McKone v Maretta

Law on the existence of a defacto relationship. 14 The question of whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were living together as husband and wife on a bona fide domestic basis must be determined in accordance with the principles recently referred to by the Court of Appeal in Light v Anderson & Ors (1992) DFC 95120. They referred with approval to the decision of Mr Justice Kearney in Simonis v Perpetual Trustee Co Limited (1987) 21 NSWLR 677 where his Honour in dealing with the similar expression in the Family Provision Act 1982 after reviewing the authorities said at page 685 the following:- "I consider that the expression under consideration constitutes a single composite expression of a comprehensive notion or concept and therefore has to be approached by considering the expression as a whole and not in several parts. This approach, as adopted by Powell J, was also the approach preferred by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Waterford's case (see 106). I consider that the factors referred to by Powell J, while not being regarded as a complete test, serve the purpose adequately in the present case to determine the question of eligible person. The factors indicated by Powell J are as follows (at 459)): "1. The duration of the relationship. 2. The nature and extent of the common residence. 3. Whether or not a sexual relationship existed. 4. The degree of financial interdependence and any arrangements for support, between or by the parties. 5. The ownership, use and acquisition of property. 6. The procreation of children. 7. The care and support of children. 8. The performance of household duties. 9. The degree of mutual commitment and mutual support. 10. Reputation and 'public' aspects of the relationship." 15 His Honour also referred to the support to be gained for this approach from the report of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission concerning de facto relationships (LRC 36 (1983)). His Honour quoted the following passage in the report (at 459): 17.10. The application of the basic definition to the myriad facets of private personal relationships between men and women will inevitably be a matter of degree and proportion. The attributes and circumstances of such relationships differ greatly, ranging from what is little more than a casual liaison, to a continuing affectionate companionship, to a long term merging of lives and resources. Moreover, the nature and quality of a particular relationship may change and develop over time, making it sometimes very difficult to pin-point a time when the relationship should assume a new legal significance." 16 and said:- "As I understand it, the parties substantially treated Powell J's approach as being appropriate to the circumstances of the present case." 17 Obviously, the list is not immutable and in particular cases other factors will have to be considered. The list is of use and it is convenient to discuss many of the incidents of the relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased under the headings set out above. Credit 18 Before dealing with that it is necessary to deal with questions of credit in relation to the parties and some witnesses. Although at times the plaintiff appeared to give her evidence in a straightforward way I had a number of difficulties with her evidence that cause me to doubt its reliability and her truthfulness. In a number of areas the documents for which she was responsible portrayed quite a different picture from the case she tried to present to the Court. For example, her income tax returns consistently showed her home address as being at a place different from what she alleged in these proceedings was where she was living. For example for the period December 1992 to July 1995 she alleged that she was living with the defendant at his home at Haberfield. However, that address was not shown in her tax returns. In addition she did not disclose in those returns at the relevant times that she was living in a defacto relationship. Similarly in respect of an application to Social Security she showed her address at a place inconsistent with her story presented to this Court. 19 Another area where her evidence caused me disquiet was the inaccuracies in her witness statements. In particular her witness statement of 18 November 1997 as amended by her statement of 29 April 1998. They gave quite different versions of events to that given in her later statement in 1999 and in her oral evidence. Examples are:- 1. Her statements in paragraph 12A that the defendant gave her a ring to celebrate being together for eleven years. That was quite contrary to her oral evidence given in chief which was that the defendant gave her a ring and asked her wear it because he was upset at representatives who would call at the front office, talk to the plaintiff and occasionally ask her out believing that she was not married. 2. Her first statements failed to mention a period of separation. 3. When errors in the first statement were corrected in the second statement that statement still omitted to deal with another admitted period of separation. 4. Her dates in the first statement for the date on which she purchased the property at Liverpool were in error by two years. 20 These matters cause me real concern as to the reliability of the plaintiff's evidence. Later in this judgment I will deal a document (Exhibit 6) created by the plaintiff. My conclusions on the facts surrounding that document lead me to the view that the plaintiff was not truthful. 