13. None of this is to detract from the risk of injustice to an accused who disputes confessional evidence, where that is the only or the only substantial evidence against him, or to underestimate the inequality of the relative positions of police and accused when an interview is conducted. That very inequality prevents the illustration of the evidence of victims of sexual assault from being a true analogy. But it is unsatisfactory to enunciate a rule of general practice as, in some way, a substitute for tape or video recordings of police interviews with suspects or a compensation for their absence. In particular, it would be wrong to do so as a stopgap measure until governments provide adequate electronic recording equipment and while legislatures in this country move (as they are moving) towards a statutory requirement that police interviews be recorded in order to be admitted in evidence, at least where that is practicable: see, for instance, s.464H of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic.). The Court was told that the electronic recording of police interviews would begin in New South Wales on 21 January 1991. The desirability of electronic recording is beyond question. However, its use will not entirely foreclose argument as to whether a confession was voluntary. Some of the questions posed by these applications will remain. But it is justice between the Crown and the accused that is the end to be achieved within the judicial process. In many cases that end can be achieved only by a warning in specific terms, related to the evidence, of the dangers of relying upon the confessional evidence if that evidence is unsupported as to the making of either the statement or its contents. In other cases fairness to the accused may not require the giving of such a warning. The accused's challenge to the confessional evidence may, on any view, lack credibility (indeed, there may have been no real challenge) or the point may have been made with such force in the address of counsel for the accused as to require little addition from the judge. Again, the judge may have made it quite clear to the jury that, in his or her opinion, the evidence of prosecution witnesses is not worthy of any credence: see, though in a different context, Chidiac v. The Queen (unreported, High Court of Australia, 1 March 1991). A rule of practice in the terms sought or in comparable terms is no substitute for a direction properly tailored to the circumstances of the trial. A direction in those terms is more likely to ensure a fair trial for the accused while maintaining, on the part of the trial judge, an even-handed approach. That is not to say that observations of a general nature may not accompany the direction, if thought to assist the jury. But I would not accede to the applicants' argument that there should be a rule of general practice in this regard.