12 September 2017 as the date for completion and making time of the essence. Curiously the notice to complete is addressed to the vendor's solicitor, who is nominated in the notice as "Bishoy Hana" not RM Legal. Bishoy Hana is not a solicitor.
The warranty that the sale was effected without the intervention of an agent is complemented by a feature of the agency agreement that indicates that no external signage was required at the Strathfield South property to advertise the property for sale.
Finally in this narrative, Abboud & Co wrote an email to the parties yesterday. That email set out the position of the purchasers of the Strathfield South property, who may still press for completion of the sale. Although one of the purchasers, Mr Mitri, appears now to have dropped out:
"Mekhail v Hana 2015/186751
Dear Sir/ Madam
Attached herein the contract of sale amended and stamped as instructed.
Also attached the original Caveat ( Protecting the purchasers right on Title ) which was in 2 names Paul Mitri and Carla Azzi which had to be amended later and caveat lodged in the name of Carla Azzi alone;
Please note that it was the lender's instruction to complete this matter under the name of the Wife Carla Azzi which will facilitate the loan service and approval can be obtained quicker.
We amended the name accordingly and amendments were noted with Office of State Revenue
Now the Bank is ready to complete the purchase and our client have already finalized the loan ready for settlement, we fear if we keep moving settlement dates that the loan will be cancelled and for the client to restart application for finances again.
Settlement should have taken place on or before 21st August 2017 in accordance with the contract of sale exchanged and dated 24th July 2017;
Our client is now worried that they had paid the deposit of 10% for the purchase of this property but were warned by some members related to the Mikhail s family that the vendor will not return their money if unable to settle so we are now requesting the court to assist our client to settle this matter as soon as possible, the property market in the area is in decline and by comparing prices for property sold recently and the size of each one sold there was lots of difference in area size and frontage, not to mention the state of the property inside and out.
We are instructed that our client is happy to direct all cheques payable for the balance owing after adjustments to the trust account of a solicitors firm chosen by the court, distribution of funds can divided as per direction of the court, if settlement cannot proceed and our client loses his money and his loan approval due to the extensive delays , please be advised that further legal proceedings will need to be initiated to protect our client's right under the contract should commence shortly.
To avoid further unnecessary costs and financial damages to all parties, kindly agree on the completion of sale by Friday 8th September 2017 at the offices of Land and Property Information, Cnr. of College and Macquarie Street, Sydney @ 2:00pm, with the full proceeds to be kept in the solicitors trust account pending a court decision re: division and distribution of funds by justice Slattery at a time that can be most convenient.
Our client is the innocent party in this matter and should be compensated for all the worry and stress it was forced upon her by the complication of this matter and other associated legal matters which has no connection to her absolutely;
Awaiting your favourable response we thank you for your kind consideration
to this matter and we remain
Regards
Yolla Abboud
Abboud & Co"
In the course of submissions the Court indicated that it was prepared to treat Ms Hana's present application as an application to vary the existing injunction, so as to permit the sale to proceed and for the proceeds of sale then to be quarantined in the trust account of RM Legal. But even this may not be entirely satisfactory to Ms Hana, who wants to use some of the proceeds to pay her legal bills for the proceedings.
But the nephews resist any variation to the existing injunction. In my view, their resistance is well justified. For the reasons set out below there is ample reason to retain the injunction in its existing form. The Court will require however the notice of injunction to be formally served upon the solicitors acting for the purchaser, Messrs Abboud & Co. If they are going to seek specific performance of this contract, then it is desirable that the nephews be present at the hearing of their application.
[3]
Applicable Legal Principles
In deciding whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction the Court must consider whether there is a serious question to be tried and then whether the balance of convenience and questions of hardship and related factors warrant the grant of an interlocutory injunction. First, the plaintiff must prove a serious, not a speculative, case which has a real possibility of ultimate success and that property or other interests might be jeopardised if no interlocutory relief is granted: JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane's Equity: Doctrines & Remedies (5th ed 2014, LexisNexis Butterworths) at [21-350] ("Equity Doctrines and Remedies"), discussing the requirements of the Beecham Group Limited v Bristol Laboratories Pty Limited (1968) 118 CLR 618 prima facie case test. Put another way, the plaintiff must show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the preservation of the status quo pending the trial: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46 at [70] - [71].
