McVicar v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd

Evidence on this Application

1. The evidence of Mr Patane on this application, which I accept, was that by email sent on 14 September 2023, a letter ("the Calderbank letter") was sent by the defendant in the following terms: "We refer to the above matter and the attached Notice of Intention to Appeal dated 4 September 2023. To save costs and efforts for all involved, on a without prejudice basis and without any admissions or concessions, our client, Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd, makes the following offer to your client, Donna Maree McVicar, in respect of Supreme Court of NSW, Court of Appeal - Case 2023/00281199 ('Appeal'): 1. your client consent to orders that: (a) the Appeal is dismissed; and (b) each party pay their own costs of and incidental to the Appeal. 2. This offer may only be accepted by signing and returning the attached draft consent orders by midday 21 September 2023 (upon receipt of which we will counter-sign same and file it with the Court). 3. Time is of the essence. 4. Unless withdrawn earlier, this offer is open for acceptance up to and including midday 21 September 2023 … This offer is made in accordance with the principles in Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333. In the event that your client fails to accept the offer, at hearing of the Appeal, our client will rely on this offer and seek costs on an indemnity basis in accordance with the principles enunciated in Calderbank v Calderbank."
2. It is necessary to note that a Notice of Intention to Appeal had first been filed inappropriately by Ms McVicar in the Court of Appeal. She was not entitled to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Any proceedings challenging the Local Court judgment had to be commenced by Summons in the Common Law Division, which is what occurred on 20 October 2023.

Submissions

1. In its submissions, Hanson seeks alternative orders. Only two are relevant. The first order is that indemnity costs be payable from 14 September 2023 which is the date of the Calderbank letter; the second alternative is that indemnity costs should be payable from the date the plaintiff filed her Summons, being 20 October 2023.
2. The submissions draw attention to the legal principles. It cannot be doubted that this Court has the power to order that costs are to be paid on an indemnity basis: s 98 Civil Procedure Act 2005; r 42.5 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005.
3. The submissions note that as a matter of principle, indemnity costs are not punitive, but rather are ordered to compensate a successful party fully for costs incurred when the Court takes the view that it is unreasonable for the other party to have subjected the successful party to the expenditure of costs: see Hamod v State of NSW [2002] FCAFC 97 at [20].
4. The submissions note that if a Calderbank offer is a genuine offer of compromise and that it was unreasonable for an offeree not to accept it, then provided the result of the proceedings is more favourable, indemnity costs may be awarded.
5. The submissions noted that a "walk away offer" (such as that set out in the Calderbank letter) can amount to a genuine offer of compromise.
6. The submissions also draw attention to the fact that where a Court finds that it was unreasonable for the successful party to be subjected to the expenditure of costs where an applicant, properly advised, should have known that they had no chance of success, or where the moving party persists in what would be seen as a hopeless case for a case clearly foredoomed to fail, then indemnity costs could be awarded: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate Palmolive Pty Ltd (No.5) [2021] FCA 246 at [8]-[12].
7. Hanson submits that at the time the Calderbank letter was sent, although the offer could be described as a "walk away" offer, it was a genuine compromise because Hanson was giving up any entitlement to costs and was proposing that each party bear their own costs. It was submitted that it was unreasonable for Ms McVicar not to accept that offer in circumstances where: 1. costs in dispute between the parties had been substantial in the Local Court, and it was reasonable to form the view that a considerable amount of costs would be expended on the appeal if it was pursued; 2. at the time that offer was made, an appeal from the Local Court had not been properly brought and therefore any appeal, if properly commenced, would be out of time, and an extension of time would be necessary; and 3. it should have been apparent to Ms McVicar, properly advised, that the appeal had no chance of success or was hopeless.
8. The submissions noted that in addition to the unreasonable conduct of Ms McVicar in failing to accept the Calderbank offer, any reasonably objective review of the proceedings, which would have been available by 14 September 2023, must have demonstrated that the appeal did not involve any issue of legal principle, nor did it involve any question of general public importance. It must have been clear that to succeed Ms McVicar had to show that there was a manifest injustice which was demonstrably clear.
9. It was submitted that this must have been so, particularly in circumstances where no additional evidence was sought to be relied upon in this Court over and above that which was before the Magistrate.
10. Further, it is submitted that the need for an explanation to obtain an extension of time is clearly required in circumstances such as those which existed in these proceedings. The absence of any such explanation was obvious. At no time did Ms McVicar ever make an attempt to provide an explanation. It was submitted that she must have known she had no explanation for the delay.

Discernment

1. I accept the submissions of Hanson that the Calderbank offer of 14 September 2023 was a genuine compromise. True it is that the offer was a "walk away" offer. However, it could be reasonably expected that the lodging of a Summons seeking leave to appeal to this Court would have involved the incurring of significant costs by both parties in circumstances where the Summons was seeking relief against an order made by the Local Court dealing only with legal costs. At no time did Ms McVicar, in this Court, dispute that she was obliged to pay Hanson's costs. Rather, these proceedings sought only to argue about the amount of costs which she was obliged to pay.
2. As well, as the reasons in the principal judgment articulate, any such Summons and any basis for contentions of that kind in it was, simply put, hopeless. It was not demonstrably arguable that there had been any miscarriage of justice in the Local Court.
3. I also note that in coming to this conclusion, the plaintiff has not filed any submissions in opposition to the order sought.
4. In my view, the conduct of Ms McVicar in refusing to accept by 21 September 2023, the terms of the offer contained in the letter of 14 September 2023, which clearly refer to the principles of law contained in Calderbank, was unreasonable. The time allowed was, in all of the circumstances, a reasonable time. As well, her claims did not articulate any basis for a conclusion that any demonstrated miscarriage of justice had occurred.
5. I conclude that I should vary Order 2 made on 27 February 2024, so as to add the words "… on an indemnity basis from 21 September 2023".

Orders

1. Accordingly, Order 2 of the Court's orders of 27 February 2024 will read: "2. Plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs on an indemnity basis from 21 September 2023."

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