The liability of the Commonwealth for the tort of conspiracy
198 The Commonwealth of Australia, while generally liable in tort, (see Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 56 and 64 ("the Judiciary Act")) is not, in my view, civilly liable as an alleged participant in the tort of conspiracy. My conclusion in this regard finds some support in Limerick Steamship Co Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia (1924) 24 SR(NSW) 214 at 250 per Ferguson J. Strictly speaking, his Honour did not finally resolve this issue. He expressed the view, however, that the Commonwealth would not be vicariously liable for the acts of an agent who had allegedly committed that tort since entering into a conspiracy was plainly outside the scope of that agent's employment.
199 In James v The Commonwealth (1939) 62 CLR 339 it was held that the Crown in right of the Commonwealth was liable for the torts of its servants acting under its de facto authority, and the fact that such authority was given pursuant to legislation which was later declared by the Privy Council to be constitutionally invalid did not affect these principles. Dixon J (as his Honour then was) observed at 359-60:
"The liability of the Commonwealth for tort may, I think, be treated for purposes in hand as arising under Part IX of the Judiciary Act 1903-1937 … The immunity of the Crown from liability for tort, to which sec 56 seems to be directed, was in part founded, or explained, upon the principle that a servant of the Crown committing an actionable wrong became individually liable but could impose upon the Crown no vicarious responsibility. The maxim rex non potest peccare [the King can do no wrong] excluded the maxim respondeat superior [let the principal answer] … But it is important to see that, once there is found a de-facto authority from the Crown in right of the Commonwealth within the scope of which an alleged tort is committed, the doctrine of ultra vires is not used to produce the same immunity as formerly arose from the incompetence of an officer at common law to bind the Crown by his tortious acts."
200 There is no doubt that a Minister of the Crown may be liable as an individual for the tort of conspiracy, just as he may be prosecuted for the offence of conspiracy: Connor v Sankey [1976] 2 NSWLR 570 at 600. It does not follow that the Commonwealth itself, whether so designated, or whether described as the Crown in right of the Commonwealth, is similarly liable for that particular tort, whether vicariously or in a direct sense.
201 There might be circumstances, likely to be rare, where an employer would be vicariously liable for a conspiracy involving his servants provided the other requirements of that form of liability are met. There may also be a criminal conspiracy between a company and its directors whose knowledge and purpose may be imputed to the company: R v ICR Haulage Limited [1944] 1 KB 551 at 559.
202 However, in the case of governmental parties, as Dixon J observed in James (supra),there is now a considerable body of statute law which has a bearing upon their civil liability. Crown proceedings legislation, including ss 56 and 64 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) has, generally speaking, removed the protections against liability for tort which were accorded at common law to the Crown. These protections included immunity from both direct and vicarious liability in tort.
203 Section 64 of the Judiciary Act provides as follows:
"In any suit to which the Commonwealth or a State is a party, the rights of parties shall as nearly as possible be the same, and judgment may be given and costs awarded on either side, as in a suit between subject and subject."
204 The general principle underlying s 64 of the Judiciary Act is to place the Crown in right of the Commonwealth (synonymous for these purposes with the Commonwealth of Australia: Bank of NSW v The Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 362 per Dixon J; but see Sue v Hill (1999) 163 ALR 648 at 671-4 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ) "as nearly as possible" in the same position in terms of potential liability for tort as would be applicable in proceedings between subject and subject.
205 The expression "as nearly as possible" was considered by Sundberg J in Baillieu v Australian Electoral Commission (1996) 63 FCR 210 where his Honour observed (at 225-6):
"Since Maguire v Simpson (1977) 139 CLR 362 it has been established that in every suit to which the Commonwealth is a party s 64 requires the rights of the parties to be ascertained, as nearly as possible, by the same rules of law, substantive and procedural, statutory or otherwise, as would apply if the Commonwealth were a subject instead of being the Crown. The Commonwealth acquires no special privilege except where it is not possible to give it the same rights and subject it to the same liabilities as an ordinary subject: see Commonwealth v Evans Deakin Industries Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 254 at 264-5.
In Asiatic Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1956) 96 CLR 397 at 427, Kitto J rendered the expression 'as nearly as possible' as 'as completely as possible', and went on to say (at 428) that s 64 in effect requires the Court 'to put out of account any special position of the Crown, and so far as possible to decide all questions of right in the same way as they would have been decided if the Commonwealth … had been a subject'. In Evans Deakin at 264-265, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ agreed that 'as completely as possible' was the natural meaning of 'as nearly as possible', and after quoting the passage I have just set out, said it was 'unnecessary to consider whether in some cases at least it would be right to consider the special position of the Crown', as the Commonwealth in that case 'was not performing a function peculiar to government'. In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Moorebank Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 55 at 68, the Court said it was not necessary to consider whether, and if so to what extent, s 64 would be ineffective to apply the provisions of State laws in circumstances where their application would interfere with the discharge of 'an essentially governmental function such as the collection of taxes'. See also Maguire v Simpson at 393-395."