Then, if in all the circumstances of the case, considering the balance of convenience and issues of hardship, the Court may nonetheless exercise its discretion by declining to issue an interlocutory injunction: Equity Doctrines and Remedies at [21-350]; and see also Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 and Beese v Woodhouse [1970] 1 WLR 586. Other factors to which the Court will have regard include the adequacy of damages, the possibilities of alternative remedies, whether there has been any laches or delay, the strength of the grounds of defence suggested by the defendant, what, if any, undertakings the defendant is prepared to give, but hardship and balance of convenience are very important: Equity Doctrines and Remedies [21 - 375]. If any infringement of a plaintiff's right between writ and hearing would be properly compensated in damages, that fact alone can, but not must, be a ground for declining an injunction: McCarty v Council of the Municipality of North Sydney (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 210.
In Kolback Securities Ltd v Epoch Mining (1987) 8 NSWLR 533 McLelland J (as His Honour then was) when considering what must be established to obtain an interlocutory injunction, including when the restraint in question may have implications for the disposition of the proceedings at final hearing, said:
"As I see it, the position is as follows. Where a plaintiff's entitlement to ultimate relief is uncertain, the Court, in deciding to grant or refuse an interlocutory injunction, must consider what course is best calculated to achieve justice between the parties in the circumstances of the particular case, pending the resolution of the uncertainty, bearing in mind the consequences to the defendant of the grant of an injunction in support of relief to which the plaintiff may ultimately be held not to be entitled, and the consequences to the plaintiff of the refusal of an injunction in support of relief to which the plaintiff may ultimately be held to be entitled: see, eg, Appleton Papers Inc v Tomasetti Paper Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 208 at 216; A v Hayden (No 1) (1984) 59 ALJR 1 at 4-5; 56 ALR 73 at 79. Where the uncertainty depends in whole or in part on a contested question of fact it is not appropriate for the Court to decide that question on the interlocutory application. Where the uncertainty depends in whole or in part on a contested question of law, it may or may not be appropriate for the Court to decide that question on the interlocutory application, depending on circumstances, eg, whether the question is novel or difficult, or is susceptible of resolution on the present state of the evidence, or whether the urgency of the matter renders it impracticable to give proper consideration to the question: see, eg, A v Hayden (No 1) (at 4; 78); Cohen v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 61 ALJR 57 at 59;68 ALR 394 at 397. If the Court does decide the question of law the uncertainty is to that extent removed.
Unless the plaintiff shows that there is at least a serious question to be tried which if resolved in its favour would entitle it to final relief, then the requirements of justice as between the parties will dictate that an interlocutory injunction should be refused: Australian Coarse Grain Pool Pty Ltd v Barley Marketing Board of Queensland (1982) 57 ALJR 425; 46 ALR 398; Tableland Peanuts Pty Ltd v Peanut Marketing Board (1984) 58 ALJR 283; 52 ALR 651; A v Hayden (No 1); Castlemaine-Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 60 ALJR 679; 67 ALR 553 and Cohen v Peko-Wallsend Ltd.
Apart from this, although normally the Court "does not undertake a preliminary trial, and give or withhold interlocutory relief upon a forecast as to the ultimate result of the case" (Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622), there are some kinds of case in which for the purpose of seeing where lies the balance of convenience (or more specifically "the balance of the risk of doing an injustice" - see per May LJ in Cayne v Global Natural Resources plc [1984] 1 All ER 225 at 237, cf per Brennan J in Brayson Motors Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1983) 57 ALJR 288 at 292; 46 ALR 279 at 285), it is desirable for the Court to evaluate the strength of the plaintiff's case for final relief: see, eg, Brayson Motors Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (at 292; 285); Castlemaine-Tooheys Ltd v South Australia at 682; 559. One class of case to which this applies is where the decision to grant or refuse an interlocutory injunction will in a practical sense determine the substance of the matter in issue: see, eg, NWL Ltd v Woods [1979] 1 WLR 1294 at 1306-1307; [1979] 3 All ER 614 at 625-626 per Lord Diplock; Cayne v Global Natural Resources plc. The present is such a case. The substantial matter in issue is whether Epoch should be permitted to proceed with the issue of non-renounceable rights in accordance with the announcement of 13 March 1987. That will be irrevocably determined in a practical sense by the grant or refusal of an interlocutory injunction."