21 The defendant gave his evidence in a fairly straightforward way but he at times gave inherently improbable answers to a number of questions. For example, against the admitted background of the two parties on his case having had a sexual relationship from 1985 to 1995 when taxed about whether he was affectionate to the plaintiff he denied it. On being shown photographs showing him with his arm around the plaintiff his explanation was merely that that was the only time he had ever put his arm around the plaintiff. At other times when he was confronted with documents that clearly showed the plaintiff's address at his home at Haberfield he retreated into a claim that the plaintiff was at that stage blackmailing him by requiring him to write or show that address in the documents. There was no suggestion in the evidence prior to this time of there ever being any such conduct on the plaintiff's part. As the discussion later in this judgment will show when dealing with the evidence of the plaintiff and the defendant at times they have both taken up positions which are quite contrary to either the documentary evidence or what is inherently likely. I will treat the defendant's evidence with reserve as to its reliability and truthfulness. 22 The plaintiff's daughter and son-in-law, Mr and Mrs Horne gave evidence. I was impressed with both these witnesses whom I thought tried to give their evidence honestly and frankly. Unfortunately their evidence only touches a limited part of the area of dispute before me because in 1988 they moved to Holbrook and did not have contact with the parties except for that which I will refer to later in this judgment. The defendant's son gave evidence in support of his father's case. I am prepared to accept his evidence but bear in mind his age at the relevant times. 23 Mr Losurdo and Mr Vella, friends of the defendant, gave evidence. There is nothing in the way they gave their evidence which would lead me not to accept them. Unfortunately their evidence was in very general terms, was imprecise so far as dates were concerned and, accordingly, not of a great deal of assistance. Although Mrs Marino gave evidence of an association between the defendant and herself her evidence was given frankly and truthfully but cross examination demonstrated the period of their association was mostly likely during the period from September 1986 until April 1987 when, on the plaintiff's version, there was a separation between the plaintiff and the defendant. 24 I turn to deal with the question of whether there was a defacto relationship by reference to the points referred to above.

The duration of the relationship. 25 On each party's version the relationship is one which covered a substantial period of time. There was a period of at least 18 years when the parties were socialising together and prior to that the plaintiff had worked for the defendant for six years.
& 3. The nature and extent of the common residence and when a sexual relationship commenced. 26 It is hard to deal with this residence separately without also dealing with the third question as to whether or not a sexual relationship existed. On this aspect the plaintiff puts the commencement of the sexual relationship in 1981 and she said it continued until separation in the middle of 1995. She says that even during periods of separation the parties would still occasionally have a sexual relationship. The defendant also admits the continuance of the relationship up until mid 1995 but says that it did not commence until he received the dissolution application from his former wife in about August 1985. On the defendant's version he admits seeing the plaintiff socially from about 1982 and says that at that time he was married and living with his wife. He continued to do so until he separated in 1984 when he and his wife continued to reside in the same house notwithstanding separation. Late 1984 to September 1986 27 The first period of the residence which is in dispute is the period from late 1984 until September 1986. At that stage the plaintiff was living at Ashfield in rented accommodation. She had been sharing that accommodation with her daughter since 1982 and according to the plaintiff the defendant moved in to live with her at Ashfield after her daughter married on 15 December 1984 and moved out of the house. The evidence of the daughter and the son-in-law, Mr Horne, is instructive. The plaintiff's daughter gave evidence that during 1984 the defendant came to the house with her mother and often stayed the night sleeping in her mother's room. This caused her daughter some concern and she informed her mother that she would not be happy if the defendant moved in while she was still living in the house. She had indeed met the defendant some years earlier. She was married on 15 December 1984 and immediately left on her honeymoon. When she and her husband returned some weeks later they were picked up from the airport and taken back to Ashfield. The plaintiff's son-in-law gave evidence that he, his wife, the plaintiff and the defendant, spent that night at the premises. He gave evidence that on that evening the defendant stayed with the plaintiff in the main bedroom. The plaintiff's daughter also said that on occasions when visiting Ashfield after she had been married, at her mother's direction, she went to the clothesline and took from the line clothes of the defendant and put them away in drawers in the plaintiff's bedroom. She observed the defendant's clothes in her mother's bedroom. I have earlier commented on the nature of the evidence given by the plaintiff's daughter and son-in-law and I see no reason not to accept their evidence of what happened in 1984 and in particular when they returned from their honeymoon and spent the night with the parties. 