Vicarious Liability of the Commonwealth for conspiracy
206 With respect to vicarious liability, the Commonwealth as an employer is open to claims of vicarious liability in relation to acts committed by a servant in the course of his employment. In Attorney-General for New South Wales v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 237 at 249 Dixon J stated:
"… the Crown is liable for the tort of an officer committed within the scope of his duty, except in situations where the duty which he is attempting to fulfil is one cast upon him by law to be executed as an independent responsibility, so that the Crown is not acting through him."
207 The Commonwealth will be vicariously liable where the Crown employee was acting within the de facto authority of the Crown: James v Commonwealth (supra). In some cases it might also be considered that the Crown employee was impliedly authorised to commit the particular tortious act: Racz v Home Office [1994] 2 AC 45 at 50-4 per Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle.
208 The Commonwealth will not be vicariously liable if the law charges an employee with a discretion and responsibility in the execution of an independent legal duty. The principle is that a public servant who is exercising an "independent discretion" that is conferred upon him personally is not acting in the course of his employment with the Crown: Enever v The King (1906) 3 CLR 969; Field v Nott (1939) 62 CLR 660. There has been cogent criticism levelled at this "independent discretion" rule - see, for example, P Finn, "Claims Against Government Legislation" in Essays on Law and Government Vol 2 (1996) at 36-7. See also the decision of the Full Court of this Court in Konrad v Victoria Police [1999] FCA 988 in which Finkelstein J (with whom Ryan and North JJ were in substantial agreement) referred to 'much informed criticism' of the common law notion of 'employee' (at par 101). In Konrad the Court held that although at common law a police officer is not an employee, the nature of Pt VIA Div 3 of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) (which deals with dismissal) was such that it should 'be given an interpretation that [would] advance its broad purposes' and that Victorian police officers fell within its purview. As the law presently stands, however, the 'independent discretion' rule represents a restriction upon the vicarious liability of the Commonwealth at common law for the torts of its servants.
209 A Minister of the Crown is not generally viewed in Australia as a servant of the Crown, but is regarded as holding office under the Crown. The concept of a public office is feudal in origin. Persons were appointed to such office under the prerogative, and were subject to little, if any, direction. The system was altered radically in the nineteenth century, and was replaced by a system of public administration in which almost all office holders became classified as employees of the Crown. Some public offices remain, however, and they include Ministers of the Crown. The same may be said of members of the judiciary.
210 In State Chamber of Commerce and Industry v Commonwealth (The Second Fringe Benefits Tax Case) (1987) 163 CLR 329, the High Court accepted that Members of Parliament hold office, and are not to be classed as employees of the Crown. In Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand this would not affect the potential vicarious liability of the Crown. In those countries legislation has been enacted regarding the vicarious liability of the Crown in tort for acts committed by Crown servants or agents, and the term "agent" is plainly wider than the term "servant": see Crown Liability Act, RSC 1985, c C-50; Crown Proceedings Act 1947 c 44 (UK) and Crown Proceedings Act 1950 (NZ).
211 The majority of the Canadian provinces have also enacted similar legislation. See generally PW Hogg, Liability of the Crown 2nd ed (1989) at 85. Each provincial Act, with the exception of those enacted in Quebec and British Columbia, provides that the Crown is vicariously liable in respect of torts committed by servants (or officers) and agents. The words "servant" and "officer", depending upon which of those words is used in the particular Act, are defined as including "a Minister of the Crown". A similar provision exists in New Zealand in which pursuant to s 2 of the Crown Proceedings Act the term "servant" is defined to include a "Minister of the Crown". It follows that the Crown's vicarious liability for the tortious acts of its Ministers is expressly provided for by statute in those jurisdictions.
212 Because a Minister is not viewed as an employee or servant of the Crown in this country it must be doubtful that the Commonwealth can be vicariously liable for a tort committed by him. In Unilan Holdings Pty Ltd v Kerin (1993) 44 FCR 481 a Full Court of this Court (Neaves, Ryan and Gummow JJ) considered the question whether the Commonwealth is liable for torts committed by a Minister of State in the conduct of his portfolio. The Court stated at 483-4:
"[W]hilst Ministers of State are undoubtedly "officers of the Commonwealth" and amenable to injunction, prohibition and mandamus under s 75(v) of the Constitution, it by no means follows that they are correctly classified as servants for whose torts the Commonwealth is liable in the same way as an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of an employee.
Ministers of State must be members of the Federal Executive Council; they are appointed to administer departments of State and shall not hold office for a longer period than three months unless elected to the Senate or the House of Representatives. Sections 62 and 64 of the Constitution so provide. The system of responsible government is thereby adopted by the Constitution: New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337 at 364-365. In administering his portfolio, a Minister of State is not merely a member of the Federal Executive Council upon whose advice the Governor-General relies; he is the person through whom in matters within that portfolio the executive government of the Commonwealth acts: Radio Corporation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1938) 59 CLR 170 at 192.
Accordingly, it is not self-evident that in respect of acts and omissions of a Minister in the conduct of his portfolio the tortious liability is that of the Minister as a servant for which the Commonwealth is vicariously liable."
213 The Court observed that these matters had been inadequately explored in submissions and, given the legal complexities of the argument, preferred to leave the question for another day. The only subsequent decision which relevantly refers to Unilan is Re Ling; Ex parte Ling v Commonwealth (1995) 58 FCR 129. One of the issues to be decided in that case concerned whether a bankrupt could have set up his claims for negligence and defamation against the Commonwealth as cross claims in earlier proceedings. Hill J stated at 132:
"From the Bar table it was said that it was not until the decision of the Full Court of this Court in Unilan Holdings Pty Ltd v Kerin (1993) 44 FCR 481 that the possibility of suing the Commonwealth in tort became clear. Before that case, it was said, so to do would have been at the 'cutting edge' of the law. It is not clear to me that Unilan was in this respect a watershed of legal development. On one view of the matter what was said by the Full Court in Unilan (at 483-484) might not be thought encouraging to the debtor. However, it is unnecessary to explore that question."
214 Despite the view which seems to prevail in Australia that Ministers are not regarded as servants of the Crown, there is a significant body of English authority which suggests that this matter may not be entirely free from doubt.
215 In Town Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment [1978] AC 359 it was accepted that Ministers could be regarded as being servants of the Crown. For example, Lord Diplock said at 383:
"The relationship of master and servant does not exist between a minister in charge of a government department and any other government servant employed in that department in whatever grade of the civil service he may be. They are both fellow servants of the Crown."
216 Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said (at 393), discussing the difference between Ministers and the Crown:
"A minister of the 'Crown' is and is constantly referred to as a servant of the Crown. But it cannot be suggested that the minister is or becomes 'the Crown'. Even if the grandiloquent description of being an 'emanation' of the Crown is applied to him he remains separate from the Crown and is not and does not become the Crown. When acting on behalf of or for the purposes of 'the Crown' some of the well recognised immunities of 'the Crown' may cover what he does. But he does not become absolved from liability for a personal tortious act even though 'the Queen can do no wrong'.
217 Lord Simon of Glaisdale stated (at 398):
"The minister at the head of a department of central government is, of course, part of that department. The very term 'minister' is, indeed, again symbolic, denoting an origin as the King's servant, and continued status as servant or agent of the Crown.
218 Lord Simon of Glaisdale also referred to the decision in Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v Administrator of Hungarian Property [1954] AC 584, and cited a number of passages from the majority and minority judgments in that case (at 399):
"Lord Reid, at p.612, quoted from the speech of Lord Westbury LC in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Trustees v Cameron (1865) 11 HL Cas 443, 501-2, commenting himself, at p.613:
'…by "the direct and immediate servants of the Crown, whose occupation is the occupation of the Crown itself" he appears to me simply to have meant those whose position under the Crown is such that their occupation is the Crown's occupation', and, at p 616: 'Ministers are pre-eminently Her Majesty's servants.'
Lord Keith of Avonholm said, at p.635:
'In all this there is little that throws light on what constitutes a person a servant of the Crown. Obvious cases like a minister of state … need hardly be considered.'"
219 Ministers are also referred to as servants of the Crown in some secondary sources. For example, Renfree in The Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia (1984) has a chapter entitled "Ministers of State and Other Servants of the Crown in Right of the Commonwealth". In this chapter, Renfree states that Ministers are servants of the Crown, as well as being members of that class of Crown servants who also hold public office: see 185, 231.
220 Nevertheless, even if Ministers can be classified as servants of the Crown, it is highly likely that they exercise "independent discretion". As discussed previously, in such circumstances the Crown would not be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of a Minister. Alternatively, if Ministers were regarded as not exercising an independent discretion in relation to the commission of certain torts, it is unlikely that the commission of the tort of conspiracy to do an unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means, could be considered to be within the scope of their employment.
221 This contention is supported by the fact that, in relation to the tort of conspiracy, an employer will only be found vicariously liable for acts of conspiracy committed by an employee if there is actual or ostensible authority for the acts constituting the conspiracy (which is generally unlikely): see Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV (now Generale Bank Nederland NV) v Export Credit Guarantee Department [1998] 1 Lloyds Rep 19 at 36-7 (per Stuart-Smith LJ), 41-2 (per Hobhouse LJ).