The application of these principles shows what should be done at this interlocutory hearing.
[4]
Consideration
There is a substantial question to be tried. The nephews claim a grant of probate of the estate. If they are granted probate or administration of the estate, they have an arguable claim to set aside the transfer of the Strathfield South property to Ms Hana based on the circumstances surrounding the transfer.
The balance of convenience strongly favours the continuation of the Court's continued intervention in the form of the existing injunction. Without the Court's intervention the inference is open that Ms Hana is prepared to dispose of the Strathfield South property without further notice to the nephews. Were the 24 July sale transaction to go ahead a third party purchaser may be able to defend final relief on the basis of the indefeasibility of the title that would have thereby been obtained. The rights of such a third party purchaser would in the ordinary case weigh heavily in favour of a variation to the injunction to allow the 24 July transaction to proceed. The Strathfield South property would then be lost to the estate.
But there are a number of sign posts that raise real questions about whether the 24 July sale was to an independent purchaser, such that the Court should now let that sale proceed. Those circumstances are listed briefly below.
First, the content of Bishoy Hana's July 2017 caveat and later caveat withdrawal are a basis to infer a connection between vendor and purchaser, notwithstanding Ms Hana's denial of any association.
Secondly, an association with the purchaser is inferable from the fact that Ms Hana, and possibly Bishoy Hana, were involved in giving instructions to Abboud & Co, a solicitor acting for both parties, to draw up the contract.
Thirdly, notwithstanding that the completion date was set 28 days from 24 July 2017, there is evidence that Ms Hana and Bishoy Hana were at LPI NSW within two to three days of the contract being made, attempting to achieve settlement and that the lodgement of transfer was attempted by them, rather than by the purchaser. This is yet another indicator that the sale to Mitri-Azzi is not at arm's length: and, neither purchaser has, as yet, sought to intervene in these proceedings.
Fourthly, the marketing of the property has been less than ideal. No advertising signage was set out at the Strathfield South property. The marketing of the property did not apparently come to the nephews' attention, for this reason. The terms of the 24 July contract itself are evidence of the possibility that there was no agent's intervention in the sale.
Fifthly, there is considerable evidence to infer that the 24 July sale is for a consideration from Mitri and Azzi that represents a substantial undervalue. Even the agent's commission agreement with Luis International indicates that the property was estimated to have a selling price approximately $200,000 greater than the price of $1,100,000 for which it was sold. Other independent appraisals indicate that it is worth between $1.6 and $1.9 million.
Sixthly, the form of the Hana-Azzi contract of 24 July and the notice to complete raise suspicions that the sale was not at arm's length. The contract does not appear to be properly signed in accordance with careful conveyancing practice and the notice to complete very strangely describes Mr Bishoy Hana as the "vendor's solicitor", when it was presumably known to Abboud & Co that he was not a solicitor. Such mistakes are less likely to occur in an arm's length transaction compared with one that is not arm's length.
For all these reasons, the need to preserve the Strathfield South property for the estate weighs most heavily in the balance and the Court will not vary the existing injunction. The Court will direct that notice of these orders and this judgment be given to Abboud & Co within 24 hours.
[5]
Conclusion and Orders
Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders and directions:
1. Dismiss the application of the defendant in proceedings 2015/186751, Georgette Hana.
2. Direct that notice of these orders and the reasons for the dismissal of this application be given by the plaintiff in proceedings 2015/186751, Mr Magdy Mekhail, to Abboud & Co solicitors and to RM Legal solicitors, so that if any proceeding for specific performance of the contract the subject of this application are to be brought, that all concerned parties are aware of the outcome of this application.
3. Reserve costs.
4. Judgment reserved.
[6]
Amendments
07 September 2017 - coversheet- representation
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Decision last updated: 20 September 2018