28 Also of note in this period is the fact that the defendant admits he put up a shade cloth in the back yard at Ashfield and stored under it some orchids which his parents had left him. According to Mr Horne he also maintained a vegetable garden at Ashfield. Given this evidence which I accept I think it is on balance likely that the plaintiff and the defendant lived together at Ashfield from late December 1984. The cessation of cohabitation appears to have occurred because of an argument between the plaintiff and the defendant about defendant's daughter, Leana. I also conclude that a sexual relationship existed from at least early 1984 if not earlier. 29 There is then a period of admitted separation on the plaintiff's part from September 1986 until March or April 1987. In that period she purchased a unit at 4/15 Nagle Street, Liverpool. The purchase of that was completed on 20 February 1987 and the plaintiff moved in to that unit with her furniture. She continued to own this unit until she arranged to sell it at the end of 1990 settlement taking place on 25 January 1991. March/April 1987 to December 1990. 30 The next period of residence together on the plaintiff's evidence is between March or April 1987 until the end of 1990. She says that this came about because of the fact that she found the travel from work at the defendant's factory to Liverpool time consuming and tiring. One matter which is strange and has to be taken into account when evaluating where the parties lived is the fact that the plaintiff did not let her property at Liverpool during the period that she says she in fact lived with the defendant. Her move, according to her evidence, was that she moved into the factory premises at Hubert Street, Leichhardt. Those premises were in an area zoned for both commercial and residential purposes and the defendant had modified part of the factory to serve as living quarters for himself. There is no doubt that during this period the parties were together. There were visits to family and friends and, for example, at times the plaintiff and the defendant visited the plaintiff's children, her son in Albury and also her daughter and son-in-law at Holbrook. The defendant and his son at one stage went to Italy for a trip and the plaintiff met them on their return in Singapore where they holidayed before returning to Australia. When considering the general arrangements between the parties it should also be noted that by late 1988 the defendant had resolved his property dispute with his former wife and he had retained the matrimonial home at Haberfield. He sold some other properties to pay out his wife and she moved out of Haberfield and left it for him. Thereafter between 1988 and late 1990 the defendant and his son worked during weekends on renovations to the house and were assisted by the plaintiff. The defendant concedes that there was some assistance but the quality or extent of such assistance as the plaintiff alleges is not conceded. 31 One area of the evidence that was investigated in cross examination was the wages records which were maintained by the plaintiff for the defendant as part of her duties as bookkeeper. Those records showed the plaintiff's address as being either Ashfield, Liverpool her rented premises at Summer Hill or the property she purchased at Carramar. They did not show her address at Haberfield even for the admitted period that she lived there or the factory where she alleged she stayed with the defendant. Similarly the defendant's address was always shown as Haberfield apart from one period in 1985 when the address was changed to Brighton-le-Sands. This was another property that he owned. That address was changed back to Haberfield in mid 1998 no doubt once his wife had moved out and he had sold Brighton-le-Sands in order to pay out his wife. It seems to me that not much assistance can be gained from these records in terms of where people were residing. The addresses seem to be merely the formal or legal addresses of people at the property that they owned or leased and does deal with the defacto situation nor, indeed, did it need to deal with the defacto situation. The period at which the defendant's address is shown as Brighton-le-Sands does not even coincide with his evidence as to when he resided there. That evidence indicated that he resided there in early 1985 but the plaintiff puts him residing there prior to December 1984 when he moved in with her at Ashfield. 32 The defendant conceded that in this period with which I am concerned the plaintiff would stay with him over the weekends at the factory. 33 There was evidence given by Adrian Maretta the defendant's son about this period with which I am concerned. He says that in 1986 when he was 14 years old he moved out of the Haberfield home and went to live with his father in factory where the business was operated. He says that he would spend the week living with his father at the factory and would spend the weekends at his mother's home at Haberfield. He did observe the plaintiff staying overnight at the factory on occasions during the week and he also recalls her staying there on the weekends. One of the reasons he went to his mother's house in the weekends was to make room for the plaintiff in the very cramped accommodation at the factory. This evidence from the defendant's son is consistent with the defendant's story and there is no particular reason why I should not accept it. There was also evidence from the plaintiff's daughter and son-in-law that on Mondays the plaintiff and her daughter would meet at the Liverpool unit and go after dinner to a gym class. The son-in-law would drive his wife out to Liverpool for this purpose. The evidence is not clear precisely when this practice occurred. It was certainly prior to September 1988 when the daughter and son-in-law moved Holbrook from Sydney. In cross examination the son-in-law, Mr Horne that it was every Monday night after the purchase of the Liverpool property that this occurred. He was not asked specifically whether it continued up to September 1998 when they moved to Holbrook. That however was the flavour of his evidence. In these circumstances it seems to me that the plaintiff and defendant resumed their relationship in March or April 1987 and that their residence was such that they resided together during the weekends and sometimes during the week at Haberfield but for the majority of the week the plaintiff resided at the Liverpool unit while the defendant resided at the factory. This is consistent with the plaintiff leaving it furnished and not letting the unit. December 1990 to April 1992 34 Towards the end of 1990 two significant events occurred. They were first the completion by the defendant of the renovations to Haberfield. All that remained at this stage was to renovate the kitchen. The other event was the sale by the plaintiff of the unit at Liverpool. It is clear on the evidence of both parties that the plaintiff moved into Haberfield at the end of 1990 or early in 1991 and that she shared that residence with the defendant until April 1992. At that time there was a dispute between the parties over the defendant's continuing refusal to marry the plaintiff. The plaintiff moved out and rented premises at Summer Hill for a period of six months. December 1992 to July 1995 35 By September of that year the plaintiff had purchased the unit at Carramar to which she moved. Shortly after this occurred in late 1992 the plaintiff and the defendant were visiting a club where they won a prize which was a trip on a ship cruising the Pacific. They went on the cruise and, according to the plaintiff, when they returned she commenced to reside with the defendant at Haberfield. She says she remained there until 1 July 1995 and on the plaintiff's version the relationship ceased. The defendant's case was that she did not reside at Haberfield during this period from late 1992 until mid 1995. The position that the defendant took on this aspect tended to break down when he was confronted with a series of different incidences confirmed by separate evidence which showed that he and the plaintiff were living together at Haberfield at this time. 36 The first of these arose out of the fact that in April 1993 there was an Italian singer, Enrico Farina, who came to Australia and stayed with the defendant for some three days. That produced two cards which were sent from overseas addressed to Mr and Mrs Fred Maretta at 92 Kingsford Street, Haberfield. Faced with this the defendant conceded that the plaintiff was also staying there for two days when the singer and his manager were his guests. The next occasion was when the defendant's brother came from overseas and stayed with the defendant. Once again the cards after the visit were sent from the brother on his return addressed Mrs Norma Maretta. Faced with this the defendant again conceded that the plaintiff had been staying there at the time of his brother's visit. The next occasion was in April 1995 when the plaintiff's daughter and son-in-law came and stayed at Haberfield for five days as they had to attend a Sydney wedding. At that stage they had a young son, Tom. They gave evidence of the plaintiff being present and there the whole time and sharing a bedroom with defendant. In the mornings their own son would go in and share the plaintiff and the defendant's bed and play with them. This occurred again in late April prior to going overseas and again six months later on their return. Faced with this evidence, once again, for the third time, the defendant conceded that the plaintiff just happened to stay for a few days to look after her daughter and son-in-law. These accounts of the defendant are inherently improbable and there are other items of evidence tending to suggest that Haberfield was the address of the plaintiff at that time. For example, there were applications for temporary membership of clubs issued or filled in by the plaintiff when the defendant would use his membership to obtain temporary admission for the plaintiff. In them the plaintiff's address was shown as Haberfield. Also shortly prior to the final separation on 1 July 1995 a form for membership was signed by the defendant showing the plaintiff, Mrs Maretta, having her address at Haberfield. Overall I am satisfied that the parties lived together in a common residence between late 1992 and 1 July 1995 at the defendant's house at Haberfield notwithstanding that the plaintiff did not let her unit at Carramar.

LONG SERVICE LEAVE STARTED 6.9.76 - 18.10.95 PAID FOR 10 YEARS = 9 YRS 1 MONTH OWING = 7.87 WEEKS = $2,361.00 HOLIDAY PAY = $1,050.00 LONG SERVICE LEAVE = $2,361.00 $3,411.00 WEEKS WAGE = $300.00 70 It will be seen in the middle of the document that there is a reference to having been paid some long service leave for ten years. That occurred when the plaintiff was getting enough money together to buy the unit at Liverpool. She arranged for the defendant to pay long service leave up to that time to help her with that purchase. However, what is obvious from this document is a calculation of entitlement to holiday pay based on figures shown in the "book" and figures for "cash". Also of importance is the week's wage of $300 which is what the defendant agreed she had been paid during the period. There is a clear calculation by her based upon the fact that she had been receiving wages partly in the book and partly by cash and in respect of cash no tax was deducted. The plaintiff's explanation when she was tackled with this document was totally unconvincing. It is worth noting the difference between what is in her first statement and that which appears in her second statement. In her first statement she said she was paid an award wage up until 1992 and thereafter at $170 per week. Her second statement, Exhibit A, paragraphs 20 and 39 and 40 and 44 apart from being internally inconsistent are deliberately vague. The correct situation is clearly shown in Exhibit 6, namely, that the plaintiff was paid wages partly or wholly in cash at $300 per week. No doubt this was to avoid problems with Social Security. The plaintiff continued receiving Social Security until towards the end of 1990 and has claimed a contribution from her alleged re-employment in January 1991. 71 The purpose of considering this matter carefully is, of course, to see whether in the earlier periods with which I am concerned with in the applications for leave, namely, December 1984 to September 1986 and December 1990 to April 1992 the plaintiff made some substantial contributions arising from lack of payment of wages to the plaintiff. There is no doubt in respect of the first period the records show she was paid a wage from the business at the rate of $300 and somewhat less in the earlier years. The wages records book shows her ceasing to receive a wage on 31 January 1990 and it recommences with her receiving on 1 April 1992 $176 a week gross which is about the time she left the defendant for the second time. 72 For the purpose of looking at the contributions in the period from January 1991 to April 1992 the plaintiff received a wage which I have found was $300 per week. One then has to look at that wage and see whether it was, for instance, below the award. This is a period when she was not alleging that she was doing substantial extra work in the factory. There is a Clerks' Award in evidence which applies to people, such as the plaintiff. There was a submission that as she was managerial it would not apply but I do not think her duties would have exempted her from the award. That award applies to different levels depending upon the responsibility of the person. Grade 1 is the most responsible and assuming this for the present purposes, one finds that the award wage from 9 February 1990 was $387.90, from 26 February 1991 $402.90 and from 16 September 1991 $413. For this period the plaintiff was paid $300 per week and accordingly the amount underpaid would be in the order of $105 per week for 15 months resulting in a sum of $6,933 gross. I say gross because, no doubt, the amount actually received would have been less because of tax deductions. However, given that she was not paying tax on this cash money there was a substantial benefit to her. A perusal of the wages book would indicate that the likely tax on $400 per week is in the order of $63 leaving a net loss of $37 per week. For 15 months this is a total of $2,404. 73 In these circumstances it seems to me, having regard to the contributions for the period, December 1990 to April 1992 that they could not be described as substantial and, accordingly, there would appear to be no reason why the plaintiff should be entitled to an extension of time. For the period December 1984 to September 1986 the plaintiff was paid the award wage and the same result applies to this period. 74 The above discussion is predicated upon of course the requirement that a proper construction of the legislation is that there needs to be a period of two years or the other specified matters before the Court will exercise its discretion. Before addressing the argument as to whether this is right I might mention the question of delay. Obviously the application is out of time. The plaintiff has said in relation to the period from April 1992 onwards she had not given up hope of the defendant and her getting back together. She did not learn about her right to make an application under the Act until 1996 which was well after the final separation in July 1995. The separation from September 1986 to April 1987 was less than two years and although not in a defacto relationship from April 1987 to December 1990 there was a serious relationship between the parties. In these circumstances I think that the explanation is sufficient. 75 The alternative way of looking at the question of deciding whether to grant leave is to approach it on the basis that one is not looking at a separate application for adjustment of rights under the Act for which a two year period should apply but one is considering whether the earlier period can be taken into account in a subsequent application. Section 18(2) refers to hardship and the failure to take into account a party's contribution for a period less than two years could amount to hardship. There is nothing in s 18 which would require these contributions to be "substantial" as is required s 17. The object of the Act is to adjust parties' property interests having regard to their contributions. Bearing this in mind I am of the view that there is no requirement that for a period to be taken into account it must be for at least two years provided there is a two year period upon which the application can be based. 76 Accordingly, I think that leave ought to be granted to bring these proceedings in respect of the two earlier periods of the parties' defacto relationship. The parties' property 77 I will now consider the property of the parties at the commencement of the relationship and the property of the parties at the end. There was in fact no joint property of the parties and the evidence did not address in any detail the nature of the property which each had at the relevant times. So far as does appear it is clear that in 1987 the plaintiff purchased the Liverpool unit for $41,000 using a mortgage advance of some $30,000. She had furniture insured for $23,000 and no other assets. She did not drive and did not own a car. The situation in 1984 consisted of her having such furniture and some savings but no real estate. By the conclusion of the relationship she had the unit at Carramar which she sold shortly after July 1995 for $92,100 from which she received $65,999 after payment out of the mortgage. She applied $52,000 of that money towards the purchase of her property at Holbrook. She had some other furniture at that stage. 78 So far as the defendant's position is concerned, his property settlement was in 1988. As a result of that settlement he had the real estate at Haberfield which was his former matrimonial home, factory premises and one of the two properties at Callala Beach together with the business. The other assets he had had before then were sold and used to make payments to his wife. By the time of the conclusion of the relationship he had sold Callala Beach but he still had the factory and his former matrimonial home together with the business. 79 Although the evidence is in an unsatisfactory state it is probably of little importance considering the lack of joint assets. One has the contributions which I have identified above and I return to deal with those in slightly more detail. Non-financial contributions 80 I will first deal with the non-financial contributions to Haberfield. The plaintiff described the work she did between February 1988 and the end of 1989 as follows:- (a) Assisting with carpentry. (b) Assisting and replacing kitchen. (c) Making curtains. (d) Planning and maintaining a garden. (e) Painting and stripping wallpaper. 81 There is no detail of the amount of time spent and accordingly one can only gather this from the evidence of others such as, Adrian, who spoke of the work occurring over the weekend period, normally on Saturdays so far as the plaintiff was concerned. There is, of course, no evidence showing the what effect that work had on the value of the property. Clearly it was of assistance but it is very difficult for a Court to judge on the limited evidence the value of such assistance 82 Household contributions. I have earlier referred to these and it seems that there is very little in the way of household contributions given that there is a sharing of these. Even if one accepts the plaintiff on doing washing there is still not a substantial amount to take into account. 83 So far as household expenses are concerned, it seems clear on the evidence of the plaintiff that while they were at Haberfield the defendant paid all the household bills and paid for the shopping with the plaintiff purchasing her own personal items. 84 I return to the question of the payment of wages of $300 a week instead of the award rate. The award subsequently changed on 21 January 1994 to $421 for a Grade 1 clerk and 20 April 1995 to $429. The comments I have earlier made in respect of the earlier period when the plaintiff was receiving cash only rather than some money on which tax was being deducted apply again but with not the same force because it is clear she was paying some tax and only receiving part of it on a tax free basis. 85 The period from December 1992 until July 1995 is 2-1/2 years at $120 per week the short payment is likely to be in the order of $15,600 gross. On a net basis after allowing the benefit of cash the short payment is $5,980. 86 I turn to the question of the additional assistance at work. I have earlier referred to this evidence when the plaintiff said that during the last two years she was spending up to seven days a week at the business. Apart from secretarial and bookkeeping work she became a principal salesperson and helped with upholstery including selecting, ordering, cutting and sewing. She also alleges she did other jobs such as cleaning, helping feed timber into machinery and stacking timber. 87 There was evidence to suggest that during this period the value of the defendant's business was declining. He continually increased his overdraft as he made more losses. At the relevant time which was from 1993 to 1995 the business was reduced to two people, namely, the parties. For this reason I am inclined to believe the plaintiff on this point. Once again it is hard to judge the amount to which they should be recognised because of the paucity of the evidence. 88 When considering how these contributions should be recognised I bear in mind again, of course, the relevant periods which were as follows:- November 1984 to September 1986 22 months December 1990 to April 1992 16 months December 1992 to 1 July 1995 2-1/2 years 89 Having regard to the whole of the evidence some of which I have referred to in this judgment and the contributions which are alleged I think the appropriate order is that the defendant pay to the plaintiff $50,000 by way of adjustment to the parties' property interests. 90 I direct the parties bring in short minutes to reflect any other necessary orders and I will hear argument on costs.

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment (9 paragraphs)

Parties

Cases Cited (4)

Cited By